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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the political subjectivity of farming in settler colonial 
contexts. Guided by theoretical concepts of political ecology, settler colonialism and 
lived geographies, this thesis examines two farming communities which have been 
central to the realisation of Israeli settler colonial hydro-imaginaries and realities. It 
employs a historical approach to explain the realities facing these communities 
today, in their struggle over water to maintain their farming livelihood and hence 
how, through water, claims of recognition are shaped and developed. Employing 
mixed qualitative methods of ethnography, archival research, interviews and 
participant observation, this thesis posits that farming practices, including demands 
for water and infrastructure, acquire political subjectivity in both communities, 
transcending farming into an act of resistance, sumud (steadfastness) and 
rootedness. Under conditions of settler colonial rule, communities are faced with a 
dialectical presence-absence of the state in their lives. The settler colonial water and 
land policies materialised realities of unequal geographies and waterscapes, othering 
the communities concerned through policies of difference and enactment of 
misrecognition through uprooting land-based belonging and resource rights. 
Through analysis of their acts of protest through the lens of ‘presence-absence’, 
farmers demand for water and infrastructure have re-configured from being acts of 
resistance to a scaled-up articulation for their demands for recognition, inclusion and 
development. Examining the role of sumud as a form of resistance in livelihood 
practices highlights how access to, and control over, flows of water by indigenous 
Arab communities acquire material and symbolic weight as an articulation of 
rootedness and protest the Israeli hydraulic mission of centralised water control and 
exclusion. Hence, their realities are shaped by complex conditions of settler colonial 
rule, where farming acquires political subjectivity as it enacts sumud in their everyday 
practices.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
While writing this thesis, news of Israeli destruction of water pipelines, 
rainwater harvesting tanks and even whole communities in Area C0F 1 of the occupied 
West Bank was a common occurrence. In the South Hebron Hills, images were 
broadcast of Israeli bulldozers, escorted by the police and army, carrying out 
demolitions of homes, cattle sheds and water tankers. Palestinian community 
members watched helplessly as a bulldozer punctured a water storage tank and 
water gushed out seeping into the dry surroundings (B’Tselem Website, 2018). The 
tanks were financed through European Union development agencies operating in 
Area C, treating water as a humanitarian resource in an area which was constructed 
as a zone of full Israeli administration and military control. The conditions that 
Palestinians living in Area C have to endure put them in direct confrontation with one 
of the most heavily armed countries in the world.  Water has become a tool of 
dispossession and resistance, where infrastructures to store and transport that 
resource to Palestinian communities, whether in rainwater harvesting tanks, or 
water tankers, are a charged part of the landscape of occupation. The metal tank 
here represents not only a physical container of water but a symbolic, cultural and 
political artefact of resistance under occupation. 
Going north and reaching the occupied Golan Heights (oGH) (known in Arabic 
as Hadabat Al Jawlan Al Muhtal, shortened in this thesis as the oGH), similar 
rainwater harvesting tanks are seen dotting the landscape in their hundreds. These 
rusting tanks collect rainwater, which is used to irrigate apple orchards covering the 
hilly landscape. Not all of them are in use; some are covered, emptied or even 
dismantled and out of use. Those tanks also represent much more than their physical 
role of capturing rainwater. Their construction and use in the 1980s, in a highly 
securitised region of geostrategic importance due to its rich natural resources, was 
                                                          
1 Area C of the occupied West Bank is a geographical and administrative division set out under the Oslo Accords 
between the Palestinians and Israel. It falls under Israeli military and administrative rule and makes up more than 
60% of the West Bank. All security, land-related and civil matters, including infrastructure and planning are 
controlled by Israel, which has rejected more than 90% of permits to construct vital water infrastructure. For 
more details, see (Passia, 2012)  
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part of a tactical collective resistance act to counter Israeli occupation’s control of 
water resources in the area. 
Our third stop takes us to the Galilee, the stronghold of Palestinian existence 
inside Israel, and specifically to the site of al-Battuf, a large expanse of 50,000 
dunums of agricultural land mostly belonging to Palestinian landowners from nearby 
villages. On my first visit to Al-Battuf in the summer of 2013, mobile water tankers 
operated by Palestinian citizens of Israel were a common site, transporting water to 
an arid farming valley. I couldn’t help but notice the similarities between the water 
realities of al-Battuf, the West Bank, and the oGH – all land-based communities who 
have for decades contested with the Israeli state their access to water (see Figure 
1.1).  
While my research does not focus on the occupied West Bank, my experience 
of working as a researcher on water politics in the Jordan River Basin (JRB) and 
specifically in Palestine invites the linkages I make above. My work throughout the 
JRB has taken me to different geographical locations within different countries, 
engaging with state actors and institutions, engineers, municipalities and water 
cooperatives. It has also allowed me to work closely with people – or to use a 
technical term ‘water users’ - and communities with varying experiences of water’s 
presence and absence, abundance and scarcity, connection and disconnection in 
their daily lives. This made me appreciate the invaluable examination of lived 
geographies of farming communities and their relationships with and through water. 
By lived geographies, I refer to their place-based experiences and practices. It 
involved farming and dwelling with/without water’s presence (as a physical source) 
and also the role that water plays in struggles over land and belonging in a complex 
and situated way.  
During my multiple field visits to the oGH and the Galilee (see Chapter 3), 
water was not always visible. Contained in pipelines, reservoirs, or canals, water 
could not be touched or seen flowing freely. When water bodies were visible, 
whether in Birket Ram and the Israeli-Jewish settlements’ artificial lakes and earthen 
dams in the oGH, or in al-Battuf’s National Water Carrier (NWC) open canal, they 
were securitised and protected by barbed wire and warning signs, while areas 
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containing pumps and wells were gated and restricted. What was also visible in those 
two locations were the attempts of Arab farming communities to develop their own 
infrastructures, whether rainwater harvesting tanks and irrigation networks in the 
oGH, or traces of unrealized drainage projects in al-Battuf valley. This sparked my 
research interest: how do infrastructures of water control and management become 
a normalized part of our imaginary of the resource, and to what extent do they 
become a crucial artefact of struggle in the lived geography of farming communities?   
While the two case studies share similar conditions of being marginalised 
populations living under Israeli state control, they have devised differentiated tactics 
for dealing with, contesting and altering their imposed water realities, giving rise to 
distinctive lived geographies. Their daily acts of resistance, especially around water 
access, use and control for farming, requires a historical and political 
contextualisation that transcends the water itself as a resource, and invites an 
examination of lived realities experienced through water. There is a need to explain 
these water realities: how Israeli power and hegemony over water and land 
resources is reflected in the daily lives of marginalised populations, and how these 
populations’ engagements with and through water shapes their lived geographies. 
What can water infrastructure (as a realisation of policymaking), its presence and 
absence, tell us about larger struggles that communities face in their daily defence 
of their place-based identity, existence and persistence?  
To make sense of the water realities presented above, I pose the following 
research questions (more details in section 1.2): 
How do settler colonial [water and land] policies and practices manifest themselves 
in the lives and livelihood practices of farming communities in the Galilee and the 
occupied Golan Heights? 
 
And, 
 
How, and with what political effects, are settler colonial [water and land] policies 
and practices resisted by farming communities in the occupied Golan Heights and 
Galilee? 
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To answer these questions, I draw on multiple theoretical concepts in political 
ecology, lived geography and settler colonialism which are discussed in Chapter 2.  
This introduction aims to present the scope of the research and analyse water 
struggles in the selected case studies through the investigation of settler colonial 
policies, their manifestations on the lived geographies of the farming communities 
and examine how resistance to these policies took shape through re-configurations 
of their farming practices, most notably water access and development. This will 
provide a platform for examining local water struggles, and how water becomes 
political for communities living under settler-colonial conditions. Realising that the 
framework for thinking about water has typically operated at the ‘transboundary’ 
scale, especially in the JRB – i.e. scale of nation-state agreements, treaties, water 
arrangements and infrastructure – this introduction also aims to present a critique of 
the current fixation on transboundary water in the JRB, before providing justification 
for the research’s conceptualisation and framing.   
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Figure 1.1 Case Studies location and relevance to the Jordan River Basin (Map developed by Yousra Othman for this thesis, 2018) 
Sahl al-Battuf 
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1.1 Water struggles and lived geographies under settler colonial 
rule 
 
My research into water struggles focuses on multiple theoretical concepts: 
political ecologies in transboundary water basins, the notion of lived geographies, 
and settler colonial infrastructures. They converge in my empirical interest in local 
conditions for non-Jewish Arab farming communities (Palestinians and Syrians) 
produced by Israel’s consolidation of its hegemonic position over the water resources 
of the Jordan River Basin, and in how these farmers have responded through their 
livelihood practices and collective political mobilisations to protect their land and 
water. My aim is to use these theoretical underpinnings to achieve a more localised 
understanding of water and its meanings in the everyday lives of these communities. 
At this localised level, my interest is in examining  how “water and power relations 
intersect to shape differential access and outcomes among diverse social groups, to 
configure particular discourses around water management and produce uneven 
waterscapes” (Budds and Sultana, 2013, p.275). This assertion takes us into the work 
of political ecology, which will be further discussed as a theoretical framing of this 
dissertation in Chapter 2. Political ecology claims that political struggles over natural 
resources are as much struggles over meaning, norms, knowledge, and identity as 
over authority and material control  (Boelens et al., 2016, p.1; Forsyth, 2004; Peet 
and Watts, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2009). Through a political ecology focus, theoretical 
conceptualisations of water provide me with a foundation to explore the dynamics 
of contestations and struggles around water that are materially and symbolically 
constituted in space and place. The tendency to portray water only as a biophysical 
natural resource justifies technological fixes, state-level management and a de-
politicisation of water. Such water impositions representing and enacting water as-
a-resource (Yates et al., 2017, p.803) are of course not confined to settler colonial 
states (or any state for that matter) but their employment in hegemonic discourses 
can be used to displace and erase other (political) ways of perceiving and interacting 
with water, as my case studies will show.  
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Since both case studies presented in this thesis come under the sovereign 
authority of the Israeli state, questions of local conflict and contestation over water 
are not possible to analyse simply at national and sub-national scales without 
considerable attention to the settler colonial character of that state. Conflicts over 
water between Israel (as a settler colonial state) and the marginalised Arab 
communities (Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip or inside Israel, and the 
Syrians of the occupied Golan Heights) must recognise the exclusion of these groups 
from Israeli-Zionist nation-building policies and their expansionist, exclusionary logic. 
This justifies the use of settler colonial theories, especially in regard to resource 
control and exclusion, to further explain local struggles over water between Arab 
communities and the Israeli state.  
As set out in Chapter 2, the settler colonialism literature (e.g. Coulthard and 
Alfred, 2014; Elkins and Pedersen, 2005; Gordon and Ram, 2016; Smith, 1998; 
Veracini, 2015; Wolfe, 2006), shows how settler colonial policies and practices 
advance the strategy of “indigenous de-territorialization” (Choi, 2016, p. 13) to 
uproot indigenous populations from their land, appropriating their natural resources 
and devaluing their affective connections to the land, which are present in the Galilee 
and the occupied Golan Heights. Conversely, settler colonial endeavours seek to re-
territorialise and claim new ethno-geographic roots for their own populations. The 
main premise of the settler colonial state is its intention of erasing indigenous to 
create new conditions and an ethno-geographical presence for its settler population. 
Therefore, the settler state relies on the dismissal of local laws and regulations, 
disregard of indigenous knowledge and experience and the creation and imposition 
of new geographies of rule. In its quest to assert its control over resources, the settler 
colonial state designs its policies of difference and exclusion which are articulated in 
the physical infrastructure these policies produce. The hydraulic mission is 
accentuated in the settler colonial state which seeks legitimacy through territorial 
control and domination. Thus, the artefacts of the state, such as water projects 
reflect that quest for the control of resources and erasure of indigenous claims to 
them. 
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With such strong self-representations about the ‘permanence’ of settler 
colonial projects (Choi, 2016), it is not surprising that settler colonial infrastructures 
are cemented and ‘concretised’, imprinted onto the landscape as markers of a new 
ethno-geography. In Eric Zakim’s To Build and Be Built: Landscape, literature and the 
construction of Zionist Identity, titled after the lyrics of a Zionist folk song– “we came 
to the land to build and be built by/in it”– he refers to the “transformation of 
Palestine from an inimical environment into a quintessentially Jewish space” (2006, 
p.1). The production of Zionist and Jewish space was viewed as a modernist, future-
looking and transformative endeavour in Palestine. In the creation of the Israeli state, 
Zionism was portrayed in large part as a hydraulic mission, constructing mega-
structures for modernising water supply, bolstering state and nation-building efforts 
and realising dreams of irrigating the desert (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012), whilst 
at the same time rendering as illegal and/or marginal the local water infrastructure 
and practices of the indigenous Arab populations. Water infrastructure therefore 
becomes a core technology of re-territorialisation, establishing centralised control 
over water and land resources for the sole purpose of settler colonization and 
expansion. However, water infrastructure is not only an artefact and an aspiration of 
the state. As Boelens and Gelles (2005, 316) argue in their research on Andean 
irrigation development, large-scale water infrastructure can be both a top-down 
manifestation of state power, nationalism and  economic modernisation,  and the 
source of claims from farmers for economic parity, recognition and inclusion in state 
development projects. In this thesis, the water infrastructure story is a story of the 
manifestation of settler state power and a story of communities’ claim for 
recognition and protection of their land and farming as sources of identity. Still, the 
size and scale of infrastructure shouldn’t matter, as mundane and makeshift 
infrastructures are equally worthy of investigation. The scholarly interest in large 
water infrastructure has driven a plethora of scholarly literature on mega-
infrastructures: dams (Menga, 2014; Molle, 2009; Sneddon, 2012; Swyngedouw, 
1999), hydropower plants (Duarte-Abadía etal., 2015; Huber and Joshi 2015; Joshi 
2015), conduits and pipelines of water and sewage networks in large cities (Amin, 
2014; Anand, 2017; Björkman, 2015; Gandy, 2004; von Schnitzler, 2008).  
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Contrastingly, Katie Meehan’s work (2014) on water infrastructure in Tijuana 
offers an alternative conceptualisation of everyday water infrastructure and its 
relationship to state infrastructure, theorising multiple objects including tub wells, 
buckets, barrels and small-scale infrastructure as part of the hydrosocial cycle (see 
also Barnes, 2012; Furlong, 2011; Linton and Budds, 2014; Sultana, 2011; 
Swyngedouw, 2009). Highlighting the imbrication of biophysical and social processes, 
all infrastructure (state/non-state, legal/illegal, large/small) form the hydrological 
cycle; understanding of the interconnection between water and society – and 
produce unequal waterscapes (Menga and Swyngedouw, 2018). Illegal and informal 
water infrastructure often co-exists with, and is co-produced by, large state water 
infrastructure, creating punctures, leaks and other unruly flows at local scales. The 
state’s power lies in its use of infrastructure to separate “politics from nature, the 
technical from the political and the human from the non-human” (Anand et al., 2018, 
p.4), but each of these moves can be challenged by communities’ contestation of the 
state infrastructure and through their demands for their counter-infrastructure, as 
the case studies show.  
To examine infrastructures, I also employ a multi-temporal and spatial lens, 
based on the fact that the most important infrastructural projects in the Jordan River 
Basin were realised in the 1950s and 1960s. This requires a historical examination of 
the water struggles of local communities, as well as an examination of the current 
lived geographies of my two case study locations. Therefore, my analysis will oscillate 
between the present and the past (from the 1950s to the present day) to explain how 
water struggles are continually implicated in, and contest, state governance over 
water bodies, human bodies, non-human objects (like crops) and landscapes. 
Considering the highly altered state of the JRB water flows, following the 
infrastructures which transport it, pump it and block it, exposes the ontological 
realities and manifestations of Israeli state narratives and policies. This journey 
around infrastructure highlights the multi-scalar materialities of water, and how 
water re-configures the lives and geographies of those who use it most: farmers. 
Water development and management in the JRB coincided with nation-state 
formation for some and the catastrophe of homeland loss for others, including denial 
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of citizenship and nationality. An important component of water struggles is the 
struggle over citizenship or what Jose Esteban Castro calls “struggles over the 
territory of citizenship” (Castro, 2006, p. 139). Here the state’s processes of water 
control and management can transform relationships of citizenship and belonging, 
as in the cases presented in this thesis, where citizenship is denied or at best limited. 
State water infrastructure projects can induce larger transformations in “values, 
meanings and social practices associated with water, and particularly in the social 
relations mediated by the control and access to the resource” (ibid).  These 
transformations particularly affect the lived experiences of those whose citizenship 
status has been systemically contested, denied and negated and whose water rights 
are not recognized by the state. As the case studies presented highlight, in the 
context of settler colonial rule, Arab farmers’ experiences revolve around the 
absence of water and infrastructure and their continuous efforts to claim rights to 
resources, notably land and water. These claims are articulated by communities 
within wider efforts of recognition as a distinctive ethno-geographic community. 
‘Hydropolitical identities’, following Lemire’s (2011) proposition, are thus part of a 
wider political consciousness (Palestinian in the Galilee and Syrian in the occupied 
Golan Heights) challenging settler colonial depictions and enactments of water and 
land use and meaning. These complex dynamics have reconfigured communities’ 
livelihood, social organisation, identity and ways of being on the land, which this 
thesis aims to highlight and expose. This thesis therefore aims to render visible local 
struggles in complex basins, like the JRB, which revolve around water, land, identity 
and belonging in a hegemonic state. It goes beyond narratives of riparian water 
politics to the everyday lived experiences and geographies of living with and without 
water, and the potential of contesting local  and national environmental and hydro-
imaginaries (Alatout, 2011; Davis and Burke, 2011; Nesbitt and Weiner, 2001).  
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1.2 Research Questions  
 
In this thesis, I examine sites of water struggle and their links to larger 
processes of resistance and political protest enacted misrecognition in a settler 
colonial context. Hence, this research contributes to understanding the lived 
geographies of Arab communities under settler colonial policies of uprooting and 
exclusion, particularly how water and land are utilised by these communities as 
channels and conduits for empowering rootedness. I analyse struggles over water 
between Israel as a settler colonial state and the marginalised communities (both 
citizens and non-citizens) who struggle to remain on the land and assert their ethno-
geographic identity.  
The first main research question of the thesis is: 
How do settler colonial [water and land] policies and practices manifest themselves 
in the lives and livelihood practices of farming communities in the Galilee and the 
occupied Golan Heights? 
 
 
This raises several sub-questions which are addressed in the thesis:  
 
 How do agricultural livelihoods function in the studied agricultural 
communities in the context of settler colonialism?  
 What ideas, norms and beliefs shape farmers’ daily practices of agriculture? 
 
The second main research question is: 
 
How, and with what political effects, are settler colonial [water and land] policies 
and practices resisted by farming communities in the occupied Golan Heights and 
Galilee? 
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 What forms of collective action do farmers use to resist and counter state-led 
policymaking, especially land expropriation and water allocations? 
 What are the political effects of the distinctive forms of collective resistance 
employed by farming communities?  
 
The main proposition is that, in the settler colonial contexts studied, the farming 
of Arab communities acquires similar forms of political subjectivity. Political 
subjectivity refers here to the constitution of farmers as subjects with a communal 
political identity and shared political goals, notably relating to land and water 
resources. 
 
To carry out this investigation, I have selected two case studies in close 
geographical proximity in which Israel has sought to realise its land and water 
policies. To recap, the first case involves sahl al-Battuf, a farming valley in the Lower 
Galilee inside Israel and the site of the construction of the controversial NWC 
described in section 1.5. The first site has an interesting history of contestation 
between the Israeli state and its Palestinian Arab citizens and remains one of the last 
Arab farming valleys inside Israel. The second case focuses on the expanded 
realisation of the Israeli hydro-imaginary through the occupation of the Golan 
Heights in 1967, and the resistance of the remaining Syrian Druze1F 2 population 
(referred to throughout the thesis as Jawlani – those who are from the Golan) to the 
Israeli occupation’s water and land policies through their farming practices. The data 
analysed was gathered through extensive fieldwork in both sites over 8 months 
between the years of 2016 and 2017. It included archival research, semi-structured 
interviews, and participant observation, as described in Chapter 3. 
 
                                                          
2 The Druze faith is a sect of Islamic origin, incorporating elements from Islam, Hinduism and other beliefs. While 
Druze is their faith and not their nationality or sense of identity, I refer to the communities of the oGH as Syrian, 
following my interaction with them and their own definition of being Syrian Jawlanis (Syrians from the Golan)  
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1.3 Making the link between transboundary and local water in the 
JRB 
 
The interest of this thesis is in how local scales of water politics link to 
transboundary ones, especially impacting the lived geographies of farming 
communities and re-configuring their farming practices and their relational approach 
to water.   My research links ‘big W’ (transboundary) water with ‘little w’ (local) water 
in our understanding of water politics or hydropolitics. Well-known scholars in the 
field of hydropolitics (such as Allan, 2002; Lowi, 1993; Waterbury, 1979) use the term 
hydropolitics to refer to “the systematic study of conflict and cooperation between 
states over water resources that transcend international borders” (Elhance, 1999, 
p.3). However, power asymmetry was not dealt with under the early hydropolitics 
literature and was only introduced later in work employing a more critical approach 
and highlighting the co-existence of conflict and cooperation, like Mirumachi’s 
Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS) (Mirumachi, 2015; Zeitoun and 
Mirumachi, 2008). The framework of hydro-hegemony, which Zeitoun and Warner 
present as “hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource 
control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment” (Zeitoun 
and Warner 2006, 435), is another critical lens through which the dynamics of water 
conflict have been studied, paying attention to strategies employed by state actors 
in international river basins. What is of interest for this thesis is how such work 
labelled a state with the ability to create or maintain hegemony over a transboundary 
water arrangement a hydro-hegemon, meaning a state able effectively to exercise 
domination over the control, use and management of transboundary water. In the 
JRB, Israel is considered a hydro-hegemon, and this thesis aims to expose how Israel 
practices hydro-hegemony at the local scale, impacting the non-Jewish populations 
and re-configuring their lived geographies and livelihood practices.  
The hegemonic control over water in the JRB has been consolidated through 
a ‘Hydraulic Mission’, aspiring to modernisation by constructing mega-structures, 
bolstering state and nation-building efforts, and realising dreams of irrigating the 
desert (Molle et al., 2009, p.328; Swyngedouw, 1999). From the 20th century until 
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today, the quest to construct mega-scale water infrastructure, such as dams, canals 
and hydropower plants has dominated the thinking and aspirations of engineers and 
governments, both at the national and transboundary levels (Mehta, 2001; Menga, 
2014; Mohamud and Verhoeven, 2016; Warner, Hoogesteger, and Hidalgo 2017). 
Water resource development has become a political tool for shaping and controlling 
relations between humans and the natural environment. Moreover, water use 
practices such as irrigation, which has been instrumental in the effective utilization 
of the JRB water sources, became an imperative of “being modern in a backward 
rural world” (Molle et al., 2009, p.330), transforming the backward practices of 
indigenous and native populations into economically sound and water-intensive crop 
production and marketing. Dismissal of traditional practices of water management 
has defined the approach of the colonial and postcolonial experts who appointed 
themselves as producers of knowledge and policy on water management. Ultimately, 
colonial discourses and their legacies have underpinned the merging of engineering 
science and the strong rule of the state with a technocratic vision of harnessing and 
controlling nature.  
Water, while present and central to all of these transboundary and large-scale 
technological projects and arrangements, is confined to physical and nationally 
strategic framings: technical abstraction by engineers, a national strategic resource, 
a political tool of control and dominance, or a problem of diplomacy and 
international relations for nation-states. The water this research focuses on is not 
disconnected from the transboundary aspects mentioned above but is inherently 
influenced by them. The Jordan River and its water resources are at the base of this 
investigation, but can only be understood from a historical investigation of how they 
became a part of a “self-evident, unified watershed” (Alatout, 2011, p.219) and how 
the Jordan River itself was imbricated in colonial legacies of nation-state building in 
the early 20th century. To understand the forces and conditions which have 
constructed water resources and the JRB as a unified basin, Alatout (2008, 2011, 
2014) adopts a political geography lens to explain the construction of environmental 
imaginaries, which Diana Davis defines this as “the constellations of ideas that groups 
of humans develop about a given landscape, usually local or regional, that commonly 
includes assessment about the environment as well as how it came to be in its current 
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state” (2011, p.3). Orientalist environmental imaginaries of the Middle East as a 
desolate and degraded environment historically justified various colonial aspirations 
to ‘restore’ and ‘improve’ the land (and its people) to make it more productive, 
efficient and modern. These imaginaries have left a long-lasting imprint on more 
contemporary postcolonial nationalistic, settler colonial and even local-indigenous 
environmental imaginaries, and the JRB is no exception. Water imaginaries or hydro-
imaginaries can be analysed from that lens, following Alatout (2011) examination of 
how international actors and nation-states come to view water resources as 
transboundary and regional, and thus in need of a unified management approach 
between states to harness water for economic modernisation projects.  
While the transboundary scaling of water in the JRB is therefore important, 
my aim is to delve into how TWM approaches manifest themselves at the local scale, 
critically examining the hydropolitical realities and local hydro-hegemony 
experienced by local communities, exposing the dynamics of water ebbs and flows 
as experienced by water users. Being ‘scale-sensitive’ (Harris, 2002a, p.745), 
therefore, allows for analysis that shows how local water struggles express wider 
dynamics of conflict and power. Such struggles within river basins therefore have to 
be analysed through what Sneddon and Fox (2006, p.196) label scalar 
transmogrification: as projects with regional and transboundary components, but 
also as national projects of water development and as artefacts associated with local 
scales when communities affected by them contest and challenge state decision-
making. The authors’ call for a “critical hydropolitics” fits the approach taken in this 
thesis by employing a multi-scalar approach to make visible the local stories of water 
politics neglected in basin-wide framings of water infrastructure development, 
understanding that ‘water connects scales’ (Rasmussen, 2016, p.21). Another 
example of this approach is Jessica Barnes’ seminal work Cultivating the Nile: the 
Everyday Politics of Water in Egypt (2014), which is an ethnographic investigation of 
how water flows in the Nile River Basin. Her approach places equal emphasis on all 
actors, state, non-state, multinational organisations and civil society as co-producers 
of water management and use. Her emphasis on examining the everyday practices 
of actors at multiple scales reveals that the most political and active contestation 
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occurs not at the international and transboundary scale but rather in the local, 
everyday arrangements carried out around and through water. Rasmussen discusses 
the idea that water connects scale (2016, p.21) and Barnes (2012, p.2) refers to water 
crossing scales. This thesis relies on such a conceptualisation to take scale into 
account but is not rigidly bound to discussing distinct scales. Furthermore, water has 
been made invisible on a national scale under conditions of settler colonialism where 
marginalised voices are unaccounted for entirely or just dismissed. 
In the JRB, earlier work on local hydropolitics in the West Bank (Trottier,  
1999) was further developed by original accounts of local water struggles and politics 
by Joshka Wessels (2015b, 2015a), examining challenges to Israeli hydro-hegemonic 
practice in the occupied Golan Heights and the occupied West Bank. Using cognitive 
theory (emphasizing identity, trust, and other cultural elements), Wessels explains 
how and why cooperation over shared transboundary resources fails, moving water 
politics research away from rational understandings of conflict and cooperation. 
Similarly, Van Aken’s research (2006) examines the local hydropolitical implications 
of the large-scale water projects developed in the Jordan Valley since the 1950s and 
1960s, specifically the large-scale irrigation programmes in Jordan that had a political 
role in settling Palestinian refugees following the  creation of the state of Israel and 
the Nakba of the Palestinians in 19482F 3.  
The fluidity, complexity and symbolism of water are usually ignored in 
mainstream transboundary management framings of water, emphasising its 
technical character and therefore contributing to a process of what Tania Li describes 
as the de-historicisation, de-socialisation and de-politicisation of water (Li, 2007).  
                                                          
3 As Van Aken et al. note in their comprehensive analysis of water use in Jordan, the hydraulic mission 
trajectory for basin management has disrupted tribal resource management, with hydrocracies – professional 
water managers and engineers – taking over the role of management 3 Establishment of the irrigation paradigm 
in the Jordan River basin as a national necessity has ultimately reshaped the agricultural practices and actors in 
the Jordan Valley, where a masculine approach to resource management, heavily dependent on irrigated 
agricultural practices dominates, disintegrating decades of traditional water management practices and norms.  
An interesting analysis is that of a community of farmers involved in irrigated agri-business in the Lower Jordan 
basin, dominating the agricultural activities, versus a disappearing peasant community, involved in more 
traditional agriculture practices which went beyond that to represent a “wider moral and political belonging”. 
The developments in the basin, mainly the East Ghor Canal, have supported the agribusiness model, benefiting 
urban elites and large landowners. 
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When a basin is over-politicized, like the Jordan River Basin, space for studying water 
struggles on a local scale is typically side-lined or ignored, fixating struggles on 
territorial scales (Norman, 2012). Following Sneddon and Fox (2006), amongst others 
(Furlong, 2006; Joshi, 2015; Mirumachi and Van Wyk, 2010; Selby, 2005), this thesis 
focuses on conflicts between the state and non-state actors as experienced locally. 
As Selby (2005, p.331) argues, the dynamics within states and social formations are 
those that require examination vis-à-vis actual water struggles, emphasising how 
“the most important scarcities and conflicts are located within, rather than between, 
states and social formations.” Similarly, Leila Harris’ work on the controversial 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) in Turkey demonstrates how “complex 
interrelations between water uses and social conflicts” exist and how examining 
histories and geographies of water struggles “points to the importance of intrastate 
and local scales as potential sites of conflict” (Harris 2002b, p.743; see also Mollinga, 
2008). In this thesis, I draw on this and other literature in political ecology which 
situates water as an object of multiple ontologies, a tool for understanding 
alternative hydro-social and political worlds inhabited by marginalised Arab 
communities living under settler colonial conditions (Barnes and Alatout, 2012; Yates 
et al., 2017). Internal water struggles within countries and communities within the 
JRB reveal the story of water contestation between farmers’ lobbies, newly 
established state regulations and between different sectors (Alatout, 2008; de 
Châtel, 2007; Van Aken et al., 2009). Local farming communities’ struggles over water 
distribution ultimately have to reckon with, whether through disengagement or 
engagement, the “bureaucratic technical—administrative recipes and rules” drafted 
by politicians and policy makers” (Zwarteveen, 2008). 
 
1.4 Transboundary water: a brief history of the construction of 
the Jordan River Basin and its water resources 
 
The Jordan River had the misfortune of becoming a border, initially in the politics of 
empire (1840s-1923) and subsequently in the politics of nation-states (1948 until the 
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present). By turning the river into a border, water became a territorial object[…]The 
consequence of turning the river into a border and water into a territorial object led 
the nation-states of the late-1940s and early-1950s to use the very sovereign claims 
over territory to redefine water as a matter of national security and as a resource 
that could and would be used in order to secure the nation-states (Alatout, 2014, pp. 
307–308). 
As Figure 1.2 shows, the Jordan River Basin refers to a watershed area with 
three headwaters: Al Hasbani in Lebanon, Banias in Syria and Leddan in 
Israel/Palestine, which come together to form what is known as the Upper Jordan 
River. This river continues its flow towards another important water body, Lake 
Tiberias. The lower tributary of the Jordan, known as the Yarmouk River, joins the 
Jordan after its flow out of Lake Tiberias eventually reaching the Dead Sea.  The 
historical misfortune of the Jordan River becoming a border within a politically 
unstable region has also made it the site of multiple investigations by scholars from 
international relations, hydrology and hydrogeology, geography, and other 
disciplines. As Marwa Dadoudy (2008, p.217) states, “the Jordan River is one of the 
most frequently studied transboundary watercourses in the world, and the allocation 
of its flow has been the source of conflict for a considerable period of time”. 
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Figure 1.2 The Jordan River Basin boundaries (source: ESCWA-BGR 2013) 
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In this section I provide a brief historical contextualisation of how Israel 
became the hydro-hegemon of the basin, showing how the National Water Carrier 
(NWC) project and its assemblages became the dominant infrastructure of water 
control in the JRB and within Israeli-controlled territories (sovereign and occupied). 
The consolidation of Israel as a basin hydro-hegemon, and the hydro-imaginary, 
artefacts and infrastructural objects generated by this, are instrumental to my 
analysis in the case studies of ‘lived geographies’ and water struggles.  
The colonial construction of ‘the Jordan River Basin’ as an ordered, unified 
watershed anticipated water resource cooperation, which is yet to be seen on a 
basin-wide level (Alatout, 2011). The construction of unified river basins can be 
claimed to have begun in the turn of the 20th century worldwide. After the First World 
War, the British and French colonial powers drew the borders of the future nation-
states in the Levant region3F 4 in a way that resulted in the configuration of the Jordan 
River as transboundary, what Alatout refers to as “the misfortune of becoming a 
border” (2004, p.307). Around that time and during the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919, the statement of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO)4F 5 regarding Palestine 
was one of the first official claims made by the Zionists for a homeland in Palestine. 
Following the infamous Balfour Declaration of 1917, the statement was focused on 
putting forward the boundaries envisioned by this organisation for a Jewish 
homeland, with details regarding borders, water, land and administration clearly 
identified and presented. Lord Walter Rothschild5F 6 on behalf of the Zionist 
Organisation, presented the Zionist aspirations for control of land and water:  
 
                                                          
4 Levant, (from the French lever, “to rise,” as in sunrise, meaning the east), historically, the countries along the 
eastern Mediterranean shores, namely: Syria, Lebanon, historical Palestine, Jordan 
5 The World Zionist Organisation (WZO) was founded in 1897, to enact Zionism, which is an ideology that seeks 
to establish Jewish people in Palestine (referred to as Eretz Yisrael) through promoting Jewish settlements to 
redeem the land and strengthen a national identity in Palestine (WZO website, 2018). For more see, (Abdo and 
Yuval-Davis 1995).  
6 Rothschild was a conservative member of the House of Commons, head of Britian’s Jewish community and a 
Zionist.   
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The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out 
below:  
Starting on the North at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the 
vicinity South of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills 
of the Lebanon as far as JISR EL KARAON, thence to EL BIRE 
following the dividing line between the two basins of tile WAD: EL 
Kook and the Wadi ET TEIM thence in a southerly direction 
following the dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes 
of the HERMON, to the vicinity West of BEIT JENN, thence Eastward 
following the northern watersheds of the NAHR MUGHANIYE close 
to and west of the Hedjaz Railway. (United Nations website) 
The centrality of water is evident in the concerns highlighted in this 
statement, where control of water resources is seen as paramount in the 
establishment of a viable Jewish state: 
 The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other semi-arid 
country, depends on the available water supply. It is therefore, of 
vital importance not only to secure all water resources already 
feeding the country, but also to be able to conserve and control 
them at their sources (ibid).  
 
Zionist claims to water and border regions extended further in the decades 
following that statement: these efforts were effective in claiming concessions under 
the British colonial mandate over hydropower and electricity generation. Before 
Israel was established, the Zionists had secured rights to water from the Jordan River 
and the Yarmouk, which have had ramifications for water control and rights claims 
until this day. Theodor Herzl, the founding father of Zionism, regarded hydroelectric 
power as the economic basis of the new society in Palestine (Smith, 1993, p.118). 
Water infrastructure development, especially to increase water availability for 
further economic development, became a building block of Israeli efforts to create a 
modern, technologically advanced society (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012). This 
Zionist/Israeli water infrastructure drive began prior to the establishment of the 
state, with its framing as a nation-building endeavour in the 1930s, what Feitelson 
and Rosenthal (2012: p.273) call the “Zionist hydraulic mission” era. The Rutenberg 
concession, granted by the British Mandate to the Zionist pioneer Pinhas Rutenberg 
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in the 1920s, is case in point of the Zionist aspiration to tame nature and develop a 
new society. Rutenberg, with exclusive rights to exploit the waters of the Jordan, 
constructed a hydropower plant on the banks of the river, acquiring large amounts 
of land on both banks, and controlling the confluence of the Yarmouk and the Jordan. 
Until its destruction in the 1948 war, it exemplified the Zionist imaginary of 
hydrological domination and control (Meiton, 2015).  
After the Second World War, the region began its transformation into 
independent nation-states – Lebanon (1943), Syria (1946) and Jordan (1946) – and, 
following the Palestinian Nakba6F 7, which left 700,000 Palestinians expelled from 
Palestine and dispersed around the region, the creation of Israel as a state in 1948. 
The Jordan River’s headwaters were located in different countries: the Hasbani River 
in Lebanon, the Liddan (Dan) River in Israel, and the Banias River in Syria, under Israeli 
occupation in the occupied Golan Heights (oGH) since 1967. Therefore, the river 
basin acquired intense political significance for the riparian countries, adding 
complexity to the mosaic of cultural, commercial, and religious meanings already 
experienced by diverse cultural and religious groups living within the region. The 
large-scale development of water resources by these new states was an important 
political strategy, whereby the states made claims of territorial sovereignty through 
the material and discursive control of water bodies (Lowi, 1993; Sosland, 2007; 
Zeitoun et al., 2012; Zeitoun et al.,  2013).  
Following 1948, Israel’s position as a hydro-hegemon began to consolidate 
materially and cognitively through its access to the Liddan River and control of Lake 
Huleh. Following the general armistice agreement of 1949 and the establishment of 
Demilitarised Zones (DMZs), Israel began draining Lake Huleh and then, in 1952, it 
officially began diverting the Jordan River by constructing a canal at Jiser Banat 
Ya’qoub (Daughters of Jacob Bridge), within the DMZ. This caused Syrian retaliation, 
in the form of counter-attacks and official complaints to the UN Security Council. This 
was followed by a short yet historical decision by the US to halt its aid to Israel, if the 
diversion work wasn’t halted (Lowi, 1993; Schmida, 1984; Sosland, 2007). This active 
                                                          
7 Nakba, literally meaning catastrophe, refers to the expulsion of 750,000 people in1948 from Palestine by the 
Zionist forces, which later became the Israeli state.  
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‘construction’ of a water and environmental imaginary by the Israelis was taking 
place amidst the shuttle visits of an American envoy and mediations between Israel 
and the Arabs regarding a unified regional plan for the development of the Jordan 
River Basin. While these talks were taking place, Israel continued its unilateral action 
in the DMZ, consolidating the material reality of the Israeli hydro-imaginary. The 
construction of the NWC began in 1953 and it was operative by 1964, carrying out 
the first and only out-of-basin diversion of the waters of the tributaries of the Upper 
Jordan River, through al-Battuf, toward the coastal cities and the Naqab (Negev).  
The 1950s marked a period of US-led negotiations over the allocations of 
Jordan River Basin water between the newly established nation states in the wake of 
the 1948 war. Contesting imaginaries of the Jordan River Basin were developed by 
those nation states and the colonial powers, who now acted as mediators. For Eric 
Johnston, the personal envoy sent by then United States President Eisenhower to 
solve the Arab-Israeli water dispute, the water resources were constructed  as “a self-
evident, unified watershed using that conception to underwrite the political project 
of building a cooperative region” namely, depoliticization of watershed boundaries 
(Alatout in Davis and Burke, 2011:223). The Arab states acted as a unified bloc, 
constructing through their water plans a unified interstate Arab identity and focusing 
on in-basin water use that would benefit the populations living within its boundaries. 
This directly contradicted the Israeli imaginary of the basin, representing a nationalist 
vision in which the efficiency of water transfer and its uses served the geographical 
consolidation of the Jewish nation. Israeli planners, like Simcha Blass, were 
responsible for transforming thinking about water from being a regional or local 
concern to a national one, ensuring that Israeli national priorities trumped the Arab-
state and Johnston-mission framing of water as a tool for cooperation and regional 
stability.  
To reinforce its hegemonic hydraulic mission, between 1953 and 1964 Israel 
constructed the National Water Carrier, its biggest infrastructure project and the 
epitome of water infrastructure as a technology for nation-building (see Figure 1.3 
below). Diverting 350 million cubic meters annually from the Jordan River Basin 
towards the coastal cities before reaching Al Naqab (Negev), and causing long-term 
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environmental deterioration to the lower Jordan River, this infrastructure project 
also provoked Jordan and Syria to intensify unilateral water withdrawals from the 
same river basin. The National Water Carrier has been labelled “a centralised 
technical apparatus through which all the water of the state was regulated” (Harris 
and Alatout, 2010, p.153). Following its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
the Syrian Golan Heights in 1967, Israel further secured control over the headwaters 
of the Jordan River, in addition to controlling the groundwater of the West Bank 
(Zeitoun, 2008; Zeitoun et al., 2012). 
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Figure 1.3 The Israeli National Water Carrier and overall grid (source: Fanack 
website) 
 
 Israel’s realisation of its hydraulic mission attests to the claim  that “a state 
with the ability to plan, construct and operate large infrastructure projects has the 
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physical ability to change the hydrogeology of the resource, thereby creating new 
hydro-strategic and hydro-political realities” (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, p.445). 
Through an assemblage of dams, pipelines, pumping stations, reservoirs and 
diversions, the Israeli development of a centralised water infrastructure, supported 
by institutional arrangements and engineering expertise, facilitated the emergence 
of a hydraulic bureaucracy and effected a re-territorialisation envisioned by the 
settler colonial state. These and other infrastructures of re-territorialisation have 
been central to the symbolic and material geographies of Zionism (Salamanca, 2014). 
Water infrastructure has been a core technology for re-territorialisation in the 
occupied Arab territories, establishing centralised control over water and land 
resources for the purposes of settler colonisation, whilst at the same time rendering 
as illegal and/or marginal the local water infrastructure of the indigenous Arab 
populations (Weizman, 2007; Yiftachel, 2006). The imbrication of agriculture and 
water was paramount in these critical decades for the Israeli state, hence the 
interlinked analysis of both in this thesis. The water story is closely intertwined with 
the production of the agricultural imaginaries and practices of not only Jewish 
farmers, but also the Arab (Palestinian and Syrian) populations who were hugely 
affected by this hydraulic mission. The phase of analysis chosen is a phase where the 
Zionist ideologies “dictated” water development (Galnoor, 1978) and while being 
fraught with  internal tensions, they ideologically converged to produce the 
contemporary Israeli water policy. 
 
The Israeli imaginary of the basin was internally contested. As Alatout (2008) 
contends, discourses of abundance in the Zionist and Israeli water sector prevailed 
until the 1940s, but were abruptly replaced by a dominant narrative of scarcity, 
legitimising centralized water management, institutions and technologies. Backed by 
the Israeli water abundance proponents, the quest for making the desert bloom 
envisioned the construction of assemblages of diversion canals, pipes, collection 
pools and pumps, which would move transboundary waters of the north to al-Battuf, 
known in Israeli/Hebrew as Beit Netofa, serving as a natural reservoir for storage and 
flow regulation. This was to be connected to another assemblage of networks to 
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bring water to the coastal cities and continue its way towards the Naqab (Negev). 
While the pessimist scarcity group of the Israeli water sector (as described by Alatout, 
2008) were vehemently against this narrative of ‘abundance’, they did not diverge 
radically from the necessity of this nationalist project, prioritising instead urban 
development of the North. This group considered Lake Tiberias as an ideal ‘natural’ 
reservoir and regulator of water from the tributaries of the Jordan and had strong 
reservations about the abundance group and their intensive irrigation focus, as well 
as the politically contentious approach of diverting water from the DMZ. Eventually, 
the scarcity framing prevailed and became the official Israeli discourse on water 
resource management. The environmental imaginary of the NWC was so dominant 
in the mindset of the Israeli state that it was considered a critical project for national 
survival, by proponents of abundance and scarcity narratives alike. However, for Sahl 
al-Battuf, one of my case studies, the abundance/scarcity framings and tensions were 
not able to curb the imposition of NWC infrastructures onto their landscapes, 
bypassing the agricultural plains of the valley and entrenching the misrecognition of 
Arab water and land ontologies.  As shall be seen in Chapters 5 and 7, the state is 
clearly not a monolithic whole. Al-Battuf case exposes the dialectics of the state in 
the construction of state bodies (MoA and the Ministry of Environmental Protection) 
of al-Battuf as a site of agricultural production and flood control, while also being 
framed and constructed as a site of preservation and conservation. Chapter 7 also 
reveals the lucrative potential of the oGH as a site for the production of apples in the 
1970s capitalised by the agricultural sector, while also showing the systematic 
exclusion of the Jawlani farmers from land, water and marketing mechanisms to 
maintain and strengthen that production. The state’s systematic imposition of 
conditions of presence-absence thus explain that non-monolithic and divergent 
approach to agricultural activities in those two communities. 
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1.5 Why is this research important: Local environmental and 
hydro-imaginaries  
 
Much has been written about Israel’s settler-colonial hegemony over natural 
resources, spatial planning and zoning, and military surveillance and control. 
However, Palestinian and Syrian environmental imaginaries and realities have not 
received as much attention. Both sites investigated in this thesis had the misfortune, 
like the Jordan River itself more generally, of becoming geopolitically strategic sites 
for Israeli water control, withdrawal and development. Local narratives and 
experiences of settler-colonial geographical realities acquire importance in 
countering, or at least adapting to the material and symbolic effects of Israeli myths 
regarding water advancement and technological superiority. Moving beyond the 
developed/underdeveloped, colonizer/colonized dichotomy, these sites show how 
environmental narratives are contested, negotiated and shaped by multiple bodies, 
infrastructures, actions and affective ties. The methodologies from below employed 
in this dissertation problematise a top-down colonial narrative – and even a 
Palestinian nationalist one - to understand the local land and water ontologies 
(re)produced by Arab communities in the two study areas. Building on the work of 
Palestinian scholars who have relied on and bolstered the Palestinian oral history 
approach  (Khalili, 2004; Masalha, 2012b; Sayigh, 2008), my work seeks to narrate 
the water struggles from below in an attempt to decolonise the dominant 
methodologies (Smith, 1998) used to narrate the history of water policy and 
development in the JRB.  
Similarly, Alan Mikhail (2013) argues for subaltern environmental histories in 
the Middle East and North Africa, documenting how peasants (fellahin)7F 8 have shaped 
the management and political economy of natural resources, altering and 
continuously transforming their rural ecologies. Surveying the history of peasant 
                                                          
8 Fellahin is a term widely used in the Middle East to refer to villagers or peasants. However as many 
authors (Abufarha 2008; Ayyash 2018, 23) highlight, the fellahin of the Levant are distinct from European 
peasantry, as fellahin usually refers to  rural farming communities with communal shared ownership of the land, 
which they cultivated according to communal traditions.  
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resistance in Palestine, Charles Anderson highlights how peasant histories of agrarian 
struggles in Palestine have been dismissed by scholarly work, and  explores the acts 
of everyday resistance of the peasantry against British colonial rule in the early 20th 
century, debunking what he terms the orientalist myth of idle, passive and apolitical 
subjects (2015, p.6). Michael Provence (2005) also claims that the conventional 
histories of the Great Syrian Revolt against the French in Syria have largely ignored 
the voices of the rural population, who were at the forefront of this popular rebellion. 
Episodes of collective mobilisation in both communities studied under this research 
will explore the role of the peasantry in the Great Revolt in Palestine (1936-39) 
against the British, and the Great Syrian Revolt (1925–1927) against the French, 
linking this to more recent events in the communities studied, namely the general 
strike of 1982 in the occupied Golan Heights and the Land Day demonstrations in 
1976 in Al Battuf Valley in the Galilee.  
Shahid Amin argues in Event, Metaphor, Memory, that “Peasants do not 
write, they are written about” and this is commonplace in academia, where research 
seems to draw extensive testimonies from the interviewees, rarely narrating their 
stories (Amin, 1995, p.1). That is why oral histories are able to convey rich accounts 
of the lived experiences of people better than any archival document, despite 
sometimes being dismissed due to a positivist fear of unreliability (Khalili, 2011; Riley 
and Harvey, 2007b). Riley and Harvey claim that oral histories have not been utilised 
enough when studying farming and agriculture. Oral histories offer ways of recording 
changes in farming practices and how these are linked to shifting social and political 
patterns and transformations in post-colonial regions. As the authors claim, oral 
histories can be useful tools to “uncover alternative, personalized, non-scientific and 
even subversive strands of knowledge” (Riley and Harvey , 2007, p.2) rather than the 
positivist techno-centric methodologies of studying agriculture and rural 
communities. This directs us, following Setten (2004, p.392), “to understand the 
production of a landscape from within, or how the landscape is the result of local 
customary practices”. For al-Battuf and the oGH, the challenge is therefore to 
“produce geographies that are lived, embodied, practised; landscapes which are 
never finished or complete, nor easily framed or read” (Creswell, 2002, p.208). 
45 
 
As I argue in this dissertation, Arab farming communities marginalized by 
Israeli sovereign authority face particular challenges in claiming rights to resources 
and also to a distinctive ethno-geographic, place-based recognition. As Zeitoun 
observes “those who live the water conflict generally lack the means to project their 
voices into the concentrations of power, where national and international policy-
makers can – and do – ignore them” (Zeitoun 2008, xiv). Across the JRB, many areas 
call for investigation of the breadth and depth of microhistories that relate water 
stories from below – how communities used and valued the resource, how they faced 
pressures to normalise and engage with technical valuations of water and its flows, 
treating it as a commodity to enhance production and increase productivity – a 
priority of national governments and multinational agencies which guided their 
water policymaking. The JRB, therefore, is an ample source of community stories: the 
Yarmouk Triangle (Israel), the Adassiyeh and Bha’i community agricultural 
development (Jordan), Dera’a (Syria) and the Jordan valley (Jordan and West Bank) 
are all sites and sources of micro-histories and lived geographies which will justify 
research (UEA, 2018). For this thesis, two locations were chosen as they hold both 
ideological and geopolitical significance to the control and development of water 
resources in the Jordan Basin. They are sites where the water imaginary and 
infrastructural assemblages of the Israeli state became a reality, altering and re-
configuring water meanings, uses and interactions for local Arab communities under 
precarious conditions of marginalisation, dispossession and misrecognition.  
 
1.5.1 Sahl al-Battuf (Al-Battuf Valley, Galilee, Israel) 
 
Going beyond its geopolitical and regional significance as an instigator of 
conflict and war, the NWC project, as a significant artefact of the Israeli water sector, 
also impacted the lives of Palestinian farmers inside Israel, especially in Sahl al-Battuf 
in the Galilee in the 1950s and 1960s where the NWC expropriated thousands of 
dunums and severely restricted the livelihoods of farmers there. Drawing on sources 
from British and Israeli archives and extensive fieldwork in al-Battuf, this thesis aims 
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to represent the Palestinian fellahin8F 9 (farmers) as the protagonists of an untold story 
of water and land politics in the Galilee. Continuously framed as a state-level issue 
by the mainstream TWM lens, water politics are manifested here in the continuous 
efforts of the farmers of al-Battuf who, as active historical and geographical agents, 
protested against the NWC, demanded rights to water infrastructure in the valley, 
and re-configured agricultural practices to defy discriminatory Israeli water and land 
policies. Moreover, while oral history narratives have focused their attention on the 
catastrophic destruction and depopulation of the Palestinian villages, towns and 
cities (Davis, 2011; Khalidi, 2006; Masalha, 2012a; Sayigh, 2008), my focus is on the 
villages which remained as an important site of Palestinian lived experiences and 
geographies of resource dispossession, contestation and perseverance.  
 
1.5.2 The oGH (Syria)  
 
The Golan Heights presents a set of physical and geopolitical strategic 
characteristics, rich in water resources and consisting of a very fertile plateau, 
conditions which justified its capture and control by Israel (Ibrahim, 2017; Ram, 
2015). More than 147,000 people distributed in 163 villages and towns in addition to 
108 farms (Mara’i and Halabi, 1992) lived in the Golan Heights prior to 1967, creating 
a thriving community of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds under the Syrian 
state. Following Israel’s 1967 occupation, almost all land and water resources came 
under the full control and administration of the Israeli state, leaving the remaining 
Syrian communities disconnected and confined to a small geographical area, with 
their livelihoods threatened by encroaching settler colonial practices. That Israeli 
hydro-hegemony was central in the occupation of this territory became clear when 
Israel instantly took control over the Upper Jordan tributary of Banias, began its full-
frontal excavation of groundwater, capturing all springs and fresh water sources, in 
addition to increasing water availability by storing the runoff of floodwater. As a 
community shattered and separated from its Syrian homeland, the Jawlani water 
                                                          
9 I use the term fellahin interchangeably with farmers, especially in al-Battuf, as this is how the villagers I met 
there identify themselves.  
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story of struggle and resistance does not have a place in the TWM discourse on the 
Jordan River, further justifying my focus on the oGH as a site of important water 
contestations against hydro-hegemonic control.  
In summary, I argue that the TWM perspective is lacking in its ability to 
explain hydropolitics at the local level, even though local water struggles are shaped 
and reconfigured by inter-state dynamics at the basin level. This scale of analysis and 
reflection therefore requires approaching water struggles from another vantage 
point. My argument in this thesis is that Israeli water management, which is 
physically dependent on transboundary sources, produces settler colonial 
exclusionary water policies and infrastructures that alter and reconfigure 
relationships between the indigenous people and their lands and waters. TWM with 
its international relations and nation-state focus, is devoid of tools to analyse the 
local politics of water and precisely so under settler state colonial conditions. 
Following Snedon and Fox (2006), I further argue that scholarship on water politics 
in the Jordan Basin is deficient insofar as it only focuses on inter-state interactions 
and dynamics, and that we need a multi-scalar examination of dynamics and actors 
who constantly engage and contest the state and its water policies.  
 
1.6 Outline of chapters  
 
The thesis is divided into 8 chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 
2 represents the theoretical framework that will inform the main discussions of the 
thesis. The chapter focuses first on scholarly work in critical political ecology on water 
and power, arguing that it provides critical understandings of water from below in a 
region where water has only been framed as a strategic and national issue requiring 
strict top-down approaches. The chapter addresses two other theoretical fields that 
have also been influential in framing the argument of this research: settler 
colonialism and lived geographies literature. In terms of the former, I argue that our 
understanding of water and land in settler colonial contexts has to take into account 
the operating premises of the elimination and exclusion of the native. Engaging with 
48 
 
settler colonial literature allows us to critically examine the logic and hegemony of 
settler colonial rulemaking. However, my critical contribution to augment what has 
been addressed in settler colonial literature in the Israeli state context, highlights the 
lack of attention to the infrastructures and artefacts of the settler colonial rule that 
shape the lived geographies of indigenous populations (for an exception, see  
Salamanca, 2014). The lived geographies, experiences and practices of communities 
living under settler colonial water regime are further additions to my examination, 
as water is a dominant and powerful object of claim making and recognition. Israel’s 
imposition and hegemonic ordering of waterscapes on indigenous populations not 
only (re)produced their own ontologies of water but also re-configured their 
livelihoods, identities and lived geographies resulting in a hybrid mix of local 
community efforts of contestation. This theoretical framing aims to bridge 
discussions of water in critical political ecology with scholarship on settler colonialism 
and place-based resistance and lived geographies. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology used for data collection and analysis. In this 
chapter, I describe my personal motivation for carrying out this research and the 
reason for the selection of the case studies. This chapter justifies and comments on 
the methods used for data collection and analysis. The last section discusses 
experiences of being in the field, and my positionality as a Palestinian female 
researcher in relation to working in Palestine/Israel.  
Chapters 4 and 5 examine al-Battuf in relation to the two research questions. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the settler colonial hydro-imaginary and how it 
cast al-Battuf as the imagined site of a reservoir, and a critical junction for the 
realisation of the NWC. The chapter’s focus is on the events surrounding the 
construction of this project, and how Palestinians inside Israel, at that time living 
under military rule imposed by the Israeli state, engaged with the state to protest 
and negotiate their claims over space. The findings reveal a contestation apparent 
between the state imaginary and Palestinian place-based imaginaries, which 
required tactics employed by the villagers to defend their land and water ontologies. 
The chapter shows how ‘settler’ states “shape water management in their image” 
(Obertreis et al., 2016:169; Swyngedouw, 2015). The Israeli/Zionist hydraulic mission 
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involved the state becoming the master hydraulic engineer, producing and 
reproducing nature/water and changing its flow, availability, and value, which 
produced a new nature, or new waterscape (Swyngedouw, 2004). The contestations, 
framed as ‘struggles for water and land’ in Chapter 5, seek to reveal how such 
mobilisation were shaped by the state’s relationship with its estranged Palestinian 
populations in the midst of citizenship claims, and therefore show how such resource 
struggles were being constituted through water as a vessel for making claims of 
recognition.  
Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with the second case study of the occupied Golan 
Heights. Chapter 6 examines the lived geographies of the Syrian communities who 
remained in the Golan Heights after the 1967 war. The construction of the Golan 
Heights as a geostrategic water reservoir has dominated the Israeli narrative and 
hydro-imaginary, culminating in its territorial occupation, and consolidating Israel’s 
hydro-hegemon status over the water resources of the JRB. However, the years 
following the 1967 occupation were experienced by the Jawlanis as an intensified re-
configuration of their lived geographies, identities and livelihood practices. Chapter 
6 is focused on the transformation of landscapes and waterscapes and the effects of 
this on the lived geographies of the remaining populations. Chapter 7 delves into the 
local contestation and protest against the imposition of the occupying state’s hydro-
hegemony and the imbrication of their agricultural livelihood struggles with their 
political mobilisation against Israeli citizenship enforcement. The chapter further 
illustrates how water struggles were shaped by Israeli policies of exclusion and denial 
of access to water, a key resource for the survival of their life-sustaining crop, apples. 
Their scaling up of what I refer to as ‘counter-infrastructure’ is analysed in light of the 
Israeli suppression of vernacular water infrastructures the farmers constructed and 
their uneasy co-existence with the state.  
Chapter 8 represents the main comparative findings chapter of the thesis. It 
first analyses how the main elements of the water struggles have been re-configured 
in light of settler colonial land and water policies through a ‘presence-absence’ 
experience. It examines the presence-absence of the state, infrastructure and water 
in the lives and livelihoods of the Palestinian farmers in Al-Battuf and the Jawlanis of 
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the oGH. The last section focuses on the varied experience of both communities in 
resisting and contesting the Israeli hydro-hegemony, and the political implications of 
those tactics for the water and recognition struggles these communities are still 
facing today. Chapter 9 is the conclusion of this thesis. It summarises the main 
findings of the chapters. It also reflects on the contribution of this research to larger 
bodies of work on water struggles in settler colonial contexts, highlighting the 
potential contribution it can make to theorising small and big infrastructures and 
their role in constructing hydro-imaginaries of the settler state, as well as their 
potential to serve as tools of resistance and contestation. 
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Chapter 2:  Lived geographies, water struggles and resistance 
in settler colonial waterscapes 
 
In this chapter, I present the theoretical conceptualisations that inform my 
investigation into Arab water struggles in the Galilee and occupied Golan Heights. It 
addresses in turn relevant scholarship on political ecology, lived geographies and 
settler colonialism to produce a conceptual framework for examining the key 
research questions: 
1. How do settler colonial [water and land] policies and practices manifest 
themselves in the lives and livelihood practices of farming communities 
in the Galilee and the occupied Golan Heights? 
2. How, and with what political effects, are settler colonial [water and land] 
policies and practices resisted by farming communities in the occupied 
Golan Heights and Galilee? 
I first discuss how political ecology can provide a useful framework for thinking 
relationally through water (Krause and Strang, 2016; Loftus, 2011). While political 
ecology helps to think about water relationally, settler colonialism literature focuses 
on ethno-geographic communities’ struggles, highlighting issues of material and 
discursive formulations of misrecognition: land, water and identities. Moreover, the 
lived geographies literature helps ground our analysis in ontological terms, explaining 
place-based attachments, identities and dependencies, further illuminating places as 
sites of struggle and re-configuration. The overarching analytical focus is 
infrastructure, which I use as “an ideal ethnographic site for theorizing” everyday 
practices and contestations with power (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012, p.402). Settler 
colonial infrastructure needs to be examined not only as an object of intervention or 
disruption of pre-existing local ontologies of water and water management but also 
as a site for imposing exclusion and cementing policies of difference.  
Water and water infrastructures become objects of disconnection and exclusion 
by design in settler colonial logic, where such exclusion is justified by constructs of 
modernity, national strategy and the subjectivity of actors who are perceived to be 
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under-developed because of  their indigenous way of life (Kooy and Bakker 2008). 
Water infrastructure is a central tool of analysis in this literature, and following Katie 
Meehan’s critical work on the hydrosocial cycle (Meehan, 2014; Meehan and Moore, 
2014) and conceptualisation of hydrosocial territories (meaning spaces recreated 
through the constant dynamics between social, political, infrastructural and human 
elements, as seen in section 2.1) (Boelens et al., 2016), I theorise all types of 
infrastructure as objects of power.  While the focus of water researchers has tended 
to be the mega-projects of state control – the dams, hydropower plants, grids and 
desalination plans (e.g. McCully, 1997; Menga, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2015; van Wijk 
and Fischhendler, 2017; Warner et al., 2017), this thesis is preoccupied with the 
small, local infrastructure that often escapes the state’s watchful eyes, creating 
conduits for resistance, claim-making, and protest during water struggles. What I aim 
to do throughout the chapters is to examine water infrastructures as sites of violence, 
exclusion and misrecognition (explored in Chapter 4 and 6) as well as conduits of 
resistance and opposition to hegemonic state rule (Chapters 5 and 7). As Rodgers and 
O’Neill note “infrastructure is by no means only a site where forms of social control 
and oppression can be observed, but also a potential place for imagining more 
positive politics” (2012, p.402).  
 
2.1 Political ecologies of water  
 
As Karen Bakker states, water is intensely political. While it is often assigned to 
the realm of national security and inter-state contestation, it is “largely framed as a 
backdrop to politics” in conventional international relations and geopolitics framings 
(2015, p.617). Bakker’s interest in understanding the “human mobilization of, and 
interrelationship with, water” (2015, p.617) is shared in this thesis. The materiality 
and fluidity of water also requires us to look at infrastructures mediating its flows 
and ebbs, or as Bakker puts it, examining ‘socio-technical objects’. My inspiration in 
examining local water politics comes from the literature on the politics of the 
everyday and the centrality of water in local struggles, especially in the global south 
(Boelens, 2014; Gelles, 2000; Paerregaard, 2013; Rasmussen, 2015; Delgado and 
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Zwarteveen, 2008). There are similarities between how local water struggles in such 
regions relate to wider structures of power, hegemony and dispossession and local 
water struggles in the Jordan River Basin, and this existing scholarship recognises the 
analytical value of a multi-scalar approach (Budds and Sultana, 2013; Linton and 
Budds, 2014; Perreault 2003, 2015). While the everyday political acts carried out by 
predominantly agrarian communities around water access and control may not be 
directly connected to larger scales of national and international water governance, 
they are conditioned by them through the flow and ebb of water carried through 
state-centric infrastructures.  
Political ecology research explores how people’s relationship with environmental   
processes has material and discursive effects which are inherently political, including 
the shaping of identities (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Wolf, 1972; Forsyth, 2004). As an 
inter-disciplinary field, political ecology goes beyond the biophysical ecology into 
different trajectories, especially cases of struggle over resource access and control, 
and pays attention to historical approaches to environmental issues (O’Connor, 
1998; Walker, 2005). It therefore addresses key issues of resource distribution, 
access and political rights (Moore, 1993), focusing on land users and social relations, 
and how these relations intersect within particular historical-geographical settings 
(Neumann, 1992; Peet et al., 2010). As Carroll argues, historicising water allows us to 
understand how water becomes an object of governance, (Carroll, 2012) and how we 
can investigate its imbrication in state policies of governance and in the lived 
geographies of water-dependent communities. 
The relevance of political ecology for this thesis is in its critical manifestations 
(Forsyth, 2004; Forsyth, 2008; Robbins, 2011), which allow for an examination of the 
interaction of environment-related decisions with livelihood, governance and power 
relations, with a view to shaping a socially just environmental policy making.9F 10 Of 
importance to this research is how place-specific environmental imaginaries have 
                                                          
10 Blaikie’s proclamation of the politics of soil erosion is a case in point of the need for application of politics in 
the ecological realm of research and knowledge production (Blaikie 1985), which changed the utilization of 
political ecology concepts and ideas. Since then, the political process analysis in political ecology has developed 
and become more profound, contextualised and participatory, according to Forsyth (2008). 
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political-economic origins and effects. Richard Peet and Michael Watts present such 
environmental imaginaries as a central concept for political ecology (1996, 263):  
Liberation ecology proposes studying the processes by which 
environmental imaginaries are formed, contested, and practiced in 
the course of specific trajectories of political-economic change. It 
borrows from poststructuralism a fascination with discourse and 
institutional power, yet remains within that tradition of political 
ecology which sees imaginaries, discourses, and environmental 
practices as grounded in the social relations of production and their 
attendant struggles. The environmental imaginary emerges, 
therefore, as a primary site of contestation; critical social 
movements have at their core environmental imaginaries at odds 
with hegemonic conceptions.  
 
Environmental imaginaries’ contestation have been embedded within historical 
narratives of colonialism, feudalism and other political-economic regimes in the 
context of this study, where access to resources has been highly contested and often 
violent, as exemplified by Donald Moore’s work on Zimbabwe’s subaltern struggles 
(Moore, 1993). In their book, Violent Environments, Nancy Peluso and Michael Watts 
(2001, p.26) define violence as “practices (brutal acts) that cause direct harm to 
humans” expanding the concept of resource-related violence beyond the physical to 
nonphysical harm. Thus, they argue, while resource dispossession may be conducted 
in a physically non-harmful way (e.g. legal appropriation), this does not negate the 
harmful (socio-economic and affective) impacts on those whose resources are taken 
away from them. In the case of Israeli acts against Arab communities in the Jordan 
River Basin, resource dispossession is institutionalised and carried out by physical 
violence (e.g. the destruction by state actors and settlers of Arab water infrastructure 
and crops) as well as the less visible, non-physical violence of discriminatory rule-
making and cultural and political misrecognition. For Mehta (2016) invisible power 
refers to power which shapes people’s consciousness and beliefs and leads them to 
accept the status quo, arguing that invisible power operates in a context of structural 
violence, where according to Farmer et al. (2006, p.1686) “social arrangements… put 
individuals and populations in harm’s way”. Mehta argues that these structural 
arrangements are embedded in the political and economic aspects of daily life; they 
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are violent because they cause systemic harm. In this respect the invisible power of 
Israeli water hegemony is achieved by its technical-managerial normalisation, 
justifying water inequality and dispossession.  
The lens of political ecology thus offers a fertile ground to understand the 
multiplicity of water meanings and processes as (re)produced by political-economic 
contexts and social relations. The waterscapes and hydrosocial cycle are analytical 
concepts which help us explore the imbrication of local-level water politics and 
struggles in power relations. Eric Swyngedouw defines waterscapes as water 
landscapes of hybrid character with ever-changing societal and ecological factors 
(Swyngedouw, 1999). They are an "expression of the interaction between humans 
and their environment and encompasses all of the social, economic and political 
processes through which water in nature is conceived of and manipulated by 
societies" (Molle at al. 2009, p.2). Acknowledging that the context of that interaction 
is replete with asymmetries, Budds and Hinojosa (2012, p.124) argue that the notion 
of waterscapes is useful to "explore the ways in which flows of water, power and 
capital converge to produce uneven socio-ecological arrangements over space and 
time, the particular characteristics of which reflect the power relations that shaped 
their production". These come in direct challenges to engineered and managerial 
conceptions such as watersheds or river basins, obscuring their social construction 
while focusing on their biophysical characteristics. As Molle et al. assert, river basins 
are human-made waterscapes reflecting specific political, social, and natural 
relationships at certain points in time – they are contested within different scales 
producing overlapping hydro-social territories, realities and imaginaries (Molle and 
Wester, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2009). 
Another relevant concept is hydrosocial territories, which are defined as “socially, 
naturally and politically constituted spaces that are (re)created through the 
interactions amongst human practices, water flows, hydraulic technologies, 
biophysical elements, socio-economic structures and cultural-political institutions” 
(Boelens et al., 2016, p.1). Hydrosocial territories exist in plural forms, articulating 
contrasting notions of what such territories mean and to whom, and often featuring 
negotiations and struggle over the governance of water resources (Hoogesteger et 
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al., 2016). The relevance of territorial struggles, in the context of settler colonialism, 
is that they “entwine battles over natural resources with struggles over meaning, 
norms, knowledge decision-making authority, and discourses” (Boelens et al., 2016, 
p.8). Hydrosocial territories become (re)configured through infrastructure, entailing 
major impacts for different water users’ identification with the physical 
environments while simultaneously altering political order and establishing a hydro-
political network hierarchy (Duarte-Abadia et al., 2015). Within these frameworks, 
water becomes influential in the production of society, including how the production 
of material artefacts, such as large-scale water infrastructures, configures and 
influences nation-state building.  
My research interest is partly to show the central role that water has played in 
the Zionist/Israeli settler colonial project by following its infrastructures and their 
impacts on the lived geographies of colonised communities. To investigate the role 
of such infrastructures in shaping what Alatout refers to as hydro-imaginaries – the 
assemblages of ideas, meanings, values and discourses which shape how we think 
and imagine water (2011), we need to examine how they materialise geographically 
and produce hydropolitical territories. While the focus has been on the state and 
colonial imaginaries (Davis, 2010) (whether British, French, American, Israeli, or 
Arab), this research appreciates and employs local water-imaginaries as they relate 
to, and counter, hegemonic state imaginaries about water and environment. Political 
ecology, and its examination of power, discourse and hegemony in nature-society 
interactions, allows us to explore the emergence of  conflicting environmental 
imaginaries (Nesbitt and Weiner, 2001) and the tension between them.  
 
2.1.1 Water as a resource and ‘scarcity for the few’ 
 
Engineering, management and scientific knowledge-based approaches to 
water governance dominate how water is perceived and governed, creating a 
hegemonic ontology of ‘water-as-resource’ (Yates et al., 2017, p.803), especially 
in settler colonial context. As Tania Murray Li (2007) observes, these prevailing 
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technical and managerial constructions of water typically result in water issues 
being de-historicised and de-politicised, which suggests the need for a  
historicisation of water to reveal how it becomes an issue, a problem requiring 
management and governance (Bijker, 2012; Carroll, 2012; Linton, 2010; 
Rasmussen, 2015; Schmidt, 2014). In other words, the current water 
infrastructure of the Israeli state as it impacts on, and is resisted by Arab farming 
communities, needs to be understood by examining its historical emergence and 
construction as a scarce resource. Alatout shows how a pre-state Zionist water 
abundance narrative (promoting Jewish migration to Palestine and its settlement 
by Jews) was challenged by a water scarcity narrative. The 1940s and 1950s were 
rife with contestations between those two polarised narratives until, eventually, 
narratives of scarcity won out, successfully shaping Israeli water policy and also 
limiting other ways of imagining water resources (Alatout, 2008; 2009). The 
colonial idea of ordering nature in the Levant was further consolidated by those 
scarcity narratives, which justified the planned, large-scale transformation of 
landscapes (Gibbs, 2009). While ‘natural’ or biophysical scarcity exists in 
Palestine, scarcity narratives reflect a powerful discursive construct – what Lyla 
Mehta refers to as a ‘manufactured scarcity’ serving the political interests of 
those in power (Mehta, 2005). Water scarcity, therefore, is produced by political, 
technological and economic barriers which limit people’s access to water, rather 
than by physical water scarcity (Molle and Wester, 2009, p.3). Jessica Barnes 
(2009), in her work on Syrian water management has highlighted how scarcity is 
constructed as a consequence of the government’s promotion of water-intensive 
agriculture. This scarcity, Barnes argues, is further consolidated by spatial 
representations that render geographical locations as zones of scarcity and 
abundance on the map. Such constructions of scarcity as natural are seen in many 
cases around the Middle East, and the JRB in particular. Whether in Israel, 
Palestine, or Jordan, such narratives of scarcity prevail as a “apolitical and 
ahistorical” reality (Barnes, 2009, p.519), assuming scarcity as a fixed condition 
requiring state policy interventions to combat it, mainly through technological 
solutions and rational-choice market-based mechanisms of water management. 
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The politicisation of water, whether under abundance or scarcity narratives, 
serves political purposes and positions water at the heart of the conflict in 
Palestine/Israel. What Alatout illuminates in his work on Israeli narratives of 
abundance and scarcity is that both co-constituted water politics. However, it was 
the earlier abundance narrative which placed water as an important driver of the 
Israeli settler colonial nation state. What can be concluded from that articulation of 
those narratives is a reality of ‘scarcity for the few’ – i.e. non-Jewish inhabitants of 
Palestine/Israel. While Israeli narratives of scarcity consolidated its control over 
water resources and extensively harnessed them for the benefit of Jewish 
agricultural settlements and in order to make the desert bloom (which of course 
contradicts scarce water narratives), abundance was rearticulated as scarcity to 
justify Israel’s use of water for its national and ideological purposes. Consequently, 
those who suffered ‘real’ (physical and socio-economic) scarcity were the 
populations deemed external to the nation-state building project, whose water 
needs and demands were neglected or denied under the justification of ‘there’s not 
enough water’. This is how water conflicts and struggles “are as much a symptom of 
relations with the state as a question of water scarcity in itself” (Rasmussen, 2015, 
p.59; Selby, 2005). Whether biophysical/natural scarcity or human-induced scarcity, 
variations of water flow “create, transform or destroy social linkages” (Boelens et al., 
2016, p.3) and transform lived spaces and boundaries as they produce new 
landscapes and waterscapes . As Alatout further elaborates, “water becomes part of 
a specific technopolitical network with specific effects on known communities, places 
and orders. For water to become political, it has to be made political” (2009, p.371).  
Making water political, therefore, allows us to challenge the  water 
engineering and management paradigms which have largely neglected wider social 
and political processes involved in water systems, as shown by David Mosse in his 
work on South India’s ‘tanked’ landscape and rainwater harvesting (Mosse, 2003; 
2008). Similarly,  Carse’s work on the construction of the Panama Canal reveals how 
large-scale infrastructures become part of a managed watershed, in which 
infrastructure is not only the articulation of socio-technical systems but also  
“grounded in everyday life… revealing sites for ethnographic research on negotiation, 
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struggle and meaning” (Carse, 2012, p.543) which are typically ignored. As we shall 
see in the case studies presented in this thesis, Israeli socio-technological systems of 
water governance have indeed shaped the everyday life of marginalised communities 
and altered landscapes to secure hegemonic control over water imaginaries, 
meanings and governance but have been ignored by most literature on water politics 
in the JRB.  
Moreover, the specificities of settler colonial waterscapes and struggles continue 
to be missing from political ecology’s engagement with water. In a recent paper 
Simpson and Bagelman (2018) call for the ‘decolonising’ of urban political ecologies, 
putting settler colonialism and indigenous scholarship in conversation with political 
ecology. The disregard and erasure of indigenous people’s (in their case the 
Lekwungen in British Columbia) cultural and ecological interventions in the landscape 
reflects on realities of environmental governance today. The everyday practices of 
the indigenous within a settler colonial state oscillate between the reproduction and 
the decolonisation of political ecologies of the city, therefore requiring examinations 
of those practices and how they shape local landscapes and communities’ 
identification with them. This thesis is an attempt to do so for the political ecology of 
water in a specific settler colonial context, and resembling Simpson and Bagelman’s 
work, it focuses on the ‘quotidian’ farming practices as acquiring political subjectivity 
under such conditions.  
 
2.2 Lived geographies, sumud, and everyday resistance  
 
In this thesis, I argue that the fixation of scholars and practitioners of 
transboundary water management with the regional and international scales, and 
the technical-managerial framing of water-as-resource, has confined it to the 
governance calculations of state-actors, international agencies and institutions. 
Accordingly, this apolitical framing has often ignored struggles over water resources 
and water imaginaries, including their links to wider political mobilisations. Therefore, 
this thesis acknowledges how scale is socially constructed to make visible the politics of 
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water but is critical of how the transboundary scale confines meanings and values of water 
to the national, ignoring (or making invisible) the local, everyday dynamics of water. As water 
flows physically through the JRB, it also crosses scales. The intention of this thesis is not to 
confine water to a certain scale (local or national) but to emphasise the fluid dynamics 
around water.” I aim to examine how the lived geographies of marginalised Arab 
communities affected by this hegemonic discourse and show how settler colonial 
discourses (and material practices) are resisted by these farming communities in the 
occupied Golan Heights and Galilee. Geographically-themed literature is used here 
to situate my research interest in lived geographies, by which I mean place-based 
experiences and practices. These lived geographies are, I argue, reconfigured by the 
water infrastructures of state rule, but in such a way that the agency of the affected 
farmers has significant social and political autonomy.  
 
2.2.1 Political ontology of land 
 
According to Greider and Garkovich (1994), and drawing on the work of 
Edward Soja (1989), the social construction of nature challenges deterministic views 
of nature as a given, showing instead that cultural groups co-create nature and the 
physical environment through material and symbolic practices.  Landscape is the 
embodied site of a society’s experience of being, the tangible source of value and 
practices that mutually shape both land and people (Ingold, 2000). In many societies, 
land and identity are inextricably linked: “through extensive interaction with a place, 
people may begin to define themselves in terms of . . . that place, to the extent that 
they cannot really express who they are without inevitably taking into account the 
setting which surrounds them as well” (Ryden, 1993, p.76). People’s everyday tasks 
and activities become constitutive acts of dwelling. Without land, a community may 
lose its distinctive identity, which is why coercive efforts at displacement and 
dispossession, such as through colonialism, authoritarian regimes or military 
occupation, typically include the violence of cultural misrecognition. The lived 
geographies perspective adapted here focuses on the dwelling practices of 
indigenous groups subject to settler colonial misrecognition, for it is through such 
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dwelling that these people (and non-human agents, such as crops) form landscapes 
constitutive of their distinctive ethno-geographic communities. 
Under settler colonial rule, which operates with a logic of elimination, the 
lived experiences of indigenous communities are systematically disrupted, with the 
intent to erase them (Wolfe, 2006). In these circumstances the landscapes become a 
vehicle for the communication of place-based identity, whether for the imagined 
communities of settlers or those of the indigenous populations. Such place-making 
“contains overt and covert social practices that embed in place-making behaviours 
notions of ideology, power, control, conflict, dominance and distribution of social 
and physical resources” (Stokowski, 2002, p.368). Relph’s work is seminal in the 
geographical literature on people’s identity of place, which refers to a persistence 
and unity of it, and with the place, where the intensity of attachment to a place for a 
people resides (Relph, 1976). Of particular relevance to this research are the 
concepts of inclusion and exclusion as they shape the meaning, experiences and 
values humans attribute to place. Existence or rootedness in a landscape implies 
“being at home in an unself-conscious way” where much of the landscape is taken 
for granted (Tuan, 1980, p.4), and such rootedness is deeply politicised in settler 
colonial contexts. As Ingold (2000) asserts, the ways of being are inscribed into the 
landscape through stories and histories.  
 
While Ingold and Tuan’s phenomenological work on place established a solid 
understanding of place and attachment to place as central to lived geographies, it 
does not engage with power relations, including the legacies of (post)colonial place-
making and its exclusionary policies of dispossession and misrecognition. To explain 
issues of power, violence and coercion, especially when examining settler colonial 
states, we need to acknowledge the association of territory with fear and violence 
(Elden, 2007). The violence of state formation is marked out by the formation of 
bounded territorial space, which in itself is an act of exclusion and inclusion (Elden, 
2010). The basic premise is shared by Lefebvre, when he observes that “every state 
is born of violence, and state power endures only by virtue of violence directed 
towards a space” (1991, p.280). Therefore, it is not surprising that in cases of settler 
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colonialism, the colonised are being de-territorialised, and hegemony takes the form 
of territorial and resource control, as has been the case with the Zionist policy in 
Palestine (Newman, 1985). As Swyngedouw and Boelens highlight, ‘territorial 
struggles go beyond battles over natural resources per se, as they also involve 
conflicts over meaning, norms, knowledge, decision-making authority, 
representations and discourses’ (2018, p.115). 
 
In the case studies presented in this thesis, place-based attachments and 
connections are imbricated in the hydropolitical history of the Jordan River Basin, 
and influenced by a number of regional and national conditions which shape the 
current dynamics of dispossession and misrecognition. In order to understand 
contestation over place and resources, in the context of communities facing settler 
colonial policies and practices, it is useful to examine “the defense of constructions 
of place” (Dukpa et al., 2018; Escobar, 2001, p.139) insofar as they produce a political 
ontology of land. Political ontology, as Arturo Escobar (2016, p.21) explains: 
…refers to the power-laden practices involved in bringing into being 
a particular world or ontology; on the other hand, it refers to a field 
of study that focuses on the inter-relations among worlds, including 
the conflicts that ensue as different ontologies strive to sustain their 
own existence in their interaction with other worlds.  
 
Scholarly literature on sense of place revolves around characterisations and 
dimensions related to place-attachment, place-identity and place-dependence, each 
highlighting an important dimension of place-belonging. In relation to Escobar’s  
‘political ontology’, struggles can be explained as subaltern practices of difference 
that intend to create alternative socio-natural worlds (Escobar, 2008, p.67) where 
the subaltern develops and defends an alternative (minority) political ontology of 
land shaped, in large part, by the ‘othering’ of indigenous peoples by the settler state. 
As Escobar (ibid) explains: 
The goal of many of today’s struggles is the defense of place-based 
conceptions of the world and practices of world making – more 
precisely, a defense of particular constructions of place, including 
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the reorganizations of place that might be deemed necessary 
according to the power struggles within place.  
 
Defences of place are at the heart of the case studies in this thesis. The Israeli 
transformation of landscapes in the Galilee and occupied Golan Heights and their 
transformation to hydrostrategic waterscapes represented the attempted 
imposition of a Zionist political ontology against indigenous Arab communities. 
Facing threats to their livelihoods, identities, and places of belonging, the affected 
communities engaged in ‘place-based’ collective actions to (re)produce and protect 
distinctive communal identities, ones with autonomous ontologies of land (and 
water). Place-based characteristics in both areas led to differentiated experiences by 
communities against the rupture of settler colonial uprooting, resulting in 
differentiated strategies and actions. In this way, borrowing from the work of Donald 
Moore, the case studies represent situated struggles which produced ‘entangled 
landscapes’ where entanglement is seen as “knots, gnarls, and adhesions rather than 
smooth surfaces; an inextricable interweave that ensnares; a compromising 
relationship that challenges while making withdrawal difficult if not impossible” 
(Moore, 2005, p.4).  
The entangled landscapes of the Galilee and occupied Golan Heights have as a central 
feature the dual presence and absence of the settler state in the lived geographies of 
the indigenous Arab communities. In light of this contestation between attempts at 
state erasure and communities’ persistence in remaining visible and rooted, the 
concept of ‘presence-absence’ emerges as a useful analytical tool to describe and 
analyse competing imaginaries of how misrecognition is materialised, countered and 
contested. The presence-absence of the state is a dynamic condition which has 
transformed communities’ identity and their interaction around land and water 
issues. It relates above all to the simultaneous experience both of exclusion by the 
state (e.g. from political representation) while at the same time being subject to state 
power (e.g. state restrictions on land and water use). The Israeli state is present in its 
material transformation of the landscape through use of infrastructure and 
policymaking. However, at the same time the ‘othering’ of the Arab communities, 
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their experience of discriminatory resource distribution and cultural misrecognition, 
creates an absence of the state, in which they can create and defend their own land 
and water realities (ontologies). In its attempts at erasure, the settler colonial state 
is also dialectically engaged in acts of consolidating its settler presence on top of and 
in replacement of the indigenous landscape. In order to erase, the state has to 
construct infrastructure to consolidate its control over land and resources. Water 
infrastructures therefore are important artefacts of misrecognition as they facilitate 
policies of exclusion and dispossession. In parallel, and as this thesis argues, 
infrastructures also serve as artefacts of recognition used by ethno-geographic 
communities to assert their presence on the land, protect their livelihood and resist 
erasure. Therefore, the presence-absence of the state produces conditions shaping 
the lived geography of these communities, manifested through resource (water, 
land), infrastructure (state, community) and identity (second class citizens, non-
citizens) ebbs and flows. Similar to the work of Rasmussen (2015) on water in the 
Andean highlands highlights, communities’ struggles with present-absent state 
leaves them to battle with conditions of abandonment [absence] while also aspiring 
to be independent from state control [presence] over their water. 
2.2.2 Sumud, resistance and water struggles  
 
Sumud (صمود) is literally articulated in concepts such as steadfastness or 
perseverance in relation to the Palestinian existence under conditions of 
dispossession. The fellah’s perseverance and presence on the land, for example, was 
incorporated by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the sixties and 
seventies into the national liberation discourse, constructing a much-needed 
unification of a distinct Palestinian national identity. However, that significance of 
the peasant was only symbolic and relevant to a construction of sumud as staying on 
the land, but in a non-violent, passive and non-confrontational form – according to 
the PLO (Swedenburg, 1990). Arab politicians since 1978 have confined sumud to a 
geographical location (the occupied Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and 
Gaza), as Raja Shehadeh writes in his book, The Third Way: A journal of life in the 
West Bank (Shehadeh, 1984). However, Shehadeh (viii) asserts that sumud “had been 
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practiced by every man, women and child here struggling on his or her own to learn 
to cope with, and resist, the pressures of living as a member of a conquered people” 
and he further highlights how sumud for the samidon (those who practice sumud) “is 
developing from an all-encompassing form of life into a form of resistance”. 
Swedenburg (1990) further reflects on a rupture in the Arab narrow viewpoint due 
to the grassroots uprising of Palestinians during the first Intifada in 1987, one that 
put the Palestinian individual and the peasant as the central actor and agent of social 
change, liberation and what Meari refers to as community resistance which was 
being initiated and led by workers and peasants (Meari, 2017).   
Attesting to its multiplicity, sumud can be found in varying acts and pockets of 
everyday life and culture, including in poetry (Sazzad, 2016), confronting 
interrogators (Meari, 2011), claiming residual spaces of Palestinian existence in the 
refugee camps (Alkhalili, 2017), enacting resistance to planning inside Israel (Plonski, 
2016), staying on the land and cultivating it (Darweish and Sellick, 2017; Reger, 2017), 
encountering the Israeli military checkpoint (Gould, 2014; Rijke, 2014; Ryan, 2015a) 
or through adaptation to adverse conditions, especially as exercised by Palestinian 
women (Ryan, 2015b). In summary, it’s the endurance of settler colonial conditions 
through continuous non-violent opposition and engagement with these conditions. 
As Raja Shehadeh claims, sumud is a third and alternative way for Palestinian that is 
neither exile nor submission in face of the coloniser (Shehadeh, 1984). It can 
alternate from its most passive forms of getting by to visible and vivid confrontations 
and opposition to settler colonial rule (Halper, 2006b). Sumud invokes suffering, 
resistance, perseverance and survival against all odds.  
In this thesis, sumud is identified as explicitly informing the daily acts of resistance 
of the Jawlanis and the fellahin (farmers) of sahl al-Battuf. Notions of sumud will be 
used to analyse the particular acts and tactics of resistance exercised by Palestinians 
inside Israel and the Syrians of the oGH, conceptualising sumud as ”a relational 
concept that involves a complex web of alternating relationalities to the self and 
multiple others” and as “a possibility that is actualized in particular moments and 
floating up as a potentiality in others” (Meari, 2011, p.53). Both areas are important 
sites of Israeli waterscape, and both Arab populations have articulated and 
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undertaken diverse acts of sumud in the face of settler colonial uprooting and 
dispossession. The empirical chapters (chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) relate and discuss these 
specific invocations of sumud, in which I argue that sumud is articulated through the 
political subjectivity which farming acquired as a means of staying on the land.  
The recent work of Ayyash (2018) highlights how the examination of fellahin acts 
of resistance offers a ‘decolonial’ approach which transcends the limitations of 
settler-native distinctions or the nationalist/statist framings of resistance. As Vincent 
Lemire has shown in his work on fellahin’s water struggles under the British mandate 
in Jerusalem, hydropolitical consciousness was imbricated in wider nationalistic and 
recognition struggles being undertaken by the Palestinians against Zionist state 
policies, in contestation with some Palestinian elites and intellectuals (Lemire, 2011, 
p.33). Contestation over natural resources – water and land in this thesis – are argued 
to be constituents in the multiple elements which make up an Arab political 
consciousness and sumud.  
Scholarly literature on resistance has paid significant interest to Palestinian 
cases of everyday resistance against a hegemonic settler colonial regime (Gould, 
2014; Halper, 2006a, 2006b; Johansson and Vinthagen, 2014; Marie et al., 2016; 
Rijke, 2014; Vinthagen and Johansson 2013). Resistance, especially under settler 
colonialism, is an ongoing process not an event (Svirsky, 2017). While resistance is 
often associated with specific momentous events, this remains a narrow view at odds 
with what scholars have examined as everyday, subtle, and hidden acts of resistance 
and confrontations with power (Abu-Lughod, 1990; Bayat, 2010; Brewer, 2010; 
Mitchell, 1990; Scott, 1986). The oppositional act of resistance, coupled with its 
practical manifestations in the daily lives of the subaltern is continuously entangled 
with power and is in continuous flux (Hirsch 2017; Hollander and Einwohner 2004; 
Johansson and Vinthagen 2014; Vinthagen and Johansson 2013). Certeau, in his 
seminal work, The Practice of Everyday Life (1984), examines the everyday acts of 
resistance carried out by the subaltern, or the marginalised, and offers an important 
distinction between strategies and tactics. While strategies belong to the realms of 
military control and political-economic power, associated above all with organised 
campaigns to reach goals, tactics are specific actions always in a state of flux, 
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constantly reassessed and revaluated in relation to contexts of opposition. An 
important insight from De Certeau’s work is to show the often-underestimated scope 
for everyday practices of resistance in the face of overwhelming power, as 
represented in my study of water struggles in settler colonial contexts. The reference 
to resistance literature would not be complete without reference to seminal work by 
Spivak-Chakrabarty (1988), and the non-European historical context in which they 
examine subaltern struggles. Situating peasant movements at the centre of their 
research, their work is invaluable in understanding forms of peasant dissent and 
protest outside of rational and nationalistic drivers. The relevance to this thesis is in 
its attempts to deconstruct colonial discourses around third world dissent and 
protest and allow for platforms of decolonising our knowledge base and analysis.   
As we shall see in this section, the centrality of linking such conceptualisations 
of resistance with the more vernacular and grounded local concept of sumud is 
central to understanding how settler colonial resource policies and practices have 
been resisted by farming communities in the Galilee (Audeh, 1983; Bashir, 2006; 
Darweish and Sellick, 2017; King-Irani, 2000; Sa’di, 2001). It is also instructive, as 
shown extensively in this study, how accounts and experiences of everyday 
resistance in the occupied Golan Heights have also drawn on, and developed, the 
idea of sumud (Abu Fakhr, 2000; Al-Marsad, 2018; Kennedy, 1984; Mara’i and Halabi, 
1992), highlighting sumud’s multiplicity in enacting perseverance under settler 
colonial conditions.  
However, the lens through which everyday resistance and protest is studied 
in this thesis departs from a romanticised and unified anti-colonial approach. Lila Abu 
Lughod was attentive of how narrations and conceptualisations of everyday 
resistance in a way reduced it to a romanticised phenomenon. She insists that 
resistance should be used ‘as a diagnostic of power’ (1990, p.41), to allow learning 
from the everyday acts of resistance “about the complex interworkings of historically 
changing systems of power” (ibid, p.53).  This puts the focus of analysis and study on 
those framed as the ‘others’ and asks how the Israeli governing apparatus deals with 
and enacts ways of contending with these groups. The interest of using the sumud 
and resistance lens is to see how very concretised and centralised systems of Israeli 
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governance of land and water are challenged and re-configured in the everyday 
practices of farming communities. These can be minute and insignificant to the 
settler colonial state at times, while erupting into larger consolidated acts of protest 
opposition, and negotiations in other times, as both case studies reveal. The settler 
colonial state’s systematic neglect of Palestinian and Syrian farmers, as discussed and 
explained by the presence-absence lens, lends to further interpretation of cases of 
acquiescence and recognition sought by these communities through the aspiration 
to be recognised as equal farmers and to be incorporated into the existing 
institutional arrangements in order to stay on the land. Here, the resistance of the 
subaltern is marred with attempts of incorporation and inclusion within the Israeli 
government plans. Therefore, the subaltern lens allows this research to explore 
struggles not just as resistance but also those of negotiation, compromise and 
acquiescence. This produces conflicting narratives and imaginaries, further 
explaining the contentious and nonhomogeneous lived experiences and decisions of 
the communities studied. The dilemmas of both communities (as discussed 
extensively in chapter 5 and 7) is in the adoption of narratives of resistance and or 
cooperation. While resistance binds together the ontological and political values of 
land and water, through the rejection of state intervention and control, the 
cooperation narrative engages directly and actively with the state to secure rights to 
develop and to be seen as equal in the eyes of the state. This can be seen in al-Battuf 
through the engagement of different actors to achieve the drainage project, or 
through the direct support of conservation of the valley. In the oGH, the 
development of the cooperatives also scaled up the engagement with the occupying 
power and further incorporated the Syrian farmers within the Israeli agricultural 
complex.”  
 
2.3 Settler colonialism, misrecognition and Infrastructural 
violence 
Settler colonialism is the practice of conquering land and then 
populating it with the victorious people, the settlers. Such a 
population shift may be triggered by the need for space for an 
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expanding population, or it may be prompted by the need to assert 
economic and political control in the new territory; regardless, it 
results in the dispossession and often the extermination of large 
parts of ‘native’ populations and the subsequent cultural,  
economic, and political subordination of the remainder (Lloyd and 
Pulido, 2010, pp.796-797). 
 
Veracini (2013) defines settler colonialism as a political-economic formation 
which aims to expel a majority of the indigenous population, creating a new territory 
for the settlers of the conquering state. Wolfe (2006) refers to settler colonialism as 
an act of elimination. Settler colonial projects and regimes face stark, competing 
choices for dealing with local indigenous communities. Kellerman identifies three 
options: genocide (elimination in the words of Wolfe, 2006), tight control, and 
partnership (Kellerman, 1993). The settler state is generally expansionist and 
ethnocentric, usually establishing coercive control over territory and the symbolic 
resources of the indigenous inhabitants of the land (Yiftachel, 2006). This formation, 
in case of its failure to remove these inhabitants completely, systematically excludes 
them from nation and state-building identity projects.  
 
Settler colonialism deploys an expansionist spatial logic of accumulation by 
dispossession. As Lloyd (2012, p.66) notes:  
What distinguishes a settler colony from an administrative or 
extractive one is in the first place the settlers’ focus on the 
permanent appropriation of land rather than the political and 
economic subordination of the indigenous population, the 
monopolisation of its resources, or the control of its markets. 
 
 According to Wolfe (2006), Zionism constitutes an intensification of, rather 
than a departure from, settler colonialism. However, as a land-centred endeavour, 
and unlike the fixation of colonialism on natives as labour, the Zionist settler colonial 
project in Palestine focused on ‘Jewish land’, ‘Jewish labour’ and the control of 
natural resources. The establishment of agricultural cooperatives, kibbutzim, was the 
epitome of that vision during the early years of the State of Israel, creating a new 
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society devoid of the native and harnessing natural resources for the benefit of 
national development. The transformation of the inherent meaning in land, territory 
and terrain has been archetypal of state and settler interventions (Kolers, 2009). 
Settler societies do not recognize indigenous conceptions of land and property, 
typically viewing indigenous populations as failing to make productive use of land. 
The strategy of “indigenous de-territorialization” (Choi, 2016, p.13) has been 
deployed to strip from these populations both land and other resource entitlements, 
including affective connections to the land (Elkins and Pedersen, 2005). A settler 
project succeeds, therefore, when it cements its control of the land it occupies, 
establishes sovereign political authority and completes its termination of 
autonomous indigenous forms (Veracini, 2013). Under such conditions, territorial 
power is associated with fear and violence, where the settler/indigene distinction 
reproduces binaries of inclusion/exclusion and friend/enemy (Elden, 2010; Lefebvre, 
1991, p.280).10F 11 
 
The processes of dispossession and elimination of indigenous societies do not 
only concern policies of erasure and destruction but also the hegemonic imposition 
of a socionatural order, in this case the construction of uneqal waterscapes. The 
material and symbolic transformation of land, territory and terrain has been 
archetypal of settler state interventions (Kolers, 2009). While indigenous peoples 
traditionally placed spiritual and cultural significance to land and natural resources, 
managing and controlling their use through communal governance, these systems of 
meaning and practice were swept aside by settler colonialism. Wolfe highlights how 
settler colonial endeavors on land should not be seen as bounded events (in the 
Nakba for instance), but rather as ongoing processes of establishing new realities on 
the expropriated land, through the erasure of history and memory of the indigenous 
and continuous efforts to establish normalcy in destruction and elimination (Wolfe, 
                                                          
11 To understand the political construction of such a relationship between the settler and the native, Mamdani 
(1996) explains how settler colonialism establishes the reason why one is a settler and the other is a native. This 
highlights the complexity of such a relationship and its dynamics, as it views the existence of one as a necessity 
of the existence of the other. Settler presence also bolsterers nationalist sentiments in the colonized, in 
opposition to colonialism. Building on that, it is evident how settler colonialism and varying agents of foreign 
control also play a pivotal role in this transformation, reconstruction and redefining of space and place.   
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2006; Salamanca et al., 2012). While it remains risky to romanticise indigenous 
livelihood practices and forms of production, it is evident that such populations 
adopted and managed their resources independently from the western conceptions 
of value (Mikhail, 2011). The settler colonial strategy of de-territorialisation of the 
indigenous population has been deployed to strip indigenous populations from their 
lands, severing their material and affective connections to the land (Elden, 2010). 
Moreover, such acts of dispossession are not replaced by inclusive modes of 
governance within the new settler state, as indigenous populations are routinely 
excluded from such arrangements, imposing a state of limbo on such populations: 
being present in the settler colonial state while being banished to spaces of 
marginality and instability.  
  
My interest in employing the settler colonial lens is to investigate how water 
and land policies of the Israeli state manifest themselves in the lives and livelihood 
practices of farming communities in the Galilee and the occupied Golan Heights, and 
how these policies are resisted. While encapsulated in a settler colonial regime and 
its constricted spaces of existence, struggles nevertheless emerge to challenge the 
state’s policies of dispossession, exclusion and misrecognition. A distinct ‘othering’ 
has been exercised by the Israeli state to justify its exclusionary policies exercised 
against the Palestinians inside Israel, and in occupied territories against the Syrian 
and West Bank/Gaza Strip Palestinians to varying degrees. Abdo and Yuval-Davis 
(1995, p.292) explain that “the main thrust of the Zionist settlement project for most 
of its history has been to dispossess and then to exclude the Palestinians whenever 
possible from control over the various resources of the country and the state”. This 
alienation and exclusion of the indigenous becomes solidified in the everyday life of 
the communities undergoing it, as the “Palestinians are incorporated into the one 
not connected directly to land and control of land” (Shafir, 2005, p.55).  
Israeli dispossession, by detaching the Palestinian and Syrians from their land 
and limiting their livelihoods subsistence, has resulted in a precarious livelihood and 
identity politics. Control of land readily lends itself to conflict in settler colonial 
contexts. Land is an important economic asset and source of livelihoods; but it is also 
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closely linked to community identity, history and culture. Communities, therefore, 
can readily mobilise around land issues, making land a central object of conflict. For 
Veracini, a settler project succeeds when it completes the ‘external’ supervision and 
control of the land it occupies, establishes “local sovereign political and cultural 
forms” and also completes its termination of “substantive indigenous autonomies, 
and has tamed a landscape that was once perceived as intractably alien” (2013, p. 
28). In both case studies examined in this study, I argue that the settler colonial 
project has not succeeded in these terms, on account of the active persistence of 
indigenous landscapes and waterscapes.   
The Galilee’s character of being an Arab stronghold long tormented the Israeli 
leaders such as Ben Gurion, who visualised the Arab villages “occupying the space”, 
reducing its judaisation character and requiring conquest and ‘occupation’ (Bashir, 
2004, p.17). In such settler colonial processes, the settler aspires to blur the line 
between settler and native and come to be viewed as the native. The space it 
occupies is heavily invested in in economic terms to render it ordinary (Ram, 2015). 
The equal judaisation of space and place by the settler state is seen in the occupied 
Golan Heights, where Israel tries to normalise the landscape and render it ordinary, 
even a site of tourism and recreation. In both case studies, the Israeli space 
entrenches itself within the ‘others’ and creates realities of disenfranchisement for 
those non-Jewish indigenous populations opposing normalisation. Ram highlights 
how such sites are far from ‘natural’ extensions of their host territory as they remain 
“encamped spaces”. Ram’s analysis, however, disregards the role of indigenous 
subjects, who are not as ‘abject’ in such a state of exception but remain resistant to 
settler colonial attempts at integration (Isin and Rygiel, 2007).  
The settler colonialism lens is adopted, therefore, to bring about a deeper 
understanding of how Israeli policies of land planning and water management – 
devised to eliminate, uproot and reduce the space of the indigenous population’s 
existence – can also trigger and solidify acts of rootedness, belonging and sumud 
through farming and resource claim-making. Events of rupture, such as land 
confiscation, removal and denial of rights and misrecognition, are met with counter-
acts of resistance and protest, re-affirmation of identities and a re-rooting in place. 
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For Palestinians inside Israel, the dichotomies of being citizen strangers (Robinson, 
2013) and fifth column citizens, excluded and unequal, tells a complex and 
problematic story of resistance and protest. The Jawlanis of the occupied Golan 
Heights, being non-citizens in an occupied land, also live in a state of limbo in an 
uneasy co-existence with the settler state.  
 
2.3.1 Settler Colonialism as Systemic Misrecognition 
 
Only recently has work on the politics of misrecognition explored the 
symbolic devaluation of places and place-based identities. As Nancy Fraser claims: 
“To be denied recognition—or to be ‘misrecognized’—is to suffer both a distortion 
of one’s relation to one’s self and an injury to one’s identity” (Fraser, 2000, p.109). 
The conditions under which the erosion of collective identities constitutes an injury 
is a focus of various attachment theories applying a rights-based understanding to 
territorial communities (e.g. Kolers, 2009; 2012; Moore, 2012) and landscapes (Egoz 
et al., 2011). The idea of rootedness: what Kolers labels “ethnogeographic 
communities” share a common ontology of land manifest in culturally-specific 
conceptions of use and a distinctive nexus of land use practices (2009, pp.109-11).  
The coercive imposition of a hegemonic land (or water) ontology by a settler 
colonial state represents environment-related violence under the Peluso and Watts 
(2001) definition adopted in section 2.1 above, covering systemic physical and non-
physical harm. Indigenous identities exist in a precarious tension with the place-
making of settler colonial states, which is predicated on the imposition of a dominant 
ethnogeographic identity. Settler colonialism carries out an ontological uprooting of 
ethno-geographic communities. This is not limited to uprooting through the 
confiscation of agricultural lands but extends to the destruction of a moral economy 
and cultural identity associated with indigenous farming practices (Bourdieu and 
Sayad, 2004). Here, misrecognition is systematic and goes beyond the definitional 
term of mistaking the identity of a group to refer more broadly to the systematic 
devaluation of minority identities, resulting in the marginalisation and exclusion of 
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indigenous groups. Systematic misrecognition can be enacted as an engineered 
strategy of policy making. In the ethno-geographic communities studied here, it 
involves the imposition of policies of forced citizenship and an ontological 
colonisation of land and other resources. These ethno-geographic communities have 
shaped themselves and their landscapes in defence against this misrecognition, 
asserting a distinctive right to recognition and place-based identity. Consequently, in 
its effort to erase the presence of those communities in the landscape through denial 
of access to resources such as land and water, the settler colonial state enacts 
misrecognition. The ontological erasure of communities’ presence is contested by 
using those same resources as conduits of claim making and identity making. 
In al-Battuf, the Palestinians remaining inside Israel after 1948 have faced an 
exclusionary ethno-national state, which enacted misrecognition of their ethno-
geographic identification, and confined their existence in enclosures under military 
rule and ‘a denial of Palestinian sensibilities’ (Rabinowitz and Abu Baker, 2005, p.11). 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the state began its incorporation of Palestinians 
inside Israel as citizens of the state and facilitated their normalisation into Israeli 
society through de-nationalisation strategies and incorporation into state institutions 
and arrangements. The Israeli citizenship of the indigenous Palestinians enabled 
limited legal and political tools, which continue to struggle under policies of 
difference, mainly the judaisation of their lands (McKee, 2014).  
 
The Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights is another manifestation of a 
wider settler project featuring the dispossession and displacement of indigenous 
populations. In the occupied Golan Heights, the Syrian Jawlanis not displaced to Syria 
have faced strong normalisation pressures, intensified in 1982 when Israel enacted 
the Golan Heights Law to apply Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the 
territory (a de facto annexation not recognized by the international community). 
From a settler colonial lens, Gordon and Ram (2016) highlight how the formation of 
settler colonial geographies in the occupied Golan Heights followed a ‘refined’ 
approach of control and destruction, employing what they referred to as ‘liberal 
biopolitical technologies’. As Ram (2015) argues, in the Golan Heights there is an 
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inherent tension between the normalisation and domestication of an occupation 
regime and the re-articulation of spatial practices necessary to maintain coercive 
control over individuals and groups who have resisted this imposition of rule, and the 
misrecognition it entails. The misrecognition inflicted on the Jawlani community in 
the occupied Golan Heights expresses this tension, continually surfacing in the 
discriminatory spaces and socio-natures structuring the landscape. 
 
2.3.2 Settler colonial studies and the need for indigenous studies  
 
While settler colonial studies offer analytical tools to understand settler 
colonialism’s environmental practices, politics and their effects, Carroll critically 
engages with  Veracini's (2014) justification of settler colonial studies as a conceptual 
platform for the task of explaining settler colonial relations. Carroll contests that “the 
anchoring analytics of elimination and destruction/replacement...loses theoretical 
grounding when a history of Indigenous displacement (and continual Indigenous 
presence) is lacking” (Carroll, 2017, para. 18). Moreover, J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, an 
indigenous scholar, asserts that “to exclusively focus on the settler colonial without 
any meaningful engagement with the indigenous…can (re)produce another form of 
‘elimination of the native” (Kauanui, 2016, para. 3). Kauani is referring here to the 
adoption and citation of Wolfe’s work without paying any attention to the root and 
origin of theorisation that Wolfe refers to in native scholarship and the fact that this 
theory – ‘settler colonialism is a structure not an event’ – cannot be devoid and 
separated from engagement with indigenous experience. While Kauanui agrees with 
Wolfe’s conception of the endurance of settler colonialism, she contends that 
indigeneity also is enduring and that “indigenous people exist, resist and persist”.  
In the Palestinian context, Rana Barakat cautions in her essay Writing/righting 
Palestine studies about the limitations of a settler colonial analysis in writing about 
Palestine but giving insufficient agency to indigenous communities. She states that 
relying on a settler colonial analytic has “led to a Zionist-centered reading of the 
narrative of Palestine” (Barakat, 2017, p.2), and therefore the need to study 
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Palestinian history from an indigenous lens. Bhandar and Ziadah (2016) further 
criticise how the settler colonial analytic is used in the case of Palestine and expose 
some of its shortcomings in the legal context and in its anti-colonial framing of 
Palestinian solidarity struggles. One of the striking legal dynamics that the authors 
attempt to engage with is “the cunning of recognition” of other indigenous 
communities and aboriginal groups in Canada and Australia and the narrow 
confinement within western anthropological discourses of what it is to be indigenous 
(Coulthard, 2007; 2014). Indigeneity also comes with its own shortcomings and 
compromises, as Suhad Bishara claims in the case of the Bedouins in the Naqab 
(Negev) (Assafir, 2017 in Arabic) as she claims its inapplicability to the Palestinian 
cause, and its implication in further disintegrating and fragmenting of a political 
Palestinian identity. Bhandar and Ziadah also claim that formal recognition in the 
case of indigenous peoples in Canada and Australia reinforced the colonial 
sovereignty of the state. 
Libby Porter, in her work on the postcolonial consequences of planning, 
argues that histories of Western concepts, like planning, ‘obscure’ colonial relations 
of domination and subjugation and lead to its normalisation. Citing Franz Fanon 
(1963), Porter claims that colonial power is reproduced not only through ‘material 
operations of power’ but also through the subjection of the colonised to forms of 
recognition that maintain colonial rule, and normalise their alienation (Porter, 2017). 
As Chakravorty-Spivak contends in her seminal work, Can the Subaltern speak?, the 
struggles of the subaltern have been about gaining recognition and reclaiming a voice 
to speak up in the face of existential threats and systemic misrecognition. What 
Spivak calls ‘strategic essentialism’ occurs in conditions where, to get political 
attention, the subaltern has to claim its voice in a language that the settler colonial 
state hears and can understand, even if this adopts an identity consistent with their 
‘otherness’ (Spivak, 1988). In Porter’s analysis, this is reflected in how political claims 
for recognition by indigenous peoples against settler colonial powers are largely 
ideological, compromising their own heterogeneous make-up. Gaining rights to 
recognition from the settler state can therefore normalise their subjection, 
reproducing the assumed binary relations between settler-coloniser and colonised.  
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While the settler colonial state coercively pushes uniform ways of seeing and 
managing spaces and objects of rule, everyday tactics of resistance can make 
indigenous presence legible and their imaginaries legitimate and visible, challenging 
settler colonial imaginaries of ordered development and their “receding visibility of 
indigenous life” (Veracini, 2015, p.43). James Scott suggests that, despite planners’ 
intentions, state spaces of control end up being variegated and incomplete. He 
differentiates between, on the one hand, state-imposed plans that attempt to 
demarcate space and make it legible from afar (Scott, 1998), and on the other hand, 
acts of resistance that arise in villages and other places removed or hidden from state 
centres of power (Scott, 1985, 2009). This echoes an overarching lens by which the 
case studies are analysed in this thesis: the ‘presence-absence’ lens through which 
spaces are controlled, hegemony is exercised, and counter-hegemony takes place. 
What I argue as an overarching lens cutting through the theoretical underpinnings 
reviewed above, is that, for the two case studies, struggles take place in a constant 
reality of the ‘presence-absence’ of the state, infrastructure, citizenship rights, 
recognition of identities and mostly through the presence-absence of water. Linking 
all of these elements to conditions of surveillance and abandonment by the state 
against its Palestinian and Syrian subjects will allow for the indigenous history to be 
re-articulated within larger struggles over water and identity. The dominance of 
hydro-hegemonic regimes will therefore be critically interrogated, allowing for a 
more politicised history and counter-imaginary to emerge where the presence of an 
indigenous other clashes with, and contests, the new political order imposed by 
settler colonial rule.  
The issue remains as to how to recover indigenous histories by reframing the 
agency of indigenous subjects under settler colonial rule, and to overcome the binary 
simplification between native and settler by reversing the colonial logic. To 
essentialise indigenous imaginaries as natural, romantic and unitary (as highlighted 
in section 2.2.2), feeds into the binary narrative of settler colonialism. What I try to 
show in this thesis is not the reversal of the mere binary of settler colonial depictions 
of the native Arab as ‘primitive’ or necessarily more in tune with ‘natural’ landscapes 
or waterscapes, but rather that their indigenous struggles exist within, and shape, a 
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complex, dynamic and hybrid reality of settler colonial rule. This approach recognises 
the active agency of the Palestinians in al-Battuf and Syrians in the oGH: it rejects a 
victim narrative, which is often assumed by settler colonial studies on Israel/Palestine 
(see Plonski, 2016).  Hence, I argue for putting indigenous water histories at the 
forefront of the understanding of the water struggles, rejecting the passive 
victimisation often implied by settler colonial studies, and exposing acts of resistance 
carried out in the critical decades of water policymaking in Israel during the 1950s 
and 1960s, and their scaling-up and re-configurations in the following decades 
through water and infrastructure. 
 
2.4 Settler state water and infrastructural violence 
 
This section offers an overview of infrastructure “as an ethnographically 
graspable manifestation” (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012, p.403). In the introduction to a 
special issue of Ethnography on infrastructural violence, Rodgers and O’Neill consider 
how infrastructure often serves to exclude and marginalise yet can also serve as a 
conduit for social change and protest.  
The story of Infrastructure is most dominantly told through the prism of it 
being a state-led endeavour fraught with inequality, disruption and asymmetric 
power. It serves as the site of nation-building symbolism, especially concerning water 
infrastructure, and is harnessed to channel and disseminate legitimacy, ideology and 
power (Menga, 2014; Menga and Swyngedouw, 2018; Obertreis et al., 2016; 
Swyngedouw, 2007). Through infrastructure, the state can distribute material capital 
(of water flows) but also social, ideological and symbolic capital (Swyngedouw, 2004). 
Hence, state infrastructure can be used as a tool of exclusion and marginalisation, 
consolidating citizenship fragmentation and inequality in access to resources based 
on racial, class and ethnic divisions (Ibrahim, 2017; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Anand, 
2011). Because of their centrality for nation-building exercises, infrastructures 
become ontological manifestations of state attempts to govern people (or subjects) 
and resources (Scott, 1998). As Mukrerji (2009, p.15) reflects, canals and water 
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carries before becoming technical accomplishments they “had to be an object of 
political desire”. The rationale, scale, impact, execution and maintenance of 
infrastructures require us to ask questions about who controls infrastructure and the 
capital it channels, to whom is it going and who is it excluding especially on an 
everyday basis. A plethora of literature can be found on infrastructural lives, violence 
and materiality in the city (Anand, 2012; Björkman, 2015; Coleman, 2014; Kooy and 
Bakker, 2008; Larkin, 2013; Mitchell, 2014; Obertreis e al., 2016; Swyngedouw, 2007) 
and other works focused on the anthropology of infrastructure (Franz Krause and 
Strang, 2016; Star, 1999; Strang, 2004; Strang, 2014) exposing the relationship 
between  water,  infrastructure  and  political  rule. These ethnographic approaches 
allow the understanding of how “exclusion was built into the design of 
infrastructure” (Jasanoff, 2006, p.752) and since much of the time infrastructures are 
taken-for-granted or invisible, the violence and political contestation  they cause may 
be hidden.  
Structural violence describes social structures—economic, political, legal, 
religious, and cultural—that stop individuals, groups, and societies from reaching 
their full potential. While the use of the term violence is often associated with certain 
visible acts of misbehaviour, Galtung refers to structural violence as realities and 
circumstances that are ‘avoidable’ and ‘intended’ (Mehta, 2016). Structural violence 
is therefore entrenched in the structures that govern and mediate interactions and 
is normalised by state, law and regulation. Because they seem so ordinary in our ways 
of understanding the world, they appear almost invisible. As Starr (1999) argues, the 
conditions creating systemic disparity in access to resources, political power, 
education, health care, and legal standing are just a few examples of structural 
violence. Structural violence is therefore closely linked to distributive injustice, 
inequality and dispossession (Farmer, 2004). Denial of modernisation and access to 
scientific advancement is another manifestation of the structural violence of 
exclusion and marginalisation exercised against the marginalised and indigenous 
populations.  It normalises the denial of communities’ ability to progress and 
embrace social change (Li, 2017).  
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Infrastructural violence obstructs and alters forms of life, and in the case of 
the Israeli water infrastructure it distinctively segregates and excludes. 
Infrastructures “distribute life and harm” (Anand, 2011, p.2: see also Li, 2017), 
evoking emotions of abandonment and suffering because of the state (Rasmussen, 
2015, p.11). Being on the margins of the state, as Rasmussen contends, re-configures 
the communities’ engagement with the state’s “present-absence” and how the state 
makes its presence felt and visible through abandonment conditions, “understood as 
suspended between material conditions, social imaginaries, and modes of 
governance” (2015, p.11). These emotional experiences of being left behind, 
systematically side-lined from state decision making, is juxtaposed with feelings of 
resentment due to the encroachment of the state on livelihoods and resources. Such 
emotive struggles (Davidson et al., 2005) are at the heart of the lived geographies 
approach adopted in this thesis. Continuous struggles against the state (in this case 
a settler-colonial state) oscillate between protesting being ‘abandoned’ and 
deliberately excluded by state policies and practices, and aspiring to create 
infrastructures and parallel governance structures that are independent of the 
state’s governing gaze and control. The promise and aspiration for infrastructure also 
allows the framing of such artefacts as conduits of resistance and opposition to 
hegemonic state rule. As Rodgers and O’Neill note “infrastructure is by no means 
only a site where forms of social control and oppression can be observed, but also a 
potential place for imagining more positive politics” (2012, p.402). As Barnes notes, 
technologies can indeed help build communities but can also fracture them (Barnes, 
2012). 
2.5 Concluding remarks  
 
The literature reviewed in this chapter and its conceptual underpinnings have 
guided this research and refined its theoretical argument. To study water in settler 
colonial societies, we need to be alert to conditions of presence as much as absence 
of its material and discursive construction. What brings together this chapter, at the 
convergence of political ecology, lived geographies and settler colonialism, is the role 
of infrastructure as an object of material and discursive power, in shaping and 
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contesting settler colonial waterscapes, channelling water through multiple social, 
political and cultural dimensions. As Nikhil Anand and co-authors claim: “Discourses, 
narratives and language give form to infrastructure as much as concrete, wires, or 
zoning regulations” (2018, p.9). Mirroring this observation, the forms of 
infrastructure dominating the waterscapes of our study will be a central theme of the 
inquiry, whether large-scale state infrastructures, such as the National Water Carrier, 
or the counter-infrastructures of Arab farmers are contested and adopted as 
conduits of claim-making and rootedness. In a settler colonial context, the presence 
and/or absence of infrastructures in certain locations and contexts can tell us more 
about the lived experiences of communities and the relations between water and 
power. Such conditions of suffering with and without infrastructure are visible in the 
lives of the two case studies and reflect larger processes of exclusion and 
dispossession. Ultimately, communities’ claims over water reflect larger claims for 
recognition and self-determination. On a basin-level, the hydro-hegemonic position 
of Israel has denied Palestinian and Syrian states from claiming their rights to control 
and access major water resources. Contrastingly, Palestinian and Syrian communities 
experiencing a localised form of that hegemony are claiming rights to water through 
infrastructure as an act of resistance, outside of TWM arrangements and scales.  
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
 
The overall objective of this thesis is to examine how Arab farming communities 
have responded to settler colonial land and water policies and how Israeli hydro-
hegemony was experienced in local lived geographies. I study material realisation of 
state water infrastructure (including law as infrastructure) and examine acts of 
protest and resistance through counter-infrastructures as means of staying on the 
land and protecting livelihoods. I intend to reveal the complex web of interactions 
and encounters that farming communities experience to claim rights to water and 
infrastructure, through which claims to identity and belonging also surface. The 
research therefore required an embeddedness in the field, and a selection of 
appropriate case studies where such water struggles were taking place, notably 
featuring the imposition by a settler colonial state of water infrastructures that 
discriminated against indigenous ethno-geographic communities. In this chapter, I 
will begin by sharing the motivation to carry out the research and the rationale for 
the selection of case studies. I will then describe the main methods used to collect 
and analyse data. Finally, the last section will discuss aspects of reflexivity and 
positionality while doing fieldwork and other research.  
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
3.1.1 Research motivation  
 
The main objective of the study Transboundary Climate Security: Climate 
Vulnerability and Rural Livelihoods in the Jordan River Basin, carried out in 2012-13 
by the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), UK, and Birzeit 
University, Palestine, was to investigate climate-related vulnerabilities of agricultural 
communities in (post)occupation environments, namely in South Lebanon, the oGH 
and the occupied Palestinian territories (Mason and Mimi, 2013). The main findings 
highlighted how (post)occupational conditions and stresses are perceived by Arab 
farmers as more significant than climate change, specifically concerning water 
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allocations. In this project, I was leading the research in the occupied Golan Heights 
(oGH), exploring a field site and context very different from my usual water-related 
research in Palestine. One of the focus group sessions which I carried out as part of 
this research uncovered a recurring theme: identity. Place-based identity was used 
by the Jawlani focus group participants to highlight issues of land, water rights and 
access to resources, viewing their agricultural, infrastructural and livelihood practices 
as an expression of sumud. This is where I realised how water has been confined in 
our research work in the JRB to state-centric dynamics, occluding what that water 
means for communities who were denied equal access to it. I have worked closely 
with Palestinian communities affected by manufractured scarcity who had to adapt 
to discriminatory Israeli policies of water control and access, enacting sumud in their 
actions. Encountering a similar framing of land-based resistance in the Golan Heights 
was of great interest to me.  
 My research motivation therefore emerged from apparent parallels in Arab 
communities responses to the imposition of Israeli water politics in the oGH and the 
occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT), both under Israeli occupation. Since the Oslo 
Accords in 1992, water has become a politically charged topic in the oPT, and indeed 
is one of the issues to be negotiated in the final peace agreements between Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority. This has consolidated all the efforts of NGOs, 
Palestinian civil society and international donor agencies on examining water-as-a-
resource, essentially de-historicising and de-politicising daily water struggles in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Realising the reductionist approach that such a 
technical-managerial discourse imposes has led me to study what I refer to as ‘water 
politics from below’. First, the motivation was the need to tell the history of multiple 
waters: that of the transboundary, the state, Arab agricultural communities and 
other actors’ waters. Secondly, water infrastructures matter in the study of water 
struggles across the basin. Infrastructures are ideological as much as they are 
technical and this is reflected in their modes of operation, connections and 
disconnections. My main interest was in how these infrastructures connect and 
disconnect communities not just from water, but also from landscapes, livelihoods 
and place-based attachments. This is when I decided to examine infrastructures as 
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sites of dispossession and as conduits of resistance and claim-making. The oGH 
offered an ideal first location for that investigation, as the Israeli water infrastructure 
there both consolidated strategic geopolitical control of the tributaries of the Jordan 
River and expressly served a settler colonial project which was resisted by the 
remaining Syrian populations residing there. 
Investigating water infrastructure in Israel and Israeli occupied territories also 
necessitates the study of the National Water Carrier (NWC) as an emblem of 
centralised state water control and hydro-hegemony. As highlighted in Chapter 1, the 
discursive construction of the JRB as a transboundary watershed encouraged Israel’s 
efforts to become a hydro-hegemon. The Israeli water infrastructure facilitated 
transfers from the north (oGH) through Lake Tiberias and through an assemblage of 
large canals, pipelines and pumps to reach al-Battuf. This justified al-Battuf as the 
second site of investigation, as it offered similarities and distinctions with the oGH 
case in terms of being an area central to the realisation of Israeli hydro-hegemony 
and associated discriminatory water transfers.  
The selection of these two case studies is also justified by the nature of the 
Arab communities themselves. First, the two case studies feature communities who 
are under Israeli control; one of Palestinians living inside Israel, who are citizens of 
the state yet face systematic exclusion and discrimination, and the other of Syrian 
villages under Israeli occupation since 1967 and annexation since 1982, who have no 
citizenship rights but remain under Israeli civil administration. Second, both cases 
represent marginalised communities subject to divergent experiences of settler 
colonialism, including demographic displacement, confiscation of resources, and 
discriminatory governance. Their water histories have usually been disregarded and 
marginalised because of their incorporation into an Israeli state while being 
systematically excluded from that same state in terms of rights to resources. Due to 
the geostrategic importance of their locations, their community-based water issues, 
if recognised, are usually attributed to national and regional scales rather than 
framed as local struggles against the state. Instead of approaching water politics 
within the conventional transboundary water management (TWM) lens which has 
dominated how water is framed in the Jordan Basin, the focus of the research is thus 
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on ‘small w’ water, understanding communities’ water struggles as encounters with 
settler colonial power and hydro-hegemony.  
 
3.1.2 Research questions and objectives  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, my main research questions are: 
How do settler colonial [water and land] policies and practices manifest themselves 
in the lives and livelihood practices of farming communities in the Galilee and the 
occupied Golan Heights? 
 
To answer this, I pose two sub-questions: 
 How do agricultural livelihoods function in the studied agricultural 
communities in the context of settler colonialism?  
 What ideas, norms and beliefs shape farmers’ daily practices of agriculture? 
 
How, and with what political effects, are settler colonial [water and land] policies 
and practices resisted by farming communities in the Galilee and the occupied 
Golan Heights? 
 
To answer this, I pose two further sub-questions: 
 What forms of collective action do farmers use to resist and counter state-led 
policymaking, especially land expropriation and water allocations? 
 What are the political effects of the distinctive forms of collective resistance 
employed by farming communities?  
 
This research employs a qualitative approach in its design, data collection and 
analysis. Qualitative research allows the exploration of “the understandings, 
experiences and imaginings of our research participants, the ways that social 
processes, institutions, discourses or relationships work, and the significance of the 
meanings that they generate” (Mason, 2002, p.1). Informed by this definition, the 
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research is not a simple production of descriptive narratives of livelihood practices 
but rather aims to understand how farming transcends the economic act of income 
generation to acquire political subjectivity and meaning. The main proposition is that, 
in the settler colonial contexts studied, the farming of Arab communities acquires 
similar forms of political subjectivity. Political subjectivity refers here to the 
constitution of farmers as subjects with a communal political identity and shared 
political goals, notably relating to land and water resources. The qualitative data 
collection and analysis in this research is designed to enable me to interpret, and 
account for, the lived geographies of farmers subject to settler colonialism.  
 
3.1.3 The case studies  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Location of case studies (Map developed by Yousra Othman for this thesis, 2018) 
 
 
Al-Battuf Valley 
The Galilee has always been a central focus of the Jewish/Israeli land-
acquisition efforts and plans. The Galilee was at a point of rupture, just like the rest 
of Palestine during the 1948 war, which resulted in the shrinking of the Palestinian 
population in the Galilee specifically by 56%, dropping from 207,490 in 1946 to 
Sahl Al-Battuf 
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90,600 in 1948, coupled with an increase in Jewish populations by 35.5% (from 
39,410 in 1946 to 53,400 in 1948) (Falah, 1993). While the Jewish settlement 
campaign was heightened most profoundly in the subsequent years (1974-1982), the 
first epoch of Israel’s settler colonial encroachment on the Galilee began in 1948 with 
the destruction of 162 Palestinian villages, distributed in 5 localities (Abu-Sitta, 2004).  
 Continuously populated by its Palestinian inhabitants before and after the 
1948 Nakba, the Galilee has been the target of several policies and laws that have 
been used by the Israeli state to facilitate the Jewish expropriation and 
encroachment on the Palestinian towns and villages’ land, in addition to plans to 
Judaise the Galilee. Following the aftermath of the 1948 Nakba, Israel began 
construction of settlements in the Galilee (divided into Upper and Lower Galilee) for 
security reasons and to curb the ‘demographic threat’ of the Palestinians inside 
Israel. Those Jewish settlements were built in between the remaining Arab villages 
and towns, taking the role of Mitzpeen (lookouts/watchtowers). From 1949 until 
1966, Israel governed the remaining Palestinian towns and villages (including the 
Galilee) under military rule, continuing to seize Arab lands relentlessly (Jiryis, 1976). 
Numerous studies have carried out meticulous research on the topic (Bashir, 2004; 
Falah, 1989; 1990; Forman, 2006; Jiryis, 1976; Shafir, 2018; Yiftachel, 1992). The 
Galilee was a site of Judaization campaigns to erase its Arab character and contain 
the ‘demographic threat’, as will be explained in Chapter 4.  
Al-Battuf, our area of investigation, is a rich and vast plain in the heart of the 
Galilee (Figure 3.1). 40,000 dunums of land remain in the hands of the Palestinian 
farmers, mainly subsistence agriculturists and small landholders. Most of this land is 
cultivated to grow seasonal, rainfed crops, mainly wheat, barley, pulses, okra and 
watermelon. Due to the highly fertile soil, the valley is famous for a certain produce, 
the rainfed bateekh al-Battuf – Battuf watermelons – which were grown under 
special techniques unique to the farmers of the valley to maintain its shape and 
productivity. In addition, the valley was an area famous for livestock and cattle 
rearing. Al-Battuf also has a natural phenomenon of al-gharaq, or flooding of around 
15,000 dunums, which happens during the rainy season. Farmers with lands in these 
plots risk having their winter crops destroyed and have to plant their summer crops 
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later (as the water recedes), which limits their crop productivity. Al-Battuf, although 
mostly belonging to the Palestinian farmers, has also had its share of land 
confiscation, which makes it an ideal site for examining water and land struggles. As 
shown in Chapter 5, the Israeli government’s decision to construct the NWC open 
canal on Arrabeh and Sakhnin lands spurred one of the first confrontations between 
Palestinians inside Israel and the Israeli state over water.  
 
The occupied Golan Heights  
The Golan Heights, a high volcanic plateau located at the convergence of borders 
between Israel, Syria and Jordan is a strategic location of geopolitical and 
hydropolitical significance (See Figure 3.1). With a total area of 1,800 km2, the Syrian 
Golan lands were first occupied by Israel in 1967, which maintains its control over 
1,200 km2. The Golan Heights are a water-rich region, receiving the highest level of 
rainfall in the region– between 1000mm in the Northern region to 1600mm at Mount 
Hermon annually, while the central area received 800mm and the south 500 m on 
average. The Israeli occupation in 1967 and then de-facto annexation in 1982 turned 
the indigenous Arab inhabitants of the Golan into residents with a temporary status, 
stripping away their Syrian nationality. Most have rejected attempts to accept Israeli 
citizenship, which triggered riots and a six-months strike in 1982 (Keary, 2013; Mara’i 
and Halabi, 1992). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the reaction of the Israeli 
authorities was to deprive them of their formal Syrian identity, issuing documents 
stating they are ‘undefined’. Israel also discarded the legal frameworks for land 
ownership recognised by the Syrian government and replaced it with a military 
system of land expropriation (Mara’i and Halabi, 1992). The declaration by Israel in 
1968 that 98% of the oGH lands are closed military zones and the centralised control 
of water by the state had substantial effects on the agricultural practices of the Syrian 
residents and confined their geographical spaces of existence to that of their villages 
(Al-Marsad, 2009).   
In both areas, abrupt water and land re-configurations were experienced after 
the onset of Israeli sovereign control. The dispossession of and inequality in resource 
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access and control has made land and water struggles central to political 
mobilisations in the Battuf Valley and Golan Heights. Governmental bodies 
formulated plans for the colonization of the Golan Heights as early as 1967, and the 
judaisation plan for the Galilee from the 1950s, as shown in chapters 4 and 6. With 
agriculture being “the traditional base of pioneer colonization” (Harris, 1978, p.326; 
Masalha, 1992), the Israeli Land Authority (ILA), the World Zionist Organization’s 
(WZO) Settlement Division and the Israeli Department of Agriculture amongst others 
emerged as key actors designing and implementing exclusionary land acquisition 
against the Arab and Palestinian populations in both locations (COHRE and Badil, 
2005; Davis, 1983). Table 3.1 below summarises salient features of the two case 
study areas. In chapters 4 and 5 the case studies are analysed to identify the effects 
on Arab lives and livelihoods of settler colonial land and water policies, followed in 
chapters 6 and 7 by accounts of historical and contemporary land and water struggles 
against settler colonial rule. The main comparative findings are discussed in chapter 
8. 
Table 3.1 Comparative summary of case study areas 
 Al-Battuf The oGH 
Colonial 
resistance 
during the 20th 
century  
- 1936-39 Great Arab 
Revolt in UK Mandate 
of Palestine 
- Great Syrian Revolt 
1925-1927 in French 
Mandate for Syria and 
Lebanon 
Beginning of 
Israeli settler-
colonial rule  
- 1948 Arab-Israeli war: 
Nakba displacement 
160,000 Palestinians 
remaining inside Israel 
on 6% of the land of 
historic Palestine  
- Galilee: more than 
160  villages 
destroyed, but remains 
- 1967 Six Day War: 
Israeli occupation, 5 
villages remained with 
a population of 6,000 
(1967) on 7% of land 
- Destruction of 
hundreds of Syrian 
towns and villages 
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a dominantly 
Palestinian populated 
region.  
 
Israeli land 
policies  
- Judaisation of the 
Galilee 
- Al-Battuf: land 
confiscation of 10-
12,000 dunums of land  
- Colonisation of the 
Golan 
- Israeli state control 
over more than 93% 
of land, leaving 7% 
only for the remaining 
population  
 
Ownership of 
Arab 
agricultural land  
- Al-Battuf: Agricultural 
land under private 
ownership 
- oGH: Agricultural land 
under private 
ownership 
Israeli 
citizenship 
status 
- Israeli citizenship 
enforced on Arab 
population but not 
nationality – 
citizenship not fully 
realised as non-Jews 
- Attempted imposition 
of Israeli citizenship 
for Arab population 
but contested and 
rejected 
- Unidentified 
nationality/ residency 
status 
Israeli state 
infrastructure  
- Enactment of Israeli 
water law in 1959 
- National Water Carrier 
completed in 1964 
- Military order 120, 
1968 
- Israeli water law 1959 
enacted in 1982  
- Control of Birket Ram, 
groundwater, springs 
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and construction of 
reservoirs 
 
 
Key expressions 
of protest  
- Protests against 
National Water Carrier 
construction and land 
confiscation (1954-64) 
 
- Land Day 1976 
- Land reclamation, 
defense of local 
springs and increasing 
water availability 
(1967-1981) 
- 1982 general strike for 
6 months  
- 1980s – 
confrontations against 
land expropriation, 
expansion of 
rainwater storage 
tanks  
 
Crops  - Mainly rainfed crops: 
Wheat, pulses, 
watermelon, seasonal 
vegetables (okra, 
onion, tomatoes).  
- Extensive to intensive 
agriculture 
- Mainly apples, but 
also cherries and 
peaches 
 
 
3.1.4 Research methods  
 
The main objective of this research is to explore the dynamics of water 
struggles in Arab farming communities subject to settler colonial rule. To deal with 
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such a value-laden issue, in which agricultural practices are politically charged, 
qualitative research approaches are the most appropriate, as I am interested in 
understanding the material and discursive (re)production of distinctive 
ethnogeographic communities, whose landscapes and waterscapes are formative of 
their collective identity. The study uses three main research methods: semi-
structured interviews, including oral histories; participant observation; and archival 
research (see sections below). Participant Observation will allow me the opportunity 
to analyse and observe the activities of farming communities on a daily basis, while 
interviews will offer a more in-depth exploration of the meaning, values and opinions 
of individuals carrying out their farming practices. Archival research will provide 
historical details on Israeli land and water policies in the areas studied, as well as the 
agricultural practices and political mobilisations of the Arab communities.  
Comparative case study 
George and Bennett (2005, p.5) define case study research as “the detailed 
examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical 
explanations that may be generalizable to other events”. The case study research 
method offers “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 
2013, p.25). Moreover, case studies typically generate multiple sources of data in 
order to exposing aspects of the reality of lived experiences, often challenging 
produced knowledge about a space, or people, or event.  Case study researchers are 
more interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and 
the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency 
with which those conditions and their outcomes arise (George and Bennett, 2005). 
The authors argue that process tracing can be used to test whether the residual 
differences between two similar cases were causal or not in producing a difference 
in these cases’ outcomes. In this study process tracing is the systematic assessment 
of data generated by the qualitative research in order to answer my research 
questions and test the proposition that in settler colonial contexts the farming of 
Arab communities acquires similar forms of political subjectivity. This methodological 
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logic will be used to test whether the two case studies, the oGH and al-Battuf valley, 
produce the same outcomes (political subjectivity of farming) due mainly to the same 
causal force (Israeli sovereign control). Relying on within-case analysis, comparisons 
of a small number of cases (in this study water struggles and resistance in both 
locations) will also be used to further analyse difference or similarity between the 
two areas. While George and Bennett acknowledge that qualitative-led case studies 
share similar epistemological logic with statistical methods, they are more suited to 
the investigation of real-world contexts with complex causation (see also Byrne and 
Ragin, 2009). 
 
3.2 Data collection methods  
 
3.2.1 Access to the field 
 
In 2012-2013, I carried out my work in the oGH as part of the Transboundary 
Climate Security: Climate Vulnerability and Rural Livelihoods in the Jordan River Basin 
project mentioned earlier. This was invaluable for my PhD research as it provided me 
with a ‘preliminary’ fieldwork opportunity and established connections with relevant 
individuals and groups. Once I arrived to carry out my first PhD fieldwork visit in 2016, 
I got in touch with my original gatekeeper and re-introduced my research, its variance 
from the previous study and my intentions to carry out a more grounded and 
ethnographic approach to the topic of land and water. After re-establishing 
connections with the previous interlocutors who have become close acquaintances 
and connections, I began a process of snowball sampling. As I was interested in 
meeting people who are actively involved in farming practices, I selected active 
farmers, but also avoided restricting myself to a set category of people to meet. 
Throughout the fieldwork, people identified themselves as farmers although they 
were not all committed to practicing farming full-time. A recurrent comment I 
received, especially in the oGH, is that “we are amateur farmers”, or that “we farm 
to stay on the land”. Those identifications alerted me to farming as a cultural and 
political practice, which therefore required a more flexible approach to the selection 
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of interviewees. Hence, I ensured that I met people from all age groups, genders, and 
professions.  
My first encounter with al-Battuf was in 2010 when I participated in 
environmental peacebuilding training organised by a local organisation named 
Towns Association for Environment Quality (TAEQ), a joint project between 
Palestinians inside Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank who were working on 
environmental issues. Our visit to al-Battuf on that training provided me with an eye-
opening experience of the struggles faced by Palestinians inside Israel when it comes 
to access to land and water. Al-Battuf starkly reminded the participants of the 
realities faced by Palestinian farmers in the West Bank (especially in Area C) where 
they had no access to water or the right to construct any type of infrastructure 
without Israeli permits. Al-Battuf farmers who met with us shared stories of their lack 
of access to water, electricity and the prohibition of any type of construction since 
the 1960s. Another stark reality imposed on the landscape was the NWC, a concrete 
river dividing lands of farmers and limiting their freedom of movement, while 
another water body, known as al-gharaq, also formed and flooded large areas of 
land. Multiple contradictions and realities of water in the lives of the communities of 
al-Battuf existed in this geographical space. The realities of a water struggle taking 
place in the Galilee, among Palestinians who were regarded as Israeli citizens, 
seemed to reveal the exclusionary logic of a settler colonial state and suggested to 
me later the possibility of comparing al-Battuf with the oGH. When I began the PhD, 
I was able to access the field again through connections with a friend and colleague 
whose family is from Arrabeh al-Battuf, one of the villages in al-Battuf valley.  
 
3.2.2 Ethnographic approaches: participant observation 
 
Ethnography provides insights into meanings and processes that motivate 
social groups (Herbert, 2000, p.550). Herbert asserts that such processes are “both 
place-bound and place-making”. Emerson et al. (1995) define ethnographic field 
research in the context of studying a group’s everyday lives. Participating and 
observing the daily lives of the group is, they argue, an approach of learning and 
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theorising from the ground up. Ethnography, therefore, is potentially empowering as 
it provides an opportunity to develop and construct knowledge from the people or 
‘subjects’ of the study.  
Michael Burawoy (2000, p.25) rightly states that “you learn ethnography 
through practice, and perhaps a little bit of apprenticeship. There are guidelines, but 
few rules.” On questions of identity, ethnography offers an invaluable tool in 
understanding through deep observation the day-to-day activities, spoken and 
unspoken meanings and knowledge whereby identity is constructed (Adams, 2009). 
The reflexive element of identity, which emerges when people explain and express 
what identity means to them, allows a learning experience for both researcher and 
informants. Participant observation, or the art of ethnography (Burawoy et al., 1991) 
is the study of people in their own time and space, allowing us to understand not 
only what people claim they do but to observe what they actually do in a quest of 
mutual understanding between the participant observer and subjects. While 
participant observations allow for an intensive level of research, its intensity limits 
the possibility of generalization (Burawoy et al., 1991, p.2). However, for the purpose 
of my study, an ethnographic approach was employed not to generalise about the 
effects of settler colonial policies and practices, and opposition to them, but to 
expose and compare local lived experiences between two specific Arab communities.  
 
The flexibility offered by doing participant observation leads to a mixed 
method of reading, writing and observing (Crang and Cook, 2007). By observing 
people’s everyday actions, participant observation offers not only an opportunity to 
passively observe but also to engage in conversations and dynamics that unearth 
understandings and experiences of research subjects. Triangulation of what people 
do and what they express or explain they are doing allows the researcher to explain 
the deeper meaning of these actions (Burawoy et al., 1991). This requires entering 
the field with no fixed assumptions as to motivation or experience, making it more 
an inductive rather than a deductive endeavour. In my case, the general proposition 
that settler colonial policies and practices politicised farming was open enough to 
explore – through my participant observation – multiple ways of understanding and 
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enacting politics through Arab land and water practices, gradually building up an 
inductive understanding of political agency and identity that could not be predicted 
by settler colonial theory.  
Andrew Sayer (1999, p.20) distinguishes between extensive and intensive 
research approaches, where intensive research is concerned with “what makes 
things happen in specific cases, or in more ethnographic form, what kind of universe 
of meaning exists in a particular situation”. Therefore, intensive research, as in my 
study, requires the focus on studying “individual agents in their causal contexts” 
(p.21) and its strength lies in the possibility of interpreting meanings in context, 
which is the objective of this research.  Ethnography, essentially requires the 
researcher to be “A good ethnographer [who] recognizes that there are patterns of 
behaviour, shared sets of symbols, and structures that shape possibilities, but she 
also recognizes individual interests and idiosyncrasies, the role of creativity and 
improvisation, conflict, and the ways that social position can produce and reflect 
significant variety in the group” (Murchison, 2010, p.95). 
However, in carrying out my fieldwork following an ethnographic approach, I 
did not adhere to a fully immersed and embedded experience in the field. While my 
knowledge of the geography, language, history and the hydropolitics of the region 
allowed me to depend on my professional expertise and my network of water 
practitioners, the sites where I worked were new to me, even as a Palestinian. I 
experienced and practiced embeddedness in the field in the oGH, with a lived 
experience of being part of the community who welcomed me into their homes, 
offices, orchards, and private lives. Overcoming the limitations of not being fully 
ethnographic (but following an ethnographic approach), required the use of multiple 
qualitative methods, including interviews and archives. This triangulation of methods 
will allow a more comprehensive and rich data analysis. 
Therefore, my data collection allowed the exchange of experiences with 
interlocutors, people I’ve met through direct contacts with gatekeepers and others 
through snowballing while being in the field; literally being in the orchards of Majdal 
Shams and the agricultural expanse of al-Battuf. I would drive my car to the valley of 
al-Battuf and examine the sites of Israeli infrastructure, fenced and securitised, then 
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make my way to the unrecognised and half-dug zero canal where the aspirations of 
the farmers to develop their agriculture was put on hold. At these sites, families 
would pass by in their cars, offering to help me with anything I need, and opening up 
conversations about al-Battuf, where they would invite me to a cup of tea, or take 
me with them to buy their seasonal produce. In Majdal Shams, accessing the apple 
orchards takes you on a maze of locally-constructed asphalt roads where tractors 
pass you by with truckloads of apples, offering a taste of the year’s harvest. This spurs 
interaction and dialogues that sometimes last minutes and other times end up in 
longer discussions, home visits, and sharing of experiences of apple planting. The 
interviews, all carried out in Arabic, sometimes took place in the field while 
harvesting apples, while at other times they took place in the homes of families over 
lunch and were therefore not always easy to plan, record and document. This 
resulted in reliance on voice recorders at times, and field notes in other situations 
where the recorder was not available. This flexibility also allowed me to engage with 
female interlocutors rather than the predominantly male farmers who I encountered 
in the orchards, allowing for a gendered perspective on how farming significantly 
changed gender roles in an agrarian society and confined women role to that of 
workers in packaging houses and coolers (see 3.2.3).  
The relationships established in the field built trust with my interlocutors. 
Returning to the field on many occasions allowed for repeated discussions with some 
of them, breaking any ‘romanticised’ assumptions and preconceptions about farming 
and water struggles. These interactions allowed me to experience and observe the 
myriad ways of negotiation, compromise, and survival tactics employed by the 
colonised in their continuous struggle with power and hegemony. The hegemony of 
the settler state infiltrates into daily language used (Hebrew was fluently spoken by 
farmers in each case study), the places of work farmers engage with to provide 
income (such as working in nearby Israeli Jewish settlements), their education 
systems and other community services. All of these daily interactions also challenged 
me as a researcher to avoid biases, generalisations and binary categorisations. As 
chapters 5 and 7 will show, acts of resistance, framed by the researcher, are laden 
with contradictory relations with power, that of negation and opposition, yet also of 
98 
 
compromise and negotiation. This allowed for a more grounded and ‘real’ experience 
of the lived geographies of the communities studied.  
 
3.2.3 Interviews and social histories 
 
The purpose of field work is not to strip ourselves of biases, for that 
is an illusory goal, not to celebrate those biases as the authorial 
voice of the ethnographer, but rather to discover and perhaps 
change out biases through interaction with others (Burawoy et al., 
1991, p.2) 
 
Qualitative interviewing is used in this research, when conducting fieldwork 
in both locations, in order to uncover farmers’ situated and contextual accounts and 
experiences of practicing their livelihood under conditions of settler colonialism. 
Therefore, the epistemological logic is to interact with these interviewees, listen, and 
most importantly “analyse their construction of discourse” (Mason, 2002, p.64). 
Jennifer Mason highlights the need to be critical in analysing what an interviewee 
says and does not say, avoiding the risk of oversimplification. When gathering 
accounts of why farmers remain in agriculture under restrictive and limiting 
circumstances of land and water expropriation and discrimination, it is necessary 
therefore to compare different interviews and other sources of evidence. This 
research also explores the potential of producing alternative stories, what Linda 
Tuhiwai Smith refers to as ‘counter-stories’ and ‘counter-narratives’ as 
conceptualised by Nancy Peluso’s work on forestry in Indonesia as forms of 
resistance (Peluso, 2009; Smith, 1998). 
It is anticipated in this research that oral histories will allow an exploration of 
identity, farming practices and politics. Oral histories in the occupied Golan Heights 
will involve interviewing and recording oral testimonies of an older generation of 
farmers who have witnessed the introduction of the apple tree as a main crop. 
Brought in from the Lebanon Mountains, apple trees have come to symbolise Jawlani 
identity under occupation, cut off from their Syrian homeland. Due to its centrality 
in the identity narratives of the people in the oGH, oral testimonies serve to explore 
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what Alessandro Portelli explains as “not just what people did, but what they wanted 
to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did” (2015, 
36). Understanding the meaning and value of apples to the Jawlani population, 
especially the young generation, can provide insights into how identity is being 
continuously reconstructed under changing circumstances and events. Oral histories, 
therefore, offer alternative narratives of agricultural practices which will help 
produce original insights into farming in the oGH. However, limitations of oral 
histories lie in their subjectivity, conflicting statements and their reliance on memory 
and personal experience. This will be complemented by the use and triangulation 
with other research tools outlined in this section. It will be further augmented by 
multiple interviewing, revisiting and re-interviewing the informants (Cousin, 2005). 
Additionally, group interviews will also be used to triangulate data and go beyond 
singular narratives, allowing the representation of all voices, including women and 
the elderly.  
In addition to the methods highlighted above, this research was also multi-
sited. I carried out fieldwork at the two main sites, in addition to visiting other critical 
sites in the Jordan River Basin, including the Yarmouk Triangle, Israeli water 
associations in the Jordan Valley and the occupied Golan Heights, the Jordanian side 
of the Jordan Valley and border areas. I consulted Israeli state archive documents, 
which related to political, water and land management issues specific to the two case 
study sites, during the period between 1948 and 1990.  
I carried out fieldwork in the summer of 2016 and summer of 2017, each 
lasting 3 months and conducted 40 in-depth interviews with people living and 
working in the basin. The people interviewed included farmers, community 
organisers, political figures, water experts and residents of the two case study sites. 
The main gate keeper in the occupied Golan Heights was the Golan for Development, 
a local organisation working on local health and cultural services. In Al-Battuf, a friend 
living in Arrabeh suggested initial contacts and introduced me to her family, who I 
had the opportunity to stay with and learn more about al-Battuf. All interview 
references appear in this thesis with surname and date of interview. 
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During the summer of 2016, I split my fieldwork between the two sites. In July 
2016, my focus was on al-Battuf, a geographical area I knew little about. Staying with 
a local family was an invaluable entry point, as they suggested names of farmers 
active in al-Battuf. Staying in Arrabeh village for the month allowed me the flexibility 
to be available to meet farmers at their own time. My first interview was carried out 
with Abu Saleh, Ahmed Jarbouni, who is a well-known figure and the previous head 
of the Arrabeh Municipality. Through visiting al-Battuf together, he identified the 
main sites of relevance to the al-Battuf struggle: the NWC canal, the zero canal, and 
al-gharaq (as seen in chapters 4 and 5) and allowed me to visualise how al-Battuf 
lands are distributed amongst those infrastructures. This was the beginning of a 
snowballing approach where I was able to meet more farmers by word of mouth and 
my own interactions while walking in the vast valley. In that month, I was able to 
meet five farmers and conduct interviews with them. I also carried out another four 
interviews with local civil society organisations (see Table 3.2) who actively work on 
Palestinian citizens’ rights, namely Adalah – the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights 
in Israel – and the Arab Center for Alternative Planning, based in the village of 
Eilaboun. The interviews with personnel working on land and planning issues allowed 
me to understand the precarious conditions under which land is controlled and 
managed by regional councils and the significance of that in the Galilee land 
struggles.  
In August 2016, I focused my research on the oGH, where I focused on re-
establishing my connections with Golan for Development, one of the few 
organisations operating as a civil society and health service provider in Majdal Shams. 
I also established connection with Al-Marsad – Arab Human Rights Centre in the 
Golan Heights – which also provided me with background on the legal context of the 
reality of living in the oGH. During that month, I carried out apple picking with Abu 
Naser’s family, a reputable political activist and full-time farmer. I stayed with the 
family during that week and was able to observe and participate in apple picking 
activities, debates about politics and daily conversations about life in Majdal Shams. 
I also visited one cooler, Al Marj, and examined the operational processes of apple 
storing and cooling, which employs women mostly to carry out the cleaning, sorting 
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and packaging (see Figure 3.2), exposing the gendered roles the water-intensive crop 
generated. In total, I carried out five interviews in Majdal Shams.  During September 
2016, I focused my activities on acquiring materials from the different archives 
(detailed in the next section). A brief trip in the winter of 2016 allowed me to 
interview two Israeli water professionals, one working in Mey Golan (December 
2016, Katzrin settlement in the oGH) and the other a senior official at the Water 
Authority (December 2016, Tel Aviv). 
 
Figure 3.2 Women working in the packaging factories in Majdal Shams (Author's 
picture, August 2016) 
 
In the summer of 2017, I followed the same approach and focused my 
interviews in two months. In August 2018, I returned to Arrabeh village and stayed 
with the local family, while extensively carrying our interviews with male and female 
farmers, journalists, researchers and local historians. I carried out ten interviews and 
had multiple other recorded and non-recorded conversations during my visit, 
especially when in al-Battuf amongst farmers. Another event, Battufna festival 
(mentioned in chapter 5), was an opportunity to observe and meet locals and even 
government representatives. For example, a local female (Palestinian citizen) 
representative of the Drainage and River Authority was at the festival, and I was able 
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to interview her, in addition to observing how farmers interacted and debated with 
the representatives about the authority’s proposals. I was also able to interview 
TAEQ staff member and learn about their perception of the potential of al-Battuf and 
their work with the farmers there. In September 2017, I stayed in Majdal Shams, 
carrying out interviews and visits to the apple orchards with my interlocutors, where 
I carried an additional ten interviews, while being able to meet many of the 
interviewees from 2016 again and follow up on issues arising during our discussions, 
including any updates they wanted to share.  
My interviews and meetings with interlocuters varied from pre-arranged 
interviews to others that were spontaneous conversations. Many of the farmers who 
I met in al-Battuf for example, would be gathered around in the late afternoons, 
which allowed for unstructured conversations and discussions between farmers who 
were familiar and close to each other. In Majdal Shams, similar situations would 
occur when I was staying with local families, where visitors and family members 
shared their reflections and experiences of farming and their recollections of the 
1982 general strike.  
Table 3.2 Organisations met during fieldwork 
Organisations met Location Period 
Golan for Development  Majdal Shams, oGH Summer of 2016 
Al-Marsad Majdal Shams, oGH Summer of 2017 
Al-Haramoon  Majdal Shams, oGH Summer of 2017 
Adalah – the Legal Center 
for Arab Minority Rights 
in Israel 
Haifa, Israel Summer 2016 
Arab Center for 
Alternative Planning 
Eilaboun, Galilee Summer of 2016 
Mey Golan  Katzrin, oGH Winter of 2016 
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Israeli Water Authority Tel Aviv, Israel Winter of 2016 
Town Association for 
Environmental Quality 
(TAEQ) 
Sakhnin, Galilee Summer of of 2017 
Arrabeh Municipality  Arrabeh, Galilee Summer of 2017 
 
 
3.2.4 Archives  
 
This research also consulted archival documents to establish a historical and 
political background of agricultural transformation, land and water policy change and 
events of popular rural resistance (see Table 3.3). However, such archival documents 
are located in state and academic institutions belonging to the colonial establishment 
(British, French or Israeli). This raises awareness that archival documents “should 
always be viewed with judicious scepticism (Khalili, 2011, p.73). The legacy of colonial 
and settler colonial land and water policies is evidently produced in the geography 
discipline, with many geographers serving colonial and imperial agendas (Bashir, 
2004; Blaut,1985). This only exemplifies how one field of science and policy came to 
transform land and water planning in the colonies. In such archives, the underlying 
belief is that “the status of the colonised people has been fixed in zones of 
dependency and peripherality, stigmatised in the designation of underdeveloped, 
less-developed, developing states, ruled by a superior, developed or metropolitan 
coloniser who was theoretically posited as a categorically antithetical overlord (Said, 
1989, p.207). In settler colonial contexts, the subaltern voice is further diminished 
and dismissed. The subaltern here is classified as non-citizens or at best residents of 
a state who are not equal to its deserving (entitled) citizens. Hence, their lived 
experience is either distorted or forgotten completely in state discourse. In the case 
of the oGH and al-Battuf, the voice of the subaltern is lacking in the official state 
archives and narratives, which requires uncovering their stories in a nonconventional 
manner. This exposes that those stories are far from straightforward and benign but 
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rather marred by attempts of negotiation, integration and incorporation with the 
settler state and its institutions and processes. This research therefore relied on the 
colloquial and vernacular documentation of the events which shaped the lived 
geographies of farmers through examining the village books, studies and anecdotes 
of events which altered the geographies of those two communities. The attempts of 
erasure and misrecognition carried out by the settler state is resisted through the 
narration of local sumud practices, raising the voice of the subaltern in a settler 
colonial context.”  
However, the value of archival documents cannot be underestimated as they 
expose discourses of land and water planning and management which have shaped 
and continue to shape the practices of the Arab farmers today in the areas studied. 
It was necessary to be cautious and critical when consulting Israeli state archives for 
information on farming practices in the Galilee and Golan Heights. The status of 
archives as sites of plunder and erasure (Sela, 2018), is evident from  the Israeli state’s 
looting and control of Palestinian archives after 1948 and in the invasion of Beirut in 
the 1980s, which today can be found in the National Library in Jerusalem and in the 
Israeli State Archives (ISA), among other locations. I used these two sources for my 
main archival research. While navigating the archive website (which was all in 
Hebrew), censorship was a major constraint and visits to the archives were replaced 
by online orders. Since 2016, the Israeli archives, which are available for researchers 
visiting Jerusalem to request physical documents for review (which most Palestinians 
are prohibited from, except through issuing of permits), have been available via an 
online database. However, many files are not available online or heavily redacted for 
security reasons. For example, many of the oGH files I requested online were 
unavailable for viewing, or if they were provided, many pages were blacked out. 
Nevertheless, the material acquired from the archives remains an important source 
of information, and this material is drawn on in chapters 4 and 6.   
 
The National Library of Israel, located in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 
provided the second source for Arabic and Hebrew documents, in addition to 
newspaper archives. I was able to visit the library on multiple occasions in summer 
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of 2016 and 2017. Al-Ittihad newspaper, founded in 1944 was the journal of the Arab 
faction of the Israeli Communist Party. The newspaper was a critical resource for 
documenting the historical events of the construction of the NWC from a Palestinian 
Arab perspective which also devoted interest and concern to the fellahin and the 
working class. This provided a detailed coverage of daily acts of resistance, describing 
the events which surrounded the construction of the NWC and the fellahin’s 
opposition to it. Moreover, the Hebrew press also provided a different perspective, 
consolidating the framing of the NWC as a national strategic project, and how the 
Palestinians’ protest of it was framed as oppositional to national goals and 
aspirations. The Government Press Office (GPO), accessed online, was also an 
important source of images of the NWC and the oGH landscapes and geographies.  
 
Table 3.3 Archives and libraries consulted during fieldwork 
Archives Location 
Israeli state archives (ISA) Online 
The National Library of 
Israel Archives 
Jerusalem 
The Zionist Archives Online 
Institute of Palestine Studies 
(IPS) Library Archives 
Ramallah, Palestine 
Government Press Office 
(GPO) 
Online 
 
A third archival source was found in the works of social historians who resided 
in Arrabeh al-Battuf. As Rochelle Davis has explored in her seminal work, Palestinian 
Village Histories: geographies of the displaced  (Davis, 2011), village memorial books, 
written and collated by Palestinian refugees about their destroyed villages, provide 
an enriching understanding of erased Palestinian histories. Davis exposes how such 
books, largely from a fellahin background, aimed at narrating the fellahin’s lived 
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geography and history and not that of nationalist and statist character that were 
focused on statistics and state archives. Through representation of the past in the 
words of the Palestinian refugees themselves, these village books provide a 
corrective force to official histories narrating the story of those in power. My research 
aims to tell the story of villages which remained yet were re-configured and 
transformed by the settler colonial state of Israel, of which Palestinians and Syrian 
became its residents. Revisiting their own experiences, the lived realities of the 
villages, and their interpretation of those transformations is possible in this research 
through the examination of village books, written and collated by local authors who 
have survived the contemporary events in their lived geographies. These books are 
usually a personal effort by the author to collate materials about the village, its 
geography, history, politics and socioeconomic activities. Published by local press 
firms in the region, they are sold locally or gifted to libraries, schools and interested 
individuals and research centres. The village books I examined contained narratives 
and documentation of village geography, social and political conditions, economic 
activities and development efforts. Local authors such as Othman Mbadda Ali (2000), 
Ahmad Jarbouni (1998), from Arrabeh village, were the main books I’ve consulted to 
gain insight into water struggles locally and their imbrication in larger struggles for 
recognition by the Israeli state. Interestingly these books were written by authors 
who have also played important and somehow contradictory roles (opposing the 
military rule, then being appointed, for example, as public officials, head of village 
council, mayors) and therefore needed to be handled with caution and awareness. 
For Kufr Manda (as seen in Chapter 4.3.1 and 5.1.1.), a masters dissertation and a 
locally published book by Nader Zou’bi (2015) on the events surrounding the NWC 
were also an invaluable source of information. During my fieldwork, I managed to 
interview three authors (Jarbouni, Nassar and Zoubi) and meet Mbadda Ali (but not 
interview him due to his health).  
 
The oGH provided a plethora of academic and popular literature that also 
transcended the western-centric audience. Books by Abdul Sattar Qasem (1984), 
Nazeer Majalli (1982), Al-Batheesh (1986), Muslih (1993) were among those who 
wrote in Arabic extensively about the six-months strike and occupation of the Golan 
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Heights in general. Moreover, a number of local researchers and residents of the oGH 
have also written to Western audiences in journals such as the Institute of Palestine 
Studies, in addition to the publication of local organisations such as Al-Marsad and 
the Arab Association for Development, which published a number of brochures 
especially in the 1990s. Additionally, local magazines by the Union of University 
Graduates from the oGH and other magazines were consulted at the Institute of 
Palestine Studies (IPS) Archives in Ramallah, Palestine. All of these sources have been 
invaluable to understanding the local experiences and reflections of Jawlanis and 
allies during those critical times of annexation in the 1980s.    
 
3.3 Reflexivity and Ethics 
 
Studying your own society is not devoid of problems, as Altorki explains in her 
chapter: ‘At Home in the Field’ (Altorki and El-Solh, 1988). Being an ‘insider’ invites 
the researcher to abide by the norms of her/his culture, or for the interviewees to be 
less comfortable in sharing details about political views, family details or social status. 
However, it also reduces the time needed to establish contacts and get accustomed 
to norms and traditions. Establishing rapport, Altorki exclaims, is less problematic 
and is further facilitated by speaking the language and simply fitting in. In my 
research, an insider-outsider role also characterised my work in the two locations: in 
both communities, my status as a Palestinian from Jerusalem offered some degree 
of flexibility in terms of escaping the gender role played by women in the community, 
in addition to other political, cultural and educational attributions facilitating access 
and flexibility. Altorki and El-Solh highlight how the indigenous field-worker “has the 
indisputable advantage of being able to attach meanings to patterns that he or she 
uncovers much faster than the non-indigenous researcher” (1988, p.7).  
Carrying out research in the Middle East, and specifically in occupied Palestine 
and the Golan Heights, does not come without its challenges, both physical and 
cognitive. As Laleh Khalili states, we as researchers need to be careful and aware of 
how power operates in the field and in the archives (2011). In a context where politics 
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infiltrates into both public and private spheres of life, it is important to be aware of 
“how “the political” structures and underwrites the representation of research 
material” (Khalili, 2011, p.66). Awareness as well of the power asymmetries between 
us as researchers and the research subjects serves as a reminder of our positionality 
in addition to comprehending research subjects’ power asymmetry within their 
communities and with external actors. As Khalili states, a native researcher does not 
automatically overcome all boundaries and asymmetries that exist in a certain 
context or site, and “has to be even more vigilant about the ease with which she can 
be “placed” by her interlocutors” (ibid, p.71). This vigilance is even more necessary 
when researching marginalised individuals, or dealing with contentious issues of 
conflict, war and dispossession (Liamputtong, 2006). 
To conduct this research, I had to plan my fieldwork in geographical locations 
that I rarely visited as a Palestinian. While most of my previous fieldwork was carried 
out in Palestinian villages in the West Bank, this doctoral research allowed me to 
venture into new geographical territories that I was not familiar with, and to build 
relationships and networks with communities that were similar yet distinct in many 
ways to the conventional Palestinian farmer in the West Bank. My identification as a 
female Jerusalemite coming from an urban middle-class and large family contributed 
to the dynamics experienced while in the field, both positively and negatively. It 
allowed for openness in dealing with people who could identify my family name and 
even distant members of my family, while also creating a feeling of being ‘othered’ 
as an urbanite. This interesting dynamic allowed me to reflect on historical socio-
political class relations in Palestine, and their impact on water and land struggles 
overall, which were led by the peasants (fellahin), not the elites and urbanites of 
society. Doing fieldwork at home was therefore an illuminating experience, as it 
allowed me to get out of my city and the typical fieldwork locations in the West Bank, 
and to explore being a ‘familiar other’ learning and exposing myself to new and 
unfamiliar territories. The experiences in both case study sites were enriching on a 
personal development level, in addition to its rich empirical significance. 
 The field research also alerted me to the dominance of the male farmer, 
researcher, practitioner in our (and even this research’s) perceptions of water 
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management and farming. I tried to navigate this male-dominated field by 
interviewing female farmers, researchers, journalists and civil society members 
which revealed an understudied and illuminating world of female-led resistance. In 
the oGH, women still carry out farming tasks alongside men, especially during the 
harvest season. However, this role has been decreasing in the field due to the 
intensive mechanised nature of apple growing. Before the intensification of apple 
orchards, the variety of rain-fed crops and even irrigated vegetables meant a more 
dominant presence of women farmers in the field. Today, their role has been 
transferred to workers in the apple packaging houses, where most of the workers 
employed are women. This has illuminated other re-configurations taking place in 
the oGH as a result of intensive agricultural practices. Women’s role in the general 
strike and the popular struggle against the Israeli annexation was also pioneering and 
transformative alongside that of men. In al-Battuf, a similar role change was also 
noted for women farmers. Interestingly, since intensive agriculture initiatives 
(including collective drainage projects) were not realised, coupled with the exodus of 
male farmers seeking job opportunities in the Jewish sector, this resulted in the 
return of female farmers to al-Battuf to continue rainfed and baali farming practices 
(Figure 3.3). In my research, I met four powerful women farmers who have made 
farming in al-Battuf their life-long goal, despite the male-dominated field and societal 
pressures. Today, they lead the farmers’ market events, selling their produce and 
participating in income-generating activities such as preparing traditional food for 
visitors to al-Battuf, in partnership with local organisations. However, female farmers 
were also often excluded from key elements of the water struggle in both cases; for 
example, the agricultural cooperatives in the oGH and al-Battuf were led by male 
members only.   
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Figure 3.3 Jameeleh Shazli, one of the female farmers persistently farming in al-
Battuf, pictured here picking baali Okra, known in Arabic as Bamyeh (Author’s 
picture, September 2017) 
 
LSE Research Ethics policy  
Before conducting my fieldwork, I reviewed the LSE Research Ethics Policy to 
ensure my research follows the school’s procedures and principles. It made me aware 
of my responsibilities as a researcher in the social sciences towards my institution 
and those people who take part in my research. I completed the Research Ethics 
Review Checklist and received confirmation of committing to my ethical safeguards. 
This included obtaining informed consent from human participants and ensuring that 
they are not put in any risk or harm by taking part in this research. Working in 
Palestine/Israel and the oGH required attention to the risks involved in exposing 
communities or individuals to further restrictions or harassment by the Israeli state. 
However, my working on issues of farming and water was perceived to be apolitical 
by Israeli authorities and therefore raised few suspicions and issues. Participants 
were willing and open to speak about their experiences, and no risks were identified 
either by participants or myself from the research. Carrying research outside of the 
UK required the submission of further preparatory procedures regarding health and 
safety in the field, political concerns, and other emergency plans. Being a Palestinian 
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working at home of course prepared me for being attentive and flexible in carrying 
out my fieldwork based on the political situation at the time. My visits to the oGH in 
particular were arranged after appropriate checking of the situation along the 
barriers separating the Israeli occupied part from the rest of the Syrian lands. In the 
Galilee, less precaution was needed as the area was relatively safe and has not 
experienced political unrest in recent years.  
While in the field, I have clarified with my interviewees the need for consent 
to carry out interviews and recording of our conversations. The interview extracts 
presented here are not anonymised as participants agreed to their names being 
used; indeed, many of the interlocuters have made multiple statements in the public 
sphere, whether in local media outlets, civil society reports or videos online. The 
primary data for this research has been collected by interview recordings, documents 
acquired from the field and relevant archives, my own fieldnotes and pictures. I have 
securely stored all of those documents digitally. All the interviews were carried out 
in Arabic; therefore the transcribed ones had to be translated to English, while others 
were summarised from audio recordings.  
Field presentations of research findings in the occupied Golan Heights 
 
My work in the oGH in particular put me in direct and close contact with the 
few local research and development organisations working in Majdal Shams. This has 
allowed me to share my research with a wide and interested audience, who 
appreciated this historically-focused endeavour in tracing and locating water 
struggles as part and parcel of larger struggles of recognition and resistance which 
have shaped the identity of the oGH and its inhabitants. This allowed me to work 
closely and present my research at multiple times to a local audience. The experience 
was very enriching, as I felt that the researcher- participant binary was dissolved, but 
not completely disregarded. I was invited to speak about my research for a local 
online news agency, daliluk. In my last field visit in September 2017, I was invited to 
participate in a roundtable discussion on the future of farming and share my research 
findings. This was organised by the oGH Cultural Salon, a local initiative affiliated with 
the Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies, an independent non-profit research 
112 
 
and cultural centre focusing on Syria, based in Qatar and Turkey (Figure 3.4).   This 
opportunity allowed me to meet with wider groups of farmers (from other villages) 
and listen to the contemporary and pressing issues farmers are facing in regard to 
unequal marketing opportunities, the internal politics and tensions within 
cooperatives, apple cooler issues, and wider concerns over farming in the future. This 
informed my analysis and allowed me to observe the transformation of farming acts 
from the decades of annexation until today. Such an opportunity was not available 
in al-Battuf, as farming there (as will be seen in chapters 5 and 8) was not supported 
by any strong cooperatives or research centres, reduced to acts of a handful 
individuals who persisted on the land.  
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Figure 3.4 Roundtable discussion at The oGH Salon, part of the Haramoon Centre for 
Contemporary Studies in Majdal Shams (Daliluk.com, September 2017) 
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3.4 Summary of chapter  
 
In this chapter, I have described my research topic, questions and objectives 
and the suitability of my research methodology and data collection methods. I also 
highlighted my own motivation for carrying out this research and the selection of the 
case studies. I justified my qualitative methodology and identified the main data 
collection methods. Finally, I have engaged with reflections on my time in the field 
and my positionality while doing the research.  
 
  
115 
 
 
Chapter 4:  Al-Battuf lived geographies and their re-
configuration under Israeli settler colonial rule 
 
This chapter situates Sahl al-Battuf (the valley of al-Battuf) as a site of struggle 
and resistance; a hydrosocial and political territory. Departing from the literature on 
hydropolitics which constructed it (and sometimes even only mentions it) as a site 
for a settler hydro-imaginary, this chapter examines how settler colonial water and 
land policies have manifested themselves in the lives of the farming communities of 
al-Battuf and how they shaped norms and beliefs about livelihood activities and 
water meanings.  
Al-Battuf is referred to in that literature in its biblical Hebrew name, Beit Netofa, 
and usually shown as a site on the map of a natural reservoir envisioned by the Zionist 
planners as an integral part of a complex web of infrastructures, mechanisms and 
arrangements that came to produce the National Water Carrier (NWC) of Israel and 
its connections and dis-connections (see Figure 4.1).  The settler colonial hydro-
hegemony has obscured and severed indigenous land-based livelihood practices and 
re-configured their lived geographies significantly. In this chapter, I illuminate the 
struggle against the state and the NWC that ensued for the villages of Kufr Manda, 
Arrabeh and Sakhnin from 1954 to 1964 and connect it with settler colonial 
geographies and realities of Palestinians living inside Israel. The chapter aims to 
frame the struggles faced by these populations and many others inside 1948 borders 
(known as Israel proper) as a struggle for recognition of their ethno-geographic 
identities and resource rights.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will describe land and water relations during 
the period prior to the creation of the Israeli state. This will provide historical context 
for how water became an object of exclusion and dispossession, and how it became 
political on both national and local levels through examining the settler state 
institutions and framing of irrigated agriculture as a solely Zionist endeavour. The 
second section examines the lived geographies of al-Battuf communities under the 
Military Rule, which was imposed on the Palestinians remaining in their towns and 
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villages after 1948, focusing specifically on relations of farming and water. Al-Battuf’s 
geographical location has brought the politics of water into the everyday lives of a 
disenfranchised and dispossessed ‘remainder of society’ just waking up to the 
aftermath of its dispossession or Nakba. Therefore, this section focuses on sites of 
dispossession through water, exemplified by the NWC as a strictly settler colonial 
infrastructure.  
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Figure 4.1 Al-Battuf as a reservoir site in the Jordan River Basin (adapted from 
Schmida, 1985, p.1) 
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4.1 Lived geographies of Al-Battuf farmers pre-1948 
 
Al-Battuf valley, located in the Lower Galilee, stretches over 50,000 dunums 
of fertile, clay heavy soil. “This beautiful expanse extends from ‘Hitin and Eilaboun 
hills to the east, to Saffuriyeh and Shafa’am mountains to the west, and Tur’an 
mountain range to the south, and Arrabeh, Sakhnin and Kufr Manda mountains to 
the North” (Jarbouni, 1998, p.142). Al-Battuf, as its name in Arabic suggests connotes 
the act of “floating”, referring to annual flooding that turns around 20,000 dunums 
of the valley into a natural lake – “where the dew floats” (Mbadda Ali, 2000). Another 
explanation given by one of the elders and a geographer himself was Abu il Touf, the 
father of the flood, a Bedouin name given to the valley to describe its winter state of 
flooding. Al-gharaq, or flood, is another local name given to the area, and the most 
frequently used today to describe this phenomenon. Farmers with lands in these 
flooded plots plant their winter crops at risk, and if the rainfall is heavy that year, 
their crops are destroyed, and their summer crops will be planted later (until the 
water reduces), which puts them in a less favourable condition and limits their crop 
productivity. 
 
4.1.1 Al-Battuf: land and water realities in the valley 
 
While it was prominent for agricultural land such as al-Battuf to be considered 
Mashaa’11F 12, an Ottoman decree in 185812F 13 necessitated the parcellation of land 
between the villages surrounding the valley, where the largest area of the land was 
                                                          
12 Mashaa’ refers to collectively owned land by villages. The land is allocated on a rotating basis, so the fellahin 
will move between lands throughout the years. The private property on the other hand was fixed, planted with 
trees. Trees were not allowed to be planted in Mashaa’ lands, only vegetables and pulses. The mashaa’ came as 
an outcome of high taxes and the collective efforts by the villagers to oppose it (Zu’bi, 1984).  
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allotted to Sakhnin (16,000 dunums), Arrabeh (14,000), and Saffuriyeh (10,000)13F 14 
with the remaining villages of Kufr Manda (4,500), Bu’ineh (1,000), El’izeer (650) and 
Rummaneh (500) receiving smaller areas of land based on population and village size 
(see figure 4.2) (Mbadda Ali, 2000; Interview with Abu Saleh Jarbouni, previous head 
of local authority and farmer, Arrabeh 18 July 2016).  Since that period, the 
agricultural land of al-Battuf was reclaimed for rainfed agriculture. Having served for 
generations as a site of livestock grazing, the valley became highly fertile and suitable 
for agricultural activities. Since then, these two agricultural practices, grazing and 
farming, have been inseparable for the fellah in al-Battuf during this period. So ba’ali 
agriculture, the vernacular term used to describe the livelihood without water, in the 
rich clays of al-Battuf and its water retention quality characterises it as one of the 
most fertile plains, especially with its unique climatic condition of receiving 600mm 
of water in the winter. These biophysical and social elements have contributed to a 
distinct crop variety in the valley and the maintenance of a subsistence mode of 
agriculture. Winter crops were dominantly wheat, corn and pulses while the summer 
crops were watermelon, melon and sesame and seasonal vegetables. Subsistence 
agriculture required a continuous presence on the land, in addition to whole families 
participating in the daily chores. The farmers would even move to the Battuf in the 
summer to protect their harvest and limit their commute in the hot months, building 
small sheds to protect them and their crops, a ritual called Ta’zeeb. This complete 
process of farming and livestock grazing, in addition to the crop rotation between 
seasons, maintained a very healthy soil and provided families with year-long 
subsistence and exemplified the livelihood of the fellahin and their attachment to the 
land as ethno-geographic communities. As Ayyash argues, fellahin’s existence on the 
land transcended notions of nationalist, ideological and economic values, viewing 
land and life as “inseparable for the Palestinian fellahin, and only those who best 
knew the land lived on it, and they lived on it because they knew it best, were part 
of it, as it was a part of them” (2018, p.31).  
                                                          
14 Saffuriyeh is a village in al-Battuf that was destroyed in 1948, and its inhabitants becoming refugees. Saffuriyeh 
village owned 10,000 dunums of land in al-Battuf, which were confiscated, the village destroyed and its 
inhabitants becoming refugees in 1948. Today, Tzipori and other settlements is built on the village lands, and the 
agricultural lands used by the settlers.  
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Figure 4.2 Sahl Al-Battuf overview (Developed by Yousra Otham for this thesis, 
2018) 
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In al-Battuf, al-gharaq phenomenon was a distinct feature on its eastern end. 
Al-gharaq limited the agricultural productivity of an estimated between 10-20,000 
dunums (depending on annual rainfall), but also allowed for the planting of moisture-
loving crops, like okra. Al-gharaq phenomenon was not unique to al-Battuf and can 
be also witnessed distinctively in Marj Sanour in Jenin, in addition to Deir Ballout in 
Salfit, and al-Bireh (all in the occupied West Bank), and before its draining in Lake 
Huleh (near the Lebanese border). As Tesdell and Issa (2017) also highlight, Al Balu’ 
is another name given to distinctive seasonal pools or winter ponds and is derived 
from the root word ‘to swallow’. In the colonial and settler colonial mind-set of the 
British and Zionists at the time, these were areas to drain and utilise optimally with 
the introduction of drainage interventions, technological fixes and advancements. Al-
gharaq, and al-Battuf in general, has always been a site of colonial interest and 
development aspiration, and the drainage of the valley has been a widely agreed 
upon approach. During the British mandate, the District Commissioner of the Galilee 
District, received a letter from T.L. Ward, who was pushing for the drainage of al-
Battuf (ISA, 1947), and was discussing with the Director of public works preliminary 
estimates of cost. The drainage scheme, he explained, “if executed, would prevent 
the flooding which occurs almost annually at the eastern end of the depression and 
as a result some ten thousand dunums or more of good land, now useless in winter 
could be made to grow crops from the winter rain” (ISA, 1947). These plans never 
materialised and instead were in contrast reconfigured drastically to fit the Zionist 
and Israeli imaginary, which sought a landscape which complemented and realised 
the material and discursive water hegemony it had long lobbied for since the times 
of Sykes-Picot. 
 
The earliest ‘Anglo-Zionist’ plans of Hays-Lowdermilk identified sahl al-
Battuf as the site of a natural reservoir and a critical component of the national 
planning of Israel’s water supply (Lowdermilk, 1946). As the plan was to divert the 
headwaters of the Jordan River, the ideal approach was to provide a storage reservoir 
that would control the flood water and redistribute it to where it was needed. To 
realise the Zionist aspirations for a nation-state, the priority was to reach 
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the coastal cities and the Naqab (Negev), where the Zionist dream of making the 
desert bloom would take place throughout the ensuing decades after 1948. At that 
time, Israel was wary of making Lake Tiberias the storage reservoir for political 
reasons and due to concerns over sharing the Lake with Arab riparian states, which 
resulted in the conceptualisation of the Lake “as enemy space” (Alatout, 2011, 
p.230). Lowdermilk, commissioned by the Jewish Agency (JA) to carry out an 
exploration of the potential of Palestine as a site of land and water abundance, 
praised Jewish land and water reclamation as an emancipation of land which under 
Arab rule had suffered from neglect and destruction. While fraught with ideological 
praise and a clear support for the Zionist enterprise14F 15, Lowdermilk plan was the first 
to be adopted as a water resource plan, which was technically and scientifically 
complemented with later technical plans of James Hayes and Savage, which were 
funded by the Commission on Palestine Surveys in the U.S. (Schmida 1984). What 
unified those plans, although not implemented, was a fundamental feature that 
characterised forthcoming Israeli water plans: out-of-basin transfers, and the full 
utilisation of all water sources for irrigation and electricity production. These plans 
required the transformation of al-Battuf into Beit Netofa reservoir, which Lowdermilk 
was the first to include in Israel’s water planning. This would fill the valley with 1 
billion cubic meters and fully submerge the villages lying in the valley, like Kufr 
Manda, in addition to covering all the agricultural land area of the remaining villages.  
The UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181, 1947, p.143)15F 16 reiterates the 
significance of sahl al-Battuf in the construction and concretisation of the Zionist and 
later Israeli water hegemony. In the borders article of the plan, emphasis is given to 
the JA’s priorities regarding water for irrigation, which necessitates the inclusion of 
the valley in the Jewish state borders:  
From the south-west corner of Kafr l'nan village the boundary line 
follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point 
close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar 
                                                          
15 Lowdermilk’s clear anti-Arab sentiment is expressed when he stated, “if individual Arabs found that they 
disliked living in an indurstrialized land, they could easily settle in the great alluvial plain of the Tigris and 
Euphrates Valley, there is lad enough for vast numbers of immigrants.” (Lowdermilk, 1946, pages 127-128) 
16 The Partition plan of 1947 was a proposal by the United Nations, recommending the partition of Palestine 
into an Arab and Jewish state. The UN General Assembly adopted the plan and Resolution 181 was enacted. 
However, the plan was not implemented, and the 1948 war broke soon afterwards.   
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and Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of 
the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the 
reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands 
to the south and east.   
 
Zionist water imaginaries and plans were therefore placed at high priority 
even in the demarcation of borders for the partition of Palestine between Arabs and 
Jews. This signifies and complements a distinctive role water and water bodies have 
played in the Zionist nation building highlighted in previous literature (Zeitoun et al., 
2012). As Alatout (2012) claims of the Jordan River becoming the border, sahl al-
Battuf was also the site of border making and claiming of a Zionist Jewish state, where 
water became and was made political.  
 
4.1.2 Hydro-imaginaries: scarcity and abundance of water 
 
Al-Battuf’s unique water-retention soil quality allowed the realisation of a 
self-sufficient eco-system, where the need for irrigation was not present for the 
fellahin at that time. Utilising the absorptive capacity of the soil, the fellahin in al-
Battuf worked within the limitations of nature and adapted the rainfed or ba’ali 
agricultural practices utilised for generations to produce traditional crops. As will be 
seen in this section, this was contradictory to the Zionist water and land aspirations, 
which utilised technological and infrastructural tools to overcome and control 
ecological conditions. However, this is not to be understood as a normalising of Arab 
vs. Jewish conceptions of adapting to or overcoming natural limitations as this would 
to adopt an environmentally deterministic approach, which this thesis aims to avoid 
and challenge (see section 2.3). Before 1948, Palestinian farmers were utilising 
technological tools and mechanisms to drill for groundwater, diverting river flows 
and establishing prosperous water-intensive farming, like the famous citrus orchards 
in multiple locations in historic Palestine1, but not in al-Battuf. This thesis argues that 
the settler-colonial laws have significantly re-configured land-water relations and 
meaning for the colonized. It also emphasises that a historical examination can 
explain the underlying causes of a consistent and naturalised denial of access to 
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water and infrastructure in farming, and the dominance of a water scarcity narrative 
to control flows to non-Jewish agriculture.   
 
While the Zionists were constructing an abundance narrative (Alatout, 2009) 
and strengthening their efforts to intensify irrigated agriculture, the seminal work of 
Imseh reveals how on a Palestinian end, one writer and expert, by the name of Najib 
Nassar, adopted a construction of Palestine as a water scarce region, where he saw 
dryland farming  (ba’ali) and its development as a condition for the advancement of 
Arab farming and ‘a more durable attachment to the landscape’ (Tesdell, 2018, p.72). 
Juxtaposing Nassar’s model of an agriculture suiting the limitations of climatic 
conditions and rainfall, the Zionist imaginary aspired for controlling of nature rather 
than adjusting to its limitations, creating the impetus for conflict and contestation 
over water rights and claims. The earliest traces of water conflict in Palestine before 
1948 can be traced to the British colonial mandate period, when reports and studies 
nurtured competition over land and water rights in Palestine between Jewish and 
non-Jewish water users. As Wishart (1985) argues, three British documents shaped 
the water conflict on the ground. These were studies conducted to explore the 
limitations and prospects of Jewish immigration to Palestine and its implication on 
economic development. The Simpson report of 1930, which focused on immigration 
settlement and economic development, provided less optimistic estimates of 
Palestine’s cultivatable area and recommended legislation be enacted to settle water 
rights, emphasising “that agricultural development among Arab farmers was a 
requirement for future peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine” 
(Wishart, 1985, p.53).  However, a letter in 1931 sent from the British Prime Minister 
Ramsay McDonald to the JA’s Chaim Weizmann, aimed to emphasise British support 
to Jewish immigration and maintained a neutral position on it, further delaying any 
legislative decisions which would settle water rights for Arabs. The British White 
Paper of 1939, also mirrored Simpson’s estimates and was concerned with how 
landless Arabs were to be provided with land, arguing that the JA had already 
acquired enough land for Jewish settlements development.  
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Clearly, British colonial policies were often ambiguous in their effects on 
Arabs and Jews (Smith, 1993), which agitated fears and concerns, especially for Arabs 
who had been witnessing a curtailment of their agricultural livelihood practices in 
light of the JA’s acquisition and development of land and agriculture.17F 17 Water and 
land rights, therefore, became an object of conflict and contestation between Arabs 
and Jews in the 1930s and the Peel Commission aimed at addressing those issues. 
Meanwhile, the Zionist investments by that time were significant in combating what 
were considered ecological constraints to water availability. The concessions given 
to them by the British, such as hydropower production on the Yarmouk River, or the 
electrification of Jaffa  (Meiton, 2015; 2016), or the drainage of the Huleh swamps 
(Anton, 2008; Sufian, 2007b), were all articulations of a particular hegemony over 
land and water resource development.  
 
An important actor in harnessing of natural resources was Mekorot water 
company. Established twelve years before the creation of the Israeli state by the JA, 
the Histadrut Labour Federation, and the Jewish National Fund (JNF), its ideological 
founders restricted its work to supporting exclusively Jewish enterprises and users 
(Davis et al., 1980; Galnoor, 1980). Mekorot’s domination over water management 
meant that by 1947 it had succeeded in constructing and operating more than 
200 kilometres of water lines to Jewish communities exclusively, establishing “the 
first example in Palestine of a regular system of charges for water supply” (Wishart 
1985, p.62).18F 18 Agricultural development exclusively guaranteed for Jewish 
agriculture imposed a narrative of water-as-resource (Yates, Harris, and Wilson 
2017), relegating water to its technical and expertise dimensions, as Wishart (1985, 
p.61) explains: 
                                                          
17 In addition, the Peel Commission formed in 1936 after Arab leaders demanded a new commission to curb 
Zionist immigration, settlement expansion and decide on Palestine absorptive capacity also investigated issues 
of land settlement and agricultural economic activities. The Peel Commission report of 1937 (UN Website, nd) 
18 Mekorot, the Israeli water company, founded in 1937 before the establishment of the state, was owned jointly 
by the government, Jewish Agency and the National Federation of Labour ‘Histadrut’ (Bilski et al., 1980). Today, 
Mekorot is a wholly owned government company, under the Ministry of Energy and Water and the Ministry of 
Finance. It is formed of a group of companies which control, plan and manage 100 water mega-projects 
throughout Israel and occupied territories. 
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Water in Palestine was no longer a free good. Agricultural 
development had transformed water resources above and below 
ground into valuable capital assets. Water which had previously 
been allowed to "run off unused" or which had been "applied 
inefficiently" was exploited more economically.   
  
 The failure to enact water rights legislation contributed to the persistence of 
conflict over Palestine’s natural resources. Coupled with the slow pace at which 
modern agricultural methods were transmitted to the majority of Arab farmers and 
the reluctance to carry out irrigated agriculture in light of uncertain land and water 
rights, this limited irrigated agriculture to richer Arab landowners who had the 
necessary capital and security. Wishart’s extensive examination of Mandate 
legislation reveals that the irrigation ordinance of 1942 was never enforced due to 
Zionist political opposition, consolidating Mekorot’s monopoly in providing water 
to Jewish agricultural settlements. This shows how the colonial administration has 
materially and discursively established conditions of differential access to water from 
the early 1920s, consolidating the framing of Arab modes of agriculture and water 
use as primitive, and bolstering a Zionist approach of efficiency and development (for 
more detailed account of agriculture under the British mandate, see Kamen, 1991). 
This is why the JA’s water harnessing ambitions were clearly identified as an element 
influencing border establishment between the Arab and Jewish countries in the 
partition plan, which further highlights the influence and power of the JA in 
restricting the amendment of the ordinances that would have elevated Arab claims 
to a level playing field.  As such, the JNF and JA’s control over water quotas, resulted 
in a reality where only 2.3 per cent of the water resources available were allocated 
to the Palestinians in Israel after 1948 in a trend that continued until the present 
(Davis et al., 1980).  
 
To conclude, agriculture for the Palestinians before 1948 has responded to 
politically created water and land scarcity (Temper, 2009, p.76), reinforced by 
unequal British colonial Mandate’s approach towards Zionist aspirations for land and 
water control. This continued to be the case after 1948, most evidently seen in the 
occupied territories in 1967. This has been the premise of how water scarcity was 
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politically utilised to exclude non-Jewish actors from acquiring rights to water. In the 
case of al-Battuf, like many other locations in historical Palestine, rainfed agriculture 
remained a dominant and well developed practice acquiring high level of adaptation 
to the climatic, biophysical and political conditions of the time (Tesdell, 2015).  
 
4.2 The uprooting of Palestinians from their land (1948-1976) 
 
To analyse the struggle over water in al-Battuf specifically and the Galilee in 
general, the 1948 dispossession and Nakba serve as the year of rupture. The Nakba, 
or Catastrophe, refers to the Palestinian experience of exodus in the aftermath of 
Zionist ethnic cleansing, where around 750,000 Palestinians were expelled from their 
cities, towns and villages. Since 1948, Israel as a settler colonial project established 
its nation-state, where Palestinians became a minority group (multiple estimates 
post 1948 refer to a population of around 160,000 people). Following that, the 
Palestinians were governed under Israeli military rule from 1948 until 1966 which 
was imposed on the remaining Palestinian towns and villages19F 19 to deter the 
population and mainly internal refugees from returning to their homes and villages. 
The Palestinians inside Israel faced multi-faceted discrimination and alienation in 
those decades, consolidated by an Israeli policy of aggressive confiscation of the land 
which remained under the Palestinian control. Palestinians inside Israel, who today 
amount to 1.2 million, have been depicted as the ‘Forgotten Palestinians’, in between 
the Jewish citizens of Israel and the dispossessed Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, leading to complex and contradictory relationships with the state and the 
land they live on (Pappé, 2011). The collective experience of those Palestinians as 
both  underprivileged citizens and settler-colonial subjects (Rouhana and Hueidi, 
2017) has definitely shaped unique lived geographies to their counterpart 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, or the Syrians in the oGH.   
                                                          
19 The military rule was only imposed on the ‘Mixed cities’ (cities where Arabs and Jews lived – like Haifa, Jaffa) 
only until 1949, and Acre in 1951 (Sabbagh-Khoury, 2018). Most of the populations of Palestinians remaining 
were concentrated in the Galilee villages and the Naqab, in addition to the little triangle area.  
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The realities of living under military rule forced the Palestinians inside Israel to 
conglomerate in specific geographical areas (see Figure 4.3), imposing strict control 
and a re-configuration of their lived geographies as Palestinians. Basing its decisions 
on British colonial mandate emergency regulations, the Israeli government picked 
and chose five of those regulations to govern the Arab minority (Jiryis, 1976; 
Masalha, 2002; Rouhana and Hueidi, 2017). As Bäuml states, three of those gave 
control to the military governor “to control, limit, and even prevent the freedom of 
movement of citizens under this rule” and the other two were to prevent people 
“from entering areas that had been proclaimed closed” (Bäuml, 2015, p.109), 
therefore creating and implementing an ‘uprooting’ policy to detach the Palestinians 
from their ancestral land.  
Fundamentally, the Zionist state dealt with its non-Jewish population as an 
excluded group and thus shaped their collective existence and practices in the realm 
of marginality and exclusion (Bäuml 2017, p.109): 
The aim of the military government’s actions was to minimize and 
almost abolish the civil equality that the Arabs should have enjoyed 
as Israeli citizens. The military government resulted in the exclusion 
of the Arabs from all Jewish state systems, their discrimination in 
every domain, the deepening of their internal divides or the 
creation of new ones, the erasure of their identity, and the 
hindering of their sense as a national collective. 
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Figure 4.3 Palestinian inside Israel population after 1948 (from Lustick, 1980) 
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Moreover, those Palestinians who remained as an Arab minority in the state of 
Israeli after 1948 continued to be identified as the ‘state enemy’ even though they 
were a “poor, heavily unemployed, traumatized minority that had just witnessed the 
destruction of  its homeland and nation” (Bäuml, 2017, p.106). This logic necessitated 
their rule by military force rather than civil rule, maintaining and securing “the 
continued traditional segregation and exclusion of Arabs from the Zionist project” 
(ibid). Under military rule, citizenship was not granted to all Palestinians 
instantaneously. The Citizenship Law of 1952 granted Israeli citizenship to 40% of the 
Palestinians inside Israel at the time, while 40% received them gradually, and the 
remaining 20% who were considered Present Absentees (PA)20F 20 were also considered 
citizens later (in the 1950s) as the hopes were that they would leave Israel to go to 
other Arab countries (Masalha, 2002).  
 
Many important scholarly work have investigated this citizenship dilemma of 
Palestinians inside Israel and its use as a category of exclusion and estrangement 
(Robinson, 2013), of being citizens without citizenship and even settler-colonial 
citizens (Rouhana and Sabbagh-khoury, 2018;  Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury, 2015; 
Shafir, 2005, 2018; Sultany, 2003). While citizenship was granted gradually to all 
Palestinians inside Israel, it remained an exclusionary citizenship identity as they “are 
caught between the illusion of inclusion derived from Israel’s democratic regime and 
its discriminative characteristics embedded in its definition as a Jewish state. Caught 
in this tension, they are expected to accept their inferior status and to adopt a civic 
identity that politically rejects them and their collective memory.” (Pinson, 2008, 
p.204). Therefore, this adoption of a civic identity devoid of nationality and political 
identification with the new state created a deep dilemma for the Palestinian citizens. 
As Shafir further contends, the only citizenship framework which incorporated 
Palestinians was the Nationality Law of 1952 which is also “the one not connected 
directly to land and control of land” (2005, p.55), materialising Israeli-Jewish 
                                                          
20 The definition of an absentee, as the 1950 Knesset Law of Absentee Property states, included “every Israeli 
citizen who left his regular abode in Israel (a) to a place outside Israel before 1948 or (b) for a place in Israel which 
was at that time occupied by forces which sought to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or fought 
against it after its establishment”. For more see Cohen (2003) 
 
131 
 
hegemony over land (and water) and reserving citizenship rights “to those who were 
part of the colonisation of Palestine”21F 21.  
 
From majority to minority, the Palestinians inside Israel dealt with the years 
following the Nakba as a period of adaptation of conflictual relations between them 
and the Israeli state, as Manar Makhoul (2018) reflects through the use of novels 
written by authors who themselves are Palestinians inside Israel. He speaks of an 
attenuation of the Palestinian discourse from one of liberation and an Arab struggle 
against Zionism to one of daily lives of Palestinians inside Israel. Palestinians inside 
Israel thus subtly become Israeli Arabs, a term used by the authorities, emitting the 
Palestinian national connection. Interestingly, Makhoul further elaborates on the 
conundrum of Palestinians inside Israel, who gradually perceive themselves as 
“discriminated against people” and as he powerfully proclaims, “people who are 
fighting a national struggle for liberation do not complain about discrimination; only 
citizens fight against discrimination” (2018, p.10), denoting acceptance to be part of 
the Israeli state. This collective identification transformed the identity of Palestinians 
inside Israel and shifted the discourse of their struggle to that of recognition by the 
state, and one which aims to fight the discrimination which they face.   
 
Makhoul further claims that Palestinians inside Israel “sought to recover from 
a disastrous war through modernization, which they believed would ultimately lead 
to integration within Israel as equals” (ibid, p.15). They believed that their lack of 
integration was due to their backwardness but soon realised that it’s due to the 
exclusivist nature of Zionism (p.16). Assi’s examination of Palestinian writer Emile 
Habibi’s work, most notably The Pessoptimist, introduces a bold and alternative 
notion of Palestinian identity in this period, seeing identity in this context as a form 
                                                          
21 “Citizenship has never been simple or unitary in form in Israel – a situation it shares with many other colonial 
and postcolonial societies” (Shafir 2005, 55). As Shafir highlights, this hierarchy of stacked citizenships which he 
identified in three categories: one was related to the Nationality Law of 1952, which, as mentioned above gave 
Palestinians citizenship rights. The second concerned the law of Return of 1950, which was a citizenship 
framework solely designed for Jews, making Jewish populations worldwide citizens upon arrival to Israel. The 
third refers to a republican citizenship framework, which “provided full, civil, political, and social citizenship […] 
and excluded Palestinian citizens in many spheres to date” (ibid: 55). 
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of practice, survival tactics employed in a game that involves affirmation and 
rejection, collaboration and resistance, but never fixed. It depicts an “odd formation 
of an Arab citizenry and citizenship consciousness within the oppressive apparatuses 
of the military government experience (Assi, 2013, p.88). This quest for recognition 
and equality was paralleled in the politicisation of the population through 
identification with the Communist Party, the attempt to establish a nationalist 
movement ‘Al Ard’, and an increase in the Arab intelligentsia’s involvement in the 
political affairs of their communities (Zureik, 1979, pp.186–87): 
Within a hegemonic Zionist political culture, where deviation from 
a Zionist definition of political precepts is neither encouraged nor 
tolerated, it would be unrealistic to expect Arab efforts in this 
direction to be a complete success. However, neither could they be 
considered a total failure. While the extent of Arab politicization 
has not solved the predicaments facing Arabs in Israel as a 
subordinate group, they have at least managed to keep alive a 
sense of Palestinian identity and attachment to the homeland 
 
In conclusion, the military rule and subsequent decades of civilian rule 
succeeded in meeting the Israeli state’s objective of controlling and excluding the 
remaining Arab population from an ontological identification with the land and 
weakening any remaining collective identification and identity amongst them. Land 
and natural resources (as they were pre-1948) have become exclusive to the Jewish 
nation state building and were prohibited from contributing to any Arab collective 
identification or economic value. Through the military rule, the government 
maintained its control of the natural resources and the Arab subjects. Falah (1996) 
refers to this process as a ‘de-signification’ of the cultural landscape of the 
Palestinians, due to the settler colonial hegemony and control over land and 
territory. With this de-signification, national identity and attachment to place is 
maimed and destroyed, leaving behind a politically and socially disfigured 
community. 
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4.2.1 Military Rule, the Judaisation of the Galilee and the uprooting of 
Palestinians  
 
“Land is life – or, at least, land is necessary for life. Thus contests 
for land can be – indeed, often are – contests for life” (Wolfe, 2006, 
p.387) 
“To think about distant places, to colonize them, to populate or 
depopulate them: all of this occurs on, about, or because of land. 
The actual geographical possession of land is what empire in the 
final analysis is all about. At the moment when a coincidence occurs 
between real control and power, the idea of what a given place was 
(could be, might become), and an actual place – at that moment 
the struggle for empire is launched. This coincidence is the logic 
both for Westerners taking possession of land and, during 
decolonisation, for resisting natives reclaiming it” (Said, 1994, p.78) 
 
The military rule imposed on the remaining Palestinians inside Israel stifled 
their everyday life in two ways. First, it geographically separated communities from 
their lands and fields and imposed a permit system which allowed the military 
governor to control the movement of people. Second, the objective of military rule 
was to carry out land confiscation to infiltrate and impose a settler colonial presence 
in the midst of pre-dominantly Palestinian/Arab spaces, such as the Galilee. The 
British colonial mandate emergency laws of 1945 served as the platform for land 
confiscation under the Military law. As Sabri Jiryis explains in his remarkable work 
The Arabs in Israel, “by the beginning of the 1960s there was little land left in Israel 
to be redeemed” (1976, p.80) as the military rule utilised five land expropriation laws 
which facilitated its control over land:  
1. Law of Absentee property in 1950 reflected “insatiable appetite for Arab Land 
and “the cruellest of the land expropriation measures” (p.85). It constructed 
the idea of the present absentees and the liberty to confiscate thousands of 
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dunums and property even from people who remained inside Israel but were 
not present at their village or town22F 22.  
2. The Defense (emergency) regulations, 1945 were perennial law on which the 
military government was based, and Article 125 referred to the closed areas 
article  
3. Emergency (security zones) regulations, 5709-1949. These were until 1972 
enabling the ministry of defense to designate the protected areas along the 
border or any part of it as a security zone. The ministry of defense declared 
“almost half of the Galilee, all of the Triangle23F 23, an area near the Gaza strip, 
and another along the Jerusalem Jaffa railway line near Battir as security 
zones.” (ibid, p.90) 
4. Emergency Regulations (cultivation of waste lands) ordinance 5709-1949. 
This concerned land that was “abandoned by their owners and cultivators and 
left untilled, plantations being neglected and water resources remaining 
unexploited”. The ministry of agriculture had the authority to cease and 
confiscate any land it deemed unexploited (ibid, p.94) 
5. Law for the requisitioning of property in times of emergency 5710-1949.24 
The Galilee remained an Arab region before and after the 1948 war.  Despite 
these laws, the Palestinians inside Israel managed to hold on to some of their 
remaining lands, yet under precarious conditions where the state still had the 
ultimate power to expropriate land for security purposes and the public good. Since 
most of the agricultural land of the Galilee belonged to private smallholder land 
owners, it was protected from the earliest Zionist land acquisitions, and was 
maintained its Arab character after 1948 (Bashir, 2004). The settler colonial 
geography was yet to be imposed on the Galilee. Spreading over 1.5 million dunums 
                                                          
22 Through such laws, Israel was able to confiscate millions of dunums of Palestinian Absentee properties, around 
40% of their land (Tannous, 2012). Not only did the land confiscation not stop in 1948, but it extended to encroach 
on the remaining lands of Palestinians inside Israel through planning regulations and rules of state land 
requisition.  
23 The Triangle is an Arab Palestinian concentration of towns and villages in central Israel, near the Green Line 
separating it from the West Bank.  
24 All of these laws were employed to confiscate land from the remaining Palestinians. To further consolidate the 
ownership of the state to these lands, the Land acquisition (validation of acts of compensation) law 5713-1953 
was also passed24, consolidating state authority over Arab Land. As Jiryis (1976, p.96) refers to it as the “epitome 
of its five predecessors”. the opposition to the land acquisition law was strong however it managed to pass and 
consolidate the state authority and control of Arab land. 
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of Palestinian land, it was framed by the Israeli politicians as a space requiring 
‘liberation’ and ‘conquest’ to impose on it a Jewish character (Bashir, 2004). The 
Judaisation attempts under the military rule aimed at increasing the Jewish 
population by confiscating land from its Arab owners and building Jewish settlements 
within the geographies of Arab existence, severing the remaining villages’ 
geographical continuity and connections (Falah, 1993). With dwindling land 
remaining, the military rule resulted in a case of dysfunctional urbanisation that 
impacted the value of the villagers’ land, and the viability of farming as a livelihood.25F 25 
The Galilee experienced a second wave of ‘Judaisation of the soil’ from 1974 
to 1982 (Falah 1989, p.239) which consolidated the efforts of the Israeli state to 
penetrate the Arab core of the Galilee and establish Jewish development towns to 
dilute their populations and offset their ‘demographic threat’. This was part of plans 
of ‘Judaisation of the Galilee’ – government plans which necessitated large scale 
expropriation of Palestinian land in the Galilee and the investment in bringing Jewish 
settlements to the Galilee. The relevance of this important period is that it aimed to 
turn Arab spaces of existence into enclosures and confined areas, closed to 
agricultural expansion. As Ghazi Falah asserts, the objective was to “limit Arab 
utilization of land as a strategy of territorial control” (1989, p.237). In the 1975, 
Israel’s announcement of the confiscation of 20,000 dunums in al-Mal lands 
(agricultural land belonging to al-Battuf villages). This was followed by a secret 
document, leaked n 1976 which studied the situation of the Arabs of Israel and 
presented approaches to deal with them, mainly to curb their influence and most 
importantly to take their lands. It was written by Israel Koenig, the Northern District 
Commissioner of the Ministry of Interior whose recommendations were officially 
adopted by the government in their successive plans to develop the Galilee (COHRE 
and Badil, 2005). Such judaisation plans and laws, with their discriminatory core, 
                                                          
25 As Falah further contends, Jewish cities were being constructed in the heart of the Galilee, which were all in 
close vicinity to Al-Battuf and its villages. These ‘development cities’ were used for both security and strategic 
measures, implanted in the middle of the remaining villages of the Galilee and by 1974, there were 117 
settlements, shrinking spaces of existence of the villages and imposing a process of urbanisation of those spaces, 
as no new Palestinian town or city has been established between 1948 and the present day.   
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were justified as an approach adopted by the Israeli government to liberate the 
Galilee from its Arab character and people (Nakhleh, 1978).  
The Palestinians of the Galilee therefore were faced with existential threats 
enacted by the Israeli state against their source of livelihood (agricultural land) and 
identity (as ethno-geographic communities), which reinforced their mobilisation 
around land, most evidently in the 1976 Yawm Al Ard (Land Day). For al-Battuf 
farmers (especially Arrabeh, Sakhnin and Deir Hanna), their lands in another area 
called al-Mal (known by the state as Area 9), was under an imminent threat of 
confiscation. All mobilisation efforts and resistance were therefore embodied in Land 
and land protection. On the 30th of March 1976, a general strike was declared, and 
the Israeli police attacked demonstrators, resulting in violent confrontations and the 
killing of six Palestinian Arabs and the wounding of a handful of people and the arrest 
of many. Land Day became a symbolic and powerful celebration of belonging to the 
land which united all Palestinians inside Israel, the West Bank and Gaza and also the 
Syrians of the occupied Golan Heights in solidarity against the encroachment of the 
settler colonial state on their lands (Bashir, 2006; Nakhleh, 1978; Wakim, 2001). Its 
relevance to al-Battuf case will be explored in section 2.2, which situates its struggles 
as a preceding platform for mobilisations which expanded during Land Day.  Al-Battuf 
and al-Mal are both sites of the few remaining Arab agricultural lands, and the 
experience of land confiscation in al-Battuf can be argued to have been the impetus 
of larger demonstrations and resistance during Land Day.  
While the resistance of the Palestinian masses who participated in Land Day 
succeeded in stopping the government’s confiscation of al-Mal land, the judaisation 
process continued in the Galilee through other means: planning and settlements. As 
for planning, the Israeli government created regional councils in the Galilee to control 
planning and use as much land as possible where Arab villages exist. Misgav regional 
council, established in 1982, as part of the Judaisation of the Galilee plan, 
consolidated its control over Jewish settlements and also incorporated thousands of 
dunums belonging to Arab villages (Bashir, 2004). Settlements, known as mitzpim 
(lookouts/ watchtowers) were also constructed in the core of the Galilee around al-
Battuf and al-Mal areas as spies for the government to report any illegal activities 
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(Kanaaneh, 2008; Yiftachel and Rumley, 1991). Al-Battuf lands, amounting to more 
than 40,000 dunums, while still owned by Palestinian families, have become largely 
controlled by Misgav and Kfar Tavor regional councils – both Jewish settlement 
regional councils. This has disregarded the Arab local councils power to influence 
planning there and placed all regulation regarding development of al-Battuf valley 
under the control of the Ministry of Interior and Misgav and Kfar Tavor. This is 
relevant for studying agricultural transformations in al-Battuf today, as such transfer 
of jurisdiction meant the total abandonment of agricultural lands due to the state full 
control and intent to keep the Palestinian populations off their land, but this time 
through planning rather than confiscation. 
 
4.2.2 The demise of Arab agriculture  
 
Agriculture in the Arab sector was one of the last remaining economic 
activities after the 1948 war. Heavily weakened by the aftermath of the Nakba and 
insurmountable land dispossession, the military government instantly exercised its 
control on the remainder of this weak, mainly fellah-led sector. The Israeli 
agricultural policymaking was jointly controlled and managed by the Jewish Agency 
and the WZO’s settlement division, both ideologically driven entities whose sole 
purpose was the development and consolidation of Jewish-only economies and 
sectors. Therefore, the state’s control of the remaining Arab agriculture was to 
subjugate it to the decision-making and priorities of the Jewish state, leaving the 
farmers with no influence and power to affect this process. The Ministry of 
Agriculture established a “Department of the Arab village”26F 26 to oversee its policy 
implementation and survey the existing agricultural activities of the Palestinian 
Arabs.  
The ramification of military rule on farming were unprecedented, 
accelerating the demise of Palestinian Arab agriculture, by significantly reducing the 
                                                          
26 The Department's policy was implemented by the Military Government and by the Prime Minister's Advisor 
on Arab Affairs (Bäuml, 2009) 
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average plot size of the Palestinian farmer. While the Palestinian farmer owned on 
average 8.4 dunum in 1945, this was reduced to 5.3 by 1951 and in 1960 it reached 
4.9 (Abu Kishk and Jaraysi, 1976). Only 30% of the Galilee lands remained for the 
Palestinians living there, reducing the economic dependence on it for livelihood and 
instigating an exodus from the land towards Jewish economies, where farmers 
became labourers (Falah, 1993).  
The water realities for the Palestinian agricultural sector were also a limiting 
factor in its development, and a condition for its stagnation in comparison with a land 
and water rich Jewish sector. After 1948, as stipulated in the Water Law of 1959, all 
water resources in Israel were put under the control and responsibility of the Israeli 
state, which defined water as public property. Under a highly centralised authority 
of the state, water was securitised and framed as necessary to nation-building and 
the exercise of Jewish sovereignty under conditions of perceived water scarcity 
(Alatout, 2007). These categories and their articulation with one another made the 
water law a core instrument in Israeli structures of power, solidifying the Jewish 
character of state institutions like Mekorot (which became a state company after 
1948) and its sister company, Tahal (the water planning company), contributing to 
the marginalisation of Israel’s Palestinian citizens and their water needs, let alone 
rights. According to a report prepared in 1964 by the Water Commission27F 27, the 1959 
Water Law “has placed all the Country’s water resources under the control of the 
state to ensure that they may be conserved, protected and exploited for the best 
interests of the citizenry as a whole. While protecting individual rights to use water, 
the water law has vested in the government wide-spread powers to control and 
restrict the activities of individual water users in order to further and protect the 
public interest” (ISA, 1964a).  
The Water Law, as part of an assemblage of regulations, ideas and norms 
(Meehan, 2014) about water control in a settler colonial state, is significant in its 
construction of water as an object of state management. In this context, the selection 
of water projects in the newly established state was not based on economic logic, 
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but rather on the desire to create a modern and developed Jewish society, with 
agricultural production and irrigation of the desert a national priority. The growth of 
the Israeli water sector facilitated, through infrastructure development, the 
“emergence of a central structure designed to carry out ideological directives” 
(Galnoor, 1978, p.349)28F 28. Also central to the historical development of Israel’s water 
supply, through land acquisition and control over water sources, has been Keren 
Kayemeth LeIsrael, the Jewish National Fund (KKL-JNF). Indeed, KKL-JNF has 
increased Israel's water supply to such an extent that it has dubbed itself “Israel's 
fourth aquifer” (JNF, 2017) exclusively to its Jewish citizens:  
Israel has three water sources: Lake Kinneret, the Mountain Aquifer 
and the Coastal Aquifer. Israel also has KKL-JNF. KKL-JNF gathers 
water, drop by drop, from Negev and Galilee flash floods, and from 
wastewater treatment facilities throughout the country, to enrich 
Israel’s water economy by a total of 260 million cubic meters. 
  
Therefore, the government's activity in the Arab sector was focused in its 
early years on creating a ‘watertight’ process of monitoring and controlling the Arab 
citizens, and formulating mechanisms to deal with them including citizenship, land 
regulations, economy and education (Bäuml, 2009). Agriculture, being the “major 
foothold remaining for the Arab economy in Israel” (Khalidi, 1984, p.70) was framed 
as  a dormant field, a favourable condition by the Israeli state, as any revival of Arab 
economic activity outside of the control of the Jewish economic activities posed a 
serious danger (Bäuml, 2009). Therefore, the Israeli government, with heavy 
involvement from an appointed advisor on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister, 
designed policies of containment and integration of the Arabs into the Israeli 
economy. This was in order to prevent the formation of a separate and independent 
Arab economy, which was seen as competitive and undermining. It was proposed 
that the containment should take shape by transforming the Arab sector into labor 
force within the Jewish economy.  
                                                          
28 As Lipchin claims, the Zionist ideologies driving water and agricultural policy in Israel have “left a legacy of 
mismanagement and environmental degradation” (2007, p.251). 
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The initial approach of the military government regarding Arab agriculture 
was to carry out extensive surveys and studies of the existing agricultural activities in 
more than 50 villages and towns (ISA, 1952a,b) and gauge the potential. These 
studies admit to a significant drop in cultivated land since 1948, forcing the Arab 
farmer to change the way [he] carries out agriculture. At that point, the national 
average of landholding of the Arab farm was 40 dunums, over 60% of which were 
less than 30 dunums. This created a reality where little change the farmer could do 
to alter his agricultural practices without extensive intervention from the state. The 
Ministry identified 22,000 non-Jewish earners, 40% of them working in agriculture, 
cultivating 550,000 dunums out of 1.24 million dunums which are used for livestock, 
pasture and forests in the Galilee, Triangle and Naqab (ISA, 1960a). The Ministry 
showed interest in developing irrigation schemes in the Arab villages, claiming to 
have worked on expanding irrigated plots and drinking water for the Arab villages by 
working with Mekorot, with the plan to supply 59 villages with drinking water 
networks – around 150,000 people. It also claimed that 44 villages were supplied or 
were in the process of being supplied with water for irrigation. The Ministry was also 
interested in certain crops and systematically altered traditional crop varieties with 
the desired crops: cotton, peanuts and tobacco. In 1958 for the first time, 2700 
dunums of cotton on ba’li land were planted and 1,500 dunums of peanuts. The 
tobacco plots have expanded since the establishment of the state from 8,000 
dunums in 1948 to 43,000 today.  
A more concise report was a 6-page document advising the ministry’s 
approach and course of action towards agriculture in the Arab village (ISA, 1960b). 
The report detailed the situation in the Arab village, from population to land use, 
livestock and animal rearing, water and farming techniques. It attempted to provide 
quantitative measures and predict changes to the Arab economic activities. 
However, it also attempted to advise the ministry on the best approach to deal with 
agriculture in the Arab villages. On the issue of water, the report does not elaborate 
on the sources of water used for irrigation but claims that irrigated plot in the Arab 
areas increased by from 8000 dunum in 1949 to 28,000 dunums in 1960 and was 
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anticipated to reach 30,000 dunum with the completion of the water supply plans 
(ISA 1960a).  
 The sources of this water, however, were not ones that had been invested 
by the ministry or by Mekorot, but rather were provided from nearby springs and 
existing water sources (wells) which the farmers relied on. This is further confirmed 
in the report’s assessment of existing available water sources as “enough to irrigate 
an additional 5000 dunums”, without any commitment to increase water allocations 
to the Arab farmers through developing infrastructure and increasing provisions from 
Mekorot. The report highlighted that the use of water in the Arab villages is at 9 MCM 
per year, 7.7 of which is used in irrigation. While a rapid increase of irrigated land 
(from 4,000 dunums to 24,000 dunums) in the Arab villages was noted, the main 
recommendation was to provide minimum quantities of water, based on current 
demands of 1960.  
The conclusions of the 1960 reports stated clearly that there was not a single 
village without an inclination towards leaving agriculture for the following reasons: 
the Arab agriculture cannot compete and provide income like other sectors; higher 
education is increasing and moving people away from agriculture, the household 
family members are increasing due to better living conditions. Therefore, the report 
predicted a demise in agriculture in the Arab villages but advised that certain 
agricultural activities needed to be supported by the ministry. The reasons for that 
support were justified with three main points: first, that the Arab fellah has skills 
working rocky and difficult terrain and has high endurance to such conditions that 
the Jewish farmer doesn’t have; second, that the fellah grows many crops that the 
Jewish farmer is not able to grow because they require a large work force and are 
more traditional (like tobacco, cotton, olives and sesame); third, that the fellah is 
abandoning agriculture because of the profitability of other sectors therefore the 
need to cap prices like that of oil and tobacco and enhance profit for the farmers and 
help them remain in this sector. 
It is therefore evident that while the Israeli policymakers had predicted the 
demise of the agricultural sector, they had also been complicit in its design, while 
also persistently re-configuring it during those critical years after the establishment 
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of the state to cater to Jewish economy’s needs. Some of the crops that the ministry 
of agriculture supported the farmers in growing in al-Battuf were sugar beet (to 
supply its sugar plants in Afula), sesame, onion and tomatoes (to supply processed 
food factories). 
By 1973, the realities of the Arab agriculture were clear to take a different 
trajectory than the MoA approach of reviving Arab agriculture promised in the 1960s. 
In 1973, only 7.6% of agricultural land under Arab control was irrigated, in 
comparison with 50% of the Jewish lands that year, proving that the ambitious plans 
set forth by the state were only designed to secure tight involvement in agriculture 
in the Palestinian sector before it abandons it, leaving farmers without any prospect 
for agricultural development and inclusion (Abu Kishk and Jarayisi, 1976).  
Furthermore, by 1979 69,000 dunums were under irrigation in the Arab lands  
(Khalidi, 1984). While these numbers portray a steady increase in irrigated 
agriculture, its limitation becomes visible when compared to the Jewish irrigated 
land, which by the end of the 1970s grew by 1.5 million dunums. Moreover, 
Mekorot’s lack of involvement in enhancing water infrastructure is proof of a farmer-
led initiative to draw water from local wells and spring sources. This resulted in a 
situation where Arabs cultivated 20% of all cultivated land in 1978, while receiving 
2.3% of all water used in agriculture (ibid, p.72). Falah (1993) also shows that 
according to Israeli statistics from 1981 concerning rural areas, the numbers became 
bleaker, with Arab agriculture dropping to 13.8% of the sector, receiving 0.4% of the 
water allocated to irrigated crops.  
Water, therefore, has become a constraining factor for the Arab farmers, as 
access to water for agriculture was confined to Jewish settlements and agriculture 
and deliberately denied for Palestinian farming. Coupled with the lack of land 
available for profitable farming, sustaining an income-generating livelihood solely on 
rainfed crops became an impossible task. It is under such conditions that the 
Palestinian farmers in al-Battuf and the wider Galilee were forced to re-configure 
their livelihood practices and relations with land and farming. Moreover, those 
periods were fraught with struggles for citizenship and opposition to misrecognition 
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inflicted by the Israeli state towards its Palestinian citizens, imbricating water and 
livelihood struggles with struggles for recognition and belonging.  
As al-Battuf case will show, the state and its institutions became present in 
the lived geographies of farmers every day, dominating the landscapes of their 
existence and re-configuring their relations with the land, mainly through two 
significant events: land confiscation for the construction of the NWC, and the 
introduction of new crops and open market mechanisms for Arab agriculture. That 
clashing presence of the state, as a hegemonic actor of expropriation but also 
apparent support (read manipulation) for farming had its implications for how 
farmers in the valley challenged the state, as shall be seen in Chapter 5. As Sa’di 
describes this carrot-and-stick approach, it aimed to “introduce structural changes 
among them: to alter their collective identity, to change their modes of life, and to 
rearrange their spatial distribution. The end result was to incorporate them as small, 
marginal, and subordinate collectives devoid of a collective identity, vision, will, or 
resistance ability; in Foucauldian terms, to render them docile bodies” (Sa’di, 2011, 
p.92). 
 
4.3 The lived geographies of farming in al-Battuf (1948-1976) 
 
 
As mentioned above, al-Battuf, like much of the Galilee, was not a site of 
extensive Zionist encroachment prior to 1948. After 1949, with the displacement of 
Saffuriyeh village in the valley, confrontation between Arrabeh and Sakhnin villagers 
and the Israeli settlers began. Following the Nakba, Saffuriyeh village and lands were 
claimed by the Jewish settlers who began growing it with wheat. This specific land, 
belonged to Arrabeh and Sakhnin and was the border between the villages. The 
confiscation of land was opposed by the villagers, who at night snuck into the fields, 
harvested the wheat and succeeded in redeeming it back to the village (Abu Saleh, 
18 July 2016, Arrabeh): 
In 1949, when they displaced Saffuriyeh village, they also 
confiscated 400 dunum of our land and cultivated it, assuming it’s 
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Saffuriyeh’s land. The Makhateer [elders] of our village went to 
demand that this is our land but they refused to give it up. During 
the harvest time in May-June, youth from the village went and 
harvested all of the ‘new Jewish’ settlement wheat. 100 people 
went for the harvest. This way we got it back. 
 
The Saffuriyeh village destruction and occupation by settlers, and the struggle 
which ensued over land can be described as the first incidents of formulating tactics 
of opposition to Zionist encroachment on land and livelihoods of al-Battuf. While al-
Battuf lands remained largely intact (see Figure 4.1), 10,000 dunums of Saffuriyeh’s 
land were confiscated by the state and hundreds of dunums were expropriated 
under the guise of being left uncultivated. Out of the 51,000 dunums, 40,000 
continued to be used by the farmers. One of the abrupt changes to agricultural 
practices throughout the military period was the confiscation of pasture land, since 
it was Mashaa’ and collectively used by the farmers. Closed military zones and 
forestation areas extensively limited the livestock herding component of agriculture 
for al-Battuf farmers and more focus was invested in farming.  
 
Figure 4.4 Sahl al-Battuf in 1950 (Government Press Office, Brauner Teddy, 1950) 
 
145 
 
As this section will show, the fellahin became involved in contestation of resource 
politics and water imaginaries of the state, putting them at the forefront of the 
conflict with an enterprise carrying out its uprooting (Ayyash, 2018). The NWC, as an 
artefact of state policy and imaginary, came to al-Battuf and imposed its presence in 
their lives, transforming their livelihoods and bringing water to the forefront of their 
struggle, as chapter 5 will show.  
 
4.3.1 NWC encroachment on al-Battuf land (1954-1964) 
 
 
The politically charged decade of the 1950s was instrumental in setting out 
national water strategies for the riparian countries of the JRB. The United States 
diplomat Eric Johnston was sent out to negotiate an agreement in 1953 for unified 
development of the Jordan Valley. Concurrently, Israel was moving forward with its 
1953 seven-year plan, developed from the Lowdermilk-Hays plans of a ‘truly regional’ 
project. Its work commenced with construction of an intake to the NWC in the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in 1951 to commence the drainage of the Huleh Lake (see 
Figure 4.5), which was met by Syrian military and political opposition (Neff, 1994; 
Schmida, 1984)29F 29. Under such conditions, Israel was keen to commence the 
construction of its water infrastructure to establish facts on the ground and deter 
any Arab attempt to divert the waters of the upper Jordan.  
 
 
                                                          
29 The DMZ, delineated between Israel and Syria following the Armistice Agreement signed in 1949, was an area 
of 100 m2 from top of Lake Huleh to southern banks of Lake Tiberias. Israel was taking control of the area and 
carrying out prohibited acts like taking control of the waters of Lake Tiberias, drainage of Lake Huleh, expulsion 
of Arab residents there and creating settlement, which led to clashes with the Syrian army throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s (Molony and Hamill, 2009; Muslih 1993; Neff, 1994). 
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Figure 4.5 Israel’s original seven-year plan, showing the Beit Netofa reservoir (from 
Schmida, 1984) 
 
As alluded to in the introduction to this thesis, the urgency with which the 
NWC assemblage and specifically the ‘Beit Netofa’ reservoir was planned, designed 
and carried out was driving intensive efforts to realise a technically challenging and 
politically explosive project. According to Tahal company meeting minutes (ISA, 
1954a), al-Battuf was framed as a site of construction of the Beit Netofa reservoir, 
never examining the effect of the plans on its inhabitants and their livelihoods. All 
the attention of Israeli policymakers was on realising the NWC and transferring water 
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to the Negev. However, the material realisation of these large-scale plans was far 
from straightforward. The terrain was exceptionally challenging to excavate and 
ensure watertight canals and reservoirs. In addition to that, heightened security 
concerns were expressed by the planners, because of the nature of the works. The 
engineers of Tahal were concerned over the Jordan-Beit Netofa section of the NWC, 
which required an open canal from the northeast point in Lake Tiberias, making it 
vulnerable to Arab countries’ threats and vandalism. As Simcha Blass30F 30 explains in 
the meeting minutes of 27th of December 1954 (ISA, 1954b): 
Planning the Jordan River-Beit Netofa section is very difficult. I’ve 
looked at planning literature and I haven't found conditions as 
harsh and most of the work will take place in front of the eyes of 
the enemy. And we should construct accordingly so that it will not 
be easily targeted/damaged. This is a difficult topic and we need to 
start planning retroactively even though no work will be begun this 
year.  
 
The Beit Netofa reservoir had a very significant symbolism to the hydraulic 
mission of the state. In defiance of nature and the continuous attempt to tame it, the 
reservoir embodied the triumph of the technologically advanced Jewish state against 
nature and with that against its ‘desolate’ conditions and inhabitants (see Figure 4.2). 
The Israeli press highlighted this symbolism by characterising the project as ‘a second 
Sea of Galilee’ (The biblical and Hebrew name of Lake Tiberias) (Maariv, 1952), 
emphasising how the Galilee will be transformed to become unrecognisable (Maariv, 
1950). The National Carrier, in its river-like bends and channels is was further 
described as an ‘artificial Jordan River’ (Davar, 1964): a concrete waterway which 
defies gravity and channels much more than water: Zionist ideology and national 
identity. Evidently, the Zionist pre-state and Israeli state obsession with water – how 
to increase its availability, how to transport it outside of its basin, how to manage it 
and use it efficiently – has been and remains until today a defining aspect of national 
water policy.  
                                                          
30 Director of Tahal and a proponent of the abundance discourse as mentioned in earlier chapter.  
148 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Title reads: ‘the water will rise and the desert will bloom’ with a sign of 
Tahal company stating that Al-Battuf is the site of Beit Netofa project (Davar, 1952) 
 
The realisation of the NWC as a political, ideological and technical project was 
also a driver of state decrees and orders to begin work on the ground, even before 
the confirmation of the suitability of al-Battuf as a reservoir site. As al-Battuf was 
considered the ideal political realisation of water control, the NWC and Beit Netofa 
reservoir became a reality imposed on the Palestinian villages there, re-configuring 
their lived geographies for decades to come. From the villages of Eilaboun to Kufr 
Manda, Arrabeh and Sakhnin, the Palestinians began protesting the planned works 
by Tahal, the Israeli water planning company, which began setting up offices in 
Eilaboun. Tahal, supported by orders from the Minister of Finance to confiscate land, 
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demolish houses and move forward with the works for the planned reservoir ‘at any 
cost’, employed all tactics to ensure its control: disrupt social cohesion by employing 
residents who are close to the state as contractors, Druze soldiers31F 31 as security 
personnel or Makhateer and notables of the villages who were Mapai members (the 
ruling party led by Ben Gurion) to influence the public to sell their lands and support 
the NWC works (Al-Ittihad, 1954; Cohen, 2010).  
The NWC project first encroached on Eilabon’s land with the first tunnel 
construction along its route in 195332F 32. In November 1954, the military Governor‘s 
representative notified Kufr Manda residents that their village will be the site of a 
reservoir for the NWC, and hence they needed to look elsewhere for a place to live. 
The reservoir, upon its completion would hold 1 billion cubic meters and cover 
20,000 dunums of Kufr Manda and nearby villages of Rummaneh, Eli’zeir and the 
agricultural lands of Sakhnin and Arrabeh. Delegates from Tahal, headed by Uri 
Tahon who oversaw land settlements for the company and later became a consultant 
on Arab Affairs to the Deputy Prime Minister, visited the village in attempts to reach 
an agreement regarding land compensation and transfer of the village. Kufr Manda 
villagers vehemently refused to receive these notices and began mobilising against 
land theft ‘in the name of development’ that only aimed to dispossess them of their 
land and livelihood, as will be discussed in section 5.1.1.  
According to the original plans, Beit Netofa was considered the main reservoir 
to store and regulate the water transfer to the Naqab. However, as a 1955 accounting 
report of the planning committee of the NWC reveals, technical issues were 
continuing to arise and highlight the unsuitability of the valley for a ‘watertight’ 
reservoir. Drilling and seepage tests carried out at different locations in the valley 
showed the critical technical difficulties of constructing a canal on clay soil (ISA, 
1955). Concerns over leakage, sloughing and leaching of the clay subgrade into the 
canal were many and it was predicted that those would cause problems and failure 
                                                          
31 The Druze communities inside Israel are distinct as they have a history of cooperating with the state of Israel 
after its creation, including an imposed military conscription in the Israeli army. Collaborating allowed them to 
get permits and make a living, therefore creating a split between them and their Palestinian counterparts 
(Shihade 2012). See also (Kaufman 2016) for details about Druze inside Israel, in Lebanon and oGH 
32 Shmuel Kantor, The National Water Carrier, http://research.haifa.ac.il/~eshkol/kantorb.html  
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of the infrastructure (ISA, 1962a). Extensive research was undertaken to find a way 
to overcome this. A model of the canal was constructed by the Technion university 
in Haifa out of natural clay and tested under different conditions and designs in 
December 1960, in addition to seeking foreign expertise to deal with such conditions, 
relying on similar issues arising in California within the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation (USBR), and France (ibid). Regional politics also influenced the final 
decision to abandon the Beit Netofa reservoir. As Israel was carrying out the 
excavation work in the DMZ, Syria opposed it and filed complaints against Israel at 
the United Nations. Eventually, Israel was prohibited from continuing the work and 
diverting the Jordan River from the DMZ. Coupled with the technical difficulties 
explained above regarding the topography and soil conditions of al-Battuf, the NWC 
plan of the reservoir was amended and Lake Tiberias became the site of water 
regulation (Davis et al., 1980; Schmida, 1984).  
While the Jordan River Basin’s scholarly historical accounts mention the Beit 
Netofa reservoir as a site of unrealised Israeli plans for water storage and regulation, 
it fails to consider it a site of contestation, protest and struggle of Palestinian 
communities inside Israel. While the project was not realised, the lived experience of 
the Kufr Manda population during that period has constructed the NWC, its planned 
reservoir and Tahal staff as instigators of dispossession and uprooting, which they 
have opposed and consider an important experience in their sumud and persistence 
on the land, as shall be seen in section 5.1.1.  
The state’s abandonment of the idea of turning al-Battuf into a reservoir, for 
the reasons highlighted above, did not end the re-configurations of al-Battuf nor the 
NWC project. While Lake Tiberias became the site of storage of the UJR diversions, 
the pipelines transporting water to the Naqab were still planned to pass through al-
Battuf. In 1961, the Ministry of Finance announced the confiscation of lands from al-
Battuf, mainly the lands of Sakhnin and Arrabeh villages. With the land under 
confiscation having a width of 93m and a length of 17 km, the announcement meant 
the confiscation of an estimated 1,500 dunums of fertile land which had private 
owners. On the ground, al-Battuf became a central site of the NWC assemblage. The 
17km canal was constructed by 1964, Eshkol reservoir in the western part of the 
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valley was built in 1965 and Tzalmon reservoir and pumping station33F 33 was also 
constructed to pump water into the NWC canal in al-Battuf (see Figure 4.7).  
This spurred the second round of protests, as shall be discussed in section 
5.1.2. The hydro-imaginary of the project was eventually realised with the 
construction of the 17 km canal, confiscating the land of the farmers of Arrabeh and 
Sakhnin. As this thesis argues, settler colonial geographies of water and land control 
were juxtaposed with indigenous lived geographies to produce overt uneven 
waterscapes of dispossession and exclusion, made visible through the imposition of 
state infrastructure. The NWC realisation altered the farmers modes of livelihood, 
and their tactics of staying on the land and claiming rights to water and 
infrastructure.   
                                                          
33 Three pumps at Tzalmon raise Lake Tiberias water, along with three other pumps at the shores of the lake, 
which pump water from 209 meters below sea level to 154meters above sea level.  
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Figure 4.7 The location of Tzalmon pool and Eshkol plant (developed for this thesis 
by Yousra Othman for this thesis, 2018) 
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4.3.2 Farming re-configurations – the subordination of farming under 
Israeli rule and the abandonment of the land 
 
The fellahin of al-Battuf have depended solely on rain-fed agricultural crops 
like the famous watermelon, onion, sesame and okra which they cultivated in small 
landholding parcels. Even under these conditions, the Israeli state utilized the fertile 
soils of al-Battuf, creating a market for sugar beet, onion and tomatoes for 
production, even cotton. However, that interest in reviving and supporting Arab 
agriculture was short-lived and only served the interest of the state in a time where 
Jewish settlements were just starting. However, the inclusion in extensive irrigated 
agriculture was heavily restricted to Jewish Kibbutzim and Moshavim. In 1962, the 
Arab agriculture received only 1% of the total budget (Al-Ittihad, 1962a). 
Testimonies from interlocuters in Arrabeh tell of a time, after 1965, when 
farmers experienced golden years in their farming. Tnuva34F 34, a Jewish food processing 
cooperative was the monopoly cooperative specialising in milk, dairy and food 
products. The interlocutors described how Tnuva trucks would come to al-Battuf, and 
the whole family young and old will pick sugar beets and fill out those trucks to be 
sent directly to the Afuleh sugar factory35F 35. Such a rapid marketing of their products 
pleased the fellahin, who had never had an organised agricultural production line. 
Seeing how the government’s reliance on their produce enhanced their economic 
situation instantly, they were willing to develop and change their agricultural 
practices and crops provided that the Ministry and agricultural companies assisted 
them. Multiple crops, like cotton, tomatoes, onion and almonds were largely 
                                                          
34 Tnuva was established in 1926, when the moshavim and kibbutzim decided to coordinate and unify all stages 
of processing, producing and distributing fresh agricultural produce. At first, Tnuva distributed only fresh milk for 
drinking and later on also dairy products. In the early 1930s, as it became more established, Tnuva began 
marketing additional fresh farm produce: eggs, poultry, vegetables and fruits. 
35 During the 1970s, Israel invested in the production of sugar beet to compensate import embargos and secure 
self-sufficiency in sugar production. A sugar factory operated in the city of Afuleh, which reached its peak 
production in 1978 and was stopped in 1980 when imports were relaxed and became much cheaper (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, retrieved from:  
http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=ilandcommodity=centrifugal-sugarandgraph=beet-sugar-
production  
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produced by the Arab farmers for Israeli plants and factories, replacing the traditional 
subsistence crops of cereals and pluses (see Figure 4.3). The government was keen 
on taking advantage of cheap Palestinian labour, while providing the minimum 
support in infrastructure and technological development, as al-Battuf’s new crops 
remained mostly rainfed.   
 
Figure 4.8 Palestinian Arab farmers (men and women) carrying out cotton 
production and weighing in Sahl al-Battuf, for a joint Jewish-Arab cooperative 
named El-Cotton (Government Press Office, Cohen Fritz, 1959) 
 
However, the golden years were short lived. Soon after cheaper alternatives 
were available for the government (export channels, the strengthening of the Jewish 
agriculture, mechanisation), there was an abrupt abandonment of interest in Arab 
agricultural activities. The sugar beet factory closed, and this negatively affected the 
farmers. Onions as well began being produced by Jewish farmers and became a 
competitive crop and later abandoned. Being rain-fed, the Palestinian produce was 
making around 2 tons/dunum while the Jewish produce was making 12. Eventually, 
the government’s abandonment was experienced by the farmers of al-Battuf as a 
return to the Ottoman times and to a situation of despair, with the diminishing value 
of their crops accelerating their abandonment of land to look for more reliable 
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income generating activities.  Ali Antar, a veteran farmer and a strong local voice of 
the remaining farmers working in al-Battuf explains (Ali Antar, farmer, Arrabeh, 26 
August 2017): 
Most Arrabeh-Sakhnin from the 1950 until the 1970s, around 25 
years, remained dependent on agriculture as their primary source 
of income. In that time, the land used to produce, and the farmer 
used to benefit [financially] from the crops they harvested, and the 
reason was very clear to us: at that time, there was no competitor 
in the Jewish sector. The Jews were just beginning agriculture and 
are developing the kibbutzim and focusing on wheat and cotton. In 
that period, they also respected the Arab farmer because they 
needed him and his crops…there was also coordination between 
the fellahin and the ministry of agriculture - this we have witnessed 
slightly especially in the 1970s. I remember that the agricultural 
production was coordinated with the fellahin somehow, and they 
were interested in the agricultural produce and not necessarily with 
the fellah himself and his wellbeing.  
 
 This early interaction with the Ministry was further consolidated through its 
extension service staff who were Palestinian Arab and highlighted the beginning of 
the ordering of the agricultural practices and realities of the fellahin and their 
incorporation into the official governmental agricultural policy. The short-lived 
golden years of agriculture simply faded away once the Jewish sector developed and 
matured, leaving the farmers in dire need for support and formulating tactics to 
enhance agricultural production, which shall be discussed more thoroughly in section 
5.2. Coupled with contestation over land expropriation in al-Battuf for the benefit of 
the NWC project, the lived geographies of farmers in the valley became fraught with 
conditions of abandonment and imposition of harm as the NWC took their land, 
deprived them of water, in addition to making visible their detachment and exclusion 
from state planning and policymaking. The overt visibility of the NWC canal cutting 
across their thirsty lands asserted that the geographies of the settler colonial state 
and those of the fellahin are always uneven and separate. Nevertheless, the fellahin 
began mobilising and unifying to demand access to water and marketing mechanisms 
to enhance their position as producers. The struggle for water was multi-faceted, as 
villages in the late 1950s and 1960s were still not connected to a water network, so 
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demands for water oscillated between demands for potable water networks for the 
villages and for access to irrigation for their lands.  
 
This chapter has provided an extensive overview of the re-configuration of 
the lived geographies of al-Battuf and the Galilee under decades of systematic 
dispossession, the uprooting of land and livelihoods under Israeli military rule, as well 
as the subsequent decades of land expropriation. The core conclusion to draw is that 
the Israeli settler colonial presence has effectively altered and maimed the 
relationship between the remaining inhabitants of the Galilee and their land through 
a process of uprooting and re-configurations. Therefore, the struggle of the 
Palestinians in the Galilee was and remains a struggle over land but also a struggle 
over the relationship with the land. To root themselves back to the land which 
remained, al-Battuf inhabitants, the fellahin, enacted continuous re-configurations 
of land not only as a means of production but also as a source of belonging to a 
homeland (JPS, 1976). The next chapter will provide an extensive overview of how 
resistance to uprooting took shape and the re-configurations of land were utilised to 
restore and reclaim rootedness to the lands of al-Battuf.  
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Chapter 5:  Acts of protest and resistance in Sahl al-Battuf 
 
This chapter focuses on the ramifications of settler colonial policies of land and 
water expropriation, which were discussed in Chapter 4. The re-configurations of the 
lived geography of the farmers of al-Battuf were met with oppositional acts and 
resistance intrinsically linked with livelihood practices. Attending to the second 
research question of this thesis, this chapter examines those acts and their political 
effect on the livelihood strategies adopted, most notably water and infrastructural 
demands. Section 5.1 focuses on the oppositional acts against the land expropriation 
for the construction of the NWC in Kufr Manda (1954) and Arrabeh and Sakhnin lands 
(1961-1964). Section 5.2 examines how water became a political object of struggle 
and a tool for claiming rights to recognition from the state through the demand of a 
drainage project. Section 5.3 reflects on the struggle which characterises al-Battuf: a 
struggle with and without water, infrastructure and state support and how such 
struggles shaped and were shaped by relationships with water and land.   
 
5.1 The NWC struggle (1954-1976) 
 
The water is running through our land and we are deprived from 
using it. We tried to protest this through different means: going to 
the court, demonstrations and protests. We were imprisoned and 
prosecuted. They had no intention of providing any water to the 
people, although they promised many times. They wanted to take 
the land only. (Abu Saleh Interview, 18 July 2016, Arrabeh) 
 
Going beyond the state and inter-state hydro and environmental imaginaries 
that have dominated the writing and scholarly work on the Jordan River Basin, sahl 
al-Battuf sheds a light on a regional and localised environmental imaginary that 
opposed and contested these state-level impositions. While confrontations around 
water in the TWM literature have focused on Israel vis-à-vis Arab countries, this 
chapter will tell of more localised but equally essential confrontations taking place 
on a ‘sub-national’ scale. The events at Kufr Manda and following that in Sakhnin and 
158 
 
Arrabeh, were constructed in the Zionist-Israeli imaginary as an inherent opposition 
of the fellahin to state progress and development, and framed as a persistent 
resistance to attempts to transform and redeem the land. This was consolidated with 
framing Arab protest as driven by political and ideological reasons of enmity to the 
state, seeing the Arabs as working to obstruct a highly nationalistic and ideological 
project.  
The resistance of the villages of Al Battuf occurred when the NWC encroached 
on their land, clearly taking shape on a localised scale, detached from larger scales 
and implications of the project on the waters of the JRB but simultaneously 
influenced by an Israeli drive for control of the tributaries of the Jordan. The NWC 
and the protest decade (1954-1964) it ignited therefore serves as an entry point to 
examine and analyse the changes and reconfiguration of space, identity and 
belonging of Palestinian communities inside Israel today.   
 
5.1.1 Kufr Manda and Uri Day (1954) 
 
On the 13th of December 1954, Tahal staff, protected by police forces, began 
surveying the spring area around the Mukhtar’s house in the village of Kufr Manda. 
All the men went to the hills to avoid being forced to receive demolition notices, and 
the women and children were the ones left in the village. However, Tahal staff and 
the police were persistent in forcing the villagers to accept the reality of their 
displacement and began confronting the women and children. As the men of the 
village descended from the hills, the confrontation was heightened (Davar, 1954; Al-
Ittihad, 1954), including violent confrontation and clashes with the police force. This 
was claimed to be the first confrontation between the police under military rule and 
the Arab population after the Nakba (Zoubi, 2015). Eventually, 120 men from the 
village were arrested and forced to walk 12 km to Shafa’mr police station. They all 
were put overnight in a horse stable and badly treated. Some were imprisoned for 6 
months, like the Mukhtar of the village, Mahmoud Abdel Wahab, who was known for 
his patriotism. According to the Zionist imaginary, the Beit Netofa reservoir was a 
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‘natural’ waterbody that was facing ‘a storm at its banks’ as the below newspaper 
article shows (Figure 5.1). While the reservoir had been planned to submerge the 
village and its residents (some of whom were displaced from the destroyed village of 
Saffuriyeh in 1948, themselves internal refugees), the opposition against the project 
was labelled as ‘anti-development’ or ‘enemies of the state’, as their protest was 
seen to obstruct the NWC project as an ideological and national necessity of the 
state.  
 
Figure 5.1 ‘Storm on the banks of Beit Netofa’ during the protests and violent 
confrontation with the police in Kufur Manda village (Davar, 24 December 1954:19) 
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Delegates from Tahal were headed by Uri Tahon, an instrumental figure 
associated with the villagers’ struggle against the NWC in al-Battuf. Tahon oversaw 
land settlements for the company, negotiated land compensation deals and later 
became a consultant on Arab Affairs to the Deputy Prime Minister. He visited the 
village in an attempt to reach agreement regarding land compensation and transfer, 
presenting the villagers with Tahal plans and explaining how their whole village will 
be flooded, and that accepting compensation is their wise choice. Kufr Manda 
villagers vehemently refused to receive these notices, and began mobilising against 
“land theft in the name of development” that only aimed to dispossess them of their 
land and livelihood (Al-Ittihad, 1954), only six years after the catastrophe of the 
Nakba.  
 
In Nader Zoubi’s book (2015), the Arabs’ multiple acts of protest carried out 
during the military rule were characterised by a collective concern over land 
dispossession and a collective threat to their existence. In the case of the Kufr Manda 
clash, representatives of the nearby villages of Eilaboun, Arrabeh, Mughar, and Kufr 
Kanna released condemnation letters and statements (see example of one in Figure 
5.2), citing the violence used against Kufr Mnada as an act of terror and emphasising 
their position against the looting of al-Battuf lands. Even under the military rule, 
village representatives were communicating with the state, and exercising their 
rights to protest and condemn what they perceived as illegal and unjust actions. One 
of those protest actions were condemnation letters, which were sent to the Prime 
Minister’s office, Ministry of Agriculture and Knesset members. Delegations of 
villagers also organised meetings with Knesset members and mobilised, mainly 
through the Communist Party, demonstrations and protests in Nazareth and Acre to 
raise the issues facing the fellahin.  
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Figure 5.2 A letter signed and sent on 28 December 1954 from Arrabeh village to the 
Israeli Prime Minister condemning the attacks on Kufr Manda and al-Battuf lands as 
an attack on all of Palestinians inside Israel (stated in the letter as the Arab minority 
in the country (Bldna website, 2017) 
 
As discussed in section 4.3, the realisation of al-Battuf as a reservoir 
slowly began to dissipate. Politically, a diversion of the Upper Jordan 
tributaries to this reservoir became heavily attacked, as Syria appealed to the 
UN Security Council to freeze all work. An American threat of cutting aid to 
Israel if she didn’t comply also pressured Israel to concede to an alternative 
vision (Lowi, 1993; Schmida, 1984; Sosland, 2007). Geologically, multiple 
studies also showed that al-Battuf was not an optimal site for water storage, 
due to a large fault in its tectonic plates that would result in high loss of water. 
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Under political and geological forces, coupled with the unleashing of an Arab 
wave of protest and contestation of the project, Israeli water experts dropped 
the idea of the reservoir and Lake Tiberias became the new site of water 
storage and regulation. For Kufr Manda village, the day of their confrontation 
with Uri Tahon, Tahal’s staff and the police, and their success in stopping the 
work was seen as a day of triumph. Yawm Uri or Uri’s day is still 
commemorated today in December of each year by the village of Kufr Manda. 
It is celebrated as a day of triumph against Uri Tahon and Tahal’s personnel, 
marking the villagers’ success against the state’s encroachment and threat of 
dispossessing them of their lands, village and the transformation of their lived 
geography. As Figure 5.3 shows, Kufr Manda village stands today with the 
imposition of the NWC infrastructures in its geography, namely the Eshkol 
Reservoir, built in 1964 and its adjoining filtration pools while its agricultural 
lands remain cultivated despite the state infrastructure’s imposition.   
 
Figure 5.3 A recent picture of the Eshkol reservoir plant, facing Kufr Manda village 
(below) (Author’s pictures, September 2017) 
 
The NWC project, therefore, still required the transport of large 
quantities of water to the Naqab and al-Battuf was still the site of the 
realisation of that canal which will realise this transfer. This resumed the 
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Israeli state encroachment on al-Battuf land; this time in land belonging to 
Arrabeh and Sakhnin.  
 
5.1.2 Arrabeh and Sakhnin: the struggle against the canal (1961-1964) 
 
A few years after the confrontation mobilised by Kufr Manda against the 
imposition of a reservoir on top of their village, the struggle of Arrabeh and Sakhnin 
against the NWC began in 1961 when the Ministry of Finance announced the 
confiscation of lands from al-Battuf with a width of 93m and a length of 17 km, 12 
km of which belong to Arrabeh and Sakhnin villages. Uri Tahon from Tahal sent a 
request to the Ministry of Finance to issue an order of confiscation36F 36 of al-Battuf land 
for the construction of the NWC. Directly following that, another request was sent 
by him to increase the width of the canal and the border to 120m, 10 days after the 
original request (Zoubi, 2015), increasing the land to be expropriated (see Figure 5.4) 
and causing additional tension and anger from the fellahin. 
                                                          
36 The letter cited the 1943 order of land confiscation for public good purposes as a legal justification for land 
expropriation.  
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Figure 5.4 Uri Tahon’s letter to the Ministry of Finance requesting an increase in the 
width of land confiscation from 100 to 120 meters for the NWC canal, dated 11 
January 1961 (from Zoubi, 2015, p.60) 
 
This time, protest acquired a more organised approach: in addition to 
petitions, letters and delegation visits to the Knesset, the fellahin organised 
themselves in a joint committee of the affected villages to protest the imminent land 
expropriation and resorted to the courts to resolve their issues with the state. 
Moreover, the committee presented alternatives to the state’s plan which would 
reduce land expropriation – that the pipes of the canal be underground in a tunnel, 
for example. Hanna Naqqara, a political activist and lawyer renowned for being the 
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‘Lawyer of the Land and the People’, brought the cases of the fellahin of Sakhnin and 
Arrabeh against Mekorot to the Central and High Court of Justice, seeking 
nullification for Tahal and the state’s encroachment on fellahin’s land. 
Demonstrations in Sakhnin reaffirmed the position of the fellahin in April 1961, that 
there will be no compromise on their land (see Figure 5.5). Popular meetings were 
held in Deir Hanna and Sakhnin, mobilising the farmers to lobby for their rights. Land 
remained the key element of mobilisation and struggle of the fellahin. Reviewing Al-
Ittihad newspaper articles during that period (Al-Ittihad, 1961; 1962a,b,c), the 
fellahin negotiated their position with the state and the courts. Their demands were 
focused on:  
a) The pipeline remaining underground so the fellahin can still use their land;  
b) No confiscation but a free agreement and negotiations between the state 
and the fellahin,  
c) Agreement with the fellahin on the location of the excavations37F 37; 
d) Narrowing the width of the land, as the canal width is 4m only but the 
confiscation is 92m; and 
e) Facilitating the fellahin to benefit from water to irrigate their lands and 
provide electricity to their villages. 
As evident from reviewing newspaper archives during that period, the 
fellahin’s claims were framed as demand for recognition of their rights from the 
state, and a quest for equality with Jewish farmers, who received abundant support 
from the state and were able to change the design and layout of the NWC pipes in 
another valley (Zoubi, 2015). The demands, therefore, were local and reflective of 
the fellahin’s aspirations to develop and were not framed as political or acquiring any 
larger political significance apart from the necessity to defend land as an intrinsic part 
of their existence and identity.  
                                                          
37 The current location divides up the land and limits their mobility threatening agriculture in the most fertile 
land.   
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Figure 5.5 Sakhnin demonstrates against looting al-Battuf: “we cease to exist 
without land” (Al-Itihad, 1961) 
 
While the fellahin and the political parties backing them attempted to 
maintain a unified front, allies of the state within those communities played a role in 
deterring and weakening the position of the protestors. Hillel Cohen examines how 
such actors were operating to facilitate the selling of land for the construction of the 
NWC and how they were attacked in multiple ways by communities. In weddings, for 
example, sentiments against ‘traitors’ were expressed by singing nationalists songs 
despising them and declaring a unified front against their actions. One such song was 
sung at a wedding in Deir Al-Assad (another village which lost significant areas of land 
called ‘Al Shaghur’ to the establishment of the Jewish industrial settlement of 
Karmiel) (Cohen, 2010, p.119): 
Whatever happens  
We will not leave our land. 
Death to traitors to the nation 
And to the lackeys of the military regime. 
We will not abandon the Shaghur and the Battuf 
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Another more direct confrontation was through sending threatening letters 
to known collaborators, as in the case of a collaborator from Deir Hanna by the name 
of Hasan. Hasan was assisting Mekorot in purchasing land in al-Battuf for the NWC 
canal. Cohen (2010) reveals how Hasan succeeded in convincing two leaders of the 
protest the NWC to negotiate with the state and therefore weaken the collective 
refusal to accept land expropriation and claim rights to water and electricity. He 
justified it by saying that “there is nothing to be gotten out of a lost campaign against 
the authorities, because the government, which has invested hundreds of million in 
the plan so far, will not be deterred from carrying it out” (ibid, p.119).  
Indeed, on 22nd June 1962, the fellahin woke up to find the canal excavation 
beginning on their land by Tahal company, although the Supreme Court case was still 
ongoing. Marching towards al-Battuf, the fellahin of Sakhnin and Arrabeh laid their 
bare bodies under Mekorot Bulldozers (see Figure 5.6), refusing to allow the 
excavation to take place (Al-Ittihad, 1962b). This action forced the workers to freeze 
the work, until August 1962. While access to water for irrigation was also demanded 
by the fellahin, the critical epoch of the military rule necessitated the fight to secure 
and protect land first as it was seen as an eminent threat to their survival as an ethno-
geographic community. The fellahin and the Communist Party pushed forward in 
lobbying for alternatives for al-Battuf in the Knesset and in courts, reasserting their 
demands of equality and recognition. Since a confiscation order was not sufficient to 
expropriate the land without its owners’ approval, the government had to resort to 
the Central Court to issue an order of land possession, which will transfer the 
possession of these lands to the state with no legal means of reappraisal. 
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Figure 5.6 ‘Sakhnin and Arrabeh’s fellahin stand against the bulldozers’ (Al-Ittihad, 
1962b) 
 
In their tactic of scaling-up the protest, the fellahin submitted seven claims to 
the Magistrate Court by 61 Arab citizens from Arrabeh and Sakhnin, asking the court 
to postpone the decision of land confiscation until a ruling was made by the Supreme 
Court (Al-Ittihad, 1962c). The testimony of the Mukhtar of Sakhnin, Tawfiq Hanna 
Shaqour, reiterates the fellahin’s position and demands (ibid):  
We don’t want to cause harm to anyone and we don’t object to a 
canal that will irrigate millions of dunums. Our request is that we 
are treated like Jewish citizens are treated. We are demanding that 
the canal be underground like the other 140 km where the canal 
runs underground from Saffuriyeh until the Naqab.  
 
The testimony of Mekorot’s chief engineer, on the other hand, focused on the 
economic urgency of the project and that the state would lose around 10,000 Israeli 
Liras daily if the project was postponed. Moreover, he stated that if the project did 
not happen before the winter, it would have to be postponed for a year. While he 
confessed when questioned by Hanna Naqqara that there was an alternative to dig 
the canal underground, he stated that that “will require new technical and financial 
considerations” which Mekorot was avoiding. The testimony could not have been 
more indicative of a policy being decided at a higher political level. The NWC and its 
realisation on the ground was a top priority for the Israeli state and its assertion of 
169 
 
control over the tributaries of the Jordan during a time of heightened tension 
between Israel and the Arab states, as discussed in section 5.1. Any postponing of 
the NWC construction was therefore perceived as impossible in light of regional 
water conflict which was heightened during those years. Ben Gurion’s government 
at the time continued to carry out incitement against the fellahin of Sakhnin and 
Arrabeh, accusing them of opposing development, inciting racism against Israel and 
being mobilised under influence and lobbying of the Communist Party. It was evident 
that for the Israeli state, any postponing of the NWC canal inauguration would result 
in a catastrophic situation and affect the state budget, making the digging of the 
canal in al-Battuf a priority for the state (Al-Ittihad, 1962d). On that day at 3pm, Bar 
Ze’ev, the head Judge of the Magistrate Court decided to revoke the requests of the 
fellahin and issue the order of land possession so that Mekorot could commence the 
work in al-Battuf. On the ground, the protests and meetings of the fellahin continued 
to protect their land, through signing of petitions and letters of protest to the 
Knesset, Ministry of Justice, Head of State, Head of government and Ministry of 
Agriculture, but to no avail. The fellahin continued resorting to these measures until 
the Magistrate Court in Acre ruled against the fellahin, ordering them to hand their 
lands over within seven days for Mekorot to continue the excavation.  
On the 24th of August 1962, Mekorot bulldozers resumed their excavations in 
al-Battuf, accompanied by 500 policemen and women. They began destroying the 
crops of sesame and watermelon harvested by the fellahin, eventually confiscating 
1,500 dunums of their land for the NWC works. The day of confiscation is referred to 
as the ‘day of looting’ يوم النهب. The site was a crowd of police vehicles, described by 
the newspaper as being like ‘the old times’, referring to kufr Manda’s clash with the 
police regarding the plans by the state to turn the village into a reservoir for the 
diversion of the Jordan river (Al-Ittihad, 1962d).  
 
With this confiscation, the NWC became a reality on the ground in al-Battuf, 
and by 1964 it began its operation of diverting water from the Northwest of Lake 
Tiberias to the Naqab. The sentiment against the NWC remained amongst the 
Palestinians as a project which aimed to disposes them from their land and inflict 
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harm on their precarious existence (see Figure 5.7). The struggle has never been only 
about the 1,500 dunums that were looted but the general looting of Arab fellahin 
lands as state policy. Mahmoud Darwish, a renowned Palestinian Poet, wrote about 
the canal to depict its violence against the land and people as a poisonous snake on 
the land (Al-Ittihad, 1962e): 
The canal cuts through 150km in a pipe underground until it 
reaches the Arab villages...there it refuses to continue on its path 
underground but rather comes over ground – it wants to expand on 
the surface and float and relax – cutting the fertile land in the shape 
of a 93m coffin…over the ancestors’ bones, over the youth’s blood 
and the death of their children’s future. 
 
Figure 5.7 Palestinian fellahin stand by as Mekorot’s staff construct the Jordan-
Negev canal (Government Press Office, Cohen Fritz, 1959) 
 
5.1.3 The first Attack on the NWC – Eilaboun Tunnel (1965) 
 
While most of the tactics described above to protest and mobilise against the 
NWC took place on a regional level and involved the villages inflicted by it, the project 
remained very controversial to the Arab states, jeopardising their position and 
control over a scarce and highly securitised resource. While Israel was inaugurating 
the NWC, which changed and re-configured the water management unilaterally, 
Arab riparian states’ claims to the shared water were significantly weakened. The 
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NWC also constituted the first and only out-of-basin transfer, and any retaliating 
action by the Arab states would have been a resounding impact and instigated 
conflict and confrontation over water. The Mukheibeh dam, a dam on the Yarmouk 
river and tributaries, was announced in 1964 as part of an Arab plan to divert the 
headwaters of the upper Jordan to secure water away from the Israeli state and its 
newly built infrastructure. Israel carried out successive attacks on the dam works in 
1966 and 1967. The targeting of water infrastructure was therefore a tool used to 
deter attempts to divert water from the basin.  
Moreover, and because of its discursive and material significance, the NWC 
was also a site of attack by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Arab 
countries. Elhance (1999, p.102) alludes to this in his book Hydropolitics in the Third 
World, where he refers to it as the first (albeit unsuccessful) sabotage by the PLO38F 38. 
The Eilaboun tunnel attack was the first action to be carried out by the military arm 
of Fatah on Palestinian soil on the 1st of January 1965 (see figure 5.8 below).  This 
attack was carried out by Ahmad Mousa from the destroyed village of Naseraddin 
(Tiberias district), who was killed on his way back to Jordan. Sahl al-Battuf and nearby 
villages affected by the NWC construction therefore became a site of local and 
nationalistic struggles and imaginaries further strengthening Palestinians’ awareness 
of the politics of water control carried out through this NWC diversion.  
 
                                                          
38 Elhance (1999) analysis of this attack is that it has been the spark of a Palestinian demand for restoration of 
sovereignity over surface and groundwater in all the Palestinian lands.  
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Figure 5.8 A poster depicting the 7th anniversary of the Eilaboun tunnel attack 
carried out by Fatah (Palestine Poster Project archives) 
 
However, for the communities in the Galilee and in Sahl al-Battuf, the NWC’s 
significance to the Zionist state and its political and regional repercussions were not 
issues that were raised or considered in their struggle against its construction. During 
that period, the Arab Palestinians inside Israel were dealing with an encroachment 
of the military government, its security services and collaborators who were unified 
in subjecting this fragmented community to further chaos, tightening the grip of the 
government on the Galilee through land expropriation by any means, and through 
dissipating and supressing any nationalistic sentiment and political mobilisation 
taking place there. Therefore, the NWC’s violent imposition in their lived geographies 
and the protest it spawned was part and parcel of mobilisation strategies against the 
belligerent military rule and its allies, but which acquired a political identification in 
the 1970s and onwards. The local effect of transboundary projects, therefore, 
acquired meaning first and foremost to the local communities due to its abrupt 
transformation of their livelihoods and land encroachment, rather than its regional 
significance.  
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 Evidently, the imposition of the NWC canal on the fellahin’s land placed them 
at the heart of territorial conflict with the state over a politically significant project 
which surpassed their capacity to oppose and resist. Their concern with the project 
was with its violent expropriation of fertile land which they depended on for their 
livelihood in addition to its threat to their belonging as an ethno-geographic 
community confined and stripped away from its agency and rights. For them, the 
project meant a loss of land and exclusion from benefiting from the canal. The NWC, 
as “an act and object of political imagination” (Mukreji, 2009, p.15) therefore 
consolidated a presence of the state which produced uneven waterscapes 
(Swyndegouw, 1999) and engaged the fellahin in territorial politics which will come 
to define their land and water struggles in the following decades.  
 
5.2 Uneven waterscapes and the local struggles of access 
 
 
5.2.1 Struggles for drinking water  
 
In the midst of relentless efforts and work on the ground to put the NWC into 
operation, the villages of Sakhnin and Arrabeh were equally mobilising for access to 
a drinking water network. While the demands of the fellahin in al-Battuf were around 
water for agriculture, their villages were still lacking in basic services such as water, 
electricity and sewage provision. The NWC, when it became fully operational in 1964, 
was electrified and water was flowing through its channels, reflecting clearly the 
production of an uneven waterscape. The sahl and the nearby villages, like most of 
the Arab towns inside Israel, were struggling for basic services. The villagers’ 
attention was focused on demanding water for drinking first, while still advocating 
for a right to water for irrigation as will be discussed in section 5.2. Struggles for 
access to the water network were common in the Arab villages, towns and cities 
which remained, as Mekorot maintained its monopolistic control over water 
distribution and allocation. As Lena Dallasheh shows in her examination of water 
management contestation with Mekorot in the city of Nazareth, water becomes part 
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of negotiating citizenship, where the Palestinian citizens demand rights through 
engaging and negotiating with the state apparatus and utilises water as a conduit of 
seeking autonomy (Dallasheh, 2015). Clearly, the tactics adopted in the case of al-
Battuf for drinking water networks and irrigation schemes were sought by the villages 
as a way to raise citizenry demands and rights, only to be confronted with an 
embedded pre-emptive indifference and neglect which makes up the settler colonial 
policymaking.   
Demanding a water network was a collective effort of a number of 
established cooperatives throughout the Arab towns and villages in light of 
Mekorot’s neglect of their needs. In Sakhnin, Al-Muna water cooperative was 
established in 1960, and through membership subscriptions and fundraising, the 
cooperative was in charge of developing plans for a water network, hiring engineers 
and lobbying the government to push Mekorot to provide its ‘services’. Al-Muna 
cooperative, as early as 1962 had around 300 members and was actively seeking 
additional people to join. By 1965 it had more than 600 shareholders and members 
(ISA, 1969). In Arrabeh, a renowned Sheikh Kayed was spearheading community 
development work and was the director of al-Nada water cooperative there. 
Sakhnin, Arrabeh and Deir Hanna cooperatives frequently sent petitions and letters 
to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Regional offices of the agricultural department 
in Nazareth demanding that these official bodies contact Mekorot and Tahal to 
commence the water projects in their villages. The cooperatives had already raised 
funds, which were all deposited in special bank accounts to be paid to Mekorot as 
per government regulations. Eventually, al-Muna, after purchasing 4” pipelines and 
securing a government loan of 162,000 Israeli Lira for the electricity connection 
(which further delayed the project), was able to have Mekorot dig a well for drinking 
purposes for the three villages of Sakhnin, Arrabeh and Deir Hanna (ibid). In an 
overview of its accomplishments, al-Muna cooperative states how 370,000 IL were 
raised, partly by the stakeholders with the rest in loans from the Bank, to carry out 
all the construction work for the network, including a payment of concessions for 
Mekorot in order to dig the well. The cooperative work at that time was extending 
to raise funds and seek members to demand water for irrigation of their fields. In its 
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agreement with Mekorot, the concession regard 52% of water for drinking purposes 
while 48% would go to irrigation. However, at that time, the water provision only 
reached 30% for drinking and none for irrigation (ibid).  
Interestingly, the article expresses how such efforts developed and civilised 
water use and tools, exemplifying a quest and need to develop infrastructure and 
become a modern citizen of the state (ibid): 
 To the people of my village: we completed the water project 
after tremendous efforts and the view of sprinklers in the village, 
water in the household and the solar water heaters became a 
familiar view after the bucket, the jarra [traditional jug made from 
clay] and the well disappeared. Support the cooperative and pay 
any debts you owe to achieve development and develop our village, 
so we can follow and catch up with modernisation. 
 
In 1965 and after tremendous efforts and lobbying by the water cooperatives, 
the water well in Arrabeh was inaugurated in the presence of then Minister of 
Agriculture Moshe Dayan. Sheikh Kayed, the director of al-Nada water cooperative, 
linked their access to drinking water to leverage for other outstanding issues and 
restrictions imposed by the military government. In this event, he demanded a lifting 
of the ban on entering closed zones and help for farmers to reclaim barren land, in 
addition to support for farmers in marketing their products, the establishment of an 
agricultural college, the construction of access roads to al-Battuf, an increase in 
compensation given to the farmers because of the NWC, and an increase in the 
number of bridges along the canal to facilitate the movement of the farmers. 
Opportunities for claim making to rights to services were rife in those locations 
during the 1960s, embedding an entry point to claim rights to further services the 
Palestinian citizens perceived as legitimate and fair. However, the reality remains 
that service provision in a settler colonial context were used by the state as tools of 
control and acquiescence, increasing “the dependency of Palestinians upon the 
state” and therefore containing their political activism and mobilisation (Zureik et al., 
2011, p.91). 
 
176 
 
5.2.2 Struggle for access in al-Battuf 
 
While demands for connection to a national water network were rising in al-
Battuf villages, the situation in the sahl after the construction and completion of the 
NWC was becoming dire for its fellahin. Since the NWC cut through the length of al-
Battuf, it left them with no access to their lands, inflicting further harm and suffering. 
In the design of the NWC, four bridges were built to provide access its 17km length, 
but they were not enough. Mekorot also employed security personnel who were on 
the site prohibiting farmers from reaching their land without a permit and prohibiting 
tractors from entering. This triggered the farmers to carry out additional acts of 
protest to gain access. The dirt road was only accessible by foot and farmers had to 
make a 20km journey to reach their lands. The police were fining the fellahin if 
attempted to make the journey by cars or tractors.  
The lands are grown with sugar beets at this time, and the fellahin needed to be 
there to carry out weeding and maintenance of this crop which they relied on heavily. 
The fellahin organised themselves in a protest on their tractors on the 9th of February 
1964 from Arrabeh to the office of the Ministry of Agriculture in Nazareth and 
handed in their demands there: 1) finish with the bridge construction and construct 
more to make it easy for the farmers to reach their lands; 2) stop police harassment 
and allow the fellahin to use their tractors to transport them to their lands; 3) asphalt 
the main road that connects the village to sahl al-Battuf; and 4) ease the mobility of 
fellahin throughout the length of the canal (Al-ittihad, 1964a). Moshe Dayan, 
Minister of Agriculture at the time, promised to remove obstacles on al-Battuf 
fellahin and accepted their demands to allow their cars and tractors to pass through 
the 4 bridges of the canal (Al-Ittihad, 1964b). Knesset Member at the time Diab Obeid 
sent letters to the NWC’s director, dated 23rd of February 1965, to present the plight 
of the fellahin, how they suffered to reach their lands, and how the lack of sufficient 
bridges “cause suffering and waste of time of the farmers to reach their plots” (ISA, 
1965a).  
As archives reveal, the farmers continued to up-scale their demands for access to 
and use of NWC roads, and not only the dirt road. Sakhnin local council 
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representatives submitted petitions signed by the farmers to the police, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Mekorot to allow private vehicles to drive on the NWC road in sahl 
al-Battuf, to transport the workers (female and male) that worked on the sugar beet 
fields as it was very difficult to drive on the dirt road. They hoped that this request 
would be approved as it would not cause any harm to the project (ISA, 1967a). 
Continued efforts were sought through different channels, therefore, and the 
farmers, village council members and Knesset members continued invoking their 
citizenship rights to claim localised rights to access, use and develop their land and 
water. Another letter sent on in October 1967 from Sakhnin local council to the Prime 
Minister’s Advisor on Arab affairs protested against Mekorot’s trespassing on fellahin 
land in sahl al-Battuf, while erecting posts and cables around the canal. This depicts 
the time when the fencing around the NWC canal began to materialise, expropriating 
more land (and soil) from the fellahin to fence the area and fortify it as a securitised 
zone. The letter describes (ISA, 1967b): 
Mekorot was not satisfied with this and begun for the last couple 
of years to move these cables and posts into our land. Last summer 
the company brought bulldozers and began excavating soil from 
our land in the northern part of the canal and used it to anchor the 
posts and build a 4m street and canals nearby with a depth of half 
a meter and width of 2m approximately. All in our land and without 
any legal orders. Last week the director of the company in Tel Aviv 
and engineers came to the village and notified us that they will 
continue the work in the section that they haven’t finalised last 
year. Please intervene to stop the company.  
  
Livelihood practices were also severely affected by state intervention in al-Battuf. 
As another letter of appeal reveals, the forestation officer issued warnings to the 
farmers to move out of the area where they were camped by a given date or 
otherwise face court. For hundreds of years the farmers have been camping in al-
Battuf (Ta’zeeb) to work on their land during harvest time and to allow their livestock 
to eat. Such appeals regarding access restriction and abrupt government regulations 
were constantly opposed and challenged by the communities affected, with a 
focused demand on rights to livelihood and access to their lands (ISA, 1967b). 
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Struggles over access to land and protection of livelihood therefore took precedent 
over demands of access to water for irrigation (see examples of lack of access in 
Figure 5.9). Al-Battuf, which was before that a site neglected by the state, has 
become a critical site of ordering of landscape, water and political subjects. The 
presence of the state and its various institutions (Mekorot, Forestry Ministry, 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Israeli Army) required the farmers to interact and deal 
with the state through utilising different methods. Examining these dynamics at this 
critical time reveals an adoption of tactics for recognition employed by the fellahin 
and their representatives, shaping their citizenry identity and demands.  
 
Figure 5.9 Recent pictures showing how the NWC canal cuts through the valley and 
divides it in half with only one bridge in sight (Author’s picture, September 2017) 
 
Land confiscation struggles were omnipresent in the Palestinian Arab villages and 
signified a widely held sentiment regarding access to resources. For example, the 
village of Beit Jan39F 39, which is a Druze village that suffered from the expropriation of 
thousands of dunums, established a committee for the protection of Beit Jan lands. 
When the water network finally came to the village, the committee issued a 
                                                          
39 Beit Jan is a Druze village, 20 km north of al-Battuf which has experienced intensive land confiscation by the 
state  
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statement following the inauguration of the network by Moshe Dayan asking “what’s 
the use of water now?”. The committee was referring to the government’s relentless 
land confiscation which have left them with no land. While they valued the 
importance of water in bringing about development of their village, there was little 
land left for them to develop (Al-Ittihad, 1966).  
The provision of water networks by the government, as seen in the multiple 
examples above, oscillated between a veiled segregation and exclusion policy by the 
Israeli state against its Palestinian citizens (especially those which are politically 
opposed to the state’s discrimination policies) and a stick-and-carrot approach to 
maintain a good relationship with the Arab constituents by enhancing the 
infrastructure of their towns and villages. While water was imbricated as part of 
negotiating citizenship, the Palestinian citizens were experiencing intensive and 
aggressive land confiscation and dispossession by the state. Here, a theme brings 
together struggles over land as being above or more elevated and prioritised than 
struggles for water. As the appeals of the committee cited above reveals: what’s the 
use of water after all the land is gone? A conundrum was facing the Palestinian fellah 
in al-Battuf in his attempts to stay on the land, literally and figuratively, while 
addressing veiled and overt segregation over distribution of resources and claiming 
rights to water: 
Mekorot was not interested in supplying the Palestinian Arab 
regions with water, and with difficulty it supplied it to them even 
with drinking water. The state and the Water Authority were the 
ones in control. We became without resources. Another issue is the 
land, 95% of the land in Israel is state land and these lands were 
given to the kibbutzim and Moshavim. (Interview with Mustafa 
Natour, agronomist, Nazareth, 28 September 2017)  
 
While the town, villages and cities adopted mobilisation strategies and 
invested heavily in connecting their localities with water, the struggle continued with 
intermittent flows and Mekorot’s bureaucracy and justification of unequal 
distribution, maintenance and service provision. Struggles on the ground were also 
reflective of political realities and national policies. The 1970s and 80s were decades 
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of a reinforced and consistent narrative of scarcity in Israel (Alatout, 2009). As will be 
observed as well in the oGH case in the next chapter, limitations on water provision 
for Arab farmers were justified by a national discourse of scarcity – and that water 
had to go to the essential sectors – mainly Jewish coastal areas, agriculture and 
industry. The Palestinian citizens always faced hardships claiming water allocations, 
and bureaucratic hurdles and restrictions from Mekorot were the norm. Such 
obstacles were not generalised on all of them but were enforced on those village 
councils and farmers who were more vocal in their opposition to state policy. 
Arrabeh and Sakhnin’s historical opposition and protest the NWC (and Arrabeh’s 
affiliation and strong membership in the Communist Party) reflected on the villages’ 
access to water for irrigation and even their struggle for a water network for the 
villages (Cohen, 2010).  
 The NWC, and the fellahin’s opposition to it, weighed heavily on the denial of 
water in those critical decades of government interest in Arab agriculture, and on the 
potential to acquire water quotas for irrigation. As one farmer recalls, the fellahin’s 
opposition to the NWC reflected being denied access to the resource, even to 
temporary canal installed during the construction:  
There was a temporary canal that was dug parallel to the main 
canal which farmers used to provide water for their livestock…but 
the minute the canal construction was finished, it was covered.  This 
was a 6" pipeline and it was destroyed - I witnessed it and I also 
drank from that pipe...the farmers thought that this pipeline will 
remain for their use, but ultimately realised it was there for 
providing water for the construction of the project – for cement 
making. It was used during that time for livestock, and even to 
water some crops nearby, like tomatoes and tobacco...it wasn't 
developed at all, but the farmers were not prohibited from using it. 
This 6" pipeline was not removed correctly even, it was destroyed 
by the bulldozers, it was a provocation for the farmers. It was 
running all through al-Battuf’s 17 km of length. Here you can say 
the tension between the fellahin and the state was heightened. 
(Interview with Ali Antar farmer, Arrabeh, 26 August 2017)  
 
The government’s deliberate negligence and reprisals against the NWC 
opposition (and favouritism of close allies with the state) also weighed on service 
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provision in the valley. The rejection of water demands also resonated with very 
dominant and prevailing narratives of scarcity that were the driving force of the NWC. 
However, that narrative was used to justify denial of allocations and reclamation of 
water rights for the Arab farmer only: 
Following that NWC, there was another round of confrontation 
between the fellahin and the ministry of agriculture and the state. 
All other localities began receiving water, like Kufr Manda, 
Shefaamer, Tamra, Kabul and only Arrabeh-Sakhnin were deprived 
because they stood against the NWC. This is when the water war 
began. The fellahin began demanding support to enhance their 
production of tomatoes and other crops through irrigation and 
water access. At that point the demands were rejected stating that 
there wasn't enough water nationwide and other issues regarding 
lack of clear land unification and other reasons. Especially Arrabeh 
and Sakhnin lands in Al Battuf never got water. You have some 
villages and farmers who received water (I'zeer, Rummaneh) in the 
1980s40F 40, and before that they also provided water for Tamra, 
Shefaamer, and the Triangle area. We didn't receive any water 
development projects with false pretences, and impossible 
demands. This is where the political factors come in. They don't 
want to provide water because they don't want people to stay on 
their land. They want to uproot us away from the land. This is where 
we entered into - let's call it - confrontations over water. They 
insisted that we will not have it.  (Interview with Ali Antar farmer, 
Arrabeh, 26 August 2017) 
 
 El’izeer and Rummaneh’s wells (shown in Figure 5.10) were examples of such 
uneven water allocations. El’izeer well for instance had such a high yield that the 
water had to be pumped through a 16” pipe to feed the canal 24 hours. Meanwhile, 
the remaining farmers of Arrabeh and Sakhnin kept protesting and demanding access 
to that water, but their demands were ignored.  
                                                          
40 In a governmental review of the villages of Al-Battuf, Mekorot wells drilled there were providing the villages 
of B’ineh, E’izeer, Rummaneh, ‘Arab Njeidat, and Arab il Heeb (Bedouin communities) with drinking water and 
agricultural water for Bi’ineh [300dunums], El’izeer [120 dunum], and Rummaneh [100 dunum] (ISA, 1965b) and 
they are still provided with water until today.  
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Figure 5.10 Map showing Mekorot wells (red dots) to serve the Arab Bedouin 
villages of Al-Battuf (El’izeer and Rummaneh), with excess yield pumped back to the 
canal (ISA, 1967a) 
 
The denial of access to water for irrigation was not a specific phenomenon 
inflicted only on the farmers in al-Battuf. Palestinian citizens elsewhere in the Israeli 
state were also suffering the aftermath of the Arab agricultural development plans, 
mentioned in section 4.2.2. 41F 41 These plans retrospectively limited water provision for 
agriculture carried out by the Palestinian Arabs and hence also restricted what these 
farmers could grow, in the event that they received water. While the Jewish farmer 
received allocations based on their annual crop needs, the Arab farmer was allocated 
a specific and conditional water quota: 
The procedure was that the Arab farmer will receive 500 cubic 
meters per 1 dunum, on a condition that the total quantity of water 
used is no more than 5,000 cubic meters per year. This created a 
huge gap between the two [Jewish and Arab farmers]. First of all, 
                                                          
41 The 1959 water law had ramifications on existing use of water. Well owners were limited in the amount of 
water to pump, incurring fines if they exceeded their allotment. Similarly, irrigated agriculture that depended on 
springs was also heavily restricted, if not by directly prohibition, by Mekorot’s pumping and drilling of wells 
nearby springs, heavily reducing the available flows.  
  
183 
 
the only crops to survive on 500 cubic meters/dunum were only 
almond trees and olive trees. Any crop of vegetables and other trees 
requires around 700-800 cubic meters per dunum. Because of these 
unfair regulations, today Arab farmers receive 3.5% of water 
allocations for agriculture, despite constituting 20% of the 
population. The total agricultural land used today by Arabs 
amounts to 700,000 dunum excluding the Naqab. For the Jews, that 
number is 4.2 million dunums. They receive 96.5% of the water. So, 
we have 18% of the land, and use 3.5% of the water. This limited 
the development of agricultural development extensively and this 
was all part of a policy and not just by coincidence. (Mustafa Natour 
agronomist, Nazareth, 28 September 2017)  
Moreover, constraints over water allocation were also coupled with 
restrictions on type of crops which Palestinian farmers were allowed to grow:  
A permit was needed to grow crops like tomatoes, carrots, 
potatoes, and there were crops that Arab farmers were denied to 
cultivate, such as carrots, potatoes and onion. They were forbidden 
from growing these crops because they were all mechanised and 
required less labour. Crops like tomatoes, aubergine, cucumbers, 
peppers, green onions were allowed but they had to receive a 
permit. Meat and poultry were denied completely to be produced 
by Arabs – they did not receive permits to produce dairy, poultry, 
eggs, meat etc. That meat and dairy sector production alone 
constitutes 40% of the overall agricultural produce of Israel. (ibid) 
 
The systematic weakening and eventual demise of the Palestinian citizens’ 
agricultural sector therefore established the state’s goals through overt and covert 
strategies. The denial of adequate water allocations for agriculture destroyed the 
prospect of a viable and competitive agricultural sector and thus has achieved its 
objective of consolidating the agricultural sector within the exclusively Jewish 
Kibbutzim, Moshavim and private actors. With or without water, the Palestinian 
farmer inside Israel was forced to abandon agriculture as a livelihood and income-
generating work and become fully dependent on work in permitted Jewish economic 
activities. These experiences allude to a reality which imposes a scarcity narrative on 
Arabs and not Jews – a reality of ‘scarcity for the few’. 
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While the Israeli state consolidated its denial of water for agriculture, 
precipitation was a water source that could not be completely controlled. The 
persistence of rainfed farming activities illuminates how it acquired political 
subjectivity, becoming a necessary act of perseverance and sumud under precarious 
conditions prohibiting it from prospering into a financially profitable activity. 
Maintaining and rooting a relationship with the land became a dominant driver of 
continuing farming activities. However, land was becoming a financial burden, 
requiring that farmers devise tactics to increase the profitability of farming activities 
and water therefore became imbricated in enacting and solidifying rootedness and 
sumud on the land. That the land became a burden by no means allowed its 
abandonment; therefore farmers’ presence on it was a contrasting reality of suffering 
and hope. As mentioned earlier, water came to al-Battuf through the construction of 
the NWC canal, which has solidified and made visible a politics of difference. The 
settler colonial waterscape of abundance was juxtaposed against the lived 
geographies of abandonment and stagnation experienced because of water. Farmers 
in al-Battuf, following the 1970s and the rise of popular struggle and community 
mobilisation, began claiming rights to water they already had an excess of: the 
floodwater of al-Battuf, known as al-gharaq as their emancipation from those 
realities of abandonment and a catalyst to enhance their sumud and protection of 
the land.   
 
5.3 Draining al-gharaq and claiming rights to infrastructure 
 
Following the momentous events of Land Day in 1976 and the mobilisation of 
Palestinian citizens, land regained its centrality in the popular movement and civil 
society work in the Galilee and beyond. The success of land day protests was " due 
primarily to the united front exhibited by the peasantry"42F 42, where forced alienation 
                                                          
42 The fellah acquired a somehow mystical role of being the one tending for the land of Palestine after the Nakba, 
as described by generations of refugees and diaspora, consolidating a romantic identification with the fellah and 
the rural landscape of the villages in Palestine (Davis, 2011; Sayigh, 2008; Swedenburg, 1990). This nurtured a 
powerful sentiment of the peasant as a national signifier, mainly developed post 1948.  Inside 48’ areas, the 
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as predicted has proved “to be the crucial catalyst in any future Arab uprisings in 
Israel” (Zureik, 1979, p.187). Nevertheless, as this political mobilisation grew from 
the bottom up and was supported by political parties, especially the Communist 
Party, it was fraught with narratives of recognition, equality and inclusivity within an 
Israeli state. The demise of agriculture was seen as a strategy of the state to 
accelerate the abandonment of land, to which political parties proposed mobilisation 
for acquiring rights from the Israeli state through empowering farming and 
reclamation of land in the Galilee.  The narrative employed by such parties was to 
accomplish equality between the Jewish and Arab farmer. 
No other natural phenomenon is indicative of the state’s abandonment of al-
Battuf than the persistence of al-gharaq, Ali explains while he shows me around 
different sections of the valley (see Figure 5.11). The water of al-Battuf, whether in 
its abundant flow through the NWC canal, or in its excess when al-gharaq forms, can 
be seen as an ‘uneasy’ co-existence of narratives of abundance and scarcity. The 
contention of farmers met during the fieldwork – living with and without water – is 
that the NWC canal represents a case of abundance of water but not for them. They 
experience water scarcity while their land (where the canal stands) is abundant in 
water. Meanwhile, al-gharaq becomes an example of excess and damaging water 
that destroys and delays farming. The technically designed canal and its waters 
becomes a desirable object, while the natural phenomenon becomes a source of 
inconvenience and hardship43F 43. As Tesdell and Issa remind us, these wetlands have 
been increasingly considered as sites of waste, residual space and a limitation for 
urban and agriculture expansion in light of settler colonial policies of confinement 
and shrinking spaces of existence (Tesdell and Issa, 2017). In the colonial and settler 
                                                          
symbolism of the fellah also confronted the Israeli systematic expropriation of land, and the disintegration of 
Palestinian identity especially during the military rule from 1948-1966.  
 
43 Growing crops in al-gharaq or Balu’ areas across Palestine also continue to acquire cultural and symbolic 
significance and contributes to the uniqueness of these sites as part and parcel of belonging and attachment to 
the landform and its multiple conditions of flooding and dryness. For example, the phenomenon of having a 
waterbody in the winter months in the Marj of Deir Balut or Sanour in the West Bank invokes emotions of 
happiness and excitement, as these waterbodies are seen as reclamation of rights to experiences of claiming 
water and being by a seafront which Palestinians in the West Bank are deprived of. Sites of simple canoe boats, 
pedal boats and beach chairs transform the area of al-gharaq there in spring and early summer to a site of 
recreation. However, the case of al-gharaq in al-Battuf is quite telling of a different experience.  
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colonial mind-set of the British and Zionists, these were areas to drain and utilise 
optimally with the introduction of drainage interventions, technological fixes and 
advancements for the benefit of the settler. Going beyond a deterministic 
categorisation of the imaginaries of settler vs. native, re-configuring gharaq and balu’ 
sites should be considered here as part of a historical, economic and capitalist 
transformation imperative facing the Palestinians. In that light, we can view al-
Battuf’s gharaq area as more than just a distinct eco-system which requires 
preservation and consider that under emerging economic and capitalist motivations 
and the realities of a settler colonial state like Israel, re-configurations are 
omnipresent and inevitable, requiring alternative relations to land and water. 
Imaginaries of development and progress, therefore, intertwine and blend with 
sentiments of land protection and living within the limits of nature to produce a 
desire for the promise of infrastructure.  
As early as the 1960s, farmers began working collectively to demand action 
to drain al-gharaq. Farmers with lands in these flooded plots had their winter crops 
destroyed and their summer crops planted later (until the water reduces), which put 
them in a less favourable condition and limited their crop productivity.  Al-Battuf’s 
agricultural potential has always been a catalyst for the farmers to carry out 
developmental projects in the valley and the promise of water for irrigation became 
an aspiration for them. In those years of the 1960s, farmers were benefitting from 
government interest and investment in their crops – the crop change to sugar beet, 
tomatoes, cotton and onion. These crops, however, remained rainfed with no 
significant investment in irrigated agriculture by the state. Farmers were aware of 
the conditions under which Jewish settlements operated; with efficient production, 
secured marketing and unlimited access to state-subsidised water and extension 
services. The fellahin, therefore, realised the potential of irrigated agriculture as an 
entry point to the Israeli markets and as a means to enhance the productivity of their 
crops.  
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Figure 5.11 Al-gharaq in 1969 (personal archive of Nezar Nassar, Arrabeh) and 2003 
showing the stagnation in efforts of drainage (Government Press Office, Amos Ben 
Gershom, 2003) 
Al-gharaq therefore embodied that dichotomy of aspiration and suffering 
from infrastructure and the ordering of land and water (see Figure 5.12). From as 
early as 1968, and during the first election for the village council in Arrabeh, the party 
“Workers and the Fellahin” put forward the project of draining al-gharaq to end the 
suffering of the fellahin whose lands are affected by the annual flooding. In his book, 
Struggle over Land, Ahmad Saleh Jarbouni (who served as Arrabeh’s head of the 
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village council in 1989) recalls how the following year, in 1969, the winter brought 
heavy rains and the flooding submerged 15,000 dunums (Jarbouni, 1998). The party 
was accused of causing al-Battuf to drown even more because of their unrealistic 
project. Part jokingly, it was argued that ‘if God created al-Battuf in this condition, 
how will you ever change it?’. This was a common reaction of the fellahin and 
villagers of al-Battuf, believing in the limitations of nature, and that any planned 
alterations would only bring along more suffering – this time a godly one in the form 
of heavy rainfall and flooding. The other suffering, which the fellahin also feared was 
that of land confiscation under the guise of development. After suffering from the 
confiscation of hundreds of thousands of dunums, Palestinian citizens were wary and 
mistrustful of any state interventions on their land and a large-scale drainage project 
would inevitably invite further state ordering of their last remaining lands.  
 
Figure 5.12  Al-gharaq parallel to the NWC canal, epitomising competing hydro-
imaginaries and uneven waterscapes (Central Zionist Archives, Dafna’i Dav, 1971) 
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5.3.1 Drainage plans of Tahal and the proposal by Al-Battuf Cooperative 
 
 Even though al-gharaq remained, its drainage was not outside the 
consideration of the state. This section focuses on the various plans to drain al-
gharaq that were designed by Tahal but were never realised. In comparison, al-Battuf 
Cooperative, led by farmers, also began designing its own vision of drainage as an 
alternative infrastructure that the community envisioned for itself, rather than being 
imposed by the government. The section will document the struggles experienced 
and the promise of the drainage project.   
 Built in a critical time of state formation and formalisation of citizenship for 
Israel’s non-Jewish citizens, the NWC’s 17km wide open canal brought water to the 
forefront of the struggles of the farmers of Al-Battuf. Following the canal’s 
construction, Tahal company was assigned the responsibility for planning the 
necessary system for draining al-gharaq. Tahal reports and local sources (Mbadda Ali, 
2000) document different proposals put forward by Tahal company in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The first drainage plan by Tahal was produced in September 1963 
(ISA, 1963) under the title The Drainage Plan for the Eastern Valley of Beit Netufa. 
The plan builds on the Mandate 1946 plan and another plan prepared by the water 
department at the MoA in 1954, both of which were not realised due to claimed 
budget issues. However, the 1963 plan was more detailed as its followed the last 
stages of the NWC canal construction, therefore benefitting tremendously from all 
the hydrological work done for that project. The objective of this plan was to reduce 
the flooding area and its presence on the land through the design of a canal that 
would drain the water into Yiftachel stream (known in Arabic as Rummaneh, on the 
south western part of the valley, where Eshkol reservoir lies). While the report does 
not mention its ultimate use, it doesn’t state the benefit this water could bring to the 
Arab farmers, as it assumes throughout the report that rainfed farming is dominant. 
The other concern of the plan was to design a canal that would eliminate any threat 
of flooding to the NWC, which was cutting through the whole valley and therefore 
also present in the eastern part where flooding occurs, as Figure 5.12 shows. 
Following this, another plan again contained only technical consideration of how the 
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flood water could be utilised outside the valley and not to the benefit of the Arab 
farmers (ISA, 1978)44F 44. Tahal plans were clearly designed to increase water availability 
for the Jewish settlements around al-Battuf and their agriculture. Proposals such as 
draining the waters of the gharaq to Yiftachel, where the Eshkol reservoir is located, 
or to inject it back into the NWC canal, emphasised the intentions to keep this water 
unattainable for the farmers. Eventually, these plans of Tahal, commissioned by the 
MoA were halted completely, since the government demanded the fellahin carry out 
land re-parcellation so that the land needed for the drainage project would be 
available for public use. This stirred concerns and fears of the infamous concentration 
law that was supressed by the collective efforts of the Palestinian Arabs a decade 
before in 1961, and more recently the 1976 attempts of land confiscation in al-Mal 
area. The necessity of protecting the land therefore outweighed the necessity of 
irrigated farming. As mentioned before, the Palestinian sentiment and concern 
‘what’s the use of water without land’ echoes here as well. However, water struggles 
were not excluded from land struggles in al-Battuf as the farmers mobilised 
themselves to try to take matters into their own hands, through the re-configuration 
of al-battuf waterscape and the farming practices they have carried out for 
generations.  
 
5.3.2 Al-Battuf agricultural cooperative and the demand for drainage  
 
 In the 1980s and under the continuous hardship faced in al-Battuf, Arrabeh 
farmers mobilised and established Al-Battuf Cooperative in 1988, with the aim of 
reviving agriculture in the Arab sector and empowering the sumud of the fellahin on 
their land by alleviating their hardships. In addition, it prioritised the drainage project 
as the approach to achieve those aims, where the water would be used for the 
irrigation of crops and hence increase the productivity and marketability of al-Battuf 
                                                          
44 The only mention of Arab farmers benefiting from water projects was in a study on drinking water provision 
plans in al-Battuf (ISA, 1964b, 1967), which made drilling wells conditional, requiring the farmers of Arrabeh 
and Sakhnin to cooperate with the Land Authority and carry out an extensive re-parcellation of land, a move 
most farmers rejected fearing a spur of land confiscation.   
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produce (Jarbouni, 1998). The proposal (Figure 5.13, 5.14) prepared by the 
cooperative intended to drain al-gharaq but use all the water locally for the benefit 
of the farmers. The design envisioned the construction of two main reservoirs (first 
and second pond) in the eastern and central part of the valley and a third one for 
additional overflow and storage (third pond). It was proposed that the reservoirs be 
constructed in a way to reduce land confiscation. The first pond, for example, would 
be on lands which were controlled by the Israeli Land Authority, while the second 
pond would be on Sakhnin’s land. This ensured that the area of land confiscated is 
limited and with the consent of the farmers whose land was to be used as they would 
benefit from irrigation of their nearby plots. The reservoirs were designed to hold 
around 6.2 mcm which was sufficient to meet the needs of the farmers in the dry 
summer months (Mbadda Ali, 2000).   
 
Figure 5.13 Map drawn of Al-Battuf Cooperative drainage proposal (Mbadda Ali, 
2000) above, and on the next page its translation and geographical representation 
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Figure 5.14 Infrastructural aspirations of drainage paralleling NWC canal (developed 
for this thesis by Yousra Othman for this thesis, 2018) 
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 Al-Battuf cooperative lobbied for the drainage proposal with the MoA, which 
was not responding to the farmers’ demands but was the only channel to receive the 
necessary permits. Meanwhile, the cooperative continued carrying out collective 
projects, like the development of agricultural roads and general support for the 
farmers. Fraught with local politics and competition between political parties, the 
cooperative became less and less effective in its advocacy for the drainage project, 
confronted by the disinterest of the MoA. Similar cooperatives and organisations 
dealing with farmers rights inside Israel also emerged and adopted the case of al-
Battuf45F 45. Following these internal tensions, another cooperative, Al-Battuf 
Rehabilitation Cooperative, was established in the early 1990s. This cooperative 
began lobbying with donor agencies of the United States, European Union and others 
to support and fund the drainage project. What was observed in those decades was 
how the promise of infrastructure became articulated by marginalised subjects 
themselves (Ferguson, 1999; Boelens et al., 2014) and was evident in their claims and 
demands for modernity and access to technological advances (Anand et al., 2018; 
Boelens, 2014; Von Schnitzler, 2014).  
 Walid Sadeq, a Palestinian citizen who was the Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
at the Israeli MoA46F 46 also supported the project and began pushing for the realisation 
of the drainage project. Taking advantage of his position in the ministry, efforts were 
heightened to bring the drainage project on the agenda. In August 1993, he 
presented a budget for the development of the agriculture for the Arab citizens of 
Israel to the Minister of Finance (ISA, 1993) and 53 Million Israeli Shekels were 
allocated to realise the drainage project (Kul Al Arab, 1995). This external and internal 
pressure resulted in Tahal company commencing planning for the drainage project 
and reaching a similar design to the original Al-Battuf Cooperative (without the third 
pond/reservoir) (see Figure 5.15).  
                                                          
45 Examples of such organisations was Al Ahali Center for Community Development, established in 1999 to a role 
to support Palestinian citizens to retain their rights to land and in claiming rights to water infrastructure in al-
Battuf. In 2002, they established two cooperatives in Arrabeh and Sakhnin to represent the farmers’ needs (Al 
Ahali, n.d). Another regional one was the Arab Farmers Union, whose aim was to achieve equality between Arab 
and Jewish farmers 
46 Under the Israeli left-wing government of Peres, efforts were made to enhance the situation of Palestinian 
citizens by including them in government roles and assigning budget for the development of their towns and 
villages. This was a common strategy of securing their votes. 
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Figure 5.15 Approved drainage project design under Walid Sadeq's time (ISA, 1996) 
 
 Eventually, a bid was announced to carry out the construction work, which 
was won by the KKL-JNF. The JNF began its work by excavating a 5-km canal, which 
Approved reservoirs, for 
Arrabeh and Sakhin 
Pipe of excess 
water to NWC 
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became known as the zero canal as the first step of the project. However, following 
the commencement of the work, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was 
assassinated in 1995 and the work was put on hold. Following that, the election of a 
right-wing government halted all agricultural (and other projects) intended for the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, leaving an incomplete half-dug canal as another source 
of suffering and hardship experienced by the farmers (see Figure 5.16 and 5.17).  
 As explained by Ali, the drainage claims were scaled up as a tactic which took 
advantage of wider political opportunities: 
This state sometimes faces regional tensions and they use the Arabs 
as a tool, they sedate them - or give them a painkiller. It was the 
time of the war on Iraq and other Palestinian issues. Rabin was 
pushing for peace and all that and we jumped on that bandwagon. 
Let us have equality or balance of opportunity with the Jews. The 
fellahin were pushing for a support through Walid Sadeq and this 
peace leaning government. Rabin at that time approved this plan 
and budget. This was in 1994. This canal is located at the lowest 
point of al-Battuf, it will be a bridge/canal to transport all the flood 
water to artificial lakes or ponds. the scale of such a project was so 
good and beneficial that all the farmers agreed. However, they 
killed Rabin because he wanted peace and they killed the project 
because it will revive al-Battuf. It's politically denied for us. (Ali 
Antar, farmer, Arrabeh, 26 August 2017) 
  
 However, multiple conversations with Ali and other farmers reiterated their 
conviction that abandonment by the state is a systematic policy of the state to keep 
them off the land. When the state shows interest in the farmers plight over land and 
farming, it does it in a way to inflict more harm, and politically deny their right to 
infrastructure. Ali, Abu Saleh and other farmers made sure to drive me to the zero 
canal ditch left unfinished in the middle of al-gharaq, which became a site of suffering 
due to it being used as a dump, or the fact that it further limited access to farmers 
land (Figure 5.16 and 5.17). However, farmers of al-Battuf continually engage with 
the state even under such overt abandonment strategy, carrying out performative 
participation, that is, contesting domination, and negotiating an imposed land and 
water ontology, through multiple claims, identities, relations and emotions (Sultana 
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2011, 166). Re-configuration and re-organisation of place is necessary in their 
defense of their lived geography (Escobar, 2008), pushing farmers to see the drainage 
project as their ultimate defense strategy.  
 
Figure 5.16 part of the zero canal or ditch as it looks in dry season (Author’s picture, 
September 2017) 
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Figure 5.17 Map in Hebrew showing the zero canal as it looks in 2017 (Drainage 
Authority Report, 2017) 
 
 The promise of infrastructure and the relief of the suffering from al-gharaq, 
nevertheless, has ramifications beyond its face value. Under highly inequitable 
planning regimes, al-Battuf lands fall under the jurisdiction of the Misgav regional 
council and Kfar Tavor council, and not under the jurisdiction of any of the Arab 
village councils (Hussein and Adeeb, 1997). As Sheikh Ghanayem, a well-known 
farmer from Sakhnin, explains “Kfar Tabur/Tavor is now responsible for our land, it’s 
a moshav and became a regional council. Our local councils have no authority outside 
of the built-up area. Al-Battuf is divided between Misgav and Kfar Tabur regional 
councils. The moshav itself has no land owned here but they decide on land 
development” (Interview, al-Battuf valley, 13 September 2017). The true intention of 
the state, according to farmers, is to confiscate their lands and impose its own 
regulations on the last remaining Arab-owned private land, through re-parcellation 
mentioned above.  
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Evidently, the farmers of al-battuf are not a monolithic and unified group. 
Tensions are rife within the community on how to tackle the neglected productive 
status of the valley – some push for the revival of the drainage project as the panacea 
to the agricultural stagnation the valley is facing, while others seek state 
incorporation and recognition by seeking alliance with the different state bodies 
pushing for a conservation narrative. Others have lost faith entirely in the revival of 
the valley and have abandoned agricultural activities all together. As is often the case 
in settler colonial states, when efforts of erasure fall short, a divide and rule approach 
dominates the state’s policies towards indigenous communities and their livelihood 
practices. Collective action is thus weakened, and efforts of concerned individuals 
are dissipated, like the unrealised drainage project. 
The imperative of land protection eventually necessitated the abandonment 
of the drainage project for many, as keeping al-Battuf with no jurisdiction or clear 
land survey but ensures that al-gharaq remains as a deterrent to land confiscation 
and false promises of development and infrastructural advancement (Schwartz in 
Hussein and Adeeb, 1997). This has also created tensions between the farmers who 
are proponents of the drainage project, and those who prefer less state intervention 
and encroachment on their land. However, the active farmers were persistent in 
framing the drainage project as their ultimate hope to stay on the land. They 
continued to be present on the land and lobby for access to permits to develop 
infrastructure such as cowsheds, storage areas, electricity and water pipes. These 
efforts were met with stagnation, state neglect and refusal.  
Therefore, al-gharaq was conceptualised as a means of protecting land from 
confiscation and maintaining a status quo of suffering from water while at the same 
time suffering for water. Many farmers have expressed the view that continuing the 
baali (rainfed) crops was the only alternative, far less risky and costly than irrigated 
farming, reiterating that water had become political, not an end but a means to an 
end:  
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At first water was important because at that time in the 1960s and 
70s, there was channels to market the product directly to the 
factories. Today, there isn't. If Arrabeh decides today to switch to 
irrigated crops and receives water, what will we grow and where 
will you market it? (Qasem Jarbouni, farmer, 12 September 2017) 
 
This excerpt further highlights that water became political in al-Battuf, and 
that demands for the drainage project are also demands for recognition and the 
relinquishing of control over ethno-geographic communities’ sources of identity and 
belonging. Rather than a quest for water as-a-resource, the water struggle in al-
Battuf exposes water as an object through which claims are made, and its adoption 
as a means not an end of farmers’ struggles and perseverance (Boelens 2014; Boelens 
and Gelles 2005; Budds and Sultana 2013).  
 
5.4 Farming with and without: suffering for land and water as a 
means of sumud 
 
As Abu Saleh, the previous head of Arrabeh local council, tells me while we stand 
overlooking al-Battuf (Figure 5.18), “The NWC pumps everyday hundreds of 
thousands of cubic meters to the Naqab and we are not allowed to drink from it at 
all. Whoever goes into the canal and fills up a tank of water will be taken to court. 
The famous proverb is an example of what we go through:  
ي الب�داء 
�قتلها الظمأ..والماء فوق ظهورها محمول""كالع�س �ف  
 [translation: “like camels in the desert dying of thirst, while on its back water is 
being carried”47F 47 (Interview with Abu Saleh, and farmer, 18 July 2016).  
                                                          
47 Proverb of Turfa Ibn El Abed, a 6th century Arabian poet 
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Figure 5.18 A panoramic view of the NWC as it cuts through al-Battuf, while farmers 
rely on rain to carry out their farming activities (Author’s picture, August 2017) 
 
The consistent and varying tactics deployed by the farmers in al-Battuf, from 
demonstrations, to legal battles and lobbying efforts, highlight multiple tactics of 
opposition and resistance to a hegemonic ordering of land and water by the settler 
state. These tactics were continuously being re-configured and altered to engage and 
negotiate rights of recognition and belonging as an ethno-geographic community. 
These subtle acts of resistance, even if not documented as such in comparison to 
larger protests and resistance efforts, can thus illuminate varying elements of a 
resisting and remaining Palestinian consciousness, interlinked closely with awareness 
of local hydropolitics and hydro-hegemony (Lemire 2011; Wessels 2015a). While the 
Israeli state consolidated water as a strategic object of national security and Jewish 
development, the farmers of al-Battuf also constructed water as a means to claim 
rights to belong and be recognised as deserving citizens. As Falah (1989, p.248) 
claims, the Palestinians inside Israel have been forced into becoming a partner to 
intrastate territorial conflict, where the “only option for struggle, however limited, 
remains the legal machinery of the state”. The scaling up of methods of resistance 
and protest altered the struggle to one that required closer relationships with the 
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state, political figures and government officials, imbricating al-Battuf farmers in 
unequal power dynamics to claim their rights. The NWC snaking its way through the 
valley remains as an emblem of uneven waterscapes signalling state exclusivity and 
dominance over the landscape. Conditions of state ‘abandonment’ are also reflected 
in the lack of infrastructure familiar to other farming areas. Yet this is juxtaposed with 
farmers’ collective efforts to construct dirt agricultural roads, their reliance on rustic 
water tankers to provide enough water for young saplings of their crops to grow, and 
their presence on the land, which is evident in its continuous tending and weeding.  
 
The realities observed in al-Battuf today are the result of hybrid tactics which 
involved this inevitable engagement with the state and its apparatus, yet a total 
detachment from it at the same time. With farmers losing hope of turning their 
drainage proposals into a reality, individual acts of land reclamation and experiments 
in farming remain. Attempts to bring water in mobile tankers closely resemble 
landscapes in Area C in the Jordan Valley, where water infrastructure is heavily 
restricted. Rustic water tankers, make-shift drip irrigation systems and pesticide 
sprayers are dominant features, used by farmers to enhance the productivity of their 
crops with their own means and measures (see Figure 5.19).  
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Figure 5.19 A typical scene across al-Battuf: Failed attempts of irrigated watermelon 
fields, water tankers and a make-shift tents (Author’s picture, September 2017) 
 
Al–Battuf, in its idle condition, anticipating the promise of infrastructure, has 
become a space of multi-faceted economic and social activities. While it still belongs 
to private owners and is used primarily as an agricultural space, many families have 
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also used it as a site of recreation and escape from the suffocating conditions of the 
villages and towns they live in. “Al-Battuf is our lung, the open space we can claim as 
our own amongst the concrete jungle that is engulfing us”, exclaims Qasem Jarbouni, 
a veteran famer and elder who is one of the few who resides on his land in al-Battuf. 
Indeed, al-Battuf is a space of recreation, productivity and celebration. In the breezy 
afternoons of the weekend, many locals can be seen jogging on the dirt roads 
separating the agricultural plots or using the land for family and friends’ gathering.  
Being on the land takes on many forms. On summer evenings, al-Battuf is 
humming with the chattering sounds of families and friends gathered around 
makeshift tents, enjoying tea and coffee and catching up on the latest village news. 
Scattered rusting machinery lies mostly idle: combine harvesters, tractors, water 
tankers, and ploughs. It gives a feeling that agriculture has become secondary, if not 
completely abandoned. A handful of farmers keep producing a beautiful mosaic of 
multiple crops; wheat, seasonal vegetables, watermelon, melon and sesame, while 
also maintaining social ties and supporting the local economy.  
As Ali Antar exclaims: 
Land, apart from being a source of income, it's the source of our 
existence here. It’s a complex manifestation of our existence and 
perseverance. Without land, what are you doing in a certain area? 
Our entity, existence, Ardna [our land], attachment to our homes 
and land is what al-Battuf is about. 
 
While in the past, subsistence agriculture created conditions where the 
village depended on the land, under settler colonial conditions, the land depends on 
the farmers’ rootedness and sumud on it. In this way, farming does acquire political 
subjectivity as it is framed as a fundamental act to protect the land. The land becomes 
a responsibility, and even a burden, requiring the Palestinian subject to re-configure 
his/her livelihood practices to maintain it. No longer a source of income and a means 
of production, the act of farming acquires a politicised dimension, rooted in struggles 
to protect the land through claims to develop it and stay on it. Therefore, claims for 
water are embedded in this political subjectivity as the farmers devise tactics to 
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secure more stable and economically sound approaches to enhance the productivity 
of their land. Through such actions, sumud acquires a practical and pragmatic 
character, where continuous negotiation and recognition efforts are put forward to 
convince the settler state of farmers’ intentions of inclusivity and social justice. Ali 
further discusses highlights how farming is political and an act of sumud: 
There are no farmers, there are people who grow crops on their 
land out of persistence and being on the land. They respect the land 
and don't want it to remain barren. From the 50,000 dunums, you 
rarely see land that is barren. This deserves respect as people still 
make sure their land is cultivated, even if they cultivate while losing 
money. (Ali Antar) 
 
Of those handful farmers, female farmers remain underappreciated in their 
role in maintaining farming activities in al-Battuf. During one meeting with two of my 
women interlocutors, Jamila and Almaza Al Shathli, both very powerful and 
independent women farmers who have continued working on their land growing 
ba’ali crops for decades, the conversations revolved around the changes experienced 
in the valley, and in carrying out farming in particular.  Women pioneered the return 
to the land, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, when men of the village began their 
exodus seeking waged labour in the Israeli towns and cities. While men abandoned 
agriculture, women stepped up and continued their agricultural activities (since they 
were usually important actors in the subsistence agriculture, anyways). Rainfed 
farming and livestock rearing were their trademarks, and their interest was in 
cultivating the traditional crops and maintaining the land. After meeting on their land 
and talking about their work in al-Battuf, they invited me to join them on a ‘visit’ to 
other farmers in the valley. This is relevant to the traditional practices of Ta’zeeb, 
where families used to set up tents and remain in the valley during the harvest 
period, when farmers used to meet at night and socialise. Today, the farmers who 
remained (men and women of an older age) maintain these visits and meet in the 
valley to socialise, talking about local news, land and farming, and general gossip. 
While women remained on the land alongside men and practiced farming, their 
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visibility in the different plans and proposals, and even the cooperatives themselves, 
remain minimal.  
The gendered construction of who remains as farmers and who is considered 
as an active agent in the drainage project placed men as the main beneficiaries of 
agricultural and water projects. Women’s role remained that of a complementing 
actor and was highlighted in social events, like festivals, where they were 
incorporated into the tactics of remaining on the land. Their presence was 
highlighted again by state agencies, such as the Town Association for Environmental 
Quality – Al-Battuf Basin (TAEQ) which became an important actor in re-configuring 
farmers operations on the land through liaising with the state through their 
environmental planning role. Battufna (our Battuf) festival, is one of those events 
(see Figure 5.20). As a state-supported project, run closely by the village council, local 
governmental organisations and even the JNF, it reflects how such organisations are 
pushing for an agenda of recreation to replace irrigated farming aspiration (and even 
any form of extensive farming and herding) and control the area as a nature reserve 
for all residents (including settlements and the wider Israeli population). An 
environmental agenda and narrative became a dominant approach of the state in 
dealing with al-Battuf in the past two decades, which promotes maintaining the 
status-quo to protect the unique ecosystem of the valley and limit any 
developmental work, such as that to which the drainage project aspires.  
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Figure 5.20 A sign at the entrance to al-Battuf valley in Arabic and Hebrew stating 
“Al-Battuf is ours”, advertising a project of sustainable agriculture, preservation of 
biodiversity and supporting local economy (Author’s picture, August 2016) 
 
 The rise of an environmental protection narrative commenced with TAMA 35, 
a national masterplan approved in 2005, which aims to maintain a balance between 
Israel's development needs and the wish to preserve open spaces. TAMA 35 
designated al-Battuf as a scenic zone for recreation and landscape preservation, 
igniting the fury of the local councils, municipalities and political activists in and 
around al-Battuf. In a large community meeting, representatives of Arab Knesset 
members, civil society, popular resistance committees, farmers representatives of al-
Battuf and municipal and local village councils (Ashams website, 2015) discussed the 
implications of such a strategy on the transformation of al-battuf from a privately-
owned agricultural valley into a state-controlled landscape preservation site (see 
Figure 5.21). During the meeting, different spokespersons emphasised the centrality 
of farming as an act of sumud, which the farmers have been exercising not only in al-
battuf but also in al-Mal lands and their centrality to Land Day 1976 struggles. Such 
struggles were expressed as being re-lived again with the new policies of the state, 
such as “TAMA 35”. “TAMA 35” and what followed (with the latest River and 
Drainage Authority’s plan of 2017), conceptualised al-Battuf as a site of protection 
and preservation, clashing with the farmers’ decades long struggle and aspiration for 
207 
 
draining al-gharaq and constructing al-Battuf as a site of agricultural production and 
development. Within such a clash lies not only contesting imaginaries but also what 
is perceived by the Palestinian communities around al-Battuf as an imposing 
presence of the state through law making on the last remaining valleys of semi-
autonomous Palestinian citizens’ presence and control of the land.  
 
Figure 5.21 Large community meeting in Sakhnin to discuss recent Tama35 
ramifications on al-Battuf (source: Arab48 website, 2015) 
 
 Interestingly, the landscape is telling of a larger reality of contradiction 
between the state’s aspirations for its Jewish subjects, and what it prohibits for its 
Palestinian citizens. The juxtaposition of the largest infrastructure project in the 
history of the Israeli state, the NWC, with recent proposals for sustainable agriculture 
and biodiversity protection is stark, and indicative of the differentiated sanctioning 
of settler colonial geographies and imaginaries by the state. The latest imagination 
of sahl al-Battuf has become that of a biodiverse oasis, with multiple plans opposing 
the realisation of the development of intensive farming, excluding Palestinian land 
owners from articulating their imagination of the place and stripping away any 
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agency over their lands. As the only remaining valley with dominantly Arab 
ownership and a signifier of an Arab agricultural past and heritage, recent imaginaries 
of al-Battuf as a nature reserve leave the farmers in a state of hopelessness and 
disenfranchisement. After decades of adopting the narrative of infrastructural 
development, through lobbying for the drainage project, the farmers are faced with 
new state actors, such as the Ministry of Environmetnal Protection, who are 
advocating for state intervention in al-Battuf to preserve it as a nature reserve with 
sustainable agricultural practices and ecotourism activities (Gutkowski, 2018). The 
environmental and green actors came into the picture and began doubting the 
justification for the drainage canal and highlighting the aesthetic aspect of the 
flooding and the small plot mosaic aesthetics. As Abu Saleh exclaims “The new actors 
against this project are the green party and the environmentalists who claimed that 
certain species (worms, plants and birds) will go extinct if the drainage project goes 
ahead. Who is more important the worms or us?”.   
This environmental narrative was officially adopted in a study produced by 
the River and Drainage Authority in 2017 (see Figure 5.22), setting a precedent in the 
state’s interaction with the Palestinian farmers and their agricultural lands in al-
Battuf. Following decades of dismissal and a number of unkept promises of 
agricultural development, leaving farmers in limbo ‘with and without’ water and 
infrastructure, the government’s latest renewed interest is in maintaining the status-
quo of the farmer and furthering state control and ordering of the valley. The 
authority proposed a plan for the rehabilitation and development of al-Battuf as a 
nature reserve and a hub for alternative agriculture, walking trails and local eco-
tourism (River and Drainage Authority, 2017), labeling those efforts as empowering 
and strengthening ‘sustainable’ agricultural methods. The plan is a joint collaboration 
between the Drainage Authority, the Ministries of Agriculture, Rural Development 
and Environmental Protection, the Open Spaces Fund of the Israel Land 
Administration and representatives of the local authorities in the area (Haaretz, 
2018).48F 48 Aimed at reviving al-Battuf in a manner that allows the ‘co-existence of 
                                                          
48 The project has been approved by the Northern District Planning and Building Committee, which as an authority 
is responsible for all development projects in al-Battuf on 18th of December 2017. 
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agriculture and nature’, the plan renewed interest in al-Battuf unique landscape. 
State and non-state actors (like TAEQ) have highlighted how the modes of traditional 
agriculture which were carried out by the Palestinians for generations have enabled 
conditions for the protection and thriving of species of wild plants that don’t exist 
anywhere else in Palestine/Israel. The phenomena of al-gharaq, coupled with rain-
fed agriculture that relies on natural fertilizer and minimal interventions on the land 
have allowed for this biodiversity to thrive (Gutkowski, 2018). Such statements 
coming from official Israeli authorities  seem incomprehensible and contradictory to 
decades of a Zionist modernity narrative based specifically on hegemony over nature 
and a technopolitical approach to agricultural development (Alatout, 2009; Anton, 
2008). Heavily framed as primitive and irrational by state, the Palestinian agricultural 
methods and forms of working the land have now become embraced and celebrated 
by the same state ostracizing them and their practices as incompatible to the modern 
Zionist and Israeli aspirations.  
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Figure 5.22 The cover of the Drainage Authority 2017 report in Arabic and Hebrew 
 
Framed as the last remaining biodiversity hotspot in the country, al-Battuf 
therefore embodied an interesting shift in Israeli water and environmental narratives 
which took place in the 1990s. This shift was from a territorial and sovereignty 
framing of natural resource management to that of quality of life (Alatout, 2006). 
While the farmers of al-Battuf employ narratives of “identity in which national 
belonging is expressed, almost exclusively, in territorial terms” (Alatout, 2006, p. 
616), the recent Israeli-Jewish narrative evokes priorities of quality of life and 
environmental protection. While Alatout focuses on Palestinians inside the West 
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Bank and Gaza Strip and their environmental narratives, the same approach can be 
used to analyse the contemporary dynamics which faced both Palestinians inside 
Israel and the oGH when claiming rights to resources. The scarcity justification, used 
by the state to explain Arab exclusion from water development policy, is now further 
remoulded by new actors, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, into a 
concern for quality of life, biodiversity and aesthetics protection. The Palestinian 
citizens’ lack of sovereignty or control over resources and even their own lands leads 
to a solidification of territorial claim making over land and water. This clashes with 
the state’s narratives of environmental protection and biodiversity preservation, 
causing an irreconcilable situation. The contestation between state imaginaries of 
sahl al-Battuf as a site of environmental protection and the Palestinian citizens’ 
imaginaries of al-Battuf as a site of resistance and sumud (through the drainage 
project and development of farming) is therefore heightened49F 49. The state plans to 
transform al-battuf to a site of control and monitoring have significantly reduced the 
efforts of the farmers to remain steadfast on the land and have imposed on them yet 
again alternative imaginaries than their own. The denial of the right to infrastructure 
and development of their agricultural land and the imposition of a nature reserve is 
seen not only as an encroachment of the state on privately owned land, but part of 
a persisting effort to uproot the remaining farming communities from the land, 
turning it into a public space controlled by the state. Under the drainage Authority 
project, work commenced in June 2018 on excavation and expansion of the zero 
canal as first step towards alleviating the flooding of al-gharaq areas, with promises 
of providing water for agriculture along the canal, and the construction of agricultural 
roads (See Figure 5.23). 
These environmental imaginaries of the reality of al-Battuf reflect a story of 
how water was made political ( Alatout 2009)by multiple actors, including the 
                                                          
49 This is further complicated with competing Palestinian narratives and imaginaries of the area. While farmers 
insist on maintaining its agricultural character, Palestinian civil society ((like the Arab Alternative Planning Centre) 
focus their advocacy in general on more land for housing and urban development, and aim to extend and expand 
plans, such as TAMA35 to urban development. While they realise the importance of agricultural development for 
al-Battuf, their work is to liaise   
212 
 
advocates for the drainage project, as Hanadi Hijris from TAEQ explains (Interview, 
Sakhnin, 28 August 2017):  
The politicians and those who are outspoken about the issues of al 
Battuf had one concern which was water but when we conducted 
that survey with the farmers we discovered something else. When 
we talked to the farmers, the story was different. From the 
politicians’ point of view and the ones who speak up for the 
cooperative, they raise and flag the issue of water as existential – 
often citing the metaphor of al-Battuf being like a camel that holds 
so much water, but always remains thirsty, specifically citing the 
NWC and the zero canal. The big voices blame the NWC, the state, 
and the occupation. But look at other Arab Palestinian farmers in 
Marj Ibn Amer, or those in Qalansweh5 0F 50 who are practicing 
agriculture with no issues. Even in al-Battuf itself, B’ineh Njeidar, 
Il’izeer etc are also content. Why not you as well [Arrabeh and 
Sakhnin]? Politics play a very important role influencing how al-
battuf situation has reached this point.  
  
 
Figure 5.23 Resumed work on the zero Canal by the River Drainage Authority (Al 
Jalel, 2018) 
                                                          
50 Both agricultural areas inside Israel where Palestinian citizens practice farming. 
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Evidently, TAEQ, being an environmental governmentally sponsored entity is 
also involved in the Drainage Authority’s plan, advocating for traditional farming to 
remain with an increased support from the state and through normalising 
environmental narratives and ideas to ‘preserve a traditional and equilibrium 
agroecology which has been destroyed elsewhere in the country’.  
However, uneven waterscapes are further exposed today as the NWC, the 
epitome of Zionist waterscapes and hydro-imaginaries, is being re-configured after 
54 years of its imposition in al-Battuf land. In March 2018, the farmers of al-Battuf 
found out about a number of bulldozers and trucks operating in the valley, dislodging 
large pipelines and placing them in the fenced area of the NWC canal (see Figure 
5.24). Without any prior notification to the village councils of Sakhnin and Arrabeh 
or to the farmers themselves, Mekorot carried out the transportation of these pipes 
without any further clarification. Evidently, Mekorot is embarking on a large-scale 
project to transport desalinated water from the Mediterranean Sea through a series 
of pipelines to Lake Tiberias (Jerusalem Post, 2017), an assemblage which reverses 
that of the NWC, which has itself been only partly operational in recent years. To 
combat the continuous drop in the level of Lake Tiberias, the latest technological fix 
is the reversal of the NWC and the pumping of desalinated water back to Lake 
Tiberias (see Figure 5.25).  The drop in Lake Tiberias has reached alarming levels with 
the legacy of the NWC pumping water to the Naqab. While the NWC hasn’t been 
‘flowing’ as strong as previous years, the average pumping from Lake Tiberias has 
been 286 MCM/ year and is continuously dropping, as farmers observed throughout 
the years. This was due to a drop in the water level of Lake Tiberias in the last couple 
of years, reaching 214 meters below sea level (Water Authority, 2018). 
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Figure 5.24 the pipes laid down by Mekorot in Al-Battuf, inside the fenced area of 
the NWC canal (Alarab news agency, 2018) 
 
The sight of Mekorot employees and pipes instantly caused anxiety amongst 
the farmers due to their fear of a new confiscation row. While the plans for the 
pipelines are still not clear, the TAEQ confirms that it will be part of an underground 
pipeline by the Water Authority and Mekorot that will transfer desalinated water to 
increase the water levels of the lake. The scarcity narrative is resurfacing and 
resituating al-Battuf as a site of national water transfer, 54 years after the 
construction of the NWC and the confiscation of 1,500 dunums of the farmers land. 
Again, the farmers were not made aware of these developments and, similar to the 
1950s and 60s struggles discussed in chapter 4, the state is handling a crisis in water 
availability with the same logic as before: technological solutions to save the day. 
This development will undoubtedly resituate Al-Battuf within the national hydro-
imaginary of previous decades and these scarcity-driven policies and ‘fixes’ will again 
impact the lived realities of Al-Battuf farmers, re-configuring the struggle over land 
and water and reinstating it at the forefront of their struggles. This is particularly the 
case with other developments on the ground after years of stagnation, with the River 
Drainage Authority taking its first concrete steps in its project to develop Al-Battuf.    
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Figure 5.25 the expanding island in the Lake Tiberias (above), and Mekorot’s 
pipelines being installed to alleviate the water drop (Ynetnews, 2018) 
 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter narrated the struggle of al-Battuf farmers from 1954, when the 
NWC was imposed on their lived geographies until the present day. It focuses on how 
water came to al-Battuf and was made an object of political and territorial struggle. 
It argues that al-Battuf presents a case of an uneven waterscape, fraught with 
dichotomies of carrying out farming with and without water and infrastructure, and 
how such dynamics construct water as a tool of claiming recognition, visibility and 
continuous presence on the land. the uneven waterscape materialises in the 
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sanctioning of state-led water development, while prohibiting such development for 
the farmers which remain active on the land, placing them as actors in confronting 
the state, devising tactics which enact sumud against all odds. The efforts of farmers 
to claim water-as-a-resource, mainly rainwater/precipitation through infrastructure 
(the drainage project) are also claims of political recognition, land-based identity and 
belonging.  
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Chapter 6:  The lived geographies of the oGH villages and their 
re-configuration under Israeli settler colonial rule 
 
In this chapter, the first research question of the thesis is addressed, exploring 
how water and land policies and practices of the settler colonial state impact the lives 
and livelihood practices of farming communities in the occupied Golan Heights 
(oGH). The analysis focuses on how the relationship with the Israeli state was 
negotiated, following important years of rupture and dispossession, namely 1967 
and 1982. It also explores farmers’ ideas and norms around their daily practices of 
farming, which have been changing dramatically under the Israeli occupation and 
later annexation.  
The chapter is divided into four sections and offers a historical overview of 
the abrupt transformation experienced by this community and the re-configuration 
of their lives under settler colonial rule, with the political effects and responses 
addressed in Chapter 7. The first section explores the lived experiences of the Jawlani 
villages before the 1967 Israeli occupation, to provide a glimpse of established water 
norms, specifically in the village of Majdal Shams. The section shows how the farmers 
of the oGH, with a high dependence on agriculture and marketing of their products 
already had a prosperous farming sector focused on fruit trees, notably apple 
orchards. While their water infrastructure was only locally developed, farming 
cooperatives were beginning to be established to negotiate farming issues with the 
Syrian government in Damascus, and a local water management arrangement was 
developed. 
 The second and third sections of the chapter examine two distinct periods, 
1967-1981 and post-1981 respectively, describing the ontological manifestations of 
settler colonial rule on the ground, through the Israeli imposition of military laws and 
settlement development plans, and the effects of this on the livelihoods of those 
residing in the remaining Syrian villages. In the second section, I show how the 
occupation achieved an almost complete control over the physical means of 
production, land and water, and therefore transformed and re-configured agriculture 
in the remaining villages of the oGH, while constructing a settler-focused water 
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infrastructure and developing agriculture over the land formerly belonging to Syrian 
villages (most of the area of the oGH). The Israeli state’s narratives of water scarcity 
and its ambitious attempts to judaise the Golan have created spatial confinement 
and exclusion for the remaining villages, restricting them from carrying out their 
agricultural practices and limiting them to farming only. The third section examines 
how, through a series of military orders, settlement development plans and 
agricultural investments, the remaining agricultural activities in the Syrian villages of 
the oGH were transformed into a field of contestation, transforming farming and 
with it the landscapes and lived experiences of farmers in the oGH. The chapter 
concludes that settler colonial local hydro-hegemony played a significant role in 
altering the lives and livelihoods of the indigenous Arab population, uprooting and 
re-configuring their land and water ontologies. The settler colonial state policies 
extended to all aspects of life, including issues of citizenship and identification, which 
as this thesis argues, became imbricated with land and water struggles and politicised 
farming practices as acts of collective resistance, as will be seen in Chapter 7.  
 
6.1 Local ontologies of Land and water pre-1967 
 
The geographical location of the Syrian villages at an elevation between 600 
and 1200 meters above sea level, in addition to their position at the headwaters of 
the Upper Jordan Basin, necessitates agro-development that conforms to these 
environmental conditions. Such conditions dictate the planting of certain crops, with 
experience since the 1950s favouring fruit trees, in particular apple orchards, as the 
most suitable and lucrative crop for these farming communities. Prior to 1967, the 
Golan Heights villages belonged to the Syrian province of Quneitra, and were 
populated by predominantly subsistence farmers, who even then enjoyed a large 
degree of autonomy from the state (Batatu, 1999).  
Under the Syrian government, land was divided into three categories of 
ownership according to the Agricultural Reform Law No. 161 of 1958, followed by 
Law No. 134 to manage and organise the agricultural operations (Al-Marsad, 2009). 
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This agricultural reform law essentially cancelled the Ottoman-era land 
categorisation, especially the Miri (as explained in Chapter 4). This resulted in the 
distribution of land to the fellahin who had been cultivating and working on the land. 
The Syrian state maintained its control over what was considered state land, 
estimated at around 5000 dunums in the Quneitra and Feeq (south of the Golan) 
districts (Bagh, 1983). Notably, the Syrian government (and the French colonial 
power beforehand) was not as meticulous regarding land parcellation and surveying 
as British mandate Palestine. Therefore, in Syria land was mainly privately owned but 
while some land was parcelled and distributed to individual owners, other lands were 
collectively owned as a ‘future reservoir for the village and its residents’ (ASD, 
1994).51F 51  
Majdal Shams, amongst other villages in the Golan, carried out land 
parcellation in the early 1930s, which included a fair distribution of land to each 
family (mostly Druze and Christian families), according to their needs and the 
productivity of the land. This was later driven by the Syrian government land reforms 
mentioned above and resulted in a situation where most lands in the villages studied 
were parcelled and ownership was given to local residents. These progressive steps, 
compared to the feudal system limiting ownership to elite large landholders common 
in Palestine, secured land ownership to all families within the community and limited 
state encroachment on their lands. More importantly, the parcellation of the land 
also developed, according to Jawlanis, a sense of belonging and attachment to the 
land (Interview with Salman Fakherlddin, political activist, January 2017): 
The distribution of land had a very huge impact on how people viewed the 
land and means of production and it was done in a fair and equal manner. 
                                                          
51 The Syrian government’s pro-agriculture policies encouraged villagers to reclaim land and expand the 
agricultural base (Barnes, 2009). In Majdal Shams specifically, the villagers who established the village more than 
400 years ago bought the lands from the Ottoman Emir and other local owners. There were distinctions between 
two types of land bought: the fertile lands which were bought by individual families, and the mountainous lands, 
which were on a rugged terrain and, were less fertile. These were bought collectively under the Waq (religious 
endowment) which controlled them until there was a need for land expansion (for housing or agriculture) when 
these lands would be re-parceled and granted to those in need. In Syria, there was no Mashaa’ land as there was 
in Palestine therefore all land had either private ownership or was state land (ASD, 1994).   
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While in feudal systems peasants feel a sense of alienation from the produce 
and the source of labour (land), the small landholder who owns the land does 
not experience this feeling but a stronger feeling of attachment to his land.  
This early identification with land ownership therefore allowed the farmers 
in the oGH to think strategically about land use, management and productivity, 
allowing a better utilisation of the land with the support of the Syrian state.52F 52 With 
land being secured and more equally distributed amongst the Jawlani, the potential 
increased to grow perennial crops, like fruit trees and grape trees, in addition to the 
traditional seasonal vegetables and grain. While the Golan Heights is a fertile 
agricultural region, the villages predominantly relied on water sources available in 
their vicinity and according to their needs. According to the Syrian statistics of 1966 
regarding agricultural activities in the Quneitra region, most of the crops were rain-
fed, with dry or rain-fed farming constituting 370,000 out of 390,000 dunums (cited 
in Davis, 1983, 284). Wheat was the dominant crop (see Figure 6.1), with a production 
of 18,000 tons in Quneitra (Al-Marsad, 2009) and other crops like barley, corn, 
grapes, and fruit trees all relied on rain-water and were not irrigated. Davis (1983) 
also provides details regarding agriculture production in the Quneitra region, where 
dry or rain-fed farming constitutes 370,000 out of 390,000 dunums (figures from 
Syrian Arab Republic, 1966, p.284). Vegetables on the other hand, like cauliflower 
and other seasonal varieties were usually planted around fresh water sources, 
notably local springs. This was the case in and around Marj al Ya’fouri but also in 
other locations in the Golan Heights, like Al Bteeha in the south, which was known 
for growing vegetables due to the suitable climate and water abundance.  
                                                          
52 Interestingly, a similar rootedness pattern can be observed in the Galilee (inside 1948 Israel), and North–central 
West Bank where land ownership was private and olive cultivation is intensive, and where Palestinians continue 
to inhabit these regions without being displaced (Reger, 2017). These lands are owned by small farmers and 
landholders.  
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Figure 6.1 Majdal Shams village and the Bayader (a space where tilling and 
separating the grains took place (Government Press Office, Milner Moshe 1967) 
 
The location of al-Bteeha and surrounding villages, on the shores of Lake 
Tiberias, also facilitated the development of fisheries. Al-Marsad (2009) documents 
how a fish market took place once a week to sell and transport fish to Damascus. 
Moreover, livestock rearing was also as a significant and complementary agricultural 
activity in the Golan Heights. Thus, agriculture was the main economic activity of the 
Golan Heights pre-1967, where 64% of the labour force was employed in farming and 
fishing (Davis, 1983). As cited by Davis, the Syrian statistics of 1966 attest to a 
flourishing agricultural region on the eve of the Israeli occupation.53F 53 Thousands of 
tons of grain, vegetables, milk, wool, honey, meat and eggs were recorded. As for 
orchards, an area of 40,400 dunums with 2.7 million fruit trees with an annual 
production of 22,000 tons of various fruits was planted in the Golan Heights (Davis, 
1983, p.5). 
 The 1960s were also decades of economic prosperity in the region as there 
was an increasing commercialisation of agriculture, evident in the abandonment of 
                                                          
53 livestock numbers were 3,700 cows, 1 or 2 million sheep and goats, 1,300 horses, 7,000 beasts of burden, 
200,000 poultry, and 7,000 beehives 
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growing wheat and a greater reliance on grape vineyards. While the transformation 
was taking place from wheat to fruit trees, vegetables and other perennial crops 
were still grown for subsistence purposes. In 1966, the Golan Heights as part of the 
Quneitra province was producing a variety of crops. In the case of fruit trees, apples 
made up 7,970 dunums of land, constituting 18.5% of total land used, with vineyards 
dominant at 40% of the land covered by fruit trees.  Social infrastructure was also 
established, with cooperatives and farmers’ associations working closely with the 
Ministry of Agriculture in Damascus to enhance agricultural productivity and 
marketing (Mara’i and Halabi, 1992).  
 
The Syrian laws of land redistribution and ownership, therefore, had clearly 
established landowners in the Golan Heights who had control over their agricultural 
activities and livelihoods. With a strong attachment to the land, Majdal Shams 
farmers were also the first to adopt apple tree planting and begin replacing pulses 
and seasonal vegetable growing as early as 1946. Apple trees, from Lebanese 
saplings, were first planted as a fruit crop under flood irrigation in Al Ya’fouri, 
therefore being an irrigated crop to which spring water sources were diverted locally. 
Within ten years, the Jawlani apples (known until today as Tufah Al Jawlan – apples 
of the Golan) were being exported to Egypt. Al Marj area was endowed with spring 
water from Ras El Nabi’ (translated as Head of the Spring) and therefore was the ideal 
location for the first orchards. Hayel Abu Jabal, a political activist and veteran farmer 
narrates: 
The apples have an interesting history in our area. One of the 
Sheikhs from our region has relatives in Lebanon. On one of his 
visits, he was introduced to the apple tree and saw how productive 
it was. He came back and explained to people about the economic 
value of this crop. People didn't accept this at first...but he was a 
well-known and respected sheikh, so a couple of farmers agreed to 
go into this venture. They travelled to Lebanon and brought back a 
few saplings. That was in 1946, before the creation of the Israeli 
state. A couple of years later in 1950, the apple produce was ready. 
When people saw the production and the economic value of 
growing apples, there was a Hajmeh (Arabic for attack or rush) on 
the land. They planted a large area of land in the Marj. Everybody 
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began planting the apples. I remember clearly in 1953 another 
Hajmeh, and by then half of the Marj’s area was planted. By the 
end of the 1950s, there were more than 4000 dunums planted with 
apple trees. In 1967, the area of apple orchards was 6,400 dunum, 
and people began considering expanding to rain-fed land (Interview 
with Hayel Abu Jabal, farmer and political figure, Majdal Shams, 17 
December 2016).  
 
This account shows how apple growing was already developed and expanding 
before the Israeli occupation began in 1967 through a Hajmeh, a rush to the land. 
This mostly relied on springs, but well drilling and pumping of groundwater also 
supplied the orchards on a limited scale. As Davis (1983) notes, only 12 small-scale 
pumping licenses were issued in Quneitra province in 1966 (Syrian Arab Republic, 
1967, cited in Davis, 1983, p.6). Therefore, while large-scale water infrastructure was 
not developed by the Syrian state, the villages relied on water resources available to 
them and managed to develop pockets of irrigated agriculture throughout the Golan 
Heights. 
While no extensive water abstraction was taking place in the Golan Heights, there 
were local efforts to utilise spring water in an efficient manner. Reliance on springs 
and collective efforts to bring water to the fields further enhanced local knowledge 
of the springs, the Sa’ar river and Mt. Hermon as a water source, which the local 
inhabitants were using as a source of ice for domestic use, in addition to the yearlong 
flows of the springs due to the melting ice. Birket Ram, or Lake Ram, a unique volcanic 
pool of 5 million cubic metres (mcm) capacity, was used for the local irrigation of 
nearby orchards, as a source of water for livestock, and for small-scale fishing (see 
Figure 6.2 and 6.3).  
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Figure 6.2 Birket Ram and surrounding orchards after the 1967 occupation (picture 
by David Haftzilit, 1968 acquired from Jawlani website) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Abu Yasser Mohammad Sha’ar, known as the most skilled fisherman in 
the region, taken in 1969 (Jawlani website) 
 
The Jawlani farmers testify to the historical success of their communal 
planning and funding of water resources, predating Syrian rule. Ein El Tufaha (the 
apple spring) project in 1945 was one example of that, where water was transferred 
from a natural spring (now inside the Syrian-controlled Golan) to connect 410 houses 
to running water in Majdal Shams. Similarly, the area of Al Marj, the location for the 
earliest planting of apple trees in Majdal Shams in the 1940s, was also supplied by 
water from Ras il Nabi’ (translates as ‘the source of the spring’), thereafter the main 
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site for agricultural activities during the following two decades and symbolically 
pivotal to the current Jawlani ethno-geographic community. Al Marj lands are 
situated in the valley of the Ya’fouri, where the apple orchards were irrigated by a 
basic network of cement channels constructed by the community in the 1940s, 
diverting waters from Sa’ar River. Current Jawlani farmers express pride in this 
tradition of communal action and utilisation of their natural resources and highlight 
how their autonomy over land and water use has consolidated their belonging to the 
land. 
This section showed how water distribution in the Syrian Golan Heights, 
similar to patterns of water distribution in the Galilee and the wider region of the 
Levant, involved a network of decentralised arrangements to capture water for 
irrigation and agricultural production. In the case of Majdal Shams, decentralised 
collective efforts were carried out to secure water for agricultural development from 
the nearby springs, and Birket Ram was used for fishing and as a source of drinking 
water for livestock. These collective efforts of water management were embedded 
in well-established practices of communal agriculture that pre-dated Syrian rule and 
were respected by the Syrian state.  
 
6.2 The years of rupture (1967-1982) 
 
The 1948 war, followed by the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab 
countries, has placed the Golan Heights at the heart of the battles over the Jordan 
River Basin, especially within the Upper Jordan River. As highlighted earlier in Chapter 
1, the 1967 war was critical in shaping the oGH  as a hydro-strategic waterscape, 
when the control of the upper Jordan tributaries (Zeitoun et al., 2012) under the 
‘Israeli hegemony era’ (Feitelson, 2000) was consolidated. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the focus of the TWM literature has been on the upper tributaries of the Jordan and 
their hydrostrategic importance for the Israeli state. This section will zoom in on the 
disruptions and re-configuration of the lived geographies of the remaining Syrian 
villages after the 1967 war and how Israeli local hydro-hegemony was consolidated.  
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As the war ended on the Golan Heights front, the Druze villages remaining 
were disconnected from each other and the outside world. Jawlanis recall how during 
the first days and weeks of the occupation, they were not aware how many villages 
remained intact, who was controlling what area and the situation in the nearby city 
of Quneitra.54F 54 Slowly, with the presence of Israeli army in their villages and the 
imposition of military rule, it became evident to the Jawlanis the extent of the 
displacement, destruction and transformation of their local geography. The Israeli 
occupation caused a devastating physical and existential rupture, also disrupting the 
socio-economic and political lives and disconnecting the remaining inhabitants from 
their Syrian homeland. It was nonetheless considered by the remaining population 
as a ‘temporary’ phase of military rule that was to be tolerated until political 
interventions and negotiations rectified the situation. The 1967 occupation has 
always been framed as a case of ‘subtle’ or civilian occupation55F 55 (Ó Cuinn, 2011; 
Weizman, 2007), that of a ‘refined’ settler colonial rule (Gordon and Ram, 2016), and 
a case where the oGH became a region under a ‘forgotten’ occupation (Al-Marsad, 
2018). For the Jawlanis, the 1967 war and its aftermath are considered a point of 
rupture in their lived experience. Similar to the Nakba (catastrophe) experienced by 
Palestinians in 1948, the Jawlanis experienced an abrupt disintegration of their social 
and political everyday life: the forced displacement of more than 130,000 people, the 
destruction of cities, villages and farms, leaving behind a population of a mere 6,000 
people distributed in 6 villages (See Figure 6.4 and 6.5). Five Druze villages, Majdal 
Shams, Buq’atha, Mas’ada, Ein Qinya and S’heeta, and the Alewite village of Al Ghajar 
remained (Mara’i and Halabi, 1992). However, S’heeta Village was depopulated soon 
after by the Israeli army in 1970 and its population relocated to Mas’ada village. The 
village was completely demolished and turned into a military zone (Al-Marsad, 2018).  
 
 
                                                          
54 In 1973, another Arab-Israeli War, known as Youm Kippur War took place and Syria reclaimed 50km2 of the 
oGH. The city of Qunietra was completely destroyed by the Israeli army before withdrawing and returning the 
city to Syria (Al-Marsad, 2018) 
55 For example, from the start of occupation the oGH had no military courts in order to further prove the 
emptiness of the Golan from a threatening population, justifying ‘fresh’ law making (Hajjar, 2005). 
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Figure 6.4 Destroyed Syrian villages after the 1967 war highlighted in Green, while 
those remaining are highlighted in purple, and the Israeli settlements in red (Al-
Marsad,2017) 
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Figure 6.5 A visual representation of remaining villages and Israeli settlements (Al-
Marsad, 2018) 
 
With this abrupt transformation, Syrian territorial sovereignty was replaced 
by Israeli military control (Ram, 2013; 2015). Directly following the occupation, a 
series of military laws and orders issued by the Israeli occupation formally nullified 
Syrian sovereignty, introducing Israeli legal and administrative authority over the 
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oGH. The oGH was declared a closed military zone which tightened the military’s 
control over land and declared all water resources and works the sole responsibility 
of the Israeli state, under the sole control of the military governor (Keary, 2013). The 
realities under occupation therefore limited the geographical and political existence 
of the remaining population and confined their civil and national rights. Herding and 
livestock rearing were two professions which were eliminated completely, and the 
backbone of self-subsistence which characterised the region pre-occupation was 
ultimately crushed by the uprooting experienced by the Jawlani populations and the 
loss of their access to land. Today, there are at least 23,000 Israeli-Jewish settlers in 
the Occupied Syrian Golan, living in 34 illegal settlements. Together with the Israeli 
military and authorities, they control 95% of the land. The forcible transfer of its 
Syrian inhabitants was followed by the systematic destruction of Arab villages and 
farms by the Israeli military, facilitating land appropriation, settlement building, and 
the transfer of Israeli settlers into the region – all breaches of international 
humanitarian law (Murphy and Gannon, 2010).  
 
6.2.1 The Golan Heights in the Israeli hydro-imaginary  
 
Following the aftermath of the 1973 war, the occupied Golan Heights became 
known, by Israeli defence ministers and security forces, as the quiet front. While it 
might be a quiet military front, the Golan Heights was perceived as a water 
exploration front. Israel’s occupation of the Golan secured its control of the entire 
surface recharge areas of the Liddan and Banis rivers and therefore the quantity and 
quality of water reaching Lake Tiberias (Zeitoun et al., 2012, p.78). With its capture 
of the Golan (along with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai), Israel gained territorial 
expanse and enhanced its geostrategic position (see Figure 6.6). It also “greatly 
improved its hydro-strategic position, extensively limiting any water works and 
diversions by Arab countries whether individually or collectively” (Wolf, 1995, p.52). 
The Mukheibh dam in Syria is a case in point, which, after being destroyed by Israel 
in 1964, and together with Israel’s strategic occupation of the Himmeh and control 
over 15 km of the Yarmouk Riverbed, meant no further unilateral water 
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infrastructure was built without Israel’s consent. This hegemonic position also 
allowed Israel to carry out ‘remote’ control, beyond the territorial and physical 
control of land, where Israel could retain control over the transboundary flows with 
only its soft power to sanction any water use and development (Zeitoun et al., 2012).  
Wolf (1995, p.55) also highlights the imbrication of water with strategic 
planning and territorial control by stating how, when Israeli Defence Minister Moshe 
Dayan was on a tour of the Heights just before the Yom Kippur War in 1973, he 
insisted on the acceleration of dam building in the oGH as an anti-tank barricade. 
Through what Newman (1989a, p.219) refers to as “a mixture of civilian and military 
presence”, the Israeli state ensured its territorial control over all its occupied 
territories (and territories within the state, where its Jewish presence is 
overshadowed by an Arab majority, like the Galilee) through the civilian settlement 
development and control of resources, where agricultural settlements and resource 
control became mechanisms of defence and security of a settler colonial Jewish state.  
The defensive function of the oGH therefore acquired also a political dimension, 
within which control of water resources was of high domestic priority for the Israeli 
state. Thus, Wolf describes the settlements not only as agricultural communities but 
also as outposts, serving political and security means. Water’s association with 
agriculture acquired it with ideological weight (Galnoor, 1978) and as Frey and Naff 
state (1985, p.76):  
Israeli agriculture is not merely an ordinary economic sector. It is 
linked to the crucial matter of settlements, and settlements are 
linked to defence and national security.  
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Figure 6.6 Map showing ‘The strategic value of the Golan Heights’ (source: PASSIA, 
n.d) 
 
On seizing the Golan Heights, the emphasis of the Israeli water policymakers 
was on the fact that out of the 500 mcm of water available from the Upper Jordan 
River, 90% (around 440 mcm) was now under the control and use of the Israeli sate. 
In addition to the rivers and springs, the runoff and floods were seen as a potential 
water source to divert and utilise. The groundwater potential of the Golan Heights 
(and other occupied territories like the West Bank) were also taken into 
consideration as important water sources (ISA, 1968): 
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Even at the Yarmouk our situation has been improved and we are 
in control of part of its waters and we are situated along its banks 
for over 15 km…[the] control and presence on the sources of the 
Jordan and Yarmouk is sufficient to ensure that we are entitled to 
those sources and to maximise the utilisation of the water for the 
benefit of the residents of the countries of the region.  
 
Birket Ram was also constructed as a site within the Israeli hydro-imaginary, 
even before the Israeli invasion and occupation. In a 1956 news article, for example, 
the Golan Heights was associated with a prophecy of the first-century Romano-
Jewish scholar, Yosef ben Matityahu, who describes Birket Ram as a mysterious water 
body of elliptical shape and ‘the source of the Jordan’ (La Mirhav, 1956). The article 
shows the Israeli ethno-geographic ambition in reclaiming the Golan Heights as a part 
of the biblical land of Israel, aspiring to return to the top of the Hermon ‘without 
fear’. A strictly technical hydrogeological report by Tahal construct Birket Ram as a 
site to conquer and claim, and further study (ISA, 1968): 
A very interesting hydrogeological phenomenon is the Ram pool which 
may have value in the development of the water resources of the North 
of the Golan. Opinions are divided between the geologists regarding its 
creation and permeability  
After the Israeli occupation, the tourism potential of the oGH was fully 
explored, and natural environments were utilised to render colonial space suitable 
for settler colonialist use and enjoyment, as Moriel Ram explores (2013, p.739). 
Appropriation of natural sites such as Birket Ram or Mt. Hermon as Israeli 
environmental scenery replicated the picturesque aesthetic of Western scenic 
landscapes and naturalised an occupied land which Israel sought to claim as its own 
(See Figure 6.7).  
 
233 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Israeli Postal stamp depicting Birket Ram as part of ‘Israeli landscapes’ 
(Israeli Postal Services, 1972) 
 
6.2.2 Military orders and the governing of lives and livelihoods 
 
As Meehan asserts, “no object of Mexican statecraft has been more 
important to territorializing water than its laws”, where she considers law as part of 
infrastructures of power (Meehan, 2014, p.217). The same could be said about the 
law making that, from 1967, set in place the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. 
A series of military ordinances were issued by the Israeli military commanders, 
covering all aspects of civilian life, including land ownership and use, freedom of 
movement and political expression, the right to demonstrate, and economic 
activities. Military orders were issued by the Military Governor on behalf of the Israeli 
state to govern people’s everyday lives and economic activities, from access to 
occupied areas, to movement, use of land and water, political mobilisation, 
education and many more. Military Order 39, for example, was issued on 27 August 
1967 in order to control and prohibit access to abandoned villages which were 
declared closed zones to deter the remaining Syrian population from reaching these 
areas to claim rights to property or land there. This automatically disconnected the 
remaining Jawlanis from witnessing what happened to the other hundreds of villages 
and farms and claiming any rights to these areas, which were now declared as state 
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property. Hundreds of these villages were listed in the annex of the military order as 
destroyed.  
Political protest and mobilisation were strictly prohibited by Military Order 
49, on 6 September 1967. Military Order 70, issued on 10 November 1967 was 
created to protect nature areas, and declared these under state control and 
management. This military rule restricted access, criminalised any acts of vandalism 
and disruption in nature reserves, and prohibited the transport of any animals or 
plants from its borders. Interestingly, all the waterways were included in this 
categorisation: Banias River, Masada forests, the Jordan estuary into Lake Tiberias, 
Hermon mountain lowlands, Wadi Al Fajar, Tal Abu Nada, Al Zaki and Musa’diyeh 
(Bteeha valley), Birket Ram, Wadi Daboura, and the forests between Jraba and 
Yahudiya were all now under military state control. Interestingly for our case, Birket 
Ram, which lies between Majdal Shams and Mas’ada was placed under nature 
reserve categorisation, automatically restricting and limiting and later prohibiting 
local use of the lake as a source of drinking water for livestock, fishing, and use of 
water for irrigation of nearby apple orchards.  
In regard to water sources, the Israeli military commander established a permit 
system for carrying out all water works, consolidating the power to access and use 
water in the hands of the military governor. Military Order 291, issued in 1968, 
declared all pre-1967 land and water-related arrangements as invalid (Amnesty 
International, 2009), deeply impacting and distorting communal and local customary 
law deployed for decades by the local Arab population. Military Order 120, issued in 
1968, gave Israel the full rights to manage and oversee the water resources in the 
area, allowing military access to any area containing water works, even forcing the 
local population to fully cooperate with the military forces in identifying local water 
resources and sharing details regarding their quantity and quality (Keary, 2013). 
Military Order 120 of 1968 (see Figure 6.8) gave the Israeli state full rights to control 
and manage water resources in the Golan Heights, even compelling the local 
population to fully cooperate with the military forces in identifying and declaring any 
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local water resources, including wells (ibid).56F 56 Mekorot officials also attempted to 
impose the military orders on the use of the springs, justifying this as more efficient 
and developed, which the Jawlanis refused to accept (as discussed in section 7.1).   
                                                          
56 Following the annexation in 1981, Israeli civil law was enacted in the Heights, allowing the Israeli state to 
enforce its national water law of 1959 and declare any new Arab water infrastructure as illegal. Access and use 
of Ram Lake was therefore prohibited by law, and fell under the full control of Mekorot, the Israeli national water 
company from the late 1970s. 
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Figure 6.8 Military order 120 in Arabic and Hebrew regarding water resources 
issued by Israeli ‘Defence’ Forces, prohibiting any water abstraction, transport or 
use without governor approval (IDF, 1968) 
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As Ram (2013) describes, a surge of experts, from hydrologists, agronomists 
to archaeologists and civil engineers, were tasked by the government to assess and 
study the potential of the Golan as an open terrain for development and planning. 
The task of governing the scant population that remained made the occupation of 
the Golan Heights seem ‘subtle’ and less invasive – a task led by “apolitical, 
professional and scientific groups” (Ram, 2015, p.83) through a process Ram 
identifies as domestication.  
The influx of hydrologists of Tahal and Mekorot into the Golan, studying the 
topography, hydrogeology, overground and underground water potential resulted in 
extensive surveys of the sources of the Golan and the potential for its utilisation and 
settlement development. Reports presenting geological and hydrological maps 
including those for precipitation, drainage basins, springs and location of pumping 
structures were being developed in an effort to plan a new territory of control, as 
seen below. In their survey of the use of water by the remaining local population 
after the occupation, Tahal frames local water use as primitive and negligible (ISA, 
1969, translated from Hebrew),  
The first thing that is visible for the viewer is the fact that the water 
resources are hardly developed, neither by the residents of the 
towns and the villages nor by the Syrian government. The abundant 
springs were only partly diverted for irrigation and even that was 
done in a primitive way where the water infiltrates and evaporates. 
The irrigated plots on a large scale are found only in the Sa'ar river 
valley (near Majdal Shams) and Bteiha in the south-centre of the 
Kinneret.  
 
Due to the centrality of the Golan Heights to the state hydro-imaginary, water 
professionals approached the water sources gained after the occupation as a familiar 
resource, and a continuation of the region’s water sources which were now required 
to be fully utilised. The national framing of water articulated by the Israeli water 
professionals, resonated with earlier attempts in the 1950s (described in section 1.4), 
to frame water as a national resource, downplaying its regional and transboundary 
character. The Israeli water policy was therefore to maximise the utilisation of the 
water sources of the oGH and fully integrate it into the state’s centralised water 
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infrastructure. As a report published in March 1968 – titled Water Resources in the 
New Territories written by Yoav Harpaz from Tahal – shows, the hydrological and 
political significance of the occupation of strategic areas within the Jordan River Basin 
furthered the attainment of the Israeli vision of water utilisation and development of 
the JRB. This quest for resource control was therefore not a consequential product 
of a wider political and warfare gain, but part and parcel of it (ISA 1969, translated 
from Hebrew): 
The additional territories were not foreign to us, on the contrary, 
we knew a lot about the natural resources of the neighbouring 
region, even those that were in the not so distant past under a 
unified administration with Israel especially because they are the 
continuation of the hydrological environment of our land. In the 
previous years, we worked hard to study the geology, hydrology 
and climatology of our neighbours not because of scientific curiosity 
or because of political issues, but specifically to plan properly the 
development and utilisation of our water resources. 
…From a hydrological point of view, it’s not possible to divide the 
region like the borders were divided. The water resources in the 
new territories are interrelated and integrated to those in the state 
of Israel. The very existence of the sources and their renewal are the 
result of the physical structure and the climatic conditions 
prevailing in the wider country and beyond.  
 
As early as December 1969, the Hydrological Service of Israel (HSI) carried out 
an inventory of all springs in the Golan Heights and the wadis; 56 springs were 
identified, with their flow average (lt/sec) and capacity, in addition to identifying 
another 23 Wadis (ISA, 1980). These recordings were monitored from 1970 to 1980 
on a monthly basis to estimate the hydrological potential of the springs and wadis 
and plan accordingly to ensure the development plans were realised.57F 57 
As for Birket Ram, Tahal and Mekorot companies carried out extensive studies, 
reports and assessments. The first was a hydrological survey in December 1969 (see 
ISA, 1973a).  Birket Ram, the largest natural freshwater body, became the ideal site 
                                                          
57 As Dafny et al. (2003, p.142) show in their hydrological study of the Golan aquifer, there are over 200 springs 
(most small and seasonal).  
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of regulation and storage of water. Mekorot began planning the diversion of all wadis 
and springs, so that flood flows (which used to flow down Wadis into Lake Tiberias) 
could be captured and stored for the irrigated agriculture and development works in 
the settlements. In 1970, Tahal published a plan to construct a pumping station at 
Birket Ram, considered how much water could be pumped into the lake, and what 
pipelines and pumps would be required to take water southward towards central and 
south Golan settlements (see ISA, 1973b) (see Figure 6.9 below). In 1973, a plan was 
further developed to pump Birket Ram’s water southward (see ISA, 1973c). 
Eventually, those plans intended to pump water from Birket Ram and store it in 
artificial lakes to be developed soon after in 1975 (ISA, 1975). To that extent, much 
of Tahal’s work focused on the water provision for the south and central parts of the 
Golan, which was where many of the settlements were being constructed. However, 
the northern part of the Golan (where the Syrian villages remained) was also a site 
of water exploration and confiscation. The surveying of all water resources in the 
Golan was articulated in such a way to ensure the utilisation of that water on the 
ground for the benefit of the newly constructed and planned settlements.   
As can be seen from Figure 6.10, the established water network was essentially 
carrying out two jobs: first, the diversion of the Sa’ar river flood water to Birket Ram, 
increasing its capacity; and second its construction as a site of water regulation and 
storage. The plan, mentioned above, has been realised and a water network (in blue) 
pumps water from Birket Ram towards the settlements in the centre of the Golan, 
like Merom Golan, Ein Zeivan, Al Rom and others. These, as seen on the map, 
established agricultural plots (highlighted in green borders) and were therefore in 
need for potable and irrigation water.  
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Figure 6.9 proposed plan to pump water from Birket Ram to the settlements (Tahal 
Report 1970 from ISA,1973b) 
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Figure 6.10 Map showing the existing pipelines (In blue) transporting water away 
from Birket Ram towards the settlements in the centre of the  Golan (ISA, 1975) 
 
Maps from these multiple reports are very indicative of the desire for a form of 
legibility and colonial re-configuration of territories and landscapes, as they were 
maps that “when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they 
depicted to be remade” (Scott, 1998, p, 3).  Maps of the hydrological and 
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hydrogeological potential of the oGH followed this pattern of enabling a settler 
colonial geography and reality, making invisible the existing indigenous arrangement. 
Instead they imagined a standardised and calculated spatial arrangement of 
constructed and planned reservoirs (Figure 6.11 and 6.12), and the established and 
planned water networks in the Golan showing existing agricultural lands (in green), 
mainly in the centre and south, and disregarded water and land use and needs in the 
north where the remaining Syrian villages are (ISA, 1975).  
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Figure 6.11 Map of the basins of the oGH (ISA, 1975) 
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Figure 6.12 Map showing planned and constructed reservoirs (in black) capturing 
flood water for planned agricultural sites (in orange) (ISA, 1975) 
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For the Jawlani agrarian communities, the state’s control over their physical 
means of production (land and water) was devastating especially as accompanied by 
the extensive dispossession and destruction of their society. While the Jawlani 
communities were highly self-sufficient, they still relied economically on marketing 
their products regionally. Under the occupation, the marketing centres moved 
abruptly from Quneitra and Damascus to Tel Aviv and Haifa. While the Jawlanis 
remained under military rule that restricted their movement and their agricultural 
product marketing and transport was also placed under military control. Military 
Order 32, of 18 August 1967, stipulated regulations regarding movement of 
merchandise and stated clearly that any merchandise brought in and out of the 
closed area (the Golan Heights) required a permit from the Military Governor. 
Military Order 82, issued on the 5 December 1967, regarding the transport of 
agricultural products, also restricted any transport of agricultural products outside of 
the Golan Heights unless a permit was issued. 
The Jawlani farmer found himself at the heart of the Israeli agricultural 
marketing mechanism and enslaved to its rules and regulations. Officially excluded 
from the means of production, land and natural resources through military orders 
and control, the region was forcibly integrated into a Jewish-Israeli economy. The 
main market was now a monopolistic Israeli one, but initially one open to Jawlani 
apples. At first, the Jawlani farmer economically benefited from an open and 
demand-hungry Israeli market for its unique product: the apples. By the 1960s, the 
apple trees which had been planted in the first Hajmeh in the 1950s were now fully 
mature and at the peak of productivity, especially as the farmers had acquired skills 
in maintaining and enhancing the productivity of the apple trees.  
The Israeli state company, Tnuva was a monopoly company for agriculture 
(and later solely dairy) production and marketing. It became the sole marketing 
mechanism for the Jawlani products to the Israeli markets. Faced with the above-
mentioned restrictive measures, Tnuva representatives entered the Golan without 
the needed permits (under Military Order 32, 1967), set the prices for the produce 
and were responsible for its transport and marketing in Israeli markets. While the 
price was set by this state monopoly, the Jawlanis were selling their produce at a very 
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competitive price, due to the uniqueness of their produce, the demand for it in the 
Israeli market, and because Israeli purchasing power was higher than that of Syrians. 
The farmers recall ‘golden times’ where they were economically prospering because 
of their apple produce:  
After 1967, we reached the peak of our apple production. The war 
happened in June and the first apple season under occupation was 
instantly taken over by Tnuva. It was the only company responsible 
for marketing. They entered al basateen (the orchards) and set a 
price for apples. People were still in shock and disbelief that in six 
days the Arabs lost without fight in the Golan Heights. We were 
totally disconnected from the Syrian state. Tnuva hired a few 
people who will be the direct contact with the farmers and 
appointed a director to oversee the basateen. They provided 
foldable wooden baskets joined by cables for us to fill the apples in. 
In the Galilee, the apples were not as popular yet. There was a huge 
deficit in apples at that time and that year [1967] the apples were 
sold with unbelievable prices. We picked, packaged and delivered 
then we got paid…in Israeli Liras. (Interview with Nazih Abu Jabal, 
Majdal Shams, 7 September 2017)  
 
One of the main open souks was the souk of Birket Ram (See Figure 6.13), in 
the vicinity of the lake. The souk existed before the occupation, where many of the 
neighbouring villages used to come to shop for wool, food staples, vegetables and 
fruits and exchange local products between the villagers, Bedouins and Palestinian 
refugees of 1948 (who settled in the Golan Heights before being expelled again in 
1967). The souk survived until 1969-70, where it became a weekly market where the 
Israelis used to come to visit the Golan and buy fresh produce: apples, cheese, 
yoghurt and other staples from the Jawlanis.  
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Figure 6.13 Jawlani farmers presenting their apple produce to Israeli settlers and 
buyers at Souk Birket Ram, 1968 (Government Press Office, Bruner Ilan, 01 
November, 1967) 
 
These specific events were an emblem for a larger transformation of Jawlani 
agricultural practices. The military orders established a governing mechanism over 
all aspects of life, placing control and responsibility for resource management and 
the indigenous population in the hands of the state, as mentioned above. 
Concurrently, and due to the limited employment opportunities in the four villages, 
the Jawlanis sought jobs in the Israeli sector, mainly in construction and services, and 
as agricultural labour in the Israeli settlements and in Israel proper. However, facts 
on the ground were changing at a fast pace outside of the tranquil and quiet front of 
the Druze villages, where Israeli planners and government officials were examining 
the Jawlani agricultural livelihoods closely.  
 
6.2.3 Exclusion through planning: WZO development plans and Mey 
Golan  
 
With the settler-colonial conquest of the Golan Heights, the Israeli state and 
its subsidiary aides, the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the Jewish Agency (AJ), 
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were establishing development plans to transform the region into a haven for 
development, technology and economic development.58F 58 This focus of the state was 
evident through the publishing of multiple plans to develop the Golan, named The 
WZO development plans, which were developed on a yearly basis. To understand 
how Jewish Israeli settlement planning materialises, it’s important to highlight the 
role of the Israeli state and non-government organisations which funded and led 
decades of settlement activities even prior to the creation of the state of Israel. As 
Davis explains (1983, pp.21-22): 
Generally, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Jewish Agency are 
charged with the development of Israeli-Jewish settlements and 
colonisation projects in pre-1967 Israel territories, as well as 
territories annexed to Israel since 1967… The World Zionist 
Organisation Settlement Division, on the other hand, operates in 
the post-1967 Israeli occupied territories that have not been 
officially annexed, and are thus referred to in official Israeli 
terminology as the “administered territories”.  
 
The development planners were preoccupied with three pillars to develop 
Jewish settlement in the region: agriculture, tourism and industry. Interestingly, 
plans were developed on a yearly or 2-yearly basis, re-evaluating their 
accomplishment and addressing any shortcomings of their previous plans (see Table 
6.1 below). Population expansion, for example, was one of those issues and the WZO 
has failed to meet the population increase it envisioned in the Golan Heights, even 
to this day. The earliest plan in 1967, developed by Uzi Gador, envisioned 20 Israeli 
settlements in 15 years, with a population forecast of 55,000 to 60,000. However, as 
the development plans reveal in 1975, for example, the population of the Jewish 
settlements were a mere 2,000 (while the Druze population rose to 8,900). Even 
                                                          
58 WZO works in occupied territories while the Jewish Agency, for fear of losing its charitable status, does not 
operate in occupied territories but only in Israel proper and annexed areas. The WZO’s settlement division serves 
as the government’s construction arm in rural settlements. Sources of funding of the settlement investment are 
raised through fundraising from Jewish communities around the world. The WZO thus became the arm of the 
government in constructing settlements in the West Bank and the Golan Heights. 
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today, the estimated population of the oGH comprises 48,000 people, 25,000 of 
whom are Syrians and 23,000 Israeli settlers (Al-Marsad, 2017).  
The settler colonial imaginary of the Golan Heights as a pristine and open 
plateau was evident in these plans. The framing of the Golan as pristine and 
uninhibited and ready for Jewish development and settlement was clearly expressed 
in those plans (WZO 1967, 3 in Davis, 1983, 23):  
We have before us a region that is cut to measure…and in which 
anything can be grown, but whose relative advantage is in the 
growing of crops that are not conventional in Israel, or whose 
cultivation in Israel is far from meeting needs. 
 
The 1975 WZO plan, referring to cultivable land, identifies (as is the case with 
the previous plans) 150,000 dunums with 50,000 dunums under the ownership of 
the Jawlanis. However, until 1975, the Jewish settlements were only able to cultivate 
50,000 out of the remaining 100,000 dunums of cultivable land exclusively available 
to them. The cultivable area of the Jawlanis, however, was limited in its capability to 
expand and the plans framed development as exclusively Jewish, therefore excluding 
the Druze villages from plans of development and expansion of their land use beyond 
the villages’ borders. The exclusion from land and agricultural expansion, in addition 
to water limitations, was evident in the comparative table presented in the WZO Plan 
of 1974, which lists settlements and Druze village agricultural activities and 
illuminates the stark differences in water quotas. Up until that year, the water 
‘provided’ for the Druze villages was from already existing springs irrigating Al Marj, 
and a minor provision of water for Buq’atha (in compensation for land confiscation 
to pass the Birket Ram pipeline). For the Israeli-Jewish settlements, 7.59 mcm were 
provided for the irrigation of 16,740 dunums. While the Druze villages were left with 
no irrigated field crops and around 15,200 dunums of orchards receiving 2.1 MCM, 
as Table 6.1 shows below.  
 
251 
 
Table 6.1 an overview of agricultural land use and water allocations in all Jewish 
settlements and Druze villages (WZO, 1974:19 in Davis, 1983) 
Settlement Field crops 
(dry farming) 
(dunums) 
Land 
allocation 
field cops 
(irrigated) 
(dunums) 
Orchards Water quotas 
1973/74 
(m3) 
Mevoh Hamah 3,100 2,000 100 1,300,000 
Kafar Haruv 1,400 1,200 200 200,000 
Afiq 2,600 1,400 300 300,000 
Gesher 1,400 100 - 80,000 
Giv’at Yo’av 3,540 1,280 610 900,000 
Ne’ot Golan 2,680 1,500 270 400,000 
Alei Ad 2,400 850 - 60,000 
Ramot 1,440 1,430 630 1,650,000 
Ramot 
Magshimim 
3,450 1,400 200 600,000 
Nov 2,000 1,100 200 350,000 
Merom Golan 2,375 2,320 325 800,000 
Ein Zivan 3,400 1,350 320 540,000 
El Rom 2,880 800 320 400,000 
Neveh Ativ - - 200 10,000 
Senir - - 270 - 
Total Jewish 
Settlements 
32,665 16,740 3,945 7,590,000 
Buq’ata 10,000 - 4,700 300,000 
Mas’ada 6,000 - 700 250,000 
Ayn Qiniya 7,000 - 2,800 300,000 
Majd al-Shams 12,000 - 7,000 1,250,000 
Total Druze 
Villages 
35,000 - 15,200 2,100,000 
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The demographic threat, which has been a consistent concern of Zionist 
planners and thinkers also manifested in the case of the Golan Heights. While the 
WZO 1975 report acknowledges that the state services (such as health, education, 
public transport, etc.) have raised the living standards of the Druze villages, the 
populations living there remained excluded from development plans. This resulted 
in what the report refers to as “the demographic factor” which prompted the 
attention of the Zionist planners. More Druze population without development plans 
in their villages on the one hand meant a supply of cheap seasonal labour for the 
agricultural and industrial economies in the settlement after being “trained and... 
properly guided and directed” (WZO, 1975, 20, cited in Davis, 1983, 38). On the other 
hand, “structural discrimination” – i.e. in the services and funds provided for the 
development of Jewish settlements (especially in the Northern region where the 
Druze villages are located) – was seen as a visible reality of ‘superiority’ of the 
settlement and the benefits given to its population. Therefore, the only recognition 
of the Jawlanis in this latest WZO plan was that the discriminatory effects of the 
development plans could create “open or veiled, active or passive hostility towards 
the Jewish settlement project” (ibid, 20). An approach for “Druze development for 
the Druze” thus has been suggested and later enforced to keep the native separate 
but highly dependent on the settler economy.  
Concurrently with the exclusionary development plans, water management 
and development were also being constructed as an exclusionary field to be 
exploited by the Israeli settlements, which were increasing their demands for water 
from Mekorot.  Since 1978, the water development and use operations were 
assigned to an Israeli water management cooperative company operating specifically 
in the oGH, called Mey Golan (Golan Water).59F 59 Funded by KKL-JNF, Mey Golan has 
played a pivotal role in re-configuring the territorial arrangements of water 
governance in the region, establishing themselves as water producers serving the 
political and economic interests of the Jewish settlements, including irrigation needs 
for the rapid expansion of agricultural production. One of the first of its kind, Mey 
                                                          
59 Mey Golan is also involved with wind turbine projects in the oGH, some with cooperation with an American 
energy company named AES (Keary, 2013) 
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Golan has broken the monopoly of Mekorot and the Israeli state over water 
resources development. A cooperative of 27 settlements in the oGH, the idea was to 
supply water for agriculture in the new settlements, especially around Lake Tiberias 
and Hamat Gader (Al-Himmeh). Lake Tiberias and Birket Ram were the main 
providers of water for the settlements in the 1970s, so Mekorot was still coordinating 
with the young cooperative, until those cooperatives began constructing their own 
floodwater reservoirs (dams). Mey Golan has developed these water infrastructures 
by building 16 stream reservoirs throughout the region, collecting floodwater flows, 
in addition to the drilling of several deep wells, capturing approximately 38 MCM 
every year (Mey Golan staff member, Author’s interview, 30 December 2016).  
Throughout the oGH, the re-configuration of landscapes, through state and 
companies’ infrastructures, has transformed the region into a site of resource 
exploration and exploitation influencing the Jawlani lived experience within their 
remaining pockets of existence. While most of the exclusionary development was 
concentrated in the centre and south of the Golan, the biophysical and political drives 
of water expropriation were experienced mostly in the geographical locations of the 
Jawlani villages. As Figure 6.14 shows, the groundwater drillings were mainly carried 
out in the centre and north of the Golan. For the Jawlanis this has not only 
consolidated a reality of inequality in utilising the water resources of the region but 
has also constructed water as an object of contestation and struggle. Birket Ram and 
the wells drilled and utilised in the vicinity of the springs have become infrastructures 
of difference and exclusion, diverting water as a social and collective artefact and 
elevating it into a national resource and an object enacting the misrecognition of the 
Jawlanis. By controlling the local water sources that have shaped and were shaped 
by livelihood practices and communal actions, the Israeli state has exercised acts of 
misrecognition against the indigenous ethno-geographic community and its only 
livelihood practice left after the occupation: that of farming, and specifically apple 
trees.  
254 
 
 
Figure 6.14 Map showing reservoirs and wells throughout the Golan (Dafny et al., 
2003) 
 
255 
 
The practices highlighted in this section illustrate the settler colonial 
expansion imperative, exercised through the control of land, water and labour. Not 
only do such ontological shifts transform landscapes into ones standardised and 
legible for the settler state, they also render the indigenous population and its 
remaining landscapes on the periphery, if not completely ignored and disregarded by 
the settler state. However, through the prism of ‘presence-absence’, Jawlanis are 
framed by these plans as invisible, justifying their absence from the plans. However, 
the state’s encroachment on the lived geographies of indigenous society also 
imposes a presence that, as will be seen in the next sections, confines and even 
comes in direct opposition to indigenous self-identification and livelihood practices. 
The state sees the Jawlanis and their practices as only relevant when required as 
labour, or when their products serve the economic aspiration of the state.   
  
6.2.4 Tightening the grip on Jawlani farming activities in the Golan 
 
In the years immediately following the occupation, when the agriculture 
activities of the Jawlanis, mainly their apple orchards, were at a high level of 
productivity and marketability, Israeli government officials were extensively studying 
their agriculture. A 1974 report entitled “The Druze Agriculture in the Golan Heights” 
(ISA, 1974), surveys the agricultural activities of the Druze and outlines guidelines to 
incorporate and advance these activities in accordance with the limitations set by 
Jewish-Israeli colonisation goals for the region. The report identifies the main 
agricultural activities of the Jawlanis as apple growing and livestock rearing. This is 
elaborated in the introduction (ISA, 1974, translated from Hebrew): 
The technical difficulty that we will face is to plan agriculture in the 
scope and composition of such activities that will enable their 
existence and development on the basis of the water resources and 
land to be made available to the farmers on the one hand, and the 
relative advantages that the region will receive on the other hand 
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While the report frames the 1967 war and ‘capture’ of the Golan as the 
commencement and ‘expansion’ of agriculture carried out by the Jawlanis, it also 
refers to an overburdening on the ‘means of production’, namely land and water 
(ibid): 
Since the six-day war, the residents of the Golan participated in the 
Israeli state economy outside of their villages. At the same time, an 
expansion in the agricultural activities was witnessed and utilised 
by the residents, which led to the exploitation of the means of 
production that have been available for the farmers of the region. 
The objective of this study is to offer a plan of effective utilisation 
of the means of production while considering the relative 
advantages of the region.  
 
The population of the Druze villages in 1974 was at 10,000 people. The 
agricultural land belonging to the farmers was estimated by the ministry to be 95,700 
dunum, 27,200 of which was suitable lands for cultivation while the rest included the 
built-up area of the villages, public parks and Mar’a (pasture) land. The report 
identifies Marj Al Ya’fouri as the main orchard area of the villages of Mas’ada and 
Majdal Shams and estimates the cultivated area at 2,000 dunums. The water sources, 
which were a main concern of the study, were identified as the springs of Sa’ar and 
Musheirfeh which were channelled through earth and cement structures to the 
fields. The report identifies water cisterns, which were developed by the local 
farmers, as another (minimal) source of water for irrigation.  
Ein Sa’ar is considered as an important source of irrigation in the Marj, where 
there are excess flows to orchards in Ein Qeinya, which are desperately needed in 
the summer (May-October) for irrigation of the apples. The report estimates that the 
flow during these months of Sa’ar is around 1.8 mcm.  Sa’ar river (see Figure 6.15 and 
6.16) flow increases tenfold in the winter, where Mekorot channels all the flood flow 
into Birket Ram. The summer flows are also shared with Ein Qinya, especially in the 
early summer months when the flow is highest. In Al Ya’fouri, 1800 dunums are 
identified as being irrigated by Sa’ar river. Musheirfeh spring irrigates around 200 
dunums, and its summer flow was 500,000 cubic meters. The report also identifies 
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1000 water cisterns with a depth of 6m holding around 70 cubic meters each, 
amounting to 30,000 cubic meters per year.  
 
Figure 6.15 Map showing Ras il Nabi’ (spring headwaters) that form Sa’ar River 
(source: Google Earth, 2018) 
Marj Al Ya’fouri 
Sa’ar River 
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Figure 6.16 Sa’ar river as it flows in the winter nearby apple orchards, which flows 
to Birket Ram. Farmers utilise the spring water in the dry months using pipelines 
(Jawlany website, 2014) 
 
Water scarcity, as is evident from this report, was being framed by the 
government as a reality to be dealt with in the Golan Heights. The timing of this 
framing is indicative of a more systematic approach to limit the agricultural 
development of the Druze while boosting settlement enterprises. According to the 
report, a simple demand and availability chart was presented to justify the 
government’s approach towards agriculture in the Druze area. In these simple 
diagrams (Tables 6.2 and 6.3), which focus on a sub-regional water availability and 
demand, it was deemed that since no additional water sources were available, 
agricultural activities in the apple orchards belonging to the Druze have little 
possibility of being provided with any additional water.  While the existing sources of 
water provided 8 mcm annually and the existing demand for water was estimated at 
8 mcm, the report deduced that the water was already scarce in the northern Golan, 
259 
 
and any additional water extraction would produce a condition of heightened 
scarcity, justifying therefore the ministry’s decision to introduce water saving 
measures, and to prohibit any additional water ‘allocations’ to the Druze. However, 
the Ministry was not allocating the 2 mcm already utilised by the Jawlani, as these 
were locally used before the occupation. This framing of water supply was part of the 
state’s logic of controlling and allocating water as the sole water provider. Identifying 
the Jawlanis’ efforts of land reclamation and the planting of apple orchards in rain-
fed lands, ‘where the water of the springs do not reach’, the lack of any unexploited 
water resources justified the refusal to consider providing more water to the Druze 
farmers.  
Table 6.2 Sources of water in the Northern Golan (adapted from MoA data in ISA, 
1974) 
Source of water Availability of water for Northern 
Golan sub-region 
Quneitra dam (including Birket 
Ram plant) 
2.0 mcm/year 
Birket Ram 3.0 mcm/year 
Wells (still under investigation) 1.0 mcm/year 
Ya’fouri springs 2.0 mcm/year 
 
Table 6.3 Demand vs. Water availability in the Northern Golan sub-region (ISA, 
1974) 
Users Water Demand for 
Northern Golan 
Merom Golan, Al Rom, Ein Zeivan (Israeli 
settlements) 
4.5 mcm/year 
Ramat Shalom, Army and other uses 1.0 mcm/year 
Druze water use from the Israeli water 
system (drinking water for the villages and 
irrigation water for Buq’atha) 
0.5 mcm/year 
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Druze in Ya’fouri Valley 2.0 mcm/year 
 
While the report highlights the superior quality of the Druze apple produce 
and its efficient processing in Al Ya’fouri, in addition to the economic advantage to 
the Druze farmers, it finds the Al Marj irrigation scheme “primitive” by consuming 
excess water that could otherwise be saved either for irrigating new plots or to be 
part of the Birket Ram plant and storage (which at that time all went to the 
settlements). The possibilities for agriculture were therefore framed in terms of 
enhancing efficiency of water use, with demonstration sites proposed for a number 
of selected Druze farmers to encourage them and others to change their irrigation 
methods.  
Considering all of those conditions, especially that there is no water surplus 
in the oGH, the policy that the ministry recommended was the following (ISA, 1974):  
Since the apples of the Druze in the Golan Heights are marketed in 
Israel, it seems that at this stage there is no place to encourage new 
apple orchards for the Druze farmers. Until today, there is no 
administrative prohibition/control over apple orchards and it is 
proposed at this stage to prevent any financial support in the form 
of loans, grants and water provision (except for training) especially 
for new orchards. Providing water to the young orchards (now 
grown as rainfed) will double the yield of these orchards and 
provide incentive for the farmers to continue growing orchards in 
rain-fed lands and it is assumed that in the future water will be 
provided to these lands as well.  
 
The state survey of the Druze agriculture was an attempt to include all 
agricultural works carried out in the Druze villages within its centralised Fruit Council 
Law of 1973, to be monitored, managed and controlled by the state, as with apple 
orchards and other fruit products inside Israel. While the report concludes with 
proposals to “develop” the agricultural sector in the Druze villages by introducing 
new crops (such as cherry, grapes) and water saving techniques, the inclusion of 
Druze agriculture under the Israeli Fruit Council Law enacts a legal-symbolic 
colonization and dependence: it establishes “administrative prohibition” and other 
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state controls over the production of apples by Druze farmers, making space for 
World Zionist Organization plans to expand apple orchards, and other crops, in the 
newly established Jewish settlements of the Golan Heights.  
A quick glance at WZO 1975 in parallel with the Ministry of Agriculture plan 
also clearly exposes why such measures of control over the apple growing were 
considered a priority by the Israeli state. Apple produce until the early 1970s was still 
considered a unique product which the Jawlanis produced and which was in demand 
in the Israeli market. However, the Israeli settlements were undergoing intensive 
investments to develop agricultural and industrial economies. As seen in Table 6.1, 
in 1975, the land planted with orchards in all Israeli Jewish settlements amounted to 
3,945 dunums. In the Druze villages, on the other hand, the apple orchards covered 
15,200 dunums. The competition over production of apples and other fruit trees was 
therefore at its peak during those years, as Druze farmers were increasing the 
orchards on reclaimed land, while the settlement orchards were also establishing 
themselves as producers of this lucrative crop. Predicting a surplus in apple 
production in Israel (in the settlements of the Golan in addition to those in the Galilee 
and Hula Valley), and considering that the apple orchards there already fall under the 
Fruit Council Law of 1973, the report recommends imposing that law on the Druze 
farmers in order to control and maintain the status quo in terms of area of apple 
orchards and to facilitate and guide the production of other types of crops and trees.  
To further enhance its grip on apple growing and to take advantage of the 
military rule that was still imposed on the Druze villages, the Israeli army issued a 
military order No. 316 in 1976 highlighting regulations regarding apple tree saplings 
(see Figure 6.17). The military order stipulates that any new apple tree requires a 
permit. This was published in a rather ‘late’ military order in 1976, 9 years after the 
occupation. The articles prohibited the planting of more than 5 apple trees in the 
vicinity of individual homes for household consumption. A permit application has to 
be submitted in Hebrew in five copies to different government offices with relevant 
documentation. The military order prohibits the planting of any new apple sapling 
without this permit being issued by the military governor after the approval of the 
five different bodies. The permit was also valid for twelve months and would require 
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renewing. However, this military order specifically was a failed attempt to control the 
reclamation of land by the Jawlanis and the planting of these lands with apples. 
According to testimonies from the farmers who witnessed those times, this military 
order failed completely as farmers continued their efforts in land reclamation and 
were devising plans to provide water sources to irrigate their new fields. The timing 
of the military order, just two years after the report on Druze agriculture is indicative 
of a strict push to control, limit and ‘de-develop’ the agricultural activities of apple 
farming.   
The military-civilian mixture (Newman, 1989b) of Israeli presence in the lived 
geographies of the Jawlanis maintained a grip over land, water and agricultural use 
through military orders and rules while simultaneously implementing civilian 
processes to normalise the Israeli occupation there. This presence clearly re-
configured the lived practices and livelihoods of the Jawlanis and placed them as 
minority subjects against a resourceful and powerful settlement enterprise which not 
only exists separately but has created dependencies which the Jawlanis could not 
detach themselves from.  
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Figure 6.17 Military order 316 regarding organising fruit tree growing (IDF, 1976) 
 
The need to curb water use in the Jawlani villages was driven by a state-
sanctioned narrative of regional water scarcity. The justification presented in the 
Ministry of Agriculture report, that “there isn’t enough water for everybody”, mirrors 
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the debate in the early years of Israel’s creation between the proponents and 
opponents of the development of a water sector based on a scarcity/abundance 
logic. Here in the Golan Heights, this is no longer a debate but an imposition of a 
narrative that separates and excludes non-Jews from water and land development. 
This narrative was projected onto the Jawlani farmers in order to curb their efforts 
to claim rights to land and water. As Davis and co-authors state, local water scarcity 
was rectified through expensive transfers of water through pipes and pumps. By 
1978, most of the water needed for the judaisation of the Golan was being ‘imported’ 
from Lake Tiberias (Davis et al., 1980, p.27). While the state’s focus on local-scale 
availability was imposed on the Jawlanis, the water from Birket Ram was being 
channelled and pumped to the central and southern Golan Heights, and therefore 
exempted from limitations on water use due to ‘local availability’ and ‘scarcity’. While 
it focused on that narrative in the Northern sub-region of the Golan, its infrastructure 
and assemblages of pipelines, pumps and conduits refute these claims of working 
within the limits of nature, so to speak (see Figure 6.18 and 6.19). The act of 
channelling water and transporting it from the North to the South of the Golan, or 
from Lake Tiberias to its settlements there are clear examples of double standards. 
Arab farmers need to work within the limits of nature (in addition to the control over 
resources of the state) while Jewish farmers receive their water needs through both 
material and social infrastructure that overcomes economic and biophysical 
conditions. Rather than economic rationality, the Israeli settlements of the Golan 
Heights represented what Wolf (1995, p.113) refers to as a “striking example of water 
“diseconomy””. The settlements’ water was coming mostly (80% of 50 mcm) from 
Lake Tiberias, which required pumping and extensive energy costs. In an economic 
rationality sense, internalising the cost of energy to pump water to their locations 
meant that their crops were highly overpriced and therefore not competitive in the 
market. Here is where Wolf describes the settlements not only as agricultural 
communities but rather as outposts, serving political and security means beyond 
their agricultural viability.  
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Figure 6.18 Mekorot’s pumping station on Birket Ram (Author’s picture, December 
2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.19 Mekorot’s pipelines pumping water from the Lake to Israeli settlements 
(Al-Marsad, n.d.) 
 
Therefore, the Jawlanis were engaged in a highly contested and securitised 
endeavour, which situated their agricultural practices and need for water against 
state objectives of security and defence. However, as will be seen in Chapter 7, there 
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were opportunities to counter these dominant narratives of (scarcity for non-
Jews/abundance for Jews), as exemplified in the struggles the Jawlanis undertook. 
The following section will examine how Israeli rule attempted to erase the Syrian 
identity of the Jawlanis. 
 
6.2.5 Forced citizenship and the annexation of the oGH (1981-1990)  
 
The Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights was an inevitable move, as the official 
discourse maintained the region as an inseparable part of the country, due to its 
security importance and justified by biblical claims over the territory (Harris, 1978; 
Yishai, 1985). While such claims were made for Labour and Likud (the right-wing 
party), it wasn’t until the late 1970s, when the Likud party came to power that such 
aspiration began being put forward in the Knesset as bill proposals. Within the oGH, 
the experience of the ‘tightening of the grip’ on the remaining populations was 
already being felt, as shown in the preceding section. The right-wing government was 
slowly infiltrating into the everyday lives and practices of the Jawlani communities, 
imposing not only the settler colonial geographies on them, but extending that to the 
imposition of citizenship and identities (Mara’i and Halabi, 1992). On December 14 
1981, the Israeli government decided to extend Israeli law to the oGH, as a de-facto 
annexation (similar to that which took place in East Jerusalem). The misrecognition 
characterising the annexation law involved the imposition of Israeli citizenship on the 
remaining Jawlani populations, which sparked outrage and protest (discussed in 
Chapter 7). The Israeli army distributed leaflets on the 10th of March 1982 in the 
Jawlani villages, announcing the end of the military occupation and the enforcement 
of civilian law through annexation. It stipulated that the military identity cards would 
expire by the end of March and that individuals were required to have a civilian Israeli 
ID, to be distributed by the army during a curfew on the villages (see Figure 6.20).  
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Figure 6.20 Israeli army announcement of the expiry of the identification cards given 
after 1967 and its replacement with a civil Israeli identity card (ISA, 1982) 
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With the unilateral decision of Israel to annex the Golan Heights in 1981, 
including its Syrian Arab communities, Israeli policymakers envisioned citizenship as 
a tool to normalise the status of the territory and its inhabitants. With the remaining 
Syrian population in the occupied Golan Heights being predominantly Druze, Israel 
systematically pushed for the recognition of this ethno-geographic community as 
non-Arab, forcing the same policy of “Druzeness” that it has employed for the Druze 
who lived in Palestine until 1948, who have become Israeli citizens (Hajjar, 1996; 
Kaufman, 2016; Ram, 2015; Wessels, 2015). From the start of statehood, Israel 
promulgated a distinctive Druze identity as a non-Jewish minority; for example, 
designing tailored educational curricula and enforcing army conscription for the 
Israeli Druze. These moves mirrored, albeit more successfully, the political efforts 
employed by the French in their Syrian mandate (1923-1943) to separate the Druze 
from the wider Arab population; though Druze historiography, even in Israel, has 
challenged the notion that the Druze are non-Arab (Provence, 2005, 15-17). 
Furthermore, the Druze citizens of Israel retain socio-ethnic ties with fellow Druze in 
Lebanon and Syria: all face citizenship duties and other domestic obligations which 
sometimes clash with their ethno-communal loyalties and practices, e.g. restrictions 
on cross-border travel and the customary usage of natural resources (Kaufman, 2016; 
Mason and Khawlie, 2016).  
The annexation law and the enforcement of Israeli citizenship came in a critical 
time following the arrest of the political activists, community leaders and religious 
figures who were working for the Syrian government and protesting the Israeli 
occupation. This political repression included the expulsion of teachers from schools 
because of their anti-Israel sentiment and support for Syria (Mara’i and Halabi, 1992, 
Qasem, 1984, Majalli, 1982). On the 2 September 1981, and following these arrests 
and the annexation law announcement, a general strike was organised by the 
Jawlanis to include 3,500 students, and a refusal to attend the Israeli-run schools. 
This prompted the military governor to send a letter (Figure 6.21) urging the parents 
not to succumb to external pressure and jeopardise the future of the education of 
their children (ISA, 1982). 
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Figure 6.21 Military government pamphlet urging Jawlanis to send their children to 
schools, following a boycott of military government institutions in protest to the 
annexation law (ISA, 1982) 
 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The deracination of the Jawlani ethno-geography has been a continuous military-
bureaucratic process, punctuated by episodes of violent dispossession. Israel quickly 
moved to affect the physical appropriation of the land and prevent the return of any 
Syrians forcibly moved by the conflict. Through the military orders reviewed in 
section 6.2, these orders shrank the land base of the Arab agricultural economy, as 
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Israel created extensive zones for Jewish settlement and rural investment – a state-
led strategy of accumulation by dispossession replicating that in the West Bank. 
During the first years of the occupation of the Golan Heights, Arab farmers responded 
by moving agriculture to hilly and mountainous areas still under their control, and 
actually profited from sales to the Israeli domestic market, but by the 1970s state 
subsidies and other support mechanisms for settlers and their rural cooperatives had 
established the growing dominance, and global competitiveness, of these 
agricultural businesses. With further encroachment on land and water, the remaining 
Syrian populations endured multi-layered processes of misrecognition through 
exclusion and uprooting. Not surprisingly, in the context of this enduring ethno-
geographic community, the systemic misrecognition of Jawlani agriculture as the sole 
remaining livelihood practice is central to the symbolic violence against the Druze 
executed by the occupying power.  
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Chapter 7:  Water struggles, apple orchards and everyday acts 
of protest and recognition in the occupied Golan Heights 
 
In the wake of the 1967 occupation and the effective de-territorialisation of the 
indigenous population of the Golan Heights, the five remaining Arab villages faced 
enormous pressure to keep their communities intact while also adapting to the new 
order of the occupation, which included immediate military control over their land 
and water resources. As this thesis seeks to move beyond the narratives of 
victimhood dominating settler colonial literature (as discussed in Chapter 2), this 
chapter will examine modes of resistance and protest carried out by the Jawlanis 
facing systematic misrecognition of their ethno-geographic existence in the oGH.  
To examine forms of collective action carried out by the farming communities, 
and their political effects on farming practices and land relations (my second research 
question), this chapter is divided into three main sections, detailing water struggles 
through the periods of Israeli occupation (1967-1981) and annexation (1981). The 
first section will examine how farming communities have responded to and 
protested Israeli policies during the years of military occupation and explore the 
political effects of such actions, which have re-configured the lived geographies of 
the remaining Syrian villages. The second section concerns the critical event of 
annexation in 1982 and its aftermath, which resulted in mass mobilisation and 
intensified struggles for recognition, which included an up-scaling of water struggles 
through claims to water infrastructure. The third section includes a reflection on 
those events and their implications on the lived geographies today, as farmers 
struggle to maintain their presence on the land and also the economic viability and 
marketability of their produce. With ongoing political instability in Syria, issues of 
identity and belonging re-surface again, highlighting for the Jawlani ethno-
geographic community its nationalistic dilemma of being outsiders and insiders at 
the same time. 
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7.1 Acts of resistance and protest (1967-1982) 
 
7.1.1 Water sources: military orders, protection of springs under threat  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the post-1967 contestation over water was 
heightened around the springs of Musheirfeh and Ras il Nabi’, both lying physically 
in the middle of the apple orchards of the Jawlani farmers. The Israeli military-civilian 
enforcement of its colonial geography necessitated the enforcement of the military 
law governing water. Both local waterbodies tell a story where the Jawlani resistance 
to state encroachment on water required both confrontation and negotiation with 
the state. While the two springs, in the context of the total water resources in the 
oGH, do not produce a significant yield (around 2 mcm per year), they became the 
site of Israeli attempts at control.   
The spring of Ras il Nabi’ was the source of water for irrigation for the farmers 
of Al Marj. This spring is located 300-400m from the ceasefire line of 1967, and 
converges into Sa’ar River (Figure 7.1), which has strong seasonal variation in flows. 
Before the occupation, the farmers began installing pipelines in their orchards as part 
of a plan to connect it to the spring source, Ras il Nabi’, and therefore ensure a 
controlled supply of water, especially in the dry months. After the 1967 war, the 
project was halted and eventually the spring was located in the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) zone.   
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Figure 7.1 Sa’ar River and its source, Ras il Nabi’ inside the UNFDO (source: Google 
Earth, 2018) 
 
After continuous pressure on the Israeli military governor, the Jawlanis finally 
managed to receive a permit to access the area and finalised the installation of the 
pipelines in 1984, constructing a reservoir and basic pipework infrastructure to divert 
the spring to the orchards. This arrangement is still valid today, where a group of 
Jawlani representatives are given access to the zone where the spring originates and 
carry out the maintenance needed (Interview with Nazih Abu Jabal, 7 September 
2017):  
There is natural gravity of the springs and no need for pumps. The 
spring therefore will generate the flow of water through the pipes. 
This spring originates in an area that became known as the 
demilitarised zone. After many rounds of negotiations with the 
military governor we were allowed to access the area to develop 
our irrigation system from the spring to our lands, just a simple dam 
to control the spring flow. This was in 1977-80. We had to apply for 
permits in advance to go there annually and carry out any 
maintenance needed. We still go every year until today.  
 
UNFDO 
zone 
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As shown earlier in chapter 6, Israeli groundwater drilling and exploration was 
concentrated in the centre and north of the oGH (Dafny et al., 2003): one in an area 
known as Sukarra, two in the Musheirfeh area and one near Al Ya’fouri shrine and 
one near Birket Ram. These boreholes were the only ones developed which 
penetrated the regional aquifer until the late 1970s, drilled at depths of more than 
200 meters. The wells were drilled in the Jawlanis’ lands, usually confiscated by force, 
and rarely offered access to the water. The first one to be drilled was near al 
Musheirfeh area, and the two springs of Musheirfeh and Ras il Nabi’ were 
transformed by the drilling of the wells nearby. Both springs dwindled. As the spring 
water was critical to the irrigation of a large area of orchards, the farmers raised their 
concerns to Mekorot, through legal means. The claim of the Jawlanis was that in case 
of drying of the springs, Mekorot was obliged to provide water to compensate for 
the farmers’ loss. Eventually, an agreement was reached in the 1970s with Mekorot, 
obliging it to provide any quantity which is lost due to the abstractions from the 
wells.60F 60 Ironically, the Ministry of Agriculture report of 1974 (ISA, 1974) refers to this 
allocation but frames it as providing water to compensate for years of drought: 
In the previous year of drought, water was pumped from the well 
to Ein Musheirfeh to assist the farmers with their irrigation since 
due to the drought the flow of the springs reduced. 
 
One of the wells, Ram 1 in the Ya'fouri valley, was referred to in the report as 
necessary for pumping water to the Birket Ram plant, and according to the Ministry’s 
information ‘this drilling did not reduce the flow of the nearby springs’ (ISA, 1974).   
 
These early attempts by Mekorot to lay claim over the springs were 
vehemently rejected by the farmers who have relied on the springs for generations. 
                                                          
60 According to an interview with Nazih Abu Jabal, this agreement has been used as a legal tool to claim water 
rights until this day. As he’s one of the farmers of Al Musheirfeh area, he claims that in 2018., with the spring 
drying in the summer, farmers in the area began mobilising, meeting with Mekorot and sending complaints. They 
retrieved the old document signed by Mekorot as a proof that it will have to provide the water needed. 
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The developed systems of irrigation were considered part of the collective ownership 
of the springs by the farmers, who distributed the water according to their needs. 
Just like the symbolism attached to spring water in the Palestinian context (Kan’an, 
1922; Lemire, 2011; Qleibo, 2014), any denial of access to or control of the flows was 
received with indignation. The springs of Sa’ar and Musheirfeh, in addition to 
waterbodies like Birket Ram, also held similar cultural significance and importance 
for the Jawlanis. However, the Israeli hydro-hegemony at its localised scale managed 
through its infrastructures to penetrate and weaken the flows of the Jawlani springs, 
provoking confrontations over water access and demands for compensation for 
denial of access to local springs.  
 
7.1.2 ‘Reunion’ with fellow Palestinian and Druze – sharing the experience 
of living under occupation and military rule 
 
With the Israeli occupation in 1967, reunification of Arab families displaced was 
partially made possible as Palestinians inside Israel could communicate and visit 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, they could meet the Syrians 
of the oGH and also be reunited with communities they had been in close proximity 
to (cultural, political, economic, religious, family) before 1948. This ‘opening’ of the 
borders, or rather controlled access under Israel occupation, encouraged solidarity 
and collective mobilisation for those under military rule. The remaining population 
in the oGH could be in touch with their extended families and Druze spiritual leaders 
inside Israel, in Rameh and other Druze villages. Apart from the emotional and 
human-level bonding this produced, the Druze began sharing their concerns about 
how to deal with Israeli military rule, laws and regulations.  This is when collective 
community meetings used to take place between Palestinians inside Israel and their 
close friends in the oGH (Mara’i and Halabi, 1992). As one veteran farmer recalls 
(Interview with Nazih Abu Jabal, 7 September 2017): 
Their first advice was: take care and protect your land. Any land left 
barren and uncultivated is going to be confiscated by the state. 
Water, springs, wells are going to be state property. You have to be 
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strong and protect your land and water to preserve your existence. 
They shared with us that the Israeli state left them with no land and 
water. Be careful!, they said. 
 
With continued legal and practical advice from Palestinian citizens in Israel, the 
Jawlanis gained increased knowledge of how to deal with and tackle Israeli policies 
concerning land and water. Part of the advice given was regarding state forested 
land, which was under the threat of immediate confiscation. The Syrian government 
has forested certain areas in the north of the Golan, which therefore was not 
cultivated until 1967. One of these areas was known as al-Ballan – an area between 
Majdal Shams and Masada, near the Marj Lands. Being warned that this land, without 
the Jawlanis’ intervention, would be turned into settlements, the Palestinians inside 
Israel advised the Jawlanis to bring bulldozers and claim any state land or collectively 
owned lands and plant apple trees. While such action was expected to trigger state 
punishment and legal battles, they assured them that their consecutive use of the 
land for two years grants them legal rights as owners of that land and will ensure that 
they keep those lands in their private ownership.  
The concern over the little land still controlled by the Jawlanis prompted them to 
seek immediate action to reclaim any land which was abandoned or forested. As the 
Israeli government had already appropriated 95% of the land, the Jawlanis began 
their collective work to reclaim as much as possible of what remained. Another 
hajmeh ensued, as Nazih Abu Jabal recalls: 
Between 1968 and 1970, there was a hajmeh to reclaim land 
outside Marj al Ya’fouri: the area of al Khawareet, Al Ballan, Al 
Qate’, Al Hawakeer, the pomegranate orchards, Al Masna’ (the 
factory). It was an extraordinary effort of land reclamation…a 
strong hajmeh. The same year that land was reclaimed it was 
planted with apples and peaches.  
 
Interestingly, the Jawlani collective efforts of land protection and reclamation 
intersected with the economic conditions and realities of the times. In order to carry 
out such extensive land reclamation (which was economically costly and technically 
278 
 
challenging), machinery, funds, labour and plans were required. All these factors 
were available because of the economic engagements of the Jawlani with the Israeli 
economy – which was heavily in need of a workforce in the construction and 
agricultural sectors. To reclaim lands on hilly slopes, bulldozers were needed and 
Jawlanis involved in construction work inside Israel volunteered their machinery and 
time and people also began buying tractors for their personal use. Apple saplings, 
which were needed for proving continuous use of the land, were also brought in from 
nurseries in Israeli settlements where Jawlanis worked, especially around the drained 
and ‘reclaimed’ Huleh Valley, and from Palestinian merchants and farmers in the 
Galilee. The heavy reliance on apple production as an income generating crop before 
and after 1967 obliged the Jawlanis to plant apple varieties that were profitable and 
in demand by the Israeli market. Starking (Starking Delicious) apple variety was one 
such crop that was heavily planted, as its selling point is that it’s small and red, 
requiring less water than the larger Golden Delicious.  
The Israeli tolerance of such acts of land reclamation was due to the strategy 
of containing the Druze population and ensuring their loyalty to the Israeli state. 
Israel at that time was interested in the ‘druzification’ and ‘de-arabisation’ of the oGH 
Druze, similar to its strategy and tactics in dealing with the Druze of Israel, who have 
been considered historical allies of the Israeli state since 1948. They attempted to 
replicate what they had done with the Druze of Palestine, which was to create a 
distinct Druze culture and nationality, even imposing religious festivities on them that 
are separate from their Arab heritage (Hajjar, 2000; Kaufman, 2016; Kaufman, 2004; 
Nisan, 2010). The Israeli state treated all Druze as alike, as a non-Arab minority, and 
thus approached the oGH Druze with a carrot and stick policy to normalise their 
relationship with the state and ensure their loyalty to it. At the same time, Israeli 
policy making was focused on establishing settlements in the Golan Heights, 
particularly in the central and southern parts of the Golan. As a veteran Jawlani 
farmer recounts:  
At that time the Israeli state was preoccupied with other priorities: 
constructing roads, settlements, military posts. We were not in 
their radar… the colonial mind-set also prevailed that they were 
superior and that the locals would not do anything to develop 
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themselves. (Interview with Nazih Abu Jabal, Majdal Shams, 7 
September 2017).   
 
The settler colonial imperative of developing the Golan Heights, like the WZO 
development plans, can be seen as a reason for Israel not paying greater attention to 
these small acts of Arab land reclamation, in comparison to the Israeli state’s quest 
to develop settlements, farms, roads, water systems, and even a city in the oGH. 
However, the acts of reclamation, especially in Al Ballan, did not go unnoticed. These 
acts made visible the local and active existence of the indigenous population, which 
clashed with the Israeli policy of spatial confinement. After 1,000 dunums of land 
were reclaimed in al-Ballan, the Jawlanis began receiving warnings and eviction 
notices demanding they vacate the land or incur fines and penalties, as they were 
considered trespassers on state land. Eventually, the reclaimed lands were 
maintained under Jawlani control and ownership, managing to increase and expand 
their agricultural land as a singular case of success in land reclamation under Israeli 
occupation, which aimed to uproot and eliminate the indigenous ethno-geographic 
community. What the Jawlanis achieved through their tactics of resistance was to re-
root themselves in their colonised landscapes and waterscapes, making their ethno-
geographic connections visible and enduring. As Figure 7.2 and 7.3 shows61F 61 the 
transformations and re-configurations of livelihoods were not only impacting the 
Jawlanis themselves but also their practices on the ground, expanding apple growing 
as an act of resistance to settler colonial rule.  
                                                          
61 Year 1962 was chosen as a baseline year due to lack of satellite images available for 1967. 
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Figure 7.2 Landscapes of reclaimed land near Marj Al Ya’fouri (Author’s picture, 
August 2017) 
 
 
Figure 7.3 The Land Use Change in satellite images in 1962 and 2017, showing the 
expansion of Arab fruit crops (developed for the author by CNRS team, 2018) 
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7.2 Acts of resistance and protest (1982-1990s)  
 
7.2.1 Annexation, resistance and the general strike  
 
The annexation of the Golan Heights in 1982 was followed by a series of Israeli 
sanctions on the Druze population, including income tax rises, house arrests, water 
supply cuts, and restrictions on trade (of which apples were the main crop) and on 
freedom of movement (Al Batheesh,, 1986; Davis 1983; Qasem,, 1984). All of these 
sanctions would be eased, it was declared, if the Druze agreed to adopt Israeli 
identity cards and citizenship. Israeli attempts to delineate or isolate Druze identity 
as non-Syrian and non-Arab faced fierce opposition; but one neither representing a 
stable imagined community nor simply reproducing the secular narrative of Syrian 
nationhood. The call collectively to resist Israeli citizenship was first issued in 
November 1980 from the Druze spiritual leadership, after a mass meeting in the 
Majdal Shams khalwe (house of worship): this declaration threatened religious ex-
communication for any Druze taking Israeli citizenship, thereby explicitly redefining 
Druze identity as spiritually incompatible with Israeli citizenship (Kirrish 1992, 130). 
Following the mass meeting, a National Statement was issued in March 1981 
signed by Abna’ Al Jawlan Al Muhtal [The sons/people of the occupied Golan]. It 
proclaimed that the Israeli occupation’s continuous quest to encroach on the Druze 
“national characteristics and Syrian Arab nationality” will not be tolerated, 
highlighting the ancestral heritage of this nationality coupled with a pride in Arabic 
as a national language inseparable from their existence on the land. The statement 
also asserted that Syrian Arab nationality does not vanish, being transmitted from 
generation to generation: “Those who replace their nationality with an Israeli one 
are offending our collective dignity (Karameh), national honour (Sharaf), nationalistic 
belonging (Intima’) and our traditions” (Abna’ Al Jawlan Al Muhtal,, 1981, 1).  
The disintegration of a mixed society of villages, towns and farms, with multiple 
ethnicities and professions, and with different land use professions (herding, 
farming, dairy farms) impacted the remaining Jawlani population drastically. 
Confined spatially and deprived of formal self-identification as Syrian Arab, the 
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Jawlani found themselves alienated and increasingly identified as “Druze” (Firro, 
1988; Kirrish, 1992). The Jawlanis’ lived experience of non-violent opposition, 
including explicit embrace of the Palestinian idea of sumud, generated multiple, if 
sometimes competing, loyalties in which attachment or rootedness to land was the 
dominant marker. The practical experience of farming nurtures land-based 
attachments, and enacts sumud as a strategy of political resistance, constituted in 
part as a defensive reaction to systemic misrecognition. As Nazih Braik, an academic 
from Majdal Shams proclaimed (Skype, 30 December, 2016):  
We are a small community that remained. The liberation of land in 
the national sense is not our responsibility. Our responsibility is to 
protect our land, our belonging and our existence and to remain 
steadfast. When the annexation took place, we had to reconsider 
what can be done to persevere and remain. We established the 
cooperatives and started demanding water allocation within the 
legal framework of Israeli law. We did this to preserve and protect 
our existence and our livelihood. 
 
 In light of this reconfiguration of belonging, the Jawlanis embarked on 
communal resistance to the forced citizenship campaign that Israel began in the early 
1980s. It initially took the form of six months of strikes and direct clashes with Israeli 
security forces (Hajjar, 1996, p.3). This resulted in the issuing of Israeli travel 
documents to the inhabitants of the occupied Golan Heights, stating “undefined” 
under nationality as a punishment for refusing Israeli citizenship (Wessels, 2015a,b), 
and leaving the Jawlanis isolated in dealing with this denial of recognition. As one 
farmer explained: 
Our identity today is our steadfastness on the land. More so than 
our belonging to Syria, I feel this is what unifies us and brings us 
together. We, outside of our land and of the Golan, we have no 
identity. Even in our travel document, we are listed as undefined. 
(Focus group discussion, Majdal Shams, 2013)  
 
The events that led up to and followed the annexation, from refusal of Israeli 
citizenship, to the general strike were also followed by another Hajmeh on the land 
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to carry out land development and reclamation of rain-fed and rocky land, fearing 
land confiscation by the Israeli state of any undeveloped land. Since apples trees 
were the Jawlanis’ priority crop, the need for additional water sources also pushed 
Jawlani farmers to consider small-scale infrastructure construction, such as that of 
rainwater tanks to irrigate this water-intensive crop.  This attests that the Jawlani, 
now territorially confined, articulated their indigeneity as a separate ethno-
geographic community. Central to the formation of this distinct identity was the 
material and symbolic creation of a worked agricultural landscape as inseparable 
from its inhabitants’ identification with the Golan Heights. 
Land-based identification compensates being “the remainder of a society forcible 
displaced” under conditions of systemic misrecognition, as interlocuters met shared. 
While some of this coercive normalisation has been successfully institutionalized, as 
shall be seen further in this chapter, remaining on, and cultivating, the land is seen 
as effectively resisting the territorial uprooting of the Jawlani.  
 
In another National Statement issued in 1981 by the Druze leadership in the 
Golan Heights, the threatened “loss of our national citizenship” caused by the Israeli 
annexation was linked to escalating water appropriation through occupation, notably 
the “rape of our groundwater” by seizure of spring water (from Al Ya’fouri, Al 
Mushirfeh, and Ras Abu Sa’eed springs) and “theft” of water from Birket Ram to 
supply Jewish settlements in the Golan (Al Batheesh, 1987, p.39). As noted above, 
before the occupation, the lake was used by the local population for fishing, to 
irrigate crops and as drinking water for livestock. Infrastructural violence was also 
referred to in this National Statement, highlighting how Israeli military rule had 
halted a community water project to transport water to newly reclaimed agricultural 
land (National Statement, in Al Batheesh, 1987, p.39). The Druze National Statement 
treats the denial of indigenous water rights as misrecognition – as the state declares 
illegal the community-managed water systems, it undermines Jawlani identiy and 
autonomy.  
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Water became imbricated in larger re-configurations of the lived geographies 
in the oGH under the Israeli occupation in 1967, which confined and limited land and 
water access, established new rules of water use, and limited the agricultural 
practices of the remaining villages, in addition to consolidating settlements over 
more than 90% of the total area of the Golan. As the previous section shows, the 
‘activist stance’ (Mara’i and Halabi, 1992a, p.82) and resistance of the Jawlani to 
encroachment on their lived geographies solidified later in the 1970s, when 
annexation was looming as a serious consideration by the far-right Israeli 
government at the time. The Israeli occupation concentrated in the first decade on 
land use development and investment in settlement expansion while ‘neglecting’ or 
disregarding what happened in the Jawlani villages, as long as they remained passive. 
Therefore, the ‘presence-absence’ of the occupying power was a dynamic of settler 
colonial rule which influenced the realities and actions of the Jawlanis on the ground. 
While the state was present in its encroachment on the villages, confiscating land 
and planting minefields around the ceasefire line in Majdal Shams, in addition to its 
ordering of social, political and economic life through military orders, the Jawlanis 
nevertheless managed to maintain a sense of autonomy in their daily practices and 
internal affairs, considering themselves subjects of a temporary occupation which 
they were forced to deal with.  
Following the proposal of the annexation law by the right-wing government, 
the Jawlanis embarked on political mobilisations aimed at opposing acts of 
misrecognition embodied in the annexation law. The encroachment on everyday life 
was evident in the occupation’s linkage between granting Israeli citizenship and 
permits to travel, driving a car, accessing the apple orchards, obtaining basic services 
like water and electricity, and favouring those who cooperated with the state, by 
providing them with water quotas and low taxation. The military governor also began 
threatening the livelihoods of the Jawlanis by restricting their access to pasture land, 
destroying the constructed pools and filling them with rubble (Qasem, 1987).   
The six months strike that commenced on 15 February 1982 was a 
monumental event that impacted the lived geographies of the Jawlanis and re-
configured their relations with land and water. On 17 April 1982, at the height of the 
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strike, the Jawlanis went out to the streets to commemorate the 36th anniversary of 
the Evacuation Day,62F 62 known as Youm Al Jalaa’, and 6,000 of them marched towards 
the cease-fire fence. On that day, the Jawlanis also declared their commitment to 
sumud, to protecting their land and agricultural livelihoods. In a statement published 
that week they announced (Al-Ittihad, 1982):  
Land is the symbol of our sumud and our principal foundation to 
strengthen our existence and to continue our struggle to reach our 
human and national asprirations. The decision is to work in a 
collective and organised manner so that the production can be for 
the public good. This way we can continue with the strike.  
 
In response to the settler colonial strategy of accumulation by dispossession, 
the Jawlani intensified communal agricultural activities to counter expropriation of 
their land and water resources. As well as challenging material dispossession, this 
collective project generated a land-based resistance identity countering the symbolic 
violence of misrecognition. Realising the imminent threat to the hilly grazing lands 
used for herding, the Jawlani moved substantial amounts of soil to these areas, 
producing a new agricultural terrain. The construction of cylindrical metal tanks to 
catch rainwater was employed by the Jawlani as a low-cost, practical option to 
increase the availability of water for irrigation. Hundreds of such tanks, holding from 
300 to 1,000 cubic meters of water, were built mainly in the mid-1980s in defiance 
of Israeli water regulations. For one veteran farmer, this “reservoir and agricultural 
boom” was motivated above all by the conviction “that this land is ours, and we will 
not abandon it. If it needs water, we will provide it and quench its thirst” (Interview 
with Abu Naser, Majdal Shams, 15 August 2016).63F 63 
 
                                                          
62 Evacuation Day is a Syrian national day commemorating the evacuation of the last French soldier and the 
declaration of Syrian independence and the end of the French mandate on 17th of April 1946.  
63 According to a local report on agriculture, by 1987, there were 450 rainwater harvesting tanks and ponds, 
collecting between 400-500,000 m3 (Abu Jabal, 1993) 
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7.2.2 Water counter-infrastructure and the re-configuration of the Jawlani 
lived geography 
 
We have ambitions to reclaim our water, since Mekorot does not 
own it but rather has possessed it. Gradually we will reduce 
Mekorot’s use of the water and reclaim it for our own use. 
(Interview with Hayel Abu Jabal, 17 December 2016) 
 
The tactics which led to the development of counter-infrastructure for 
irrigation water by the Jawlanis arose firstly from their particular biophysical setting, 
as mentioned in Chapter 6 (see section 6.1). The communities had historically carried 
out decentralised collective efforts to secure water for agricultural development 
from the nearby springs. Druze farmers testify to the historical success of their 
communal planning and funding of water resources, predating Syrian rule. 
Channelling the spring water of Ein El Tufaha through basic dirt channels, the farmers 
began flood irrigation to the central agricultural valley of Al Marj to irrigate newly 
planted apple trees, while Birket Ram was utilised for fishing and as a source of 
drinking water for livestock. The significance of this collective infrastructure, built in 
the 1940s, during the French mandate and prior to the creation of the Syrian state, 
lies in its formative structuring of hydrosocial relations and territory, where Arab 
livelihood practices intertwined with national, religious and geographic identities, 
forging an enduring ethno-geographic community. These practices of local 
governance, both social and material, created a distinct lived geography and ethno-
geographic community, deepening an ontological identity under occupation. The 
infrastructures it produced are of interest in this section, as they serve as tools for 
the empowerment of land-based claims of belonging and recognition. This section 
will trace the progressive scaling-up of counter-infrastructure: pools, rainwater 
harvesting tanks, piped networks and apple coolers  (Dajani and Mason, 2018).  
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7.2.2.1 Pools and rainwater harvesting tanks (1980s) 
 
As part of the efforts to reclaim land and work collectively, water also took a 
central role in the overall struggle for opposing misrecognition. The 1980s witnessed 
a splurge in the construction of small reservoirs to catch rainwater, part of the 
collective efforts to increase the area under agricultural cultivation in order to 
protect the land from confiscation and increase the planting of apple trees to 
establish facts on the ground. Farmers began devising tactics to increase the water 
availability and ensure the success of these plans to increase the land devoted to 
apple orchards. As discussed earlier, the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture was devising 
ways to reduce water availability for ‘Druze’ agriculture, and all the efforts made by 
the farmers to demand increased water from Mekorot fell on deaf ears. Faced with 
the occupation’s neglect of their needs, farmers from Mas’ada village, close to Birket 
Ram, pumped water in the middle of the night to mobile tankers and used the water 
from the lake to irrigate their crops planted a few hundred metres away. This became 
riskier after annexation (Interview with Shihadeh Nasrallah, Agronomist, Majdal 
Shams, 8 September 2017): 
After the confiscation of Birket Ram, it is a known story here that 
the farmers used to pump water from the lake at night. Only after 
the annexation would the border control (Israeli army) go around 
in night patrols to arrest these farmers and confiscate their pumps. 
This is not because the military occupation was less brutal, they are 
the same. However, after the annexation the attack was more 
severe and targeted  
 
To secure sufficient water sources to irrigate the apple orchards, the Jawlanis 
began digging small pools/ponds to capture rainwater (Figure 7.4), in addition to 
other small-scale efforts to provide water for their newly reclaimed lands (ibid): 
Interestingly, between 1975 and 1985, the region witnessed the 
largest expansion in land development. In addition to increasing the 
agricultural lands, there was increased activity in creating ponds, 
and fabricating metal tanks. These ponds were also dug but they 
reached a depth of 5-6m only and were 5-6m in diameter. Other 
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shallow wells were there but as you know many failed because they 
were not based on a geological or hydrological survey. It was also 
a very expensive action but the challenge to develop the land was 
instrumental.  
 
Figure 7.4 A rainwater pond built by the Jawlani population (without Mekorot 
approval or financial assistance) in the middle of an apple orchard in Majdal Shams 
(Author’s picture, 2012) 
 
As means of addressing the water scarcity imposed on the Jawlani farmers, 
the rainwater ponds proved insufficient to meet the demand and required a lot of 
manual work in addition to being extremely costly. Other mechanisms had to be 
devised to capture more rainwater to keep the orchards alive and thriving. Hundreds 
of circular metal tanks, with a volume between 300 and 1,000 cubic metres were 
built and erected on agricultural land to collect rainwater. These metal tanks started 
dotting the Jawlani landscape, in defiance of the Israeli water law which prohibited 
the harvesting of rainwater for private use, as the Water Law of 1959 treated all 
water as state property. The building of tanks was a trial and error effort by individual 
farmers, as one recalls (Interview with Nazih Abu Jabal, 07 September 2017, Majdal 
Shams):  
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The first one to consider building a reservoir designed it as a cube. 
The consideration was to collect rainwater or bring water from 
Sa’ar River. However, it was not strong enough and the water 
seeped. Others began designing it in a circular shape and made 4 
of them... and just like mushrooms the reservoir tanks spread all 
over. 400 cubic metres to 800 cubic metres. From Majdal Shams, to 
Masada and Buq’atha it spread. The Israeli state at first didn’t pay 
attention but later on, it began testing us by issuing demolition 
orders and imposing fines. People reacted by saying: we don’t 
oppose demolition if you provide us with water.  
 
The building of the tanks and their impressive expansion to 450 units happened 
with little intervention from the state (see Figure 7.5). As Hayel Abu Jabal recalls, the 
peak of the tank action was during the years of 1986 and 1987, and it was “a very 
special time”. However, the presence of the settler colonial state was considered a 
logistical obstacle still, as the Israeli police patrols prevented any fast construction 
during the day. However, the Jawlanis had access to heavy machinery, good 
blacksmiths and construction material.  
People worked at night, since the committee of planning and 
construction in cooperation with the police were the main actors 
monitoring our villages in the morning, at night the staff goes 
home. This is when the welders begin working, and by the next day, 
the tank will be set up and ready. (Interview with Hayel Abu Jabal, 
Majdal Shams, 30 December 2016).   
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Figure 7.5 Satellite image of some of the ponds and rainwater harvesting tanks in 
the agricultural areas (developed by CNRS team for this thesis, 2018) 
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While the Ministry of Agriculture and Mekorot disregarded such tanks at first, the 
Jewish settlers of the Golan Heights started raising concerns with the Ministry of 
Agriculture. As a letter written by Knesset Member Edna Salvader to the Minister of 
agriculture, Arik Nehmakin, revealed settler imaginaries and rejection of Jawlani 
practices.64F 64 The reclamation was seen to be taking place on state land, and the 
Jawlanis (referred to as Druze) were accused of ‘stealing state land and water’. She 
also referred to the tanks’ alteration of the landscape, seen as an ugly addition. The 
settlers, represented by this Knesset member, were increasingly worried about the 
marketing of their products and how the increased production anticipated from land 
reclamation and greater water use by the Jawlanis, would negatively affect them, 
urging the ministry to take action (Min al-Jawlan, 1988, p.17). 
The response from the minister was brief, highlighting that only a small portion 
of the land reclaimed was state land, and that any work taking place was without 
prior notification and knowledge from the ministry. Equally, the ministry claimed that 
many agricultural lands were planted without permits in the Jewish settlements and 
they refused to treat the Druze violators differently. The Ministry of Agriculture’s lack 
of urgency in dealing with the matter, coupled with its disregard of the actions of the 
Jawlanis in relation to land and water, is a case of how the state was preoccupied 
with its settlements construction, which the Jawlanis have used as a tool of grounding 
their claims through infrastructure.  
However, as noted in Chapter 2, multiple actors work to create state imaginaries, 
and here it is interesting that, a new ally joined the Jewish settlers’ fight against the 
Jawlani land expansion: The Green Patrol director, Alon Galili, who employed the law 
as a tool to halt land and water reclamation in the Druze villages. The Green Patrol, 
known for its intensive campaigns against the Bedouins inside Israel, is a paramilitary 
unit located in the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and was established to pressure 
Bedouin Arabs to leave their lands and move into state-assigned urban settlements 
(Amara et al., 2012). Its establishment brought together “the four major territorial 
                                                          
64 This was a direct inquiry from the Knesset member, labelled 1851, which the Minister had to reply to (Minal-
Jawlan, 1988, p.17). 
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players in Israel: the Land Authority, the JNF, the Nature Reserves Authority and the 
Ministry of Agriculture” (Tal, 2002, p.347). Armed, the Green Patrol has a long history 
of removing Bedouins from ‘state’ lands, destroying tents, water tanks and 
intimidating the Bedouins, Druze and Arab-Israelis to keep off designated lands. In 
the oGH, and according to the Golan Land newspaper, Galili acknowledged that the 
Green Patrol’s real work had the objective of controlling Jawlani land and water use. 
Due to their affiliation with powerful actors and ministries, the Green Patrol worked 
actively on lobbying the Northern Golan Land Regulatory Agency (which oversaw all 
land development issues in the oGH) and Israeli Land Authority to carry out an 
investigation into the Druze expansion over land, which they revealed covered 
thousands of dunums. The Green Patrol sounded alarm bells when it came to water, 
estimating that the water situation is “100 times more dangerous” than land, 
claiming that the “theft” amounted to 800,000 thousand cubic meters,65F 65 not 
including the water aqueducts and Birket Ram. The patrol advised that legal 
measures should be taken against all those violating the law and storing water, calling 
for the destruction of the water storage tanks and rainwater harvesting ponds. The 
Green Patrol managed to bring the tanks owners to court, where many of them faced 
charges of illegal building, and even reducing the water level of Lake Tiberias 
(Interview with Hayel Abu Jabal, 30 December 2016):  
Their claim was that the tanks could potentially affect groundwater 
recharge but it definitely affects Lake Tiberias water level. This was 
a ridiculous claim as the total water stored by these tanks does not 
even go beyond 1MCM, and even I remember a specific number: 
700,000 cubic meters. It was a ridiculous claim but of course the 
judge ruled against us and the state was given the right to fine us.  
 
Interestingly, the Housing Ministry and the Israeli Army were leading the 
issuance of fines and demolition orders (Interview with Nazih Abu Jabal, 7 September 
2017),  
The Housing Ministry began issuing fines to the owners of each 
reservoir. The army also intervened and claimed the reservoirs 
                                                          
65Compared to 8 million cubic meters available to settlers in 1975.  
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limited military exercises and operations. We demolished our 
reservoir. We were close to a tank route. They began sending us 
fines, with warnings of either demolition or applying for permits. 
Whoever needed the reservoir had to apply for a permit and submit 
a plan for the location and area of the reservoir. This all incurred a 
lot of money in fines and permits. The farmer had to produce these 
plans, submit them to the ministry of defence and the 
environmental quality authority and protection of nature. If one of 
them declines the proposal, a permit will not be issued. Most of the 
applications were rejected and not approved. We demolished it and 
we incurred a lot of cost to demolish it.  Many people ended up 
demolishing their reservoirs…We were crazy! We invested so much 
money in them. We only wanted to prove to them [the Israelis] that 
we want and demand water. We didn’t resort to violence but to 
politics and the use of law.  
 
Following this cat-and-mouse situation with the Israeli authorities, the 
construction of such tanks by the Jawlani farmers was ‘disciplined’ by acts of state 
demolition, fines and taxation to limit the development of such structures. However, 
many remain to this day as a reminder of acts of asserting and reclaiming indigenous 
water rights, although their current use is limited.  They are visible markers on the 
landscape of a counter-infrastructure for water (see Figure 7.6 and 7.7). As much as 
the water reservoirs failed in being a feasible and economical tool to gather water, 
they became a potent symbol of a distinctive, Jawlani ethnogeography.  
Collective reclamation of water rights by constructing metal tanks as water 
reservoirs constituted a tactic of collective action and not merely an act by individual 
farmers. Defying economic rationality and realizing the tanks’ limited potential to 
secure the water needed, the Jawlanis asserted that the tanks were a lobbying tactic 
to reclaim water from Mekorot and the Ministry of Agriculture. While the fines issued 
against the Jawlanis were significant66F 66 their determination to irrigate the land was 
the driving force of their actions (Interview with Hayel Abu Jabal, 30 December 2016):    
                                                          
66 As the ASD (1994) report shows in a testimony of one of the farmers, fines reached up between 12,000- 
30,000 New Israeli Shekels (NIS). This was in addition to incurring very high costs of building the tanks, which 
were estimated between $17,000-$20,000 (Abu Jabal and Ayoub, 2009).  
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The building of these tanks was very important...we had very 
economically sound agricultural activities. We were willing to 
sacrifice. Our motivation was to protect our land, never to give up 
on it no matter what. If it required water, we will irrigate it. There 
was this determination.  
 
 
Figure 7.6 Rainwater harvesting tanks still dominate the Jawlani landscape 
(Author’s picture, September 2017) 
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Figure 7.7 a view of agricultural lands in Majdal Shams, with several rusted tanks 
visible in the orchard fields (Author’s pictures, September 2017) 
 
The scarcity narrative, which the Israeli state imposed on water use in the Jawlani 
villages, is contradicted by comparing water allocations to settlements. During 1974, 
the 1900 Israeli settlers were receiving almost 8 mcm, while the 8,900 Jawlanis were 
provided with 2.1 mcm, the settlers thus receiving 17 times more water than the 
Jawlani (WZO, 1975). The clear discrimination in water distribution and access 
trumped state narratives of scarcity, as the Jawlanis witnessed the large re-allocation 
of water resources under the occupation, from Birket Ram’s confiscation and the 
channelling of river floods to it, to the control over the tributaries of the Jordan, as 
well as water control more generally: this was a waterscape of misrecognition. The 
colonial geographies of the oGH created contrasting realities for the Jewish settler 
farmer and the Jawlani farmer. Therefore, local struggles over water intensified not 
only between the Jawlanis and the occupation authorities, but also with the settler 
population objecting to Jawlani water use and land expansion.  
As a water-intensive and seasonal crop in the face of high competition from 
subsidised settler farmers, the commercial viability of apple growing is never secure. 
A group of Jawlani farmers established the first cooling facility, Majdal Shams Cooler, 
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in 1977, in order to secure its apple production and protect its price. Initially the 
Majdal Shams Cooler was supplied with electricity through generators that operated 
until midnight, which the Jawlanis invested in after refusing to be connected to the 
Israeli electricity grid (Qasem, 1984). For the coolers, the farmers invested in a diesel 
generator. In the late 1970s, these main generators were confiscated by the state 
and the villages were connected to the national grid. Today, there are eight 
communal apple coolers (Figure 7.8) that depend on a mixture of energy sources 
including the grid, generators and solar panels. They are collectively owned by 
farmers (who are shareholders) and have been an exclusively Jawlani investment, 
borne out of an interest to maintain the economic viability of the apple crops beyond 
the season. They represent another tool in the sumud on the land, as Nazih Braik, 
from Majdal Shams, asserts (Skype, 30 December, 2017): 
Out of this struggle to remain and protect our belonging, we had to 
think more economically on how to continue our apple growing but 
at least to reduce the losses we incur. This gave rise to the idea of 
large storage coolers, as a tool to protect our land as agricultural 
producing land.  
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Figure 7.8 Apple containers outside of Al Jawlan cooler in Majdal Shams (Author’s 
picture, 2016) 
 
7.2.2.2 Piped network and the establishment of cooperatives (1980s-
1990s) 
 
When the state began compromising with us regarding allowing 
access to additional water resources through the cooperatives, the 
tanks lost their significance and importance. We had additional 
water from the cooperatives, and we didn't have to struggle as we 
did with the tanks. Now we have a more efficient way of irrigation 
(Interview with Hayel Abu Jabal, 30 December 2016) 
 
The continued struggle and mobilisation against water appropriation by the 
Israeli state following the ‘reservoir boom’ took the form of the establishment of 
water cooperatives. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Mey Golan, the settler water 
company, constructed 8 artificial lakes/reservoirs to supply the Israeli settlements 
with water, in addition to Mekorot’s control of Birket Ram. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Mekorot had an obligation towards the Israeli settler population to 
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supply sufficient water allocations based on settlements’ annual plans for agricultural 
planting. Therefore, if the settlements had a plan for apple orchards, each dunum 
had to receive 700 cubic meters to produce the required quality for marketing. With 
additional water sources becoming available to the settler populations (through the 
artificial lakes and groundwater pumping), the settlements’ reliance on Birket Ram 
reduced. Following the Jawlani reservoir boom, Mekorot was willing to reach a water 
purchasing agreement with the Jawlani population. An important distinction is made 
between the settlement ‘provision’ of water, compared with a mere water purchase 
agreement with the Jawlanis. The latter carried minimal obligations for the Israeli 
company, allowing it to dictate the amount of water to allocate annually, with no 
obligation to supply the water through the national network. While Mekorot was 
selling the waters of Birket Ram to the Jawlanis, it was also under no obligation to 
provide the pipe network to reach the designated agricultural land.  
 
 The establishment of the cooperatives was fraught with political encounters 
between Mekorot and the Jawlanis.67F 67 The first cooperative to be established, al-
Murkhan, providing water for the agricultural lands near Birket Ram, was pushed for 
by a collective of farmers who were prepared to negotiate with the Israeli state. 
Despite the religious and social ban on dealing with the state (since the 1981 National 
Statement), the water situation was weighing heavily on farmers’ land and its 
productivity. The 1980s, as mentioned above, were a time when settlement 
agriculture was rising as a competitor with advantages like state support, water 
provisions, and favoured access to markets. The settler colonial conditions under 
which the Jawlanis were carrying out their agriculture necessitated a less 
                                                          
67 To tighten its civilian control over the population further, the military rule reinforced its control over the Golan 
by setting up local councils in the remaining Druze villages (ASD, 1994). The heads of the village council were 
appointed personnel, who had close relations with the Israeli state and were Israeli citizens. These village councils 
were boycotted by the local Druze population; therefore, no election takes place of the heads of the local councils 
but are rather appointed by the Israeli state. The rationale of the boycott of participation in the election is that 
these village councils are seen as state apparatus that will serve the interests of the occupying state and its 
aspirations to control land and resources rather than the interests of the citizens, who were still living under 
military rule at that point. Even after the annexation of the Golan Heights, the village councils were reinforced as 
state apparatus and continued to be boycotted. The acknowledgment of local state representatives was 
considered equal to the acknowledgment of Israeli rule over occupied land so refusal to acknowledge them 
remained one of the longstanding principals of the local population.  
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confrontational relationship with the state, but nevertheless not an equal or smooth 
encounter. The state privileged those Jawlanis complainant with it, and therefore 
recognised this first cooperative. The Jawlanis had already established facts on the 
ground with the construction of the water storage tanks and were also ready to 
engage with the state. As Shihadeh Nasrallah reflects (Interview, Majdal Shams, 8 
September 2017): 
The state used every tool possible to ‘normalise’ the relationship 
with the Syrian Druze and wanted to return these shunned 
collaborators68F 68 to the social fabric of the Druze community. So, 
when water started becoming a recurring demand by the farmers, 
the state used it as a tool to normalise the relationship through 
these collaborators who facilitated a normal relationship with the 
state. 
 
Realising the ramifications of such state strategies, but also being under great 
pressure from settler colonial rule-making, marketing mechanisms and competing 
settlements, the Jawlanis decided to demand water allocations through the 
cooperatives framework. As Shihadeh further elaborates: 
The cooperative establishment was during a period of a collective 
assault and attack on the farmer: from the state, the ministry of 
agriculture, Mekorot, the settlements, competition over apple 
marketing. It was a critical time where apple production stopped 
generating that income and profit like it used to. Here, farmers 
wanted to act, to protect their land and their trees. We had limited 
control, the farmers needed tools in order to raise their claims for 
additional water. 
 
These encounters with the Israeli water company Mekorot began in the 
1990s, creating channels of negotiation and lobbying to acquire water rights and 
receive quotas for irrigation water from freshwater sources, including Birket Ram. 
Each cooperative consisted of a number of farmers collectively applying as one unit 
for water quotas, providing details of their plot sizes and the type of crop grown. 
                                                          
68 The collaborators were shunned by religious decrees from being part of and participating in the Jawlani 
community social and religious affairs, as mentioned in section 2.2.1 
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Mekorot studies the needs of each cooperative and decide on the quotas it deems 
appropriate. The 17 cooperatives are non-governmental organisations fully 
registered under Israeli law, therefore abiding to the Israeli state regulations. 
Farmers have shares in each cooperative, depending on the area of land they own 
and hence the water they receive. As Mekorot acted as a water seller, and not a 
water provider, the farmers had to incur expensive investments in designing, building 
and operating pipes, pumps and distribution networks (Figure 7.9). On top of that, 
while Mekorot provides water from different sources to settlements, the Jawlani 
farmers were designated water provision from Birket Ram only, in addition to 
expenses incurred through the maintenance, electricity and other fees; therefore the 
price per cubic meter was doubled.   
 
Figure 7.9 Filtering station belonging to one of the cooperatives, Al Masna’ 
(Author’s photo, 2016) 
 
However, the arrangement remains that of a commercial one, void of any 
acknowledgments of rights to water for the Jawlani farmers. In what one farmer 
described as “blackmail” and “sedated suffering”, Mekorot allowed the purchase of 
strictly limited amounts of water from Birket Ram without providing or supporting 
the infrastructure needed to distribute supplies to Jawlani agricultural land. 
However, the Jawlanis have still used the cooperative model as a tool to increase 
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their water quotas.  The cooperatives started receiving around 70 cubic meters per 
dunum in the 1990s, but the collective efforts of lobbying raised this to 250 cubic 
meters per dunum by 2016 (Keary, 2013). Whilst this is still meagre in comparison to 
the provision for Jewish settler communities and farms, the Jawlanis have succeeded 
in increasing the water allocation to their fields substantially in comparison to the 
early 1990s (Al-Marsad, 2013). Such perceptions of suffering reveal something of the 
emotional harm arising from a settler colonial regime of strongly asymmetric 
resource control and access which the Jawlanis were forced to adapt to and negotiate 
with.  
In this context, under the precarious conditions of settler colonial 
misrecognition, the Jawlanis intensified their agricultural practices and claim-making 
over land and water resources, carrying out “performative participation” that is, 
contesting domination while negotiating a reality through multiple claims, identities, 
relations and emotions to preserve their ontological presence on the land (Sultana, 
2011). 
An example from one cooperative sheds light on how water is now managed 
by the Jawlani farmers in negotiations with the Israeli state, represented by Mekorot 
and the Ministry of Agriculture. Mufid69F 69 is a farmer and a Natoor (Arabic for 
watchman who oversees and distributes water allocations to farmers). In his natoor 
work he is in charge of 540 plots of land, which receive water from Birket Ram, and 
his job is to ensure the distribution of that water according to allocations agreed 
upon by the members of the water cooperative.  
I have been doing the natoor job for 16 years. At first, we had one 
pump and one reservoir, and the pump distributes the water to the 
plots. I had to go to each stop for each farmer and make sure the 
quantities are distributed as agreed between the farmers. I 
remember in the early days of the cooperatives, we started with 80 
cubic meters per dunum. It then gradually started increasing with 
the continuous demands of the cooperatives to 105, 170, and today 
around 250. We still don’t get our rightful share and we will not be 
                                                          
69 Mufid is a pseudonym, and the cooperative is unnamed to protect those involved in water purchasing from 
Mekorot 
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equal to our neighbours [the Israeli settlements]. We also try to 
take more than our allocations, by pumping more than agreed, we 
have to do it because we still need another 200 cubic meters to be 
equal to the settlements’ use. (Interview with Mufid, Majdal Shams, 
10 September 2017) 
 
The cooperatives, in addition to acquiring increasing allocations for 
agriculture, have also been sites of resistance to an imposed cooperation and 
confined allocations. Since the allocations are given during the dry seasons, from 
mid-April to October, the pumping rates needed each month always exceeded the 
allocation agreed, this is when the Natoor pumps beyond the agreed quota. This is 
seen as a way to get back more of the water the farmers view as their rightful share, 
as Mufid shares: “Now we feel like we’re stealing or forcing the water out of Mekorot. 
They keep threatening and announcing that water is scarce, and they might stop.”  
However, the cooperatives have also increased the level of cooperation with 
Mekorot and the Ministry of Agriculture. As Mufeed further elaborates: 
The Ministry of Agriculture also began giving us access to funds. For 
instance, in compensation for the pumping costs we incur, which 
are high, they are compensating us. This is very recent, only since 
last year (2016) and it’s gradually happening with other 
cooperatives. We also receive technological support, so I can check 
the stops and control its opening and closing times through my 
mobile instead of physically being there (see Figure 7.x).  Today, the 
Ministry of Agriculture is compensating us for the pumping costs, 
which are quite high and increase the water price for the farmer.  
 
Essentially, the Ministry’s and Mekorot’s support for farmers comes at a 
price. In order for Mekorot to pump water directly and with higher pressure to the 
cooperatives, Mekorot had to replace the existing network built by farmers and 
replace it with state infrastructure. The cooperatives also had to construct new 
assemblages of pumps and pressure relief valves (see Figure 7.10) in order to adapt 
to (and reduce) the higher pressure of water coming from Mekorot.  
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Figure 7.10 Pump and stops assemblage built by one of the cooperatives in Majdal 
Shams (Author’s picture, August 2017) 
 
Moreover, the cooperatives engage on a daily basis with the state apparatus 
through altering their modes of operation. Forced to communicate in Hebrew, from 
the contracts signed to water distribution and crop maps, and the computer software 
they must use (see Figures 7.11 and 7.12), the farmers had to adapt to Israeli 
methods and even their language. Thus, the interlocutors I met used Hebrew terms 
consistently to describe crops, infrastructures, equipment and procedures. The 
cooperatives therefore serve as an example of how the settler colonial state made 
the oGH farming legible, controlled and clearly monitored (Scott, 1998). 
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Figure 7.11 Jawlani farmer Mufid showing the software used to control the water 
allocations for the farmers in the cooperative, all in Hebrew and provided by Mekorot 
(Author’s picture, August 2017) 
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Figure 7.12 Map in Hebrew showing 17 cooperatives areas, and the names of the 
Syrian villages and some settlements on the map, hanging at the administrative 
office of  one cooperative  in Majdal Shams (Author’s picture, August 2017) 
 
While there are 17 cooperatives to collectively manage water in the 
land cultivated by the Jawlani villages, different numbers were given, as 
smaller cooperatives merge with larger ones: on recent figure refers to 14 
such cooperatives. These cooperatives are all visibly mapped and their plot 
sizes, crop types and water allocations are easily visible and legible for the 
Israeli state (Figure 7.13), as the Ministry of Agriculture and Mekorot play a 
central role in the provision of water. However, outside the cooperatives’ 
small pockets of self-management of water remain, such as in the Marj, 
where apple planting originally started in the 1940s.  
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Figure 7.13 The main cooperatives and the distribution by area, plot size and crop 
type (internal map for the MoA, acquired by author, 2018) 
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Marj al-Ya’fouri, with lands estimated at 1700 dunums, is collectively 
organized by farmers who depend on the springs of Ras il Nabi’, with infrastructure 
that they have developed and maintained since the times before the Israeli 
occupation. Through their persistence on maintaining the control over the springs, 
as mentioned in section 2.1.1., the farmers on this land are used to operating and 
managing water beyond the reach of the state. While the cooperatives were 
established because of the need to engage with Mekorot and claim water allocations, 
the spring water users in Al Marj maintained their detachment from the Israeli state. 
However, as the wells dug by Mekorot in the 1970s are still threatening the dwindling 
supply of the springs, the farmers have an ongoing legal battle with Mekorot to 
respect its agreement with the farmers and to replenish spring water pumped out by 
Israeli wells. This remains a matter of continuous struggle and negotiation that 
farmers engage with in their everyday farming practices, especially during the 
summer. However, the farmers who grow the apple orchards there have framed al 
Marj as a place where the state interventions are not wanted, whether for water, 
agricultural support or development. Even on the map (see Figure 7.13), the lands of 
Al Marj are clearly seen as a pocket that seems illegible and uncooperative with the 
state. The political tension between the invariable presence of an Israeli state that 
the farmers prefer to be absent is captured by one the political activists and 
researcher (Salman FakhrElddin, 31 January 2017, Majdal Shams):  
We are forbidden to benefit from the occupation per say but we 
also have the right to demand our basic rights under international 
law. There is a certain level of services that the occupying power 
needs to provide. These efforts of demanding and negotiating daily 
rights of existence do not belittle or weaken the political struggle. 
We have dual responsibilities to remain on the land and strengthen 
our existence and we also continue to strive for freedom. But 
freedom is beyond a slogan that we use and is translated in the 
daily acts of existence. So, our struggle and perseverance on the 
land is when I protect my land, my agriculture, my water, livelihood, 
education and health services is part of my right and not a service 
provided to me. The occupation power will always be unjust. This is 
the real fabric of political struggle, bettering people’s lives.  
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As shown in this chapter, the community’s mobilisation and collective 
resistance which characterised the earliest tactics against the state evolved into a 
strategy to negotiate with the state to claim rights to water. This required 
acquiescence and compliance with state regulations, rules and regulations rather 
than direct opposition to them. While the rustic water tanks symbolised a collective 
action of resistance, the cooperatives of today characterise a more compliant 
arrangement which binds farmers to the whims of the state and its institutions. 
Economic disparities and institutional shortcomings also increase the tensions and 
conflicts between members of cooperatives and apple coolers, especially in facing 
discriminatory marketing mechanisms designed to weaken and dissipate any 
meaningful collective action effort.” 
 
 
7.2.2.3 The significance of the apple crop as a trope for identity and 
belonging  
 
5 am on a crispy early morning in September 2016, Abu Naser picks 
me up from my accommodation and on his tractor we drive towards 
the apple orchards on the outskirt of Majdal Shams. Lying directly 
on the 1974 disengagement cease-fire line drawn between Israel 
and Syria, the apple trees we will pick up today are on the ‘border’ 
separating Israeli-occupied Golan Heights from its ‘liberated’ Syrian 
part. A few hundred meters away from the famous Shouting Hill, 
where Syrian families of the Golan Heights, separated by this 
border, used to come to exchange (or shout) conversations across 
the border as this was the only form of contact since 
telecommunication and mail were completely forbidden (before the 
internet age). As we arrive, an Israeli army patrol vehicle passes on 
the dirt road near the fence and causes a storm of dust, leaving the 
apple orchards covered in yet another layer of dust.  Abu Naser 
family joins, hurriedly picking as many apples as possible, as they 
yet have to return home, take a shower and start their ‘official’ jobs: 
one a lawyer, the other an accountant, one a musician. That does 
not stop us from recapturing moments of celebration of any 
traditional harvest: freshly baked pastries, tea and coffee, Apples 
cut fresh from the trees and reminiscing and singing folklore songs 
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about apple picking and Jawlani stories of resistance in 1982. By 
10am, we conclude the picking part of the day, and I join Abu Naser 
for a short drive to deliver the apples to the processing factory (also 
in Majdal Shams) where the apples are thoroughly cleaned, sorted 
and waxed, ready in plastic containers for the market. Across the 
street from the processing unit is an apple cooler, where the sorted 
apples can be stored to preserve their quality and price for the next 
few months after the season passes. Within that confined 
geographical spot, in the northern point in the occupied Golan 
Heights, apple growing can be claimed to have become a symbol of 
the existence and belonging of the Jawlani. During the apple 
season, the villages are transformed with the recurring scene of 
farmers on tractors transporting huge containers of their produce 
– one that recharges them with feelings of pride, rootedness and 
hope (Fieldnotes, Majdal Shams, September 2016, see Figure 7.14).  
 
Figure 7.14 Abu Naser driving the tractor in the middle of his apple orchard to begin 
the harvesting of nearby apple trees (Author's picture, September 2016) 
 
For the Jawlani, apple tree planting becomes the material expression of a 
land-based political ontology, countering the systemic misrecognition materialised 
through displacement, dispossession, and strategies of forced citizenship. Compared 
to historical self-subsistence focused on vegetables and pulses, apples have become 
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a symbol of the Golan Heights, attaching the Jawlanis to the apple crop and altering 
what apples mean to their ontological existence on the land:  
I believe if we had remained vegetable growers, the occupation 
would have encroached on our lands much more intrusively. They 
still encroach on our land extensively but the apples as crops 
empowered farmers. The power was psychological and also 
material and gave them a sense of independence. There is a sense 
of dignity (karameh) and identity with the protection of such a crop 
under such conditions. (Munir FakhrElddin, historian and academic, 
20 July 2016, Majdal Shams): 
 
Indeed, the affective bonds fostered by collective attachment to apple trees 
invest sumud with cultural and political meaning for the whole ethno-geographic 
community. A recurring affirmation by the Jawlanis is that without the apple tree, 
their villages would not exist today. Their survival through decades, as a 
disenfranchised indigenous community, and amidst intense normalisation pressures, 
is signalled by the physical rootedness of the apple orchards. At the same time, the 
marketability of the apples in the early decades of the occupation (1960s-1980s) 
masks the economic reality of today, where Jawlani apple cultivation is now 
overwhelmingly a part-time occupation, and indeed a costly and not profitable one. 
During the fieldwork period, many of the Jawlanis I met in Majdal Shams commented 
on how they became ‘amateur farmers’, growing apple trees as a rite of passage to 
remain on the land, while only a handful of the old generation remained full-time 
farmers. Apple growing became an economic burden on many growers, and most 
depended on other jobs (as lawyers, dentists, medical doctors, and construction 
contractors and workers) to earn a livelihood. Israel has been the main export market 
since occupation, but from 2005 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
with local mobilisation of the Jawlani farmers, has facilitated the transport of apples 
to Syria,70F 70 which even continued on a smaller scale during the beginning of the Syrian 
conflict in 2011 until it eventually halted (ICRC, 2011). Farmers now speak of apple-
                                                          
70 The Jawlanis refuse to refer to this as export but transporting it to Syria. Export denotes a recognition and 
acceptance of Israeli claims over the Golan   
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tree planting in the region as an exclusively Jawlani endeavor, highlighting how 
community rituals of apple planting and picking have developed into collective acts 
of resistance, slowing the advance of Israeli land appropriation.  
These articulations of farming as sumud mirror the sumud narrative of 
Palestinians inside Israel and those in the West Bank and Gaza, where a common 
identity of resistance emerges from experiences of misrecognition and injustice 
inflicted on those populations through resource appropriation and political 
disenfranchisement (Braverman, 2009; McKee, 2014; Olwan, 2011; Yiftachel, 2008). 
What makes the Jawlani experience distinct is their uprooting from a nation-state in 
1967, and the detachment from a homeland which they identitify strongly with. 
Therefore, their sumud in farming supports a resistance identity anticipating re-
incorporation and re-unification into Syrian territory. 
However, farming of apple crops remains dependent on Israeli marketing 
mechanisms and input materials, such as rootstocks. Moreover, apple growing has 
been transformed by adhereing to Israeli market preferences: the traditional 
varieties of Golden Delicious and Starking Delicious are giving way to marketable 
varieties (e.g. Granny Smith, Gala, Pink Lady) favoured by Israeli consumers for their 
appearance and off-the-shelf taste. The traditional varieties are still premium 
products because their quality is dependent on the climate conditions at the high 
elevation where the Jawlani villages are situated. These varieties are still unique to 
the Jawlani villages and are in demand. However, the other varieties were introduced 
to meet the demands of a global market and to increase profitability. Smaller plot 
sizes (1-5 dunums) characterising Jawlani holdings also meant the need to adapt to 
limitations on land available and the favouring of vegetative propogation, which 
produces denser stocking, earlier harvesting and requires less labour. Only a few 
orchards in the oGH have big apple trees with long roots (from seed propogation), 
which have longer roots, wider stocks and taller body. The realities of apple growing, 
therefore, are fraught with physical, economic and political constraints, acquiring 
farming with political subjectivity under constraining manifestations of settler 
colonial rule.  
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7.3 Concluding remarks 
 
Driven by their quest to protect and expand their economically profitable 
apple production, and considering Israeli uprooting plans, the need to expand 
cultivable lands became an essential quest for the survival of the ethno-geographical 
community of the Jawlanis. In light of their shrinking lived geography, collective 
efforts were mobilised to protect their remaining property and natural resources 
from the encroachment of the Israel state, which utilised legal and military powers 
to achieve its aims. To defend the land from this mechanism of state appropriation, 
the farmers needed to expand their cultivated land, carrying out agricultural 
reclamation of neighboring hills, orchestrating collective action and the local 
utilisation of labour, machinery and skills, and initiating an ‘agricultural revolution’ to 
protect Arab lands and livelihoods. Restrictions on water use were intensified in the 
1970s by Israeli authorities, who declared that all water sources belonged to the 
state, and that any collection and use of water not licensed by the government was 
a violation of the relevant military orders. With the confiscation by Israel of Birket 
Ram (Lake Ram), the exploitation of stream and spring flows and the pumping of 
groundwater through Mekorot and Mey Golan companies, water became an object 
of political contestation between a hydro-hegemon and an ethno-geographic 
community defending its place-based identification and belonging.   
 
The counter-infrastructure discussed and presented in this chapter was 
created as tactical move against misrecognition. The rainwater harvesting tank is not 
an inherently powerful tool of water capture or claim-making to water allocations. 
However, its power emerged as it became a visible tool for claiming rights to water 
and therefore opposing systemic misrecognition. The tanks became symbols of 
power and catalyzed communal action: they stored water through locally-made 
metal containers, connected directly to the orchards, and provided water without 
reliance on Israeli state infrastructure or systems of water governance. They 
bypassed the state (Meehan, 2014) and forged new ground for larger contestations 
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over identity, land and belonging. When, with annexation, the Israeli state attempted 
to impose its misrecognition, through the tool of forced Israeli citizenship, the Jawlani 
struggle over water became part of a wider political resistance to maintain their 
ethno-geographic community. Water therefore became political (Alatout, 2009; 
Meehan, 2014) at this particular critical juncture for the Jawlanis. They articulated 
control over water as a tool for steadfastness on the land, and therefore one that 
defined a Jawlani waterscape/landscape in defiance of a settler colonial state.  
From the late 1980s, water cooperatives illustrated a scaling-up of tactics to claim 
water (Dajani and Mason, 2018), through the establishment of water cooperatives 
facilitating collective water purchases from Birket Ram. Cooperatives also paved the 
way to the upscaling of demands and the beginning of a re-configuration of the local 
waterscape through the establishment of the right to infrastructure. While Mekorot 
allowed the selling of the waters of Lake Ram, it was conditional on the Jawlani 
farmers providing their own means of transporting this water to their lands. Through 
the cooperatives, the Jawlani farmers began working with local contractors to design 
the most suitable network of pipelines, pumps and meters to ensure collective 
administration of this water – all at a very high individual cost. Once again, the 
farmers found themselves leading a re-configuration of their livelihoods and lived 
geographies that had begun in the 1940s: construction of infrastructure to capture 
their reclaimed water, achieved through collaborative struggle and mobilisation 
which now is occurring under conditions of contestation and protracted occupation. 
Resembling the water tanks that dot the landscape, the pipelines now emerged 
as an up-scaled counter-infrastructure (Mason and Dajani, 2018), creating facts on 
the ground which defied and competed with the hegemonic narratives and practices 
of state infrastructure (including law). The network of pipelines has made permeable 
the state’s unequivocal control over water, as it transports water (the physical, social 
and symbolic aspects of it) away from state power and control to that of farmers 
irrigating their apple orchards. Through such an assemblage, the area of the apple 
orchards expanded to 12,000 dunums by 2012 and re-configured the state-Jawlani 
interaction. Farmers were thus able to irrigate their apple crop, considered “the 
bloodline of life” and an important signifier of community resistance and identity, by 
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building a water counter-infrastructure which is not state-funded, owned or 
operated. This bottom-up infrastructure solidified the communities’ belonging and 
steadfastness on the land and enhanced their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state to 
acquire larger quotas of water for irrigation. 
 
For the Jawlani the construction of this counter-infrastructure provided a 
platform for both autonomous water access and the forging of a community 
solidarity resistant to forced settler colonial assimilation. This further created 
complex socio-natural interlinkages where, for the Jawlani, pragmatic coexistence 
with the occupying power sits alongside dissenting hydrological flows – a material 
and symbolic network of resistance to settler colonial de-territorialisation, 
dispossession and misrecognition. That this upscaling of infrastructure was funded 
and constructed by Arab farming cooperatives reiterates the significance of 
autonomous water governance as a site of political self-determination and collective 
identity (Hoogesteger and Verzijl, 2015; Perreault, 2003). The development of the 
irrigation infrastructure for the local farming communities of the oGH can therefore 
be seen as an example of a “(semi)autonomous grass-roots hydrosocial territory” 
(Hoogesteger et al., 2016, p.97).  
  
315 
 
Chapter 8:  Water struggles as struggles for recognition – 
comparative findings 
 
This thesis has analysed settler colonial water and land policies and their 
implication for the lived geographies of two Arab communities – Al-Battuf in the 
Galilee and Majdal Shams in the occupied Golan Heights (oGH). It has also analysed 
the opposition and resistance tactics of those communities, examining how water 
became a vessel through which recognition was claimed. The imposition of 
exclusionary settler colonial policies has significantly re-configured the lived 
geographies of these communities, re-articulating water struggles as struggles for 
recognition and transforming farming in a way that imbued it with political 
subjectivity. The actions carried out by the farmers to reclaim water were not only a 
battle over resources but actions to fight misrecognition enacted against ethno-
geographic communities and their socio-natural systems.  
This chapter aims to return to and further analyse the two case studies, in 
light of the research questions and propositions: 
 
How do settler colonial [water and land] policies and practices manifest themselves 
in the lives and livelihood practices of farming communities in the Galilee and the 
occupied Golan Heights? 
 
 How do farming livelihoods function in the studied agricultural communities 
in the context of settler colonialism?  
 What ideas, norms and beliefs shape farmers’ daily practices of agriculture? 
 
And: 
 
How, and with what political effects, are settler colonial [water and land] policies 
and practices resisted by farming communities in the Galilee and the occupied 
Golan Heights? 
 
316 
 
 What forms of collective action do farmers use to resist and counter state-led 
policymaking, especially land expropriation and water allocations? 
 What are the political effects of the distinctive forms of collective resistance 
employed by farming communities?  
 
The proposition of this thesis is that in the settler colonial contexts studied, the 
farming of Arab communities acquires similar forms of political subjectivity.  
The first section of this chapter examines the re-configurations of lived 
geographies in both case studies, highlighting the similarities and differences in 
their experiences and the implications for farming as they experience the 
dialectic of presence-absence of the (settler colonial) state. As with all settler 
colonial endeavours, the power of the state enforced conditions of dispossession, 
exclusion and control through law and infrastructure. The case studies show 
through examination of historical and contemporary water-related 
infrastructures, that power is produced through water, exacerbating inequality 
and exclusion, and ultimately impacting on livelihood practices and identity re-
configurations (Boelens, 2014; Budds and Sultana, 2013; Swyngedouw and 
Boelens, 2018). The second section discusses the thesis’s proposition, the 
political subjectivity of farming and its similar forms of enactment in both cases. 
Finally, the third section summarises a main theme arising from the investigation 
of land and water settler colonial practices, termed ‘presence-absence’, as an 
overarching concept explaining farming communities’ struggles with and without 
water, infrastructure and recognition. It will contrast modes of operation of the 
settler state in both sites and situate this in regard to larger political and societal 
conditions which allowed differential experiences of struggles and resistance 
actions to arise.  
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8.1 Presence-absence of the state and reconfigurations of lived 
geographies   
 
Both struggles presented in the preceding chapters are characterised by 
settler colonial conditions of misrecognition and dispossession: both ontological – 
creating new, uneven and asymmetric ‘realities’ of land and water use – and also 
epistemological – devaluing indigenous ideas, norms and beliefs about identity, 
belonging and existence. The notion of uprooting captures, beyond the deracination 
of agricultural lands, the destruction of a moral economy and cultural identity 
associated with indigenous farming practices (Bourdieu and Sayad, 2004). Al-Battuf 
and the oGH have both undergone material and discursive uprooting: their lands, 
communities, social structures, histories and political structures were stripped away 
and replaced by settler colonial logics, ordering geographical space for Zionist 
settlement and economic development, while excluding the remaining indigenous 
population from such considerations. The state has been dominantly present and 
absent in the lives and lives geographies of those two communities.  
 
Al-Battuf 
The enactment of the Israeli state’s military rule (1949-1966) entailed a loss 
of autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs who experienced this abrupt change in their 
access and control to their means of production – land, water and labour. On a social 
and organisational level, it created a trauma for a desolate and dismembered society 
which became a fragmented, landless and leaderless minority after 1948 (Khalifa, 
2001). In 1961, David Ben-Gurion’s (former Prime Minister of Israel) adviser on Arab 
Affairs Uri Lubrani said he wanted Arabs to turn into woodcutters and water carriers,  
reflecting aspirations to turn Arabs into dependents subjects in the Jewish state 
(Khalifa 2001). The Israeli land and water policies enacted under the military rule 
were designed to disintegrate the only remaining economic activity, which was 
agriculture, and reduce the fellahin to a labour force in the Jewish economy (Bäuml 
2009). Moreover, although citizenship was acquired by Palestinians, they were 
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excluded from being nationals of the Jewish state, hence remaining on the margins 
as citizen-strangers and settler colonial citizens. Planning and resource policies have 
been used to further encroach on and control the last remaining Palestinian citizens’ 
existence on the land, and to impose Judaisation policies to make them invisible or 
at best disappear. During this time, the Palestinian citizens inside Israel were 
impacted by physical uprooting and spatial confinement, as well as an emblematic 
uprooting and dismembering of their societal relations and national identity. 
Subsequently, the Arab farmers on these lands become the embodiment of 
‘water carriers’ in their exclusion from the utilisation of water as a means of 
production, and the confinement of their economic activities to those authorised by 
the state: as construction workers for Israeli water projects (like the NWC and other 
water infrastructures), or as employees in Israeli agricultural settlements and 
factories which have water access in abundance. Water, like land, has been used as 
a tool in Israel’s systematic rule over the Arabs and their resource-dependant 
livelihoods. This has turned the Palestinian farmers into ‘thirsty water carriers’, 
building large-scale water infrastructure on their lands but yet remaining thirsty. The 
thirst is an expression of the suffering inflicted through state policies of 
abandonment and indifference, where the state neglects Palestinian claims of rights 
to water and infrastructural development, while it carves imprints of differentiated 
access to water into the landscape and produces uneven waterscapes (see Figure 
8.1). 
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Figure 8.1 Uneven waterscapes co-existing in the landscape of Al-Battuf, one of 
abundance (the NWC canal) and the other of deprivation (rustic water tankers) 
(Author’s pictures, September 2017) 
 
.  
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However, the imposition of settler colonial waterscapes onto the landscape 
of al-Battuf engendered acts of contestation and opposition. While the NWC canal 
inflicted direct harm and constituted a threat to the existence of communities, lands 
and livelihood, it also trespassed on particular sites in which their identity and 
belonging was embedded (Rasmussen, 2016). Little if no regard was even given to 
issues of land and water rights in al-Battuf, or the deep attachment to the land by 
indigenous Arab communities. Nor did the settler-state recognise the aspirations of 
the fellahin, in their protest against the NWC, to be treated equally and justly in their 
demands for water access and infrastructural development. This imposing discourse 
of the settler colonial state severely restricted the farmers’ imaginary of land and 
water resources, producing an imaginary in limbo or competing imaginaries (Nesbitt 
and Weiner, 2001) in their aspirations for modernity vs. traditionalism, collective 
identity vs. individualism, and enemy vs. citizen. As Nabih Bashir (2006) contends, 
the confiscation of land entailed the uprooting of the Palestinians from their land 
while simultaneously also preventing them from integrating into the Jewish Israeli 
landscape, thereby creating a void existence characterised by political 
disenfranchisement and economic stagnation.  
The tactics employed by the farmers in their efforts to oppose state 
confiscation of their land for the NWC cannot be described as solely a counter-
hegemonic or resistance act, but rather as a hybrid of opposition and negotiation 
tactics, stemming from state-sanctioned apparatuses and mechanisms. The struggle 
therefore remained within the realm of legality and consent to state rule and 
governance, but at the same time sought recognition and the rectification of an 
injustice inflicted on them. The tactics for the opposition against the NWC in the early 
1960s, which were jointly led by a network of farmers, the communist political party, 
intellectuals and lawyers, articulated new political spaces of being for the farmers, 
raising concerns primarily focused on curbing land confiscation, inadequate 
compensation and lack of inclusion in state-led water projects. This marked the point 
where water struggles in al-Battuf became struggles for hybrid recognition, as 
farmers re-articulated and re-formulated their livelihood practices in opposition to 
state threats to their land-based existence, whilst at the same time anticipating 
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inclusion in state-led development as citizens of Israel. The presence-absence of the 
state therefore fuelled the struggle over land and water to be elevated to struggles 
over recognition and inclusion.  
Moreover, the presence-absence of water in Al-Battuf also contributed to water 
struggles acquiring political salience. Water became political when these livelihood 
practices were ruptured and dismantled, and when the struggles over land became 
struggles over existence and ethno-geographic survival. Curbing al gharaq and 
claiming rights to water, the drainage project has been framed as an infrastructure 
of promise. Alluding to recent work on ‘the promise of infrastructure’ (Anand et al., 
2018) discussed previously (in section 5.3), the promise of infrastructural 
development raised the hopes and aspirations of Al-Battuf farmers to be included in 
a development-driven agricultural sector. However, this unattained promise of 
infrastructure has caused community disempowerment and consolidated feelings of 
mistrust and despair. The reliance on the promise of equal citizenry and the ‘open 
access’ of communication with relevant ministries, government officials and others 
in power limited the farmers’ actions outside of the realm of the state, adapting to 
an imposed stagnation of development and change in the valley. The incomplete 
Zero Canal, on the other hand, also narrates a story of suffering and harm and the 
enactment of presence-absence. Its limbo status is highly reflective of the limbo state 
of the farmers themselves, stuck between maintaining a labour-intensive rain-fed 
agriculture with no economic value or marketing potential on the one hand, and on 
the other hand, their continued lobbying for a technological fix through the drainage 
project and associated agricultural modernisation, in the hope  that the state will 
incorporate them into what has so far been an exclusively Jewish domain. 
Sumud, therefore, had to be exercised through embracing a modernity narrative 
and a re-configuration of place-based discourses and norms about traditional 
methods of farming. The farmers in al-Battuf persisted by remaining on the land 
without piped water, practicing rainfed agriculture where farmers, both men and 
women, continued growing traditional crops for local use and marketing. The 
perseverance without rain-sourced water was utilised as a tactic for survival on the 
land and a belief in the responsibility to maintain presence and visibility before the 
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watchful eye of the state and its settler subjects on the hilltops surrounding the 
valley. On the other hand, the aspiration for drainage continued to be another tactic 
for their struggle for sumud on the land.  
The oGH 
After 1967, The Jawlanis in the occupied Golan Heights (oGH) faced similar 
uprooting strategies, experienced mainly as displacement from their local lived 
spaces and national homeland. Uprooting at both these scales resulted in conditions 
of alienation from physical sources of livelihood (land and water) and the means of 
territorial identification with a nation state. While there are similarities between the 
two cases in terms of confiscation of land, water and the neglect of the local 
populations remaining, the oGH has always been framed as a case of ‘subtle’ or 
civilian occupation (Cuinn, 2011; Weizman, 2007), a region under a ‘forgotten’ 
occupation (Al-Marsad 2018).  It has been claimed that the oGH is a case of a ‘refined’ 
form of settler colonialism, where (almost) complete ethnic cleansing occurred, 
producing an empty space for colonisation (Gordon and Ram, 2016).71F 71  The small 
population remaining after the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights (oGH) was not 
considered a demographic threat as were the Palestinians inside Israel or the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. While the oGH population experienced military rule and strict 
movement restrictions in the first years of occupation, Israel’s primary goal was the 
erasure of an indigenous ethnogeography and its replacement with an imposing and 
dominant Jewish presence.  
However, settler colonial expansion also required control of the remaining Arab 
villages in a less confrontational way that accommodated and coexisted with their 
‘othering’ in a Zionist landscape. The Israeli occupation was focused on the 
imposition of Israeli civil law, which was evident a few years after 1967 and 
comprehensively achieved with annexation in 1981. While Israel has extensively 
                                                          
71 While Gordon and Ram (2016) make convincing points regarding the characterisation of settler colonial rule 
in the oGH as refined, their lack of attention to the lived geographies and water struggles highlighted in this 
dissertation raises issues regarding the indigenous lived experience of settler colonialism, and its implications 
for re-configurations of the lived geographies. I question their claim that the ‘indigenous other’ has negligible 
agency in the oGH, despite the extensive ethnic cleansing and uprooting. 
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confiscated land and water in the oGH (as seen in chapter 6), on a local level the 
Jawlanis experienced a military rule which utilised settlements, water infrastructure, 
and other artefacts of the state to control and marginalise the Jawlani population, 
while laying its grip over natural resources (as in al-Battuf). The aspiration to root 
Jewish settlements in the oGH necessitated an extensive investment and the 
utilisation of all resources available for this endeavour. Therefore, the Israeli state 
invested in the production of waterscapes to ensure the viability of its Jewish 
settlements, denying the Jawlanis access to their local sources, like Birket Ram, while 
carrying out extensive groundwater drilling and constructing floodwater reservoirs 
for the benefit of settlers only. As Chapter 7 shows, specifically on issues of land and 
water, the Jawlanis managed to puncture the Israeli setter colonial imaginary of the 
oGH as an empty land open for settler re-arrangement and re-configuration, by 
resisting Israelisation efforts (during the annexation period of 1981-83), making 
claims for water infrastructure and allocations, and developing new agricultural land. 
Their counter-infrastructure produces hydrosocial territories of contestation that 
defy state-led processes of ordering through policies and infrastructures (Dajani and 
Mason, 2018). These forms of collective agency emphasised their ethno-geographic 
belonging to the land and transformed water struggles into struggles to assert their 
identity and belonging.  
In The oGH, where the seeds of a market-oriented agriculture were strong before 
the Israeli occupation in 1967, agriculture survived, temporarily thrived, and became 
a means of enacting political subjectivity through resistance in the following decades 
of military rule. By using water as a vessel for claiming rights from a settler colonial 
state, the Jawlanis established their presence through facts on the ground in a subtle, 
uneasy and contested co-existence with the settler colonial state, producing a system 
of parallel governance that affected other aspects of their social existence (Hommes 
et al., 2016; Wessels, 2015a). With imposed hydro-territorial constructs and the 
materialisation of state infrastructures, the Jawlanis contested those with counter-
imaginaries and counter-infrastructures which impacted the lived geography, 
transforming it into a landscape of rootedness, visible through the expansion of 
agricultural land, planted with water-intensive apple orchards (see Figure 8.2). 
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Figure 8.2 Transformation of farming landscapes around Birket Ram (Author's 
picture, August 2016) 
 
Clearly, the relationship between both indigenous groups and the Israeli 
settler colonial state was rife with struggles over the hegemonic ‘presence’ of the 
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state and its re-configurations of indigenous livelihoods and identities, and its 
simultaneous ‘absence’, turning both locations into sites of misrecognition and 
‘othering’. The state’s confinement of indigenous people to a small fraction of the 
land essentially produces and facilitates unequal geographical reorganisation (Harris, 
2004) and enacts policies of difference.  
However, the livelihood practices of farming communities and their land-
based identifications have been continuously changing and adapting to the 
conditions of their existence, shaped by both local ethno-geographic and settler 
colonial contexts, and not solely by an over imposing settler colonial rule. While al-
Battuf case exposes a more acquiescent adaptation and stagnation in their water 
struggle, as it relied on mechanisms of the state and recognition tactics, their 
resistance efforts should not be discarded. While water still remains absent from 
their farming, their perseverance without water is itself a proof of resistance despite 
all odds. Driving through the valley shows individual efforts to make do without 
water, or to bring water from elsewhere through trucks, rent the land to keep it 
productive or use it as a site of recreation for family and friends. Throughout those 
40,000 dunums, no sign of abandoning land is experienced, as farmers and their 
families ensure their continued presence and visibility on the land. Land becomes a 
responsibility and its protection an obligation as it represents the bloodline of an 
ethno-geographic identity and belonging against all odds. In the oGH, similar patterns 
of perseverance are witnessed in the lived geography. Apples remain a symbol of 
perseverance and of a distinct ethno-geographic community. Those two contexts 
produced a hybrid livelihood strategy that is empowered by a strong connection to 
the land and the need to defend it, while co-existing uneasily with the Israeli state 
(Mekorot) to ensure that defence continues through the provision of water quotas.  
These encounters, expressed and articulated in the lived geographies, 
produce spaces of existence that situate the settler colonial state as both present 
and absent. The state purposefully disregards indigenous spaces and subjects as 
marginal, and therefore absent from a state-led policy of land and agricultural 
development. However, at the same time the indigenous communities experience 
heightened state surveillance as a presence where it exercises its hegemonic control 
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over resources, bodies and identities “through a matter of controlling the resources 
(land, water and airspace) while neglecting the population” (Sa’Di, 2016; Zureik et al., 
2011, p.5).  This juxtaposition of a presence-absence of state hegemony therefore 
shapes complex lived geographies and hybrid existences for those living on the 
margins, where indigenous communities seek autonomous control over land and 
water, while also being entangled within an exclusionary state apparatus in order to 
claim rights (Table 8.1). While settler colonial studies have framed the state’s 
hegemony as overarching, fixed and dominant over spaces and bodies, the approach 
adopted here reveals moments of indigenous struggle which make permeable the 
state’s concretising dominance over space and place. It therefore challenges the 
notion of the impermeability of the settler colonial state and its infrastructures.  
 
Table 8.1 land and water policies and their manifestation in the lived geography of 
al-Battuf and the oGH 
 Manifestations of the settler colonial state in the 
lived geographies of farming communities 
 
 
Al-Battuf (1949-1976) 
 
Occupied Golan Heights 
(oGH) (1967-1982) 
 
Land policies  
• Land confiscation  
• Agricultural 
policies  
• Planning  
• Adapting to Israeli 
markets:  
Change crops (sugar 
beet, onion, 
tomatoes) with 
marketing secured 
• Adaptation to 
Israeli markets: 
 
Intensifying apple 
crop, with marketing 
secured 
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• Water - No water, 
all remains rain-
fed (ba’ali) 
 
• Reliance on 
livestock reduced 
significantly  
 
 
• Water – 
continuous 
reliance on 
limited sources 
(spring) and 
expansion of 
rainfed 
agriculture 
• Reliance on 
livestock reduced 
significantly 
 
 
Water policies and 
infrastructure 
 
Water Law of 1959 
The NWC  
 
• land confiscation  
• denial of access to 
farmland 
• imposed state 
presence (Mekorot) 
• denial of access to 
water from NWC  
• struggle for drinking 
and irrigation water  
Military order 1968 
Water Law of 1959 
Birket Ram, groundwater 
wells, dams 
 
• Restrictions on use of 
springs 
• Denial of water 
provision for 
irrigation of apple 
crops 
• Pumping of water to 
settlements 
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As settler colonial literature shows and confirms (Harris, 2004), the communities 
have engaged in a ‘constant micro-politics of resistance’ (p.179), ranging in these 
cases studies from refusal to cooperate with the state, catching rainwater through 
infrastructures outside of the state control, to refusing citizenship in a collective act 
of striking and confrontation. Al-Battuf also exemplifies how resistance was shaped 
by enacting sumud, staying on the land against all odds, and through demonstrations, 
strikes, letters and petitions. Performative participation and seeking recognition 
through engagement with the state is evidently present in both case studies, and the 
law of the coloniser became ‘a site of resistance’ (p.180), where the laws of the 
settler colonial state were bent to their advantage and where agency was able to 
take form and cause effects through livelihood practices, although this occurred ‘in 
and around the compartments created by colonialism’ (Ibid).  
Al-Battuf and the oGH struggles therefore co-evolved, materialised and were 
transformed in the face of a dominant Israeli local hydro-hegemony, consequently 
shaping larger struggles over indigenous identity and belonging through the claiming 
of rights to resources and infrastructural development. This resulted in similar tactics 
being employed by both communities, which were differentiated according to local 
contexts. The first similarity is the resort in both cases to legal means, challenging the 
law and capitalising on the Israeli legal system to enhance their standing. Secondly, 
the deployment of non-violent resistance is evident in both cases, as tactics relied 
more on communal actions including strikes, networking with local and regional 
political actors, and the establishment of collectives to counter the hegemonic 
actions of the state. Thirdly, both have empowered and strengthened their place-
based attachments and presence on the land in order to re-configure and root 
themselves through emphasising local crops, like the Apples in the Jawlan and rainfed 
local crops (wheat, okra, watermelon and others) in al-Battuf.  
 
 
329 
 
 
8.2 Presence-absence and the political subjectivity of farming  
  
During one of my visits to al-Battuf with Jamileh and Almaza, we spent some 
time in Sheikh Ghanayem’s tent, a famous gathering point for the handful of farmers 
in al-Battuf. Surrounded by tractors, forklifts and combine harvesters, we sit in this 
makeshift tent discussing how things had not changed in al-Battuf since the NWC 
canal. ‘Everything has remained the same here in this valley, no changes, it’s only this 
zero canal that was constructed in the 1990s and then we went back to normal’, 
Mahmoud Ghanayem recalls. During my conversations with Ghanayem and a group 
of other farmers about the realities of farming in al-Battuf, cars causing a storm of 
dust on the make-shift agricultural roads announce the arrival of visitors coming to 
buy freshly-ground wheat and harvested sesame from Ghanayem. The villagers of al-
Battuf region still rely on that handful of farmers to acquire fresh and seasonal 
produce and are willing to drive outside of their towns and villages (where Israeli 
produce is filling their markets) to come to al-Battuf to pick and buy okra, 
watermelon, wheat, sesame and other seasonal crops directly from the fields. Al-
battuf, as one woman who stopped by the tent to buy wheat said, is ‘our last 
connection to the bounties of our land’. She buys a few kilos of wheat flour and a few 
bags of sesame seeds (shown in Figure 8.3), as she tells me that she makes her own 
bread at home and will only prepare it with flour from al-Battuf. Other customers 
and farmers, who are from al-battuf region itself or from outside, come in to catch 
up on the latest news, discuss the situation of their crops and reminisce about the 
old days of glory in al-Battuf, when families used to fill the valley and spend the 
summer harvesting the land collectively. Today, what remains of farming are the 
individual efforts of a number of farmers who continue traditional farming with the 
inclusion of modern agricultural tools, machinery and pesticides. The realities of 
being in limbo, between traditional farming and its modernisation, shows an un-easy 
and incomplete, nevertheless relentless, effort to remain on the land with the 
utilisation of any tools available.  
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Figure 8.3 A common scene of a traditional harvest of sesame and wheat 
undertaken using machinery shows the quest for modernisation alongside the 
persistence of rain-fed baa’li crops (Author’s picture, Al-Battuf September 2017) 
 
While doing this fieldwork, whether in Al-Battuf or in the oGH, a common 
reply I received when I asked about agriculture or farming is that “farming is already 
extinct, vanished”, “what farming?”, “we are not farmers”. This has posed a difficult 
problem for me, as I assigned the role of farmers to those who cultivate the land, 
carry out livestock rearing and herding, and produce agricultural products as a result. 
Many, especially in Al-Battuf, corrected me and said we are fellahin, we were not 
given the opportunity to become farmers in the modern state definition. In the oGH, 
people I met would say they were ‘amateur farmers, doing it as a hobby to stay on 
the land’ since farming did not bring in the economic benefit to sustain livelihoods 
any more. However, the landscapes of both sites are still covered with signs of 
farming activity presence, and even livestock herding. This persistence in staying on 
the land, cultivating it with the available resources and means of production, is 
indicative of a larger role of farming in the lives of the inhabitants of Al-Battuf and 
the oGH. This thesis argues that, under these settler colonial contexts, farming has 
acquired political subjectivity. Such subjectivity accentuates the role of farming in 
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maintaining and solidifying norms, beliefs, and ideas about sumud and perseverance, 
which transcend its character as an economic activity for purposes of marketing and 
income generation.  
The communities of al-Battuf, through carrying out farming in their ‘hydrosocial 
territory’, have maintained their existence and presence on the land and made 
themselves, their livelihoods and their infrastructures (cowsheds, tents, machinery 
and water tankers) visible to the ‘watchtowers’ or the Mitzpem on the top of the hills 
in the settlements. As an act and a praxis of sumud, they continued to see their lives 
inevitably tied to the health and viability of the valley, its lands and its floodplains. 
Seeking visibility, they aimed to root themselves to the land by claiming rights to 
drainage infrastructure, which they see as critical to their continued presence on the 
land. Al-Battuf case study, like many others, contradicts and contests earlier work on 
the acquiescence of the Palestinian Arab to the Israeli state, which was how Lustick 
(1980) had described the relationship between the Palestinian citizens and the 
Jewish state. While economic and political detachment from the state was quite 
impossible, Palestinians inside Israel created spaces of protest and resistance by 
existing and staying visible in their confined geographic spaces. Writings on 
Palestinian resistance to the Israeli state’s deliberate alienation and exclusion 
policies have countered Lustick’s reductionist view of Palestinians inside Israel as 
acquiescent to their compromised and excluded state of citizenship (see Bashīr, 
2006; Sa’di, 2001; Sa’di, 1996; Sultany, 2003).  
In the oGH, apple growing acquired political subjectivity as a tool to root a 
disenfranchised and misrecognised community. Claims and realisations of water 
infrastructure strengthened the roots of the Jawlanis, asserted their claims to their 
land as productive and abundant spaces, and turned apple (in addition to cherry and 
peach) growing into an act of resistance in the face of land expropriation and water 
access denial. Tufah Al Jawlan (apples of the Golan) is symbolic not only of a crop 
celebrated for its quality, but of its embedded political salience as a source of 
rootedness during times of uprooting and dispossession. However, the oGH case 
exemplifies where resistance practices of water and farming take shape and succeed 
in making permeable the seemingly fixed and concretised arrangements of Israeli 
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infrastructure and water control. This happens, nonetheless, within the limitations 
allowed by the state and through engaging with the logic and technicality of state 
apparatus and personnel: the scaling up of Jawlani water infrastructure took place in 
negotiation with Mekorot. The Jawlani farmers enacted sumud by claiming rights to 
water and by expanding, maintaining and sustaining their apple orchards through 
extensive land reclamation, all organised and funded by local efforts. Their early 
efforts to reclaim water outside of the settler state control, through ponds and 
rainwater harvesting tanks, were inspired by opposition to imposed citizenship and 
annexation of their lands. To oppose this misrecognition, the Jawlanis enacted 
multiple scales of resistance and opposition to state imaginaries of control, including 
those around water. A reclamation of the land and water was constructed as an 
authoritative claim by the Jawlanis to oppose misrecognition and enact sumud 
through farming. Sumud in the perspective of the Jawlani therefore is embodied in 
the apple crop, which thereby acquires significance as a tool for surviving an 
uprooting of identity and ethno-geographic belonging.  
This re-configuration exposes a political subjectivity of farming practices, 
which become political acts and means of protest and resistance. To varying degrees 
and under differentiated regulatory processes, farming with and without water 
becomes a means of claiming rights to space, place and existence in both sites 
investigated. The act of persevering – sumud – utilised farming as a tool of 
rootedness in both Al-Battuf and the oGH. Farming the land at an economic loss, 
especially under conditions of resource dispossession, transcends the economic and 
market logic of a neoliberal settler state and continues to strengthen grounded 
ethno-geographic norms and beliefs about existing and being on (what remains of) 
the land. The weakening of agriculture as a reliable economic activity has not stopped 
farmers in both cases from exercising it as a right to exist and be visible in the 
landscape/waterscape. The sumud of farming itself, whether through claiming rights 
to water, or through continuing rainfed practices, indicates how struggles over water 
make visible Arab ethno-geographic communities’ existence on the land despite 
settler colonial efforts to diminish them. Due to its entanglement with symbolic 
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notions of identity and belonging, farming transcends economic, nationalistic and 
ideological drivers and is enacted to protect the land as a symbol. 
 
8.3 Presence-absence in lived geographies and the production of 
uneven waterscapes  
 
Driving through the agricultural lands of Al-Battuf or the basateen (orchards) 
of Al Jawlan reveals a space of contradictions, which inspires us to examine the 
implications of incomplete settler colonial rule on the re-configurations of landscapes 
and the production of uneven waterscapes. In al-Battuf, the NWC canal that spreads 
across the length of the valley is clearly marked and fenced as a secure state property. 
Against that imposition lies an expanse of Palestinian farming land, with its lack of 
fences blending the plots of hundreds of farmers into one large mosaic. Driving or 
walking through there invites feelings of autonomy and separation from the Israeli 
state, as it is not present there. The agricultural roads were developed collectively by 
the cooperatives, and the handful of farmers remaining on the land know the vast 
expanse by heart, identifying their plots out of a monotonous area of valley. No signs, 
electricity or any other state artefact is visible on this site, except for the NWC canal 
which became part of the landscape. In the oGH, the apple orchards take you on a 
scenic ride through asphalted roads (collectively constructed by the cooperatives). 
There, you drive through another monotonous landscape of small plots of apple 
orchards, with no signs to guide your way. Except for pipelines and pumping stations 
belonging to the cooperatives (and some Mekorot wells and pumping grounds 
fenced out) the state is once again not present. The landscape is distinctively familiar 
to local residents and common visitors who can easily find their way through the 
similar plots. Any attempts by non-locals to navigate these agricultural roads 
(especially at night, when they are pitch black due to a lack of electricity provision) 
will lead them to the securitised fence denoting ‘the border’ or to get stuck in loops 
until they find an exit towards the illuminated towns. The state is not visible here and 
does not assert its visibility into the space (for example, by installing electricity cables 
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and poles) and the space is fully recognisable and legible only to the local inhabitants. 
However, in both cases, they are heavily monitored by the state, either through army 
watchtowers (situated in Majdal Shams village overlooking the area) or through the 
Mitzpeem (Jewish look-out settlements) in the Galilee. However, the contrast 
experienced while being in the two sites affirms that these territories of control, as 
noted by James Scott (1987; 2009), are always incomplete and limited, providing 
opportunities for acts of resistance and mobilisation outside the gaze of the state. 
While the Israeli state still maintains spatial control with regional councils and 
technologies of rule, the intricate spatial practices of everyday life remain largely out 
of its reach and surveillance.  
Both cases present varying degrees of protest employed by communities to 
challenge exclusionary Israeli polices. What can be inferred from both cases is that 
the communities claimed rights through challenging the state’s ‘presence’ and 
‘absence’ in their lived geographies, capitalising on both conditions through 
deploying tactics which put them in direct confrontation with the state at times, 
while engaging in a negotiating position at others. Conditions and feelings of 
abandonment by the state towards the communities were expressed in both cases 
to describe unjust policy making towards them as rightful citizens (in the case of Al-
Battuf) and an occupied population demanding rights guaranteed to them by 
International Humanitarian Law (in the case of the oGH). Suffering for water, a 
sentiment expressed by interlocutors during field research, reflects a persistent 
process of discrimination employed by settler colonial policymaking, clearly visible 
and quantifiable in terms of water allocations between the indigenous Arabs and 
settler farmers. The examined local hydro-hegemony, reflected in those two 
waterscapes, is founded on policies of difference and exclusion, perpetuating and 
evoking experiences of struggle, suffering and eventually motivating collective action 
to claim rights.  
Even under heavily-constrained political circumstances, communal efforts 
create a significant role for agency in water and land use, manifested in material 
encounters and re-configured livelihood practices: for example, the material 
realisation of water ‘counter-infrastructure’ as seen in both the oGH and Al-Battuf 
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cases. All of these encounters take shape spatially and temporally as communities 
re-configure their lives and tactics in confrontations with the settler state, advancing 
rights-based claims to agricultural livelihoods, citizenship, water and infrastructure 
as the following sections show.  
As Olwan (2011) argues, this is farming in confrontation with uprooting in an 
effort to defend place-based affinities and beliefs. However, such acts of resistance, 
whether counter-hegemonic or oppositional, consequently reinforce feelings of 
alienation from their means of production and from their land-based sources of 
identity due to the dispossessing settler colonial structures and apparatuses. 
Whether water struggles succeed in maintaining an agricultural presence and 
existence on the land, as in the case of the Jawlan, or where the struggle has not 
materialised yet, as in the al-Battuf case, the two cases reflect and evoke real threats 
to their land-based identities. Settler colonial rule has created conditions of 
separation and alienation from material means of production and also made it 
extremely difficult for the indigenous Arab populations to maintain land-based 
identities and livelihoods. 
The politics of difference exercised through the materiality of settler-state 
hydropolitical territories becomes most visible in the state’s infrastructure, in its 
dominant and concretised presence in the landscape but the simultaneous absence 
of its recognition of the realities of thirsty agricultural communities and their right to 
water and infrastructure, which they have demanded clearly through different 
means and tactics, as seen in Chapter 5. Therefore, the presence-absence of water 
fuels and becomes an articulation of a ‘thirst’ for recognition, expressed by farmers 
through tactics of maintaining their farming (without water), while aspiring for 
infrastructure to quench the thirst of ‘misrecognition’ inflicted upon them. The 
‘Presence-absence’ of infrastructure in the lived geographies and waterscapes 
examined is also telling of a wider dilemma facing farming communities under settler 
colonial rule. The dominant and concretised presence of settler colonial water 
infrastructure, especially in the case of Israel as a regional and local hydro-hegemon, 
contrasts with the blocking and prohibition of local infrastructures. In the case of Al-
Battuf, the imposing presence of the NWC canal and its power to expand and control 
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the space is juxtaposed by an absence of infrastructure for the people making their 
livelihoods in the valley. The state’s monopoly over infrastructure, especially water, 
is reflected in the continuous stagnation and inaction in response to demands for 
local infrastructure by the farmers of Al-Battuf. The presence of the state water 
infrastructure, moreover, contrasts with the absence of Arab water infrastructure, as 
the communities investigated in Al-Battuf are prohibited from withdrawing water 
from the NWC. Their aspiration for infrastructure therefore reflects their aspirations 
not only for water itself as a resource, which is constructed in the farmers’ discourse 
as critical to their economic viability and physical presence on the land, but also in its 
symbolic value and meaning as an instrument of identity, sumud and belonging to 
the land.  The water itself, therefore, is not the end product of their struggle but a 
material and symbolic artefact, which will elevate their visible presence on the land.  
The fact that water claims came because of and in relation to the state’s 
encroachment on Al-Battuf is an example of claim-making borne out of the presence-
absence of the state. The struggle with and without, highlighting the main theme of 
al-Battuf experience, is a continuous struggle to challenge the state’s absence 
(enacted by refusing to meet farmers’ demands for infrastructure and access to 
water and leaving them with al-gharaq) but also to challenge the state’s presence (as 
an active agent of land confiscation and appropriation) and its encroaching 
campaigns to judaise the Galilee, which Al-Battuf and nearby lands and villages have 
challenged with large acts of resistance, like Land Day in 1976. The judaisation of the 
Galilee, and the transfer of land use jurisdiction to predominantly Jewish regional 
councils, like Misgav, has created pockets of resistance to the state’s dominant 
presence in the landscapes and spaces of Palestinian existence in the Galilee.  
In the oGH, the Israeli water infrastructure is also dominant in a concretised and 
centralised form, with water stored in artificial lakes, pumped from deep wells and 
diverted from Birket Ram. However, the presence of this state infrastructure reflects 
a situation similar to al-Battuf: a corresponding absence of infrastructure for the local 
indigenous population. The proliferation of settlement water infrastructures by Mey 
Golan and the hegemonic control of water resources by Mekorot in the oGH 
deliberately marginalised the Jawlani population and their agricultural livelihood 
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practices, except insofar as this met Israeli market needs before the build-up of 
settlement agriculture. The state-enforced absence of water infrastructure for the 
Jawlanis necessitated the construction of counter-infrastructures to oppose the 
imposed hydropolitical territories exclusively for settlements. However, Israel 
continued its systemic misrecognition of the Jawlanis and imposed its hegemony 
through the destruction, prohibition and control-through-metering of their local 
rainwater harvesting tanks in the late 1980s. The Jawlani aspiration for infrastructure 
was scaled up in the 1990s and re-configured to that of direct engagement and 
negotiation with the state apparatus, Mekorot, to claim larger water quotas and 
ensure the maintenance of their livelihood within their confined spaces of existence.  
 
8.4 Concluding remarks  
 
Al-Battuf and the oGH have been examined throughout this thesis as 
constructed sites of a settler-state hydro-imaginary. When infrastructures 
materialised those imaginaries, these sites were re-configured as sites of contested 
hydrosocial territories. The hydrosocial and hydropolitical story of infrastructure and 
agricultural development, told through experiences in the lived geography, enable 
sumud in a complex and heterogenous manner. This approach forces us to go beyond 
the deterministic and romantic view of local and indigenous imaginaries as stewards 
of nature, and to analyse communities’ actions within complex socioeconomic, 
political and social dynamics. The othering of both indigenous populations and the 
imposition of settler colonial temporalities excluded them from the state. The settler 
colonial depiction and construction of Arab agricultural practices as primitive and 
without any future, expressed and justified a settler colonial approach of Arab de-
development. A denial of agriculture and irrigation prospects in Al-Battuf’s case 
equates to a denial of contemporary belonging, and of their recognition as citizens 
of the state and as an ethno-geographic community with land-based roots and 
attachment to the land. The state enforced a temporal sanction on their 
environmental imaginaries and aspirations. While similar efforts were carried out by 
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the state in the oGH, a local imaginary succeeded in rooting itself back into its 
landscape and establishing facts on the ground.  
Exposing the spectrum of interactions (from resistance to co-existence) 
between settler-colonial state and local imaginaries around natural resource 
management, is telling of a more complex story of sumud through livelihood re-
configuration. Infrastructural dynamics represent one of those instances where, in 
both cases studied, engagement with the state takes the form of opposition, 
negotiation and ‘co-existence’. The landscapes examined in the empirical chapters 
have been subject to a hegemonic state imaginary – which viewed them as regions 
of geostrategic and hydrological significance, requiring centralised, concretised and 
coercive state infrastructural interventions. Walking through the landscapes and 
learning about local landscape imaginaries complicates and weakens the idea of the 
impermeability of state assemblages and mechanisms of rule. The landscapes reveal 
more complex temporal and spatial realities and meanings that the state’s 
hegemonic imaginary fails to capture. Relevant to understanding water struggles, the 
reduction of water to a transboundary resource confined to inter-state dynamics of 
conflict and cooperation overshadows these other realities, meanings and re-
configurations.  
The dynamic political struggles of both case studies show covert and overt 
forms of hegemonic control by the Israeli state and also differentiated tactics of local 
protest. Therefore, changes in protest are tactical, re-appropriating formal rules of 
water governance to serve counter-hegemonic purposes. This produced a dynamic 
livelihood strategy for both communities in a settler colonial context, opposing while 
adapting to settler colonial rules of resource extraction and control. The sumud 
concepts and beliefs of both communities forged strategies to seek recognition with 
rights-based claims to natural resources, merging to produce the lived geographies 
and land-based imaginaries of today. The oGH communities relied on water-intensive 
crops, particularly apples, which were constitutive of their indigenous imaginaries 
and livelihood aspirations, but inevitably were also partly aligned with a market-
oriented settler colonial regime. While both communities realise the politics of 
difference and discriminatory resource allocations exercised by the settler colonial 
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state do not align with their constructions of place-based identity and belonging, 
these communities necessarily negotiate and engage with the state to claim rights to 
recognition and resources. Al-Battuf, also suffering exclusion from a centralised 
infrastructure network (the NWC) chose to embrace imaginaries of drainage and the 
elimination of gharaq, as a manifestation of their ‘development’ ambitions and 
efforts to participate as equal citizens alongside Jewish farmers. Under settler-
colonial rule, interaction of the Palestinian community with the state is never 
simplistic or straightforward, resulting in a complex dynamic of livelihoods and 
landscape.  
The exclusion of Arab lands and communities from the state was intended to 
maintain an othering of Palestinian and Syrian existence and the lived spaces they 
inhabit. However, with that exclusion, it has also provoked struggles to maintain 
rootedness to land through different means which capitalised on the state’s 
presence-absence. The presence of the state created forms of mobilisation that 
spoke the language of the state (Scott, 1998), which is evident in the formation of 
cooperatives to claim rights and make demands to be included in agricultural 
development. It also allowed for engagement with, and challenging of, the state in 
its own legislative and regulating bodies, like courts, to assert claims through law—
that is, strategies attempting dialogue with the state, seeking visibility and 
recognition. The practical (day-to-day) absence of the state in Al-Battuf and the oGH, 
moreover, fostered the continuation of agricultural practices in defiance of settler 
state logic, allowing a continuous presence on the land albeit under difficult 
economic conditions. The communities living under settler colonial conditions try to 
live with an inherently exclusionary form of governance and ordering of their lives 
while rejecting it at the same time. The water struggles, livelihood tactics and 
recognition demands provide the farmers with a platform to claim rights to resources 
and rectify injustices inflicted on their lived geographies and farming practices, 
continuously re-defining and re-articulating what it means to be Palestinian and 
Syrian under Israeli hegemonic rule.  
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined water struggles in two specific locations which are 
central to the construction of the political geography of the Jordan River Basin (JRB), 
both constituting important sites of the Israeli waterscape – Sahl al-Battuf in the 
Galilee and the occupied Golan Heights (oGH). The main research questions of the 
thesis explored how settler colonial land and water policies manifest themselves in 
the lives of farming communities (Research Question 1) and the acts of protest and 
resistance enacted by those communities in light of such policies and their political 
effect (Research Question 2). Informed by these research questions, the key 
proposition assessed is that, in the settler colonial contexts studied, the farming of 
Arab communities acquires similar forms of political subjectivity. Political subjectivity 
refers to the constitution of farmers as subjects with a communal political identity 
and shared political goals, notably relating to land and water resources. Following 
the empirical investigation of Research Questions 1 and 2 for al-Battuf (Chapters 4 
and 5) and the oGH (Chapters 6 and 7), the comparative analysis in Chapter 8 
confirmed this proposition, highlighting how farming practices in both locations have 
been politically enacted as a form of sumud on the land, with similar strategies of 
place-based identity-formation and similar claims to land and water resources.  It 
showed how water, simultaneously experienced under settler colonial conditions as 
a presence and absence, was framed as an object through which community 
struggles are shaped. The demand for water infrastructure has been explored as a 
manifestation of those struggles and their enactment by the community as tools of 
resistance and collective expressions of ethno-geographic identity.   
I have engaged with three main critical theoretical concepts: political 
ecologies of water, lived geographies of ethno-geographic communities and settler 
colonial studies. Adopting such a framing allowed the tracing of Israeli (settler 
colonial) water infrastructure as it has re-configured lived geographies of the 
indigenous Arab communities over decades. Those lived geographies are fraught 
with acts of contestation, opposition and negotiation with the state to reclaim rights 
to resourcehood and, through these resource claims, rights to their ethno-
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geographic identities. These communities have undergone military and civilian forms 
of governing, under which their farming practices and water claims have acquired 
political subjectivity.  
To conclude, I will summarise the findings of this thesis. In the second section, 
I present the major contributions of this research to settler colonial studies and 
critical (water) political ecology. The third and final section presents the potential of 
this research for future investigations of water in the Jordan River Basin and beyond.  
 
9.1 Findings of the thesis 
 
This thesis examines contemporary cases of water struggles by focusing on their 
historical construction as uneven waterscapes. Demonstrating how the Israeli settler 
colonial project is not confined to a historical moment, I explored how the 
construction of state infrastructure, like the NWC in 1961 or the control of the upper 
tributaries of the Jordan after the 1967 occupation of the Golan Heights, is part of an 
ongoing structural process of resource control and dispossession. I emphasized that, 
typical of settler colonial projects, infrastructures are built in the state’s image, 
mirroring its coercive, exclusionary approach to displace, overshadow and make 
invisible indigenous socio-natures, infrastructures and hence identities. However, I 
also exposed the settler colonial project to be incomplete, and therefore provide a 
theoretical and a practical platform to examine not only dispossession but resistance 
through land-based farming practices. Uneven waterscapes, such as those examined 
in this thesis, are a manifestation of an un-easy co-existence between both settler 
colonial and indigenous re-configurations in the landscape which are fraught with 
opposition, resistance and cooperation (Simpson and Bagelman, 2018).  As Ayyash 
(2018) argues in the case of Palestine, fellahin struggles are the impetus of decolonial 
resistance. With the centrality of land and farming in their resistance, “displacement 
of people from the land” is seen “as the displacement of life itself” (p.24). 
Through exposing uneven waterscapes, this thesis has showed how water 
struggles shape and Arab communities’ lived geographies. The presence of the state 
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materialises in the imposition of its land and water policies which dominate the 
everyday livelihood practices and geographies of colonised communities, forcing 
them to interact as citizen-subjects to claim rights and receive benefits. The absence 
is manifested thought the state’s abandonment, neglect and disregard of the 
remaining geographies of existence of those communities and their imaginaries, 
which ultimately produces a platform for counter-state resistance practices, 
infrastructures and imaginaries.   
Under such conditions, the resistance acts of the Arab communities are 
ongoing and evolving, asserting claims for recognition and visibility on what remains 
of their land. However, what this thesis also showed is that resistance takes shape 
and is produced under the structures of settler colonial rule (Wolfe, 1999). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that I identified tensions and contradictions in the resistance and 
sumud strategies in Al-Battuf and the oGH: uneasy cooperation with the settler 
colonial state is often necessary to achieve concrete outcomes in struggles for 
greater control over, and access to, land and water. Infrastructures of resistance, as 
discussed in Chapters 1, 7 and 8, are co-produced with infrastructures of settler 
colonial control, increasing the complexity and dilemma of seeking justice through 
the tools of the coloniser. However, such struggles have re-configured a land-based 
identification and attachment and solidified the ethno-geographic sentiments of 
farming communities. In the oGH and al-Battuf, protecting the land and claiming 
rights to water become as integral and invaluable as their rights to other basic 
services which they are entitled to as settler colonial citizens/residents.  
These ethno-geographic communities are facing an imminent threat as the 
state’s technological apparatus of resource dispossession and control is relentless in 
encroaching on their physical geographies of existence and even their geographical 
imaginaries. The journey of the consolidation of an Israeli (Zionist) waterscape and 
infrastructure is widely told as a story of the triumph of modernity and technology 
over nature with its epitome being ‘to make the desert bloom’ with drip irrigation, 
wastewater treatment and reuse, desalination and other technological fixes. 
However, it has also been shown to re-produce a deteriorating environmental 
situation inside Israel and its occupied territories and has intensified the freshwater 
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deficit in the country. This thesis argues that this hydraulic mission is defined by the 
denial of Arab (Palestinian and Syrian) hydro-imaginaries, and the suppression or 
‘othering’ of the socionatures of these indigenous populations. As Veracini (2015, 
p.9) claims, the ‘settler colonial present is also an indigenous one’, urging us to 
conduct scholarly work which examines the experiences, struggles and resistance of 
the indigenous as extensively as we do for settler colonial rule.  
The incompleteness of the settler colonial project is largely a result of 
indigenous resistance (Qumsiyeh, 2011; Svirsky, 2017). In this thesis, and along the 
same argument aforementioned, I argue that the settler colonial water assemblage 
is not as completely impermeable as the settler colonial state constructs and 
envisions it. Rather, in the face of contesting hydro imaginaries and practices, 
indigenous resistance serves to make it permeable, porous and punctured by 
alternative modes of claim-making (Meehan, 2014). As seen in the empirical 
chapters, the Al-Battuf case of unrealised infrastructure is nevertheless a resistance 
tool which aims to puncture and perforate Israeli hegemony over water management 
and use, merely through staying on the land even without the planned water 
infrastructures. In the oGH, the rainwater harvesting tanks also succeeded in 
capturing rainwater claimed to be under the sole ownership of the state, and re-
configured the engagement between the settler state and the indigenous community 
to that of water management.  
 
9.2 Main contributions   
 
Engaging with critical water political ecologies has enriched this thesis 
through three interactions. First, the historical study of water in the two study 
locations revealed how it became an object of governance within broader settler 
colonial processes of environmental transformation in regional landscapes and 
waterscapes. Second, looking at the historical construction of water-as-resource 
through a power-sensitive political ecology lens allowed me to analyse water in its 
multiplicity of meanings and processes and examine the production of uneven 
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waterscapes and its implication on the lived geographies of farming communities 
who had worked the land with and without water availability (for agriculture). Third, 
examining water infrastructures of control and resistance under settler colonial rule 
allowed me to combine and draw upon critical scholarship (in political ecology, 
geography and settler colonial studies) to expose the imposition of settler colonial 
waterscapes on indigenous communities’ geographies and realities. The seemingly 
impermeable water infrastructures of the Israeli state have been, and continue to be, 
sites of contestation and claim making through different tactics of negotiation and 
opposition by indigenous Arab populations. This is how infrastructure as an 
ethnographic site of exploration becomes clearly relevant in the case of settler 
colonial regimes. 
Examining lived geographies also exposes the quotidian acts of sumud and 
perseverance around water, re-configuring livelihood practices and instilling political 
subjectivity in everyday farming activities. Agricultural and farming livelihoods in this 
context of resource control and exclusion were shown to acquire political 
subjectivity, where farmers’ collective assertion of resource rights played a pivotal 
role in strengthening communities’ belonging and rootedness to the land. 
Rootedness, the act of staying on the land, is demonstrated through the continuous 
cultivation of the remaining land in both Al-Battuf and the oGH and the objective of 
remaining visible as an ethno-geographic community by planting certain crops, and 
ensuring land is not abandoned or left barren. To realise this, water becomes a 
political object to claim rights to remain visible and rooted. Just as certain crops, like 
apples in Majdal Shams, require water to survive and thrive, so to in al-Battuf water 
serves as a conduit for aspirations for more reliable and marketable crops. Without 
state support for a necessary drainage canal, farmers resorted to ba’ali rain-fed 
agriculture as an adaptation to state-enforced water scarcity, also re-configuring 
local knowledge and traditional farming methods with modern tools (such as 
agricultural vehicles and pesticides).   
In politicising everyday life and practices and in conceptualising political 
resistance beyond the western definitions of it, a de-colonial conceptual space is 
opened to understand sumud and everyday resistance under settler colonialism, 
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following work on the centrality of the olive tree in the Palestinian context 
(Braverman, 2009; Reger, 2017; Simaan, 2017). This study aims to provide new 
insights into farming and water politics that pay attention to the multiplicity of water 
meanings and ontologies, as constructed in farming contexts. In this regard, both the 
dominant (settler colonial) modern water ontology and other indigenous local 
ontologies embodied in place-based relations and practices are scrutinised to assess 
their influence on water governance, theory, and practice (Yates et al., 2017).  The 
original findings provided in this dissertation on the lived geographies of indigenous 
communities under settler colonial rule and their interaction with the settler colonial 
state and its infrastructures provide a platform for theorising infrastructure and 
water as objects of political claim-making and recognition. While most settler 
colonialism literature is preoccupied (and rightly so) with land and the technological 
objects of its control, re-focusing attention on water infrastructures within settler 
colonial rule allows us to explore infrastructure not as a fixed, banal and apolitical 
object but a theoretically rich object of exclusion and emancipation. The originality 
of this research and analysis will hopefully enable decolonised and critical knowledge 
production on water politics and settler colonial infrastructure in Palestine and 
beyond.   
In their work Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine, Salamanca and 
co-authors put forward a cohesive framework for a liberation-focused research 
agenda, which aims to “analyse Zionism’s structural continuities and the ideology 
that informs Israeli policies and practices […] towards Palestinians everywhere” 
(2012, p.2). Rejecting framing Palestine as an exception, or confining Palestinian 
experiences according to constructed geographical divides, this research urges us to 
take a structural approach which attends to a historical context and avoids 
distinguishing between the military occupation (of the oGH and the West Bank and 
Gaza) and the larger structures of Israeli settler colonialism (in the Galilee, inside 
Israel and in the diaspora). In this thesis, I focused on overcoming those symbolic and 
material borders upon which studies of Palestinians have focused. For example, 
studies of water and farming in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, detachment from 
similar experiences of farmers in the Galilee or the Triangle, have produced truncated 
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histories and narratives, conforming to settler colonial geographical fragmentation 
and disparity. With the focus on the oGH, the thesis also aimed to unify 
understanding of the struggles of Palestinians and Syrians living under Israeli settler 
colonial rule by focusing on a ‘second stage of colonisation’ after the 1967 
occupation. Studying water, therefore, transcends these imposed distinctions and 
categories and allows us, for example, to understand water struggles faced today by 
marginalised Palestinian communities in Area C (as mentioned in the Introduction of 
this thesis) as part of wider struggles against a structural settler colonial water 
hegemony which aims to eliminate indigenous culture, existence and imaginaries. In 
conclusion, this research contributes to scholarly work that aims to use settler 
colonialism as a tool to de-colonise knowledge production rather than describe 
conditions under which elimination of the indigenous takes place. In this thesis, I 
relate this specifically to settler-colonial policies and practices undertaken by Israel 
as the hydro-hegemonic power.  
 
The everyday politics of water remain missing in the plethora of scholarly 
literature on the water politics in the JRB. This dissertation aimed to uncover 
different relations, actors and actions taking place in the everyday lives of 
communities who identify as farming communities but with heavily restricted access 
to land and water. Their small acts to maintain presence on the land puts them in 
direct confrontation with an overly centralised and concretised Israeli waterscape. 
However, these actors opposed challenged and negotiated claims to remain rooted 
and visible on their remaining land. More than a reliable livelihood activity, farming 
acquired political subjectivity and re-configured ethno-geographic communities’ 
meanings and value of the land.  
The politics of water therefore, are not only articulated on the international 
level as the historical construction of the JRB has shown, or in Israel’s historical 
control over the river, but can be observed and analysed at local levels, 
understanding how communities survive, adapt and challenge imposed water 
scarcity narratives on them. They directly experience the politics of difference and 
inequality exercised by the state and demand equality and recognition. Realising the 
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limitations imposed on their spaces of existence, characterised as enclosures and 
unruly spaces of othering, Palestinian and Syrian farmers adopt tools of resistance to 
reclaim their uprooted identity and belonging to the land through enacting farming 
as sumud: by planting another apple tree despite its economic irrationality, or 
building a rainwater harvesting tank to capture rainwater before it seeps into settler 
waterscapes, or in negotiating with the state water quotas (however unequal and 
insufficient). In al-Battuf, Palestinian citizens of Israel have witnessed an uprooting 
of their society and their transformation into minority citizens, severing their ties to 
a national identity and connection to the land. Farming was enacted there by 
remaining active in cultivating the land with the little means possible; rain-fed 
agriculture, ad hoc water tankers and pipes to bring enough for saplings of different 
crops to survive, and machinery, pesticides and fertilisers compensate for decades of 
stalled drainage promises and the disregard by the Israeli state of Arab agricultural 
activities. Experiencing the everyday dynamics of farming under precarious settler 
colonial conditions highlights how politics are enacted through land and water policy 
making, re-configuring farming as a site of identity rooting and belonging.  
 
9.3 Potential for future research  
 
The thesis alluded in the introduction to a critique of transboundary water 
regimes in the JRB, which has largely neglected the transformations that 
communities faced due to nation-state policymaking and wider hegemonic power 
asymmetries. The Israeli water regime was constructed during times of heightened 
political instability under which the newly-established riparian state, with U.S. 
support, strongly exerted territorial sovereignty over water through economic and 
agricultural development imperatives. 
The communities studied for this dissertation have tended not to be 
considered by international and transboundary literature as requiring investigation, 
as their water issues are considered to be at a sub-national level. The Jawlanis in the 
oGH have been under a de-facto Israeli annexation (although condemned by the 
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International community, it has not been reversed since 1981). Al-Battuf 
communities represent Palestinian citizens of Israel, who are not considered by the 
international community to be under occupation, in contrast to the Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza. The latter have received more attention in the literature on 
water injustice and dispossession. However, the former groups are even more 
marginalised in transboundary and international river basin deliberations and 
arrangements, as they are relegated to intrastate water issues (recognising state 
sovereignty over domestic water) which further disenfranchise them and normalise 
their unjust water realities. 
The domination of modern water ontologies by the riparian state, framed by 
national security and other state interests, often fails to take in to account and 
represent the realities of minority communities who depend on water for livelihood 
and place-based identification. Moreover, water use practices such as irrigation, 
which is instrumental in TWM arrangements in general and constructions of the JRB 
in particular, become sites of “the construction of gendered power and hegemonic 
masculinities” (Zwarteveen, 2017, p.40) through the way legitimacy is given to actors 
such as engineers to construct our understanding of how water should be harnessed 
most efficiently and effectively. Irrigation is seen as “being modern in a backward 
rural world” (Molle et al., 2009, p.330), transforming the backward practices of 
indigenous and native populations. These hegemonic representations and practices 
silence feminist and gendered perspectives on water multiplicity (Earle and Bazilli, 
2013). Dismissal of traditional practices of water management has defined the 
approach of the colonial and postcolonial experts who appointed themselves as 
producers of knowledge and policy on water management. Ultimately, colonial 
discourses and their legacies have underpinned the merging of engineering science 
and the strong rule of the state with a technocratic vision of harnessing and 
controlling nature, including in the context of the Jordan River Basin.  
 
The cases examined in this thesis support the argument that the stories, 
histories and realities of water are only partially told with the dominant TWM lens 
and requiring us to delve in, scale down and unearth a story of water users struggling 
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and experiencing water ebbs and flows. This thesis has followed how the presence 
and absence of water made a difference to the lived geographies of communities, re-
configuring their socionatural relations and involving them in contestations and 
struggles around water. Many more communities share such struggles within and 
outside the JRB: displaced communities in Area C, especially in the Jordan valley, and 
the Bedouins of the Naqab, where water made the desert bloom, but only produced 
such waterscapes for Jewish settlements. Other locations outside of the Israeli settler 
state also offer potential for examining water –based agrarian political struggles in 
the region, like the Deraa’ farmers in Syria, who were also placed as important actors 
in a state-wide agricultural revolution (de Châtel, 2007), or the Palestinian refugees 
in Jordan for whom basin-wide arrangements were supposedly made in the 1950s, 
and who today face (alongside Egyptian and Pakistani agricultural workers) the 
changing waterscapes of the lower Jordan River (Van Aken et al., 2009). What 
distinguishes the case studies I’ve selected for this thesis is the settler colonial lens, 
predicated on notions of exclusion, elimination and uprooting. While highly 
significant to land struggles, settler colonial rule also uproots through control of 
water, as both land and water are interlinked and intertwined as critical means of 
production and livelihoods. 
These contested encounters over water at a local scale, therefore, reflect 
critical scholarly work on transboundary state-level dynamics by Zeitoun, Mirumachi 
and Casaco amongst others, who provide theoretical grounds for examining the co-
existence of conflict and cooperation, hegemony and counter-hegemony, contest 
and consent (Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010; Mirumachi and Van Wyk, 2010; Mirumachi, 
2015; Zeitoun et al., 2017; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). The local scale water struggles 
examined in this thesis could usefully provide an impetus for applying analytical 
frameworks, such as Mirumachi’s TWINS Analysis (2015), to a sub-national or intra-
state level to expose how power asymmetries reflect on community level dynamics 
of contestation, resistance and co-existence with state water policies and 
infrastructures.  
 Another potential avenue to widen research on water is to heed Earle and 
Bazilli’s call for a gendered approach to the study of transboundary rivers (2013). This 
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research has revealed how women’s role has for decades been overshadowed by a 
water-as-resource framing. Even when fieldwork was conducted (see Chapter 3 for 
reflections) for this research, women’s role around irrigated agriculture was sidelined 
by male interviewees. In Al-Battuf women were present, visible and assertive in 
making their mark and continuing traditional farming methods. However, the 
planned drainage project was seen by community representatives as an issue outside 
their concern, relegated to male-led negotiations with the state. The role of women 
in maintaining a presence on the land during critical times of land abandonment (e.g. 
the 1970s), should also be thoroughly studied and acknowledged as they continue to 
this day to maintain and revive traditional farming activities in the valley, alongside 
male-framers. This also allows for cross-examination with the experience of women 
farmers in the West Bank, who also are leading traditional farming efforts (Tesdell 
and Issa, 2017). In the oGH, women are less present in the apple growing activities, 
but have been assigned roles in its other marketing and processing stages, where 
women workers mostly are hired in packaging houses there, altering their role from 
the field to the factory with implications that are worth investigating in further 
research.  
In conclusion, the contribution this thesis aims to provide is to enrich 
interdisciplinary discussions and scholarly conversations between critical political 
ecology, settler colonial studies and geography to take water out of its confined 
construction as a resource in TWM literature and governance work in the JRB region. 
This has restricted understanding of water relationships in the context of Israeli 
hydro-hegemony over the Jordan River, as water struggles are not only between 
riparians and not only about resource distribution. Water scholarship requires 
examining water from below, its meanings, values and ethno-geographic role and 
how relevant such an understanding is to track hydropolitical collisions and territorial 
struggles as struggles also for meaning and recognition.  
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